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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an economic and policy study of supply,
demand, and transportation variables that are important to the development
of the international steam coal market. The study analyzes in detail
specific economic and policy components of this developing market and,
by integrating the analyses of these component parts, explains the
importance of supply, demand, and transportation variables, and inter-
temporal changes in these variables, to the development of international
steam coal trade. Given this close correspondence between energy markets
and government policies, this analysis is especially useful for
determining effective government policies for international steam coal
market developments.
The dissertation is divided into two main parts. Part A is
a detailed analysis of coal transportation economics and regulation,
both inland and ocean-borne. The analysis contributes as much to the
understanding of domestic coal markets as to the understanding of the
international steam coal market. The first three chapters analyze the
economics of railroad transportation of coal in the United States.
Particular attention is directed to the estimation of long-run marginal
costs of railroad transportation of coal, the existence of monopoly rents
on coal shipments, and the effect -of Interstate Commerce Commission
regulations on railroad tariffs. Chapter IV analyzes the economics of
two alternative modes: barges and trucks. Chapter IV also analyzes the
economics of potential U.S. steam coal export routes. Chapter V considers
three major factors that could affect the economics of U.S. coal
transportation in the long-run: coal-slurry pipelines, railroad
deregulation, and long-run transportation capacity expansion.
Chapter VI analyzes coal transportation in Canada, Australia,
South Africa, and, to a lesser extent, in Western Europe and Japan. The
chapter attempts to estimate costs and to determine the difference
3between marginal costs and coal tariffs as a function of institutional
structures and coal market economics. The approach is similar to that
for the U.S. chapters, but the analysis is more limited due to data
non-availability. Chapter VII analyzes the economics of ocean transporta-
tion of coal.
Part B focuses more specifically on the international steam coal
market. Chapter I analyzes coal supply in Australia, Canada, South
Africa, and the United States. The chapter estimates current coal prices
at the mine, as well as prospective changes in these prices. Chapter II
integrates the supply and transportation analyses to determine cost-
minimizing steam coal trade patterns based on existing economics and
government policies. In addition, the effects of previously discussed
non-incremental shifts in transportation and supply variables on future
trade patterns are analyzed.
Chapters III through V analyze steam coal demand in Western
Europe and Japan to the year 2000. The existing structure of steam coal
demand is described in Chapter III. Recent estimates of steam coal demand
are criticized in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, we develop additional
estimates of steam coal demand for two major potential importers, France
and Japan.
The conclusions summarize the results of the analysis and further
discuss critical transportation, supply, and demand variables underlying
the future development of international steam coal trade. Particular
attention is paid to the prospects for U.S. steam coal exports. In
conjunction with this, the concluding remarks comment on possible future
government involvement in the development of steam coal trade.
Thesis Supervisor: M.A. Adelman
T-'tle: Professor of Economics
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CIF Cost including freight and insurance
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, as oil prices have rapidly increased and
nuclear power development has been stalled by public concern with health
and safety, the probability of a major transition from oil to coal-fired
power generation has increased substantially. In certain nations with
large technically and economically recoverable coal reserves, for example
the United States, the transition is far along. New power plants are
almost exclusively coal-fired, and conversions of existing oil-fired
plants to coal are ubiquitous. In other cases, for example Western
Europe and Japan, the transition is in the early stages, and the extent
of the transition is less certain. Nevertheless, these countries are
generally committed to a movement away from OPEC oil supplies, and
towards nuclear- or coal-fired power. If technological and political
uncertainties continue to pervade nuclear power generation, coal will
continue to be a likely alternative. Furthermore, since Japan and most
Western European nations have negligible domestic coal reserves, and
since in the Western European nations that have substantial coal reserves
(for example, the United Kingdom and West Germany) domestic coal prices
are dramatically higher than imported coal prices, an increase in demand
will yield a substantial increase in international steam coal trade.
The development of the international steam coal market will, in
significant part, be determined by government. Existing government
policies and regulations in the transportation, coal supply, and electric
18
utility sectors will affect the developing coal markets, and new policies
may evolve as the importance of coal markets increases. In both cases, a
thorough understanding of the economic and policy variables affecting the
development of the international steam coal market is essential for
effective government planning.
This dissertation attempts to provide this understanding. It is an
economic and policy study of supply, demand, and transportation issues
that are important to the development of international steam coal trade.
The study is limited in scope to four potential net exporting
countries--the United States, Canada, Australia, and South Africa--and to
two potential importing areas--Western Europe and Japan. These countries
will probably account for most steam coal exports and imports into the
21st century. The purpose is not to forecast the future prices and
quantities traded in international steam coal markets, but rather to
analyze in detail specific economic and policy conponents of this
developing market, and by integrating the analyses of these component
parts, to explain the importance of supply, demand, and transportation
variables, and intertemporal changes in these variables, to the
development of international steam coal trade. The focus is not on the
specific future role of a given country in the international steam coal
market, but rather on the variables, and on the interrelationships
between the variables, that will determine this role. For example, we
are not as concerned with the magnitude and price of Australian steam
coal exports o Japan in the year 2000 as we are with the systematic
explanation of why Australian coal might cost less than United States or
19
Canadian coal: because of locational, geological, regulatory, or some
other factors. And, just as important, what factors might change in the
long run, how might governments affect these changes, and what will be
the consequent effect on the patterns of international steam coal trade.
The dissertation is separated into two main parts. Part A is a
detailed analysis of coal transportation economics and regulation, both
inland and ocean-borne. Coal transportation is very expensive relative
to coal prices, in fact, it is often the determining influence on
patte'rns of coal trade. It also accounts for the fundamental difference
between domestic and international markets. The analysis of coal
transportation is critical to understanding the development of both
domestic and international coal markets.
Part A is organized as follows. The first three chapters analyze
the economics of coal transportation by railroad in the United States.
Railroads currently carry the vast majority of coal shipments, and they
will probably maintain this role in the future. The objectives are:
1) to determine the long-run marginal costs of railroad transportation;
2) to determine the difference between existing railroad tariffs and
long-run marginal costs; and 3) to explain this difference as a function
of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations and coal market
economics. The effect of ICC regulations on railroad transportation of
coal has been the subject of extensive attention in the past few years.
The analysis of these effects is critical to understanding both domestic
and international coal markets, and it serves as an interesting case
study in both transportation economics and government regulation. Note
20
that these sections are highly specific. The reader primarily interested
in international steam coal markets may choose to bypass large segments
of the material.
Chapter IV analyzes coal transportation economics via two
alternative modes, barge and truck. Direct regulations are not important
to the economics of these modes, but they are indirectly important to
these modes as potential competitors with the railroads. In Chapter IV
we also assemble the United States inland transportation cost estimates,
and analyze the economics of steam coal export routes. Chapter V
considers three interdependent factors that could affect U.S. steam coal
transportation patterns in the future: 1) the commercialization of
coal-slurry pipelines; 2) the deregulation of U.S. railroads; and 3) the
long-run ability of the railroads to finance capacity expansion.
Government policy is critical to all three factors, and in turn to the
development of steam coal markets.
Having analyzed coal transportation practices and problems in the
United States, Chapter VI analyzes coal transportation in Australia,
Canada, South Africa, and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe. The
objective is similar to that of the United States sections: to determine
the long-run marginal cost of coal transportation, and to explain the
difference between coal tariffs and long-run marginal costs as a function
of institutional structures and coal market economics. However, the
approach is constrained by data limitations, and subjects that were
analyzed rigorously for the United States can only be treated generally
for these other countries. Nonetheless, the section develops estimates
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of coal transportation rates for comparison with United States coal
rates, approximates where possible the relationship of rates to costs,
and considers the institutions that affect rate-cost relationships.
In Chapter VII we analyze ocean transportation. In this case,
regulation is of minor importance. The primary purpose is to develop
estimates of ocean transportation costs for major potential steam coal
trade routes. The effects of port ship-size constraints, changes in ship
technologies, and return cargo possibilities on steam coal trade patterns
are assessed.
Part B focuses more specifically on the international steam coal
market. Chapter I analyzes coal supply in Australia, Canada, the United
States, and Australia. The emphasis is on current coal prices and on
prospective changes in these prices as coal output cumulates and markets
and government policies develop. Chapter II integrates supply price
information with the transportation cost information developed in part A
to determine cost-minimizing trade patterns on the basis of existing
economics and government policy. The relative importance of critical
supply and transportation variables to the patterns of international
steam coal trade will be assessed. In addition, the effect of previously
discussed non-incremental structural shifts in transportation and supply
variables on future trade patterns is appraised.
Chapters III through V analyze steam coal demand to the year 2000.
The existing structure of steam coal demand is described in Chapter III.
Recent estimates of steam coal demand are criticized in Chapter IV, and,
based both on the delivered price estimates developed in Chapter II and
22
on a detailed analysis of the structure of steam coal demand, additional
estimates of coal demand for electricity generation in two major
potential importing countries, Japan and France, are developed in Chapter
V. Finally, the last chapter summarizes the results of the previous
sections and further discusses the critical transportation, supply, and
demand factors underlying the future development of the international
steam coal market. In conjunction with this, we will discuss possible
future government participation in the development of the international
steam coal market.
23
PART A
AN ANALYSIS OF COAL TRANSPORTATION:
ECONOMICS AND REGULATION
24
INTRODUCTION
Transportation costs for coal are as much as ten times higher per
Btu/mile than transportation costs for competing fuels. Coal-supply
districts are often remote from major port facilities. Capital
requirements for the expansion of the coal transportation infrastructure
are enormous. In addition to the cost burden, transportation regulation
has distorted the efficient provision of inland coal transportation
services. Combined, these factors are an overwhelming handicap to the
development of coal markets in general, and international coal trade in
particular.
However, transportation cost is only one of the many variables in
the coal demand function. Therefore, these negative factors do not
preclude international steam coal trade. Rather, the" indicate that
transportation costs will be a critical factor in determining the
patterns of international steam coal trade.
The first part of this dissertation is a detailed analysis of coal
transportation, both inland and ocean-borne. The primary purpose is to
explain the economics of coal transportation as it relates to the
development of international steam coal markets. However, while Part B
integrates the results of Part A with supply and demand variables and
focuses specifically on international steam coal markets, Part A is
equally important to understanding the development of domestic coal
markets, especially in the United States. Furthermore, in addition to
explaining the interaction between coal transportation and international
25
or domestic markets, Part A provides an interesting case study in
transportation economics and regulation.
Part A is organized as follows. In Chapters I through V, we will
analyze the economics of coal transportation in the United States. In
the first three chapters, we analyze the economics of railroad movements
of coal. Our purpose is dualfold: 1) to approximate the long-run
marginal costs of coal railroad transportation; 2) to analyze the
existence or non-existence of monopoly rents in railroad coal rates, and
the effects of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations on
rate-cost relationships. The effect of ICC regulations on coal movements
has been the subject of extensive concern in the past few years. An
understanding of these effects is critical to understanding coal markets.
In Chapter IV, the economics of barge and truck movements are
analyzed. Regulation is not directly important to the economics of these
modes, but it is indirectly important to them as competitors with the
railroads for coal shipments. Also, Chapter IV assembles the United
States inland transportation cost estimates, and analyzes potential steam
coal export routes. Chapter V considers three additional interdependent
factors that could affect U.S. steam coal transportation patterns in the
long run: coal-slurry pipelines, railroad deregulation, and capacity
expansion.
Chapter VI analyzes coal transportation economics in Australia,
Canada, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, Western Europe. The
objective is similar to that of the U.S. chapters: to determine the
long-run marginal costs of coal transportation, and the effect of the
26
institutional structure on transportation rates. However, due to data
limitations, the subjects that we analyzed extensively for the United
States can only be treated roughly for other countries.
Chapter VII analyzes the economics of ocean-borne coal
transportation. The primary purpose is to develop estimates of ocean
transportation costs for major potential steam coal trade markets.
It should be noted that much of Part A is extremely detailed.
Readers who are not specifically interested in the intricacies of coal
transportation economics and regulation may choose to skim much of the
material, or head directly to Part B where the results of Part A will be
integrated with the analyses of international steam coal supply and
demand.
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CHAPTER 1
UNITED STATES INLAND COAL TRANSPORTATION:
INTRODUCTION, SUMM1ARY OF INLAND TRANSPORTATION PATTERNS,
AND ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES RAILROAD COAL RATES
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INTRODUCT ION
The following five chapters analyze coal transportation economics
and regulation in the United States. Our purpose is threefold. First,
transportation, as will be shown below, is a critical economic factor in
the development of steam coal exports. On certain potentially important
export routes, inland transportation costs are as much as three times the
cost of coal at the mine. An analysis of the economic and regulatory
factors underlying United States coal transportation is essential to
projecting the United States role in international steam coal trade.
Second, transportation of coal for export is in large part interdependent
with domestic coal transportation. Consequently, the analysis is equally
important to understanding the complex present and future problems of
United States domestic coal transportation. Third, beyond our direct
concerns with steam coal export and domestic transportation, the analysis
should serve as an interesting case study in transportation economics and
regulation. To date, the literature is full of studies on coal
transportation, and studies on transportation economics and regulation.
Very few, however, have attempted to merge an understanding of the
intricacies of a particular commodity, coal in this case, with the
general principles of transportation economics and regulation.
The chapters are organized as follows. In this first chapter, past
and present coal transportation patterns in the United States will be
summarized, and the existing railroad rate structures for coal
transportation, domestic and export, steam and metallurgical, will be
29
presented and analyzed. This will show that steam coal domestic railroad
rates are increasing at a rapid rate throughout the country, and raise
the question of whether these changes are explained by cost increases or
monopoly rent increases.
In Chapter II, railroad costs will be analyzed. The bulk of the
analysis will focus on the evidence presented in the recent coal rate
cases. Though significant uncertainties exist, our conclusion will be
that long-run marginal transport costs are substantially less than
existing steam coal rates.
In Chapter III we analyze rents from a different perspective. Where
in Chapter II we estimate the costs of coal transportation in order to
estimate the level of rents, in this chapter we analyze qualitatively the
regulatory process itself, and the implicit or explicit allowance for
rents by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). First, the current
competitive environment in coal consumption and transportation is
evaluated. The firm conclusion will be that the opportunity for
realizing high rents exists. Second, the ICC's role as a possible
constraint on rents will be evaluated. We will see that the ICC has not
been and is not likely to be an effective constraint on the railroads'
appropriation of monopoly rents, and, though some justification for rates
exceeding long-run marginal costs may exist, the railroads' and the ICC's
arguments for rates exceeding costs are seriously flawed.
Chapter IV will analyze the movement of coal by barge, the most
realistic alternative to railroads on long-haul, high-volume shipments,
and truck, limited in use to short hauls, primarily as a connecting
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mode. Furthermore, transfer costs will be estimated to complete the data
base required for the integration of supply, demand, and transportation
cost variables below.
Also in Chapter IV, the results of both the economic and regulatory
analyses will be applied to United States coal exports. Potential routes
will be identified, costs will be estimated for the various
transportation options, and the effect of ICC regulations on coal export
shipments will be discussed.
The last chapter on United States coal transportation will focus on
long-term developments in transportation patterns. Three major issues
will be confronted. First, will railroads and barges be able to finance
the expansion of long-run capacity in order to handle the rapidly
increasing volume of coal carried? Second, will railroad transportation
be deregulated partially or fully, and what effects will this have on
domestic and export coal shipments? Third, and closely related to the
second, will coal slurry pipelines be allowed to compete with existing
coal transportation modes? If so, what effects will this have on future
domestic and export coal transportation patterns?
SUMMARY OF UNITED STATES INLAND TRANSPORTATION PATTERNS
In 1978, approximately 640 million short tons of bituminous coal and
lignite were moved from United States mines; 600 million short tons were
destined for U.S. consumers, and the remaining 40 million short tons (6.8
percent) were destined for Canada (14.8 million short tons), Mexico, and
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overseas consumers. Of the 600 million short tons destined for U.S.
consumers, 471 million short tons (78.5 percent) were consumed by
electric utilities, and the remainder was allocated between industrial
consumers and coking plants. With the exception of Canada, where 8.8 of
the 14.8 million short tons imports were used for steam raising,
virtually all remaining exports were used for metallurgical and
industrial purposes.1
The movement of coal from U.S. mines is broken down by transport
mode in Table 1. Approximately 86 percent of the coal carried from U.S.
mines to U.S. consumers is moved by barge, truck, or rail. 2 Of these
three modes, railroads are the major carriers with approximately 63
percent of the total tonnage. Barges and trucks carried 19 percent and
18 percent, respectively. 3 Approximately 82 percent of the coal
destined for ports is carried by rail, the remainder allocated between
tidewater ships, trucks, and barges. 4
Table I also shows that since 1974, these modal-shares have not
significantly shifted.5 Barge and rail carriers have lost some
traffic to trucks, as railroads have abandoned small spur lines and
barges have reduced short-haul shipments.
Although the railroads have maintained their position as the dominant
coal carrier, the geographic importance of rail transportation has
shifted. Since 1967, eastern traffic has decreased, southern traffic has
increased slowly, while western traffic has increased rapidly (see Tables
2 through 5). Burlington-Northern, for example, carried 66.2 million
short tons in 1978 relative to only 30 million short tons in 1974.6
Table 1
Distribution of Bituminous Coal and Lignite from United States Mines by Specific Method of Movement, 1974-1978 1/
Thousand Short Tons Percent of Total
Method of Movement 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
2/ 2/
All-rail 298,731 320,140 331,048 339,382 324,252 53.8 54.3 54.0 53.2 52.8
River and ex-river 102,517 107,025 107,503 106,844 96,301 18.4 18.2 17.5 16.8 15.7
Great Lakes 32,083 33,963 33,029 31,595 30,200 5.8 5.8 5.4 5.0 4.9
Tidewater 6,259 5,353 5,344 4,535 3,813 1.1 .9 .9 .7 .6
Truck 71,497 69,679 69,410 85,609 93,531 12.9 11.8 11.3 13.4 15.2
Tramway, conveyor, and private
railroad 44,636 53,373 66,667 69,564 65,893 8.0 9.1 10.9 10.9 10.7
Total 3/ 555,723 589,533 613,001 637,529 613,992 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1/ Final destinations include Canada and Mexico. Mexican consumption is negligible. Canadian consumption in 1978 amounted to 14.78
million short tons, 14.03 of which were moved via the Great Lakes. Excludes railraod fuel, vessel fuel, Great takes commercial
docks, coal used at mines and sales to employees, net change in mine inventory, and overseas exports (excluding Canada and Mexico).
2/ Beginning with the fourLh quarter of 1977, the transportation mode of shipments to Mexico and shipments within Alaska were excluded
from total figures to avoid disclosure of individual respondent data.
3/ Data may not add to totals shown because of independent rounding.
Source of data: Bituminous Coal and Lignite Distribution,Calendar year 1978, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Data Reports,
pp. 85
C~J
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Table 2
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION OF COAL--UNITED STATES
Tons Originated Freight Revenues
Year (Millions) Percent* ($ Millions) Percent
1965 363 26 1128 12
1967 385 27 1152 12
1969 383 26 1190 11
1971 360 26 1135 11
1973 375 24 1425 10
1975 408 29 2146 13
1977 415 30 2698 14
*U.S. coal tonnage as a percentage of total U.S. freight tonnage.
SOURCE: Moody's Transportation Manual, 1979. New York: Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., 1979, pp. A13-A16.
Table 3
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION OF COAL--EASTERN DISTRICT
Tons Percent of Total Freight Percent of Total
Originated Eastern Railroad Revenues Eastern Railroad
Year (Millions) Tonnage ($ Millions) Revenues
1965 253 44 852 24
1967 253 46 861 24
1969 252 44 869 22
1971 214 43 897 21
1973 208 39 920 19
1975 209 45 1271 24
1977 191 44 1384 23
SOURCE: Moody's Transportation Manual, 1979. New York: Moody's
investors Service, Inc., 1979, pp. A13-A16.
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Table 4
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION OF COAL--SOUTHERN DISTRICUT
Tons Percent of Total Freight Percent of Total
Originated Southern Railroad Revenues Southern Railroad
Year (Millions) Tonnage ($ Millions) Revenues
1965 75 25 180 13
1967 89 27 201 13
1969 90 26 220 12
1971 97 28 271 13
1972 106 28 284 11
1975 112 32 408 15
1977 114 31 547 16
SOURCE: Moody's Transportation Manual, 1979. New York: Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., 1979, pp. A13-A16.
Table 5
RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION OF COAL--WESTERN DISTRICT
Tons Percent of Total Freight Percent of Total
Originated Western Railroad Revenues Western Railroad
Year (Millions) Tonnage ($ Millions) Revenues
1965 35 7 96 2
1967 37 7 90 2
1969 41 7 101 2
1971 49 9 167 3
1973 61 10 221 3
1975 87 15 446 6
1977 98 17 572 6
SOURCE: Moody's Transportation Manual, 1979. New York: Moody's
Investors Service, inc., 1979, pp. A13-A16.
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Similarly, the relative importance of coal to the railroads (see Tables 2
through 5) has remained roughly constant in the East and South, while it
has increased rapidly for the West. Nevertheless, the eastern and
southern railroads still generate a larger percentage of their total
revenues through coal than do the western roads.
Coal transportation by rail is dominated by a few roads in each
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) region. Table 6 shows that 3
or 4 railroads control 85 percent of the coal traffic originating in each
region. The most striking concentration of power is in the West where
the Burlington-Northern railroad controlled 40 percent of all
western-originating coal flows in 1977.
This can be contrasted to the competitive structure in barge and
truck transport, where a large number of firms carry the traffic. For
example, in barge transport 34 for-hire carriers are listed as coal
carriers. Although four companies account for 25 percent of the total
barge tonnage, the large number of firms and the option to provide one's
own service create a relatively competitive structure. 8
Finally, transportation of coal has increasingly relied on unit
trains, strictly defined as "a complete train of dedicated cars operating
on a regularly scheduled cycle movement between a single origin and a
single destination", in contrast to past methods in which many commodities
are mixed and remixed in one train as they are shipped from many origins
to many destinations. 9  The appeal of the unit train service is that
it is far more efficient in terms of equipment utilization than is
conventional rail freight service. In 1965, approximately 25 percent of
the coal tonnage transported was moved by rail. In 1978, approximately
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Table 6
BITUMINOUS COAL HANDLED BY MAJOR CLASS I RAILROADS--1977
Tons Originated
(1,000 short tons)
Percentage of
District Total
Eastern District:
Chessie
Conrail
Norfolk and Western
Southern District:
Louisville and Nashville
Southern
Illinois Central Gulf
Western District:
Burlington Northern
Denver and Rio Grande
Missouri Pacific
Union Pacific
SOURCE: Coal Traffic Annual, 1978, National Coal
189353
71115
40285
62484
114073
59989
27315
19413
100
38
21
33
100
53
24
17
109403
50549
13210
12801
16115
46
12
12
15
Association., 1979, p. 11-11.
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50 percent was moved in unit trains, and the ICC estimates that 85
percent will be moved in unit trains by 1985.10
To conclude, large and increasing volumes of coal are being moved by
railroads, barges, and trucks. Railroads account for the majority of
coal flows, and railroads' markets are highly concentrated. Coal flows
in the East and South have been relatively stable in the past few years,
but rapid increases have obtained in the West. The next section will
focus on the existing rate structures in railroad coal transportation.
UNITED STATES RAILROAD COAL RATES
As the demand for coal rail transportation has increased in recent
years, rail rates and the controversies surrounding them have
simultaneously increased. In this section we evaluate the existing coal
rate structure and review recent changes.
The rate structure has several dimensions: type of coal (steam or
metallurgical), type of service (single-car, trainload, unit train), and
origins and destinations. 11
Based on these dimensions, three rate categories warrant our
attention:
1) steam coal, domestic unit trains.
2) metallurgical coal, domestic unit trains and trainload.
3) metallurgical coal and steam coal exports, single car and
trainload (unit-train rates do not exist for export
shipments).
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STEAM COAL DOMESTIC RATES
The most complex and controversial rates are for steam coal domestic
unit-train shipments. Prior to the 1960's coal was exclusively shipped
under single-car or trainload rates. However, given the pressures from
competing modes and alternative fuels, the ICC ultimately allowed the
railroads to post unit-train rates.12
Today, approximately 50 percent of steam coal domestic shipments are
carried by unit trains, and the Interstate Commerce Commission estimates
that by 1985, 85 percent of these shipments will be unit trains. 13
Unit-train rates can best be classified in three groups, according
to cost variations and different competitive environments. First,
shipments destined to the East and the South, originating for the most
part in Appalachia and Eastern Kentucky coal fields. Second, shipments
destined for the Midwest, largely originating in Western Kentucky and
Southern Illinois. Third, shipments destined for consumers in the
Midwest and West, originating from western coal fields.
The sample of rates that has been analyzed for all those groups
includes 1970, 1975, and 1979 rates. The first two sanples were provided
by Peabody Coal Company, supplemented for 1975 by additional western
rates from the Burlington-Northern, Union Pacific, and Denver-Rio Grande
Railroads. The 1979 sample was developed by Mobil 's traffic division for
14internal purposes .
East, South, Midwest Rates
Table 7 summarizes the 1979 rates for the East/South and Midwest
15
regions. Southern and midwestern rail rates for railroad-owned
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Table 7
MIDWESTERN AND SOUTHERN/EASTERN UNIT-TRAIN RATES (January 1, 1979)
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Tariff per ton-mile
(in cents)l
MW Shipper .0128 .0022 .0101 .0169
MW Rail .0210 .0056 .0160 .0320
S/E Shipper .0128 .0012 .0106 .0141
S/E Rail .0190 .0032 .0150 .0250
One-Way Mileage
MW Shipper 287 168 81 519
MW Rail 115 24 92 145
S/E Shipper 504 124 333 695
S/E Rail 439 118 217 695
Loading plus
Unloading Times
MW Shipper 18 10 8 36
MW Rail 16 14 7 48
S/E Shipper 10 4 8 16
S/E Rail 30 22 8 64
Minimum Annual Tonnage
(1/million short tons)
MW Shipper .79 .60 .17 2.50
MW Rail .71 .45 .25 1.67
S/E Shipper .89 .60 .33 2.00
S/E Rail .79 .50 .33 2.08
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Table 7 (continued)
NOTES: Rates are through ex parte 357, 12/15/78.
Number of Observations: MW Shipper = 12; MW Rail = 9;
S/E Shipper = 9; S/E Rail = 29.
SOURCE: "Unit Train and Annual Volume Coal
Traffic Department, Jan. 15, 1979.
Rates," Mobil Oil Corporation,
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equipment averaged 09 mills and 20 mills per short ton-mile,
respectively. For shipper-owned equipment, the corresponding rates are
approximately 03 mills in both regions. Note however that the midwestern
routes are on average far shorter in distance. We would expect some
costs of railroad shipments to be unrelated to mileage (for example,
costs incurred at loading and unloading stations). Accordingly, if we
normalized for mileages, the southern rates should be lower on economic
grounds.
By regressing the-rates on important cost-determining variables, the
variations in Table 7 can be mostly explained. A variety of models have
been estimated to explain unit-train rates. This study employs a
modified version of the model specified by Zimmerman.06
Zimmerman assumes that a railroad has a total cost of performing the
unit train service of the following form:
TC = FS + aM(M.MTT.V) + aL(L.MTT.V)
where
TC = total cost of performing the service
aFS = fixed costs pertaining to the service
aM = costs per short ton-mile
L = cost per 'incremental unit of loading time
V = number of trains per year
MTT = tonnage per train, in millions
M = one-way miles
L = loading and unloading times in hours.
He then assumed that the cost reflected in the tariff would be the
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average cost (AC) of providing this service, i.e.,
AC = TFS + aMM + aLV.MTT M L
Miles shipped reflect line-haul costs; loading and unloading times
influence rates, since faster times mean better equipment utilization and
lower capital costs; annual tonnage reflects the fixed costs, and since
AC is a charge per ton, the higher the tonnage, the lower the fixed costs
per ton.
For our purposes, the southern and midwestern samples have been
pooled. A chow test allows us to accept the hypothesis that the slope
coefficients are equal at 99 percent confidence level, but reject the
hypothesis that the intercepts are equal.07 A dummy variable (DUMR)
is used to adjust for this factor. The dummy variable takes on the value
0 for southern rates, and 0 for midwestern rates.
Where Zimmerman used only railroad-owned equipment rates, in this
case shipper-owned equipment rates have been included. The difference
should reflect the number of cars needed (capital costs) and the
utilization per car (maintenance costs). We hypothesize that,
0. required cars = (number of cars per train x number of required
trains) x (reserve factor for stand-by cars)
2. number of required trains = required number of trainloads per yearnumber of trips per train per year
3. required number of trainloads per year = annu tonnage tr noashipped
4. number of trips . 24 x number of operating days per train per year
per train per year number of hours required per round trip
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We also assume that travel times per long-haul mile and that tons
per trainload are uniform. Then the equipment costs should be mostly
related to distance and loading-unloading times. Tonnage is of minor
importance in that doubling of tonnage should not yield significant
increased requirements for cars per ton.
The equipment costs are not, however, strictly proportional to
miles. That is, as miles double, equipment requirements do not double,
given loading and unloading delays. A reasonable specification therefore
is a fixed component, DUMEQ, and a dummy variable on miles, DM.
It should be noted that an important component of tariffs is rent,
as opposed to costs. To this point we have made only casual reference to
rent. Given the existence of rents, omitting a rent variable(s) might
well bias coefficient estimates, unless the rent is uncorrelated with
other explanatory variables. By evaluating earlier work by Zimmerman (to
be fully discussed below), the hypothesis that rents are uncorrelated
with other explanatory variables can be accepted at the 95 percent
confidence level. Nevertheless, the possibility of this bias should be
made clear. Furthermore, independent of the bias, the coefficient of the
variables constructed to explain the difference between railroad and
shipper owned equipment rates are not purely cost-related. They only
explain the difference in rates, and may well pick up a rent variation as
well as a cost variation. 18
Table 8 presents the estimated equation for the combined
South/Midwest 1979 sample. All the coefficients have signs as expected,
with only the coefficient on loading and unloading times being
Table 8
Regression Results: Midwestern and Southern/Eastern Sample
(January 1, 1979)
TA78 = -.07 + .0105 * M + .00237 * u + .369 * IMAT + 1.21 * DUMR + .0016 * DM + 1.005 * DUMEQ
Standard Error: .438 .0011 .0062 .2234 .3357 .0012 .515
T Statistic: -.16 9.12 .38 1.65 3.61 1.31 1.95
Standard Error of the Regression: .797
Number of Observations: 58
F Statistic: 106.321
R2: .926
TA78 = tariff per ton
M = one-way mileage
u = loading plus unloading time
MAT = minimum annual tonnage (in million tons)
IMAT = 1/MAT
DUMR = 0 if destination is the midwest, 1 if south or east
DUMEQ = 0 if shipper-owned equipment, 1 if railroad-owned
DM = DUMEQ * M
Source: author's calculations
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statistically insignificant at the 95 percent confidence interval. 19
The eastern and southern rates are significantly higher than the
midwestern rates. This is not surprising given the competition from
barges in the Midwest.
Almost all of the southern rates and the majority of the midwestern
rates are escalated according to ICC general rate level increases. In
recent years various exemptions have led to variable increases in rates.
Nonetheless, a comparison between the three samples of rates for which
direct comparisons were possible showed consistent increases in all
rates. From 1970 to 1975, rates increased by an average of 70 percent,
and no significant regional variations were observed. From 1975 to 1978,
midwestern and eastern rates increased at the same annual rate. The
period increase was approximately 33 percent. However, southern rates,
in this case referring exclusively to destinations in Georgia, South
Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, and Alabama, have increased at an
annual rate of 16 percent, or 58 percent between 1975 and 1978.
Primarily responsible for this has been the exceptionally high increase
recently allowed on Louisville and Nashville shipments, though all
shipments have increased at rates higher than elsewhere. 20  It should
be noted that the ICC is currently considering an additional increase for
midwestern shipments; applicable to shipments which are escalated by ex
parte increases, not those which are escalated by agreements. Therefore,
the rate of increase in the Midwest may well approximate that in the
South in the next few years.
Calculating such increases on an annual basis yields approximately
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11.6 percent annual increases for the Midwest and East between 1970 and
1978. In the South, rates increased at this rate between 1970 and 1975,
but have since increased at an average of 16 percent per year. Note that
the increases themselves are irregular, so these percentages reflect
average increases over the periods considered.
Finally, it should be noted that approximately 90 percent of the
rates in the East, South, and Midwest have been posted before 1973. The
small number of new rates, primarily to Michigan, Florida, Alabama, and
Georgia, are not statistically significantly different from the old
rates. This is not surprising given the ICC reluctance in the past to
allow rates that are signficicantly different from an existing, comparable
rate structure. To the extent that these rates increase in the future,
it will be according to general rate level increases allowed by the ICC.
Even given the recent rapid increases allowed by the ICC, the existence
of a well-defined rate structure in these regions is important for two
reasons. First, it has acted in the past as an effective constraint on
monopoly pricing. Second, it facilitates statistical estimation of
railroad costs in these regions. Both these points will be discussed
below.
Western Rates
Rates originating in the West have followed a more complex pattern
over the years. The first western rates were posted in the late 1960's,
involving coal shipments from Wyoming and Montana to Minnesota. These
rates were set at very low levels as an inducement to western steam coal
market development. After the first Minnesota rates, rates from the
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Powder River Basin to Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, and
Nebraska were posted between 1972 and 1975. These rates were 20 to 30
percent higher than the Minnesota rates, with the rates to Indiana and
Illinois set at the highest levels. 2 1  Finally, since 1975, a series
of new and still higher rates has been posted, especially to destinations
in Texas, Arkansas, and Mississippi.
Table 9 summarizes the current western rates. Note that in 1979
"new" rates are higher than the "old" rates posted prior to 1975: 10
versus 8 mills on shipper-owned equipment, 12.4 versus 11 mills on
railroad-owned equipment.22 Note also that distances are on average
longer, loading and unloading times shorter with less variation, and
annual tonnage requirements higher. Furthermore, virtually all the new
unit-train rates involve shipper-owned equipment. This last fact is
attributable to a number of factors. First, the railroads have a basic
dislike of inflexibility, and the unit-train service car utilization is
by definition inflexible. Second, shipper-owned cars have allowed for
more efficient car utilization. Third, utilities have had greater
success in financing car equipment costs, so that current cost savings
are realized. 23
Table 10 presents regression results for western rates. A dummy
variable is used to pick up the higher post-1975 rate levels. Regression
analysis of western rates indicates the lack of a well-defined rate
structure in contrast with the Midwest, South and East regions. For
example, the negative coefficient suggests a truncated sample at a high
mileage level. All coefficients have the expected signs, and are
significant at a 95 percent confidence level.
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Table 9
Western Unit-Train Rates (January, 1979)
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Tariff per ton-mile
(in cents)
New, Shipper .0101 .0014 .0078 .0125
New, Rail .0124 .0009 .0115 .0132
Old, Shipper .0082 .0006 .0071 .0089
Old, Rail .0110 .0017 .0078 .0130
One-Way Mileage
New, Shipper 1259 483 498 2013
New, Rail 792 23 773 818
Old, Shipper 953 235 652 1248
Old, Rail 1052 240 640 1290
Loading Plus
Unloading Time
New, Shipper 8 2 4 9
New, Rail 18 5 8 28
Old, Shipper 9 2 8 14
Old, Rail 21 8 8 28
Minimum Annual Tonnage
(1/million short tons)
New, Shipper .58 .17 .25 .77
New, Rail .63 .12 .36 .91
Old, Shipper .99 .85 .29 3.03
Old, Rail .91 .56 .22 2.00
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Table 9 (continued)
NOTES: Rates are through ex parte 357, 12/15/78.
Number of Observations: New Shipper = 12; New Rail = 4; Old
Shipper = 9; Old Rail = 13.
SOURCE: "Unit Train and Annual Volume Coal Rates," Mobil Oil
Corporation, Traffic Department, Jan. 15, 1979.
Table 10
Regression Results: Western Sample
(January 1, 1979)
TA78 = -5.75 + .0127 * M + .0596 * u + .929 * IMAT + .668 * DUMEQ + .00124 * DM + 2.134 * DUMT
Standard Error:
T Statistic:
.876 .0007
-6.56 19.38
Standard Error of the Regression:
Number of Observations:
F Statistic:
R2:C)
TA78 =
M =
MAT =
IMAT =
DUMEQ =
DM =
DUMT =
.0284
2.09
1.121
.959
117.38
37
.321
2.89
tariff per ton, January 1, 1979
one-way mileage
loading plus unloading times
minimum annual tonnage (in million tons)
I/MAT
0 if shipper-owned equipment, 1 if railroad-owned
DUMEQ * M
0 if rate posted price to 1975, 1 otherwise
Source: author's calculations
1.21
.55
.0011
1.10
.467
4.56
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Most Western rates increase according to escalation agreements,
generally based on the Association of American Railroads (AAR) cost
scales. Burlington-Northern (BN), for example, raises its rates on July
1 of a given year by 80 percent of the cost increases for the western
district from the preceding year.24 The relative increases in
effective rates have been relatively consistent in the West. Since 1975,
rates have increased an average of 31 percent; both for new and old
rates. The AAR index over this period, multipled by 80 percent, equals
1.30. Note again, however, that although new rate increases have been
consistent with the AAR index, the new rates are significantly higher at
the time of posting than the escalated old rates. This is indicated in
the regression results above. The AAR cost indexes from 1967 to 1979 are
presented in Table 11.
A few observations on the western rate structure versus the southern
and midwestern rate structures should be made. First, they are
different. Analysis of covariance on the pooled samples showed that both
the intercepts and slopes are significantly different. Pooling the
samples showed that the western and midwestern rates are approximately
the same for equivalent operating parameters, while the southern rates
are significantly higher. Direct observation of equivalent mileages
further supports this conclusion. Of course, this does not indicate that
rents are lower in the West than in the South. Conceivably, costs are
higher in the East and South than in the West. We will investigate this
question further below.
Another important observation is that the western rate structure is
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TABLE 11
Association of American Railroads
Economics and Finance Department
Washington, D.C. 20036
Series QMPW - 106
January 30, 1980
INDEXES OF
RAILROAD MATERIAL PRICES AND WAGE RATES
Railroads of Class 1
L Annual Indexes of Charge-out Prices and Wage Rates
(Average 1967 = 100)
District and Group 1967 1968 1969 1970* 1971* 1972 1973 1974 1975* 1976 1977 1978* 1979D
UNITED STATES: 1
Fuel 100.0 103.5 106.7 110.5 114.6 117.1 136.5 272.0 321.9 350.1 389.6 
406.9 606.4
Other material & supplies 100.0 102.6 105.5 109.4 113.5 118.7 122.9 142.1 190.2 203.2 217.2 230.6 252.5
All material incl. fuel 100.0 102.7 105.8 109.7 113.7 118.1 126.7 178.9 227.2 244.5 265.3 279.9 347.8
Wage rates 100.0 105.1 112.2 122.7 136.8 149.5 164.4 173.4 190.8 210.7 227.3 
250.0 275.1
Material prices and wage
rates combined 100.0 104.7 110.9 120.2 131.2 141.8 155.2 174.7 202.2 221.3 239.2 259.4 297.9
Wage rates and supplements a 100.0- 106.3 113.6 125.6 139.4 153.4 173.9 189.1 207.1 232.0 251.6 276.5 302.8
Material prices, wage rates &
supplements combined (excl.
fuel) a 100.0 105.7 112.3 122.9 134.9 147.4 165.1 181.0 203.8 226.4 244.9 267.5 293.0
Material prices, wage rates &
supplements combined (incl.
fuel) a 100.0 105.7 112.3 123.0 133.7 145.6 163.5 186.8 212.6 235.4 255.4" 277.4 315.2
EASTERN DISTRICT:
Fuel 100.0 103.3 106.0 109.2 115.3 117.7 137.3 271.4 323.8 350.8 396.7 414.7 593.3
Other material & supplies 100.0 102.7 105.5 109.4 113.2 118.5 122.2 140.1 188.0 198.0 210.6 222.1 245.2
All material incl. fuel 100.0 102.8 105.6 109.4 113.8 118.3 126.4 176.6 225.7 240.3 261.5 275.0 338.3
Wage rates 100.0 105.9 113.2 122.9 136.6 150.0 165.5 175.2 191.3 212.1 230.9 255.5 280.9
Material prices and wage
rates combined 100.0 105.4 111.9 120.7 131.8 143.3 157.2 175.5 200.5 219.6 239.1 260.7 296.2
Wage rates and supplements a 100.0 107.0 114.6 126.0 139.2 154.3 175.1 191.4 207.5 233.2 255.6 283.8 310.1
Material prices, wage rates &
supplements combined (excl.
fuel) a 100.0 106.4 113.3 123.6 135.3 149.0 167.2 183.8 204.3 227.5 248.3 273.8 299.6
Material prices, wage rates &
supplements combined (incl.
fuel) a 100.0 106.4 113.3 123.6 134.3 147.4 165.7 188.6 211.7 234.9 257.0 281.7 316.7
SOUTHERN DISTRICT:
Fuel 100.0 104.4 104.6 106.4 110.0 112.9 129.7 251.1 298.1 322.7 362.5 375.8 524.6
Other material & supplies 100.0 102.5 105.0 109.0 112.7 118.1 122.1 140.2 188.6 199.8 213.4 226.5 247.3
All material incl. fuel 100.0 102.9 104.9 108.3 111.9 116.6 124.1 169.9 217.8 232.7 253.3 266.5 1321.7
Wage rates 100.0 104.6 111.4 122.4 135.3 149.1 163.7 173.1 189.9 210.4 226.0 248.8 1274.0
Material prices and wage
rates combined 100.0 104.2 110.0 119.3 127.6 138.5 150.8 172.1 199.4 218.0 235.3 254.8 290.3
Wage rates and supplements a 100.0 106.4 113.4 125.5 138.2 153.0 172.6 188.5 206.7 232.4 231.1 275.9 $02.4
Material prices, wage rates &
supplements combined (excl.
fuel) a 100.0 105.6 111.7 122.2 131.9 144.4 160.1 176.6 202.8 225.4 243.0 265.2 290.5
Material prices, wage rates &
supplements combined (incl.
fuel) a 100.0 105.6 111.7 122.1 130.3 142.1 158.1 182.9 210.0 232.5 251.8 273.1 308.2
WESTERN DISTRICT:
Fuel
Other material & supplies
All material incl. fuel
Wage rates
Material prices and wage
rates combined
Wage rates and supplements a
Material prices, wage rates &
supplements combined (excl.
fuel) a
Material prices, wage rates &
supplements combined (incl.
fuel) a
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.01
103.2
102.5
102.7
104.6
108.1
105.9
106.6
111.5
113.4
109.4
110.6
122.7
116.2
114.1
114.7
137.6
118.7
118.1
118.2
149.3
138.6
123.5
128.0
163.7
281.1
145.0
185.8
172.3
328.9
192.8
233.4
190.8
104.3 1110.61 120.4 132.11141.7 155.0 175.61205.2
100 .01105.7 1112.7!125.4 1140.11153.2 1173.6 1187.91207.2
100.0 1105.11111.51122.61135.71147.21165.11180.61204.1
100.0 1105.11 111.61122.81134.41145.51163.6 1187.41215.0
359.1
207.4
252.5
210.0
224.3
231.1 249.0 272.3231.1
226.0
237.5
395.4
222.5
273.3
225.3
241.5
414.0
236.7
289.2
246.8
261.1
249.0 272.3
243.3 264.7
256.2 277.3
643.0
258.6
364.7
271.17
303.0
29.5
290.0
318.2
a - Incles payroll taxes, health ari welfare benefits and other allowances.
* - Wage indices for 1970, 1971, 1975 and 1978 include retroactive wage
inceases paid in 1971, 1972, 1976 and 1979 respectively.
- ae rates and wages and supplements indexes, and conbinations including them,
are preliminary. Indexes for fuel and materials and supplies are final.
I
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far more unstable than that in other regions. Though increases in the
South and Midwest have been large recently, they have been applied to the
entire rate structure and the overall consistency has been maintained.
In the West, however, a well-defined structure never existed, and so the
constraint of comparability has not been effective. Note furthermore
that the rates currently being requested by the railroads in coal rate
cases are higher in some cases than even these 1979 levels. The
importance of this instability will be appraised in detail below.
In summary, the following ranges seem reasonable for long-distance
shipments of steam coal in unit trains. In the West, in railroad-owned
equipment, 8.5 mills to 13.5 mills, in the East 15 mills to 18 mills
(1979 dollars). Note that on a 1000-mile western shipment this
difference would amount to $5.00 per ton, certainly a margin worth
investigating in detail.
METALLURGICAL AND EXPORT RATES
Metallurgical and export shipments reflect different competitive
environments, and the rates would be expected to differ. Nonetheless, it
is important to review them briefly since they might bear on the
development of steam coal exports.
First, domestic metallurgical rates are based on a variety of
services: unit train, trainload, and single-car shipments. They are
generally higher than steam coal domestic shipments if they originate in
the East and Midwest. For example, an analysis of 20 domestic coal train
rates, destined for Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, showed
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that they ranged from 20 to 50 percent higher.25  In the West,
metallurgical unit-train shipments were not statistically different from
steam coal rates.
Export rates are higher still. A rate is set for a given group of
origins to a port or group of ports. Historically, export rates have
been set at levels higher than comparable domestic rates to maximize
transport profits on metallurgical exports. 26 Shipments are charged
according to single-car rates, independent of the actual method of
transportation. In recent years, as domestic rates have steadily
increased, and competitive pressures on metallurgical coal exports have
also increased, the margin between domestic and export rates is not as
great as it has been. Nonetheless, the rates are 30 to 70 percent higher
than domestic steam coal rates. The highest margins exist at the origins
closest to ports since rates for a given origin group are set according
to costs incurred from the furthest originating point. Table 12
summarizes rates to New Orleans, Hampton Roads, and Baltimore, through ex
parte 375.
Although no steam coal currently moves under these single-car rates,
it has in the past and could in the future. Conversations with railroad
officials revealed a general lack of interest in setting different rates,
say unit-train rates, for potential steam coal exports.27 In regions
where an export-rate structure does not exist for coal, for example, West
Coast ports and Gulf Coast ports, it is not clear what rate structure
would obtain. This problem will be considered further below. 28
55
Table 12
EXPORT COAL RATES: THROUGH EX PARTE 357,1 December 1978
Origin
Pocahontas-Tug
River
Virginia-Upper
Buchanan
Clinch Valley no.
Clinch Valley no.
Thacher-Kenova-
Tiller
New River
Kanaba
Big Sandy
Westmoreland
Gauley
Somerset
Elk River
Clearfield
West Kentucky and
Southern
Illinois
Springfield
Clinton, Ind.
St. Louis
Birmingham
Western Kentucky
and Southern
Illinois
Springfield
Clinton, Ind.
St. Louis
Birmingham
Destination
Lamberts Point,
Virginia
1
2
Newport News,
Virginia
Baltimore
New Orleans
Mobile
Mobile
Tariff per Average One-Way Unit-Train
2
Tariff per
ton-
10.54
10.54
10.54
10.75
10.75
10.53
10.75
10.99
10.48
10.48
9.84
10.48
10.62
11.51
13.48
12.60
13.40
10.99
9.85
10.17
11.97
11.17
6.99
Average O 'ne-Way
Mileage
388
388
388
426
440
430
556
646
336
406
220
331
317
624
759
685
685
299
570
641
706
671
213
Unit-Train 2
Equivalent
8.05
8.05
8.05
8.51
8.68
8.56
10.09
11.17
7.42
8.27
6.02
7.36
7.20
9.70
11.33
10.91
10.44
5.77
9.05
9.91
10.69
10.26
4.72
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Table lr. (continued)
NOTES: 1. All rates are single-car shipments, and apply both to
metallurgical and steam coal shipments.
2. Unit-train equivalent is based on Table 8. Midwestern
rates to New Orleans, Mobile; Eastern to Baltimore, and
Hampton Roads ports. U is assumed at 48, MAT at
1.20 million tons.
SOURCE: Personal correspondence with Norfolk and Western, Chessie, ICG,
Southern, Louisville and Nashville, and Coal Week.
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SUMMARY
In summary, domestic steam coal unit train rates have followed
different patterns regionally, but in all regions they are increasing at
a rapid rate. In the South, East, and Midwest, rate structures are
well-defined, but recent allowances for general rate level increases
indicate that either greater rents are being realized, or that costs are
increasing faster than the AAR index estimate. In the West, no firm rate
structure exists. Therefore, newly posted rates have been posted at high
level.s, and the railroads have attempted to pull up the old rates to the
corresponding high levels. The role of the ICC in this evolving
structure will be analyzed in Chapters II and III. Export and
metallurgical rates are significantly higher than domestic steam coal
rates. These high rate levels are potentially important factors in the
development of steam coal exports.
In the following sections, we will evaluate these rates in depth.
Our purpose will be to estimate the amount of rents that exists in these
rates, the future course of these rates, and the potential impact of
existing rate patterns on future steam coal exports. Recall that a great
deal of the following sections is as important to the understanding of
domestic coal markets as to export coal markets. The detailed analysis
of ICC costing procedures and recent ICC proceedings is important to both
coal markets. However, certain readers may choose to bypass detailed
segnents of the material.
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I
1U.S. Department of Energy, "Bituminous Coal and Lignite
Distribution, Calendar Year 1978," Energy Data Reports, April 1979,
p. 9.
2Slurry pipelines carried only 1.2 MT in 1978, but will be
considered below as a future option. The residual 14 percent was
carried to mine-mouth power stations (11 percent), or used for power
and heat at the mine, made into beehive coke at the mine, or used for
other purposes at the mine. National Coal Association, "Coal Traffic
Annual," 1978, Washington, D.C., p. 1-2.
3This is on a tonnage basis. If calculated on a ton-mile basis,
the relative modal importance would be skewed to rail since average
distance was 397 miles for rail, 280 miles for barge, and 20 miles for
truck in 1976. Ibid., p. 11-4.
4U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, International
Coal Trade, Vol. 48, no. 2, Washington D.C., February 19/9, p. 14.
5From 1965 to 1974 a different pattern obtained. Barge
transport increased, railroad decreased, and trucks were stable. See
Sargent, D., "Western Coal Transportation Unit Trains or Slurry
Pipelines," U.S. Department of Transportation, 1976, p. 6 for pre-1975
summary.
6Keystone Coal Industry Manual, McGraw-Hill, N.Y., 1979, p.
242.
7Note that the ICC regions are not necessarily related to
economic markets. In Chapter III, we will analyze the extent of
market power held by the railroads.
8Keystone Coal Industry Manual, 1979, op. cit., pp. 256-260.
9U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines,
"Long-Distance Coal Transportation; Unit Train or Slurry Pipeline,"
Information Circular 8690, GPO, 1975, p. 11.
10 Schmidt, R., Coal in America, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979, p.
298.
11Other types of rates exist, but because they are not pertinent
to steam coal export evolution, they will not be considered. For full
description of coal rate structures see ICC, "Investigation of
Railroad Freight Rate Structure--Coal," ex parte no. 270 (sub-No. 4).
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12 For an interesting analysis of the evolution of unit trains,
see: McAvoy, P. and Sloss, J., Regulation of Transportation
Innovation, Random House, New York, 1967.
13Schmidt, op. cit., p. 298.
14a. Mobil Oil Corporation, Traffic Department, "Unit Train and
Annual Volume Coal Rates," January 15, 1979.
b. Peabody Coal Company, Traffic Department, "Tabulation of
Unit Train Tariffs on Coal, All Rail," August 1970, August 1975.
15
"East" and "South" include destinations in Florida, Georgia,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and South Carolina. Midwest includes destinations in Indiana,
Illinois, Kentucky, and Wisconsin. "South" henceforth refers to
"East" and "South," unless otherwise noted.
16Zimmerman, M.B., "Long-Run Mineral Supply: The Case of Coal
in the United States," Ch. III: "Transport Rates," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, MIT, 1975.
17For a description of covariance analysis and chow tests, see:
Johnson, J., Econometric Methods, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1972,
pp. 192-207.
18To see
Let TR =
where: TR =
this, consider the following simplified example:
c( - 6)m + BPGD
the tariff for railroad-owned equipment
m = mileage
PGD = the price of an alternative fuel, delivered, minus the
delivered price of coal.
Let: T5 = (aS - cS)m + SPGD
where TS = shipper-owned equipment tariff
TC = adl - )m + SPGD + D(aS - S
where TC = tariff for combined sample
= [a(l - )]m + DM(aS - aS) + S
The cost parameters are not identified
other words, without determining rents, we c
coefficients are purely cost-related or not.
m
PGD + s
unless 6 is identified. In
annot say whether the cost
19The statistical insignificance of the unloading and loading times
is not very surprising. The reason is that there is very little
variability, and the variability is generally explained by unspecified
variables, such as the time when the facilities were installed.
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20The ICC, in justifying the recent increases allowed on Louisville
and Nashville shipments, has cited higher regional cost increases and the
deteriorating position of L+N railroad. The AAR index does not support
the former reason. The 1975 to 1978 increase for the South was 29.7
percent, versus 31.1 percent in the East and 29.3 percent in the West.
Whether the recent increases represent in effect the subsidization of a
deteriorating railroad or the realization of greater rents is unclear.
Association of American Railroads, "Indices of Railroad Material Prices
and Wage Rates," January, 1980. For a complete discussion of the L+N
rate requests, see ICC Decision no. 37063, August 28, 1979.
21 Zimmerman, M.B., op. cit., pp. 62-64.
Zimmerman, "Rent lird Regulation in Unit-Train Rate Determination:
Regional Discrimination and Inter-fuel Competition," MIT Energy
Laboratory, June 1978, pp. 22-26.
22Though the post-1975 rates are significantly higher than the
pre-1975 rates, we cannot be certain that this is totally explained by
increased rents. Part of the difference can be explained by the
Burlington-Northern mechanism for escalating rates. Using their method,
rates increased by 37 percent from 1975 to 1979. Based on a strict
application of the AAR index, the increase would be 48 percent. Now, the
80 percent BN adjustment is economically logical for old rates, since
capital costs are constant. However, the full index is representative of
the actual cost differences between a shipment initiated in 1975 and one
initiated in 1979.
23Phillips, Peter J., "Coal Preparation for Combustion and
Conversion," prepared by Gibbs and Hill, Inc. for Electric Power Research
Institute, May 1978, pp. 5-4, 5-18.
24 See, for example, Interstate Commerce Commission, Decision I + S,
No. 9199. Unit Train Rates on Coal--Burlington Northern, Inc. Appendix
B, p. 2. Decided July 13, 1979.
25Rates were drawn from: Mobil Oil Corporation, op. cit.
26Adelman, M.A., "American Coal in Western Europe," in Journal of
Industrial Economics, Vol. XIV, no. 3, July 1966, pp. 199-211.
27William Roe, Assistant vice-president, Rates, Norfolk and Western
Railway Co. and M.D. Gibon, Director, Export Traffic, Chessie system.
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28Another precedent worth noting is port equalization rates. Under
this classification, rates from an origin or group of origins to a group
of ports, are set on the basis of the distance to the midpoint port.
This suggests lower rates than would otherwise obtain to distant ports
(losses or: lower rent) and higher rates to close ports (losses in
traffic). This structure is adopted to protect geographically
disadvantaged ports and to eliminate competitive modes. It is widely
practiced on grain shipments. For a complete discussion of port
equalization rates, see ICC, Rail Services Planning Office, "Rail Rate
Equalization To and From Ports," Final Report, January 1979.
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CHAPTER II
AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES RAILROAD COSTS
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INTRODUCTION
In Chapter I we analyzed the existing rate structure for unit-train
coal shipments. We concluded that rates have been increasing rapidly in
the past few years, and that these increases will probably continue. The
most conplex and controversial dimension of the rate structure is whether
the rates equal costs or whether they include substantial monopoly rents.
This chapter analyzes railroad costs. As we will see, the subject
is a terribly complex one and conceivably even intractable. Our purposes
are two-fold. First, and primarily, to establish a lower-bound for
unit-train coal rates. If rates include a large rent component, the
reduction in rates to costs may be an important factor in the U.S. role
in steam coal export markets. Second, the analysis focuses primarily on
the recent Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) coal-rate
investigations. The issues presented in these cases, and their
resolution, are critical to U.S. domestic coal markets as well as export
markets. The detailed review of the important conceptual and empirical
issues in the coal-rate cases and related ICC investigations provides an
interesting case study in regulation and transportation economics.
PROBLEMS IN RAILROAD COST ESTIMATION
We want to estimate long-run marginal costs (LRMC) of unit-train
service. Pricing at this level is consistent with the conditions for
economic efficiency. Two other cost estimates will also be important to
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the analysis: average costs and short-run marginal costs. Average
costs, both short-run and long-run, will be important evidence in
justfying rates at LRMC versus some other level. Short-run marginal
costs, where plant and facilities are taken as fixed, will be useful in
analyzing capacity utilization in the short and long runs.
Before we analyze the approaches that have been applied to railroad
cost estimation, a brief discussion of the problems inherent in all types
of cost estimation is appropriate. The first problem is that railroads
provide a wide variety of services; not only passenger and freight
service, but many types of freight service. In large part the railroad
plant and facilities are jointly used in producing this variety of
services. The existence of these joint-production costs presents serious
problems for the allocation of costs to particular services.
Two basic dimensions of this problem must be confronted, one related
to fixed costs and the second to joint-variable costs. First, consider
fixed costs, i.e., costs that are not variable with traffic levels.
Basically, any allocation of these costs to different service units is
arbitrary. These are costs that would exist independent of traffic
levels, and so to assign them to traffic units is in a strict sense a
meaningless cost concept. Furthermore, given fixed costs, and given a
variety of diverse service units (say passenger and freight), selection
of an appropriate output unit (i.e., revenues or ton-miles) will further
complicate the allocation. This is the basic problem of joint-production
costs cited in railroad costing literature, and it renders meaningless
any estimation of average costs for a single product. Note however
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that this dimension of the joint-cost problem is of lesser importance for
estimating marginal costs. Only if average costs exceed marginal costs
by some significant margin need we be concerned with the allocation of
fixed costs. Related to this is the problem is that given fixed costs
there is no widely accepted method to divide rail costs between fixed and
variable components. This is largely because the railroads have
imperfect knowledge about cost/output relationships.
The second dimension of the joint-production cost problem relates to
joint-variable costs, that is, costs that are variable with aggregate
output levels, but that cannot be assigned to particular output units.
This problem is especially important for our analysis. In this case, the
allocation of costs is complicated more empirically than theoretically.
We might in theory determine incremental costs for a shipment. However,
because of the indivisibility of railroad plant investment, empirical
separation over output units is very difficult if not impossible.
Furthermore, to the extent that syne >Jsm exists in railroad investment
(that is, beyond the indivisibilities problem, savings arise from
combined services), even theoretical allocation of these joint-variable
costs loses meaning.
A second problem complicating railroad cost estimation is network
capacity. Many studies in the past have implicitly assumed excess
capacity on coal lines. Given this, the incremental costs of rail
service properly exclude investment costs. However, given full capacity
utilization (or capacity utilization on the increasing segment of the
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long-run average cost curve), or a long enough period to require
replacement investment, investment costs should be incorporated into cost
estimation. Failure to account for this can lead to unjustifiably low
cost estimates. Furthermore, given full capacity, long-run marginal cost
estimates are difficult since variations in costs as a function of
capacity utilization are not well understood even by the railroads. In
general, an understanding of, and proper accounting for, capacity
utilization are important to reliable cost estimates.
Related to this is a third problem: the inherent indivisibility of
railway plant and facilities, and the difficulties this creates for
estimating marginal costs. Ideally, the railroads know with certainty
all future traffic flows, and based on their forecasts they adjust plant
and equipment over time to provide optimal utilization of capacity. In
fact, future traffic flows cannot be forecast with certainty. In this
case, the railroads would prefer to build capacity as demand develops,
assuming adequate time for these investments. And, if investment was
instantaneous and the railroad plant perfectly divisible, the incremental
costs of a particular shipment would be simple to ascertain. In fact,
however, the railway plant is to a large extent indivisible. Therefore,
investment strategies at any given time will by necessity be affected by
forecasts of future traffic volumes. An understanding of output/
investment relationships is therefore especially important to guide us in
determining the necessary investments for particular unit-train
services. For example, given basic indivisibilities in plant, the
railroads will invest at any point in time for traffic volumes greater
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than those required for a given unit-train service. In determining the
proportion of this investment economically attributable to a given
unit-train service, the optimal output level given this investment level
must be understood. As we will see below, this issue is especially
important in the recent coal rate cases and in the interpretation of ICC
costing procedures .2
APPROACHES TO RAILROAD COST ESTIMATION
These problems are common to the two basic costing procedures:
statistical and engineering/accounting. The choice of methodology
depends on the characteristics of the question to be answered and the
extent to which a given approach compensates for these inherent
complexities.
STATISTICAL COST ESTIMATION
Statistical estimation of railroad cost functions has been well
developed. The traditional form is to fit the following relationship
over a cross section of firms:
TC = a + ex
where TC is a vector of cost observations, x is a vector of output
observations, and a and 8 are intercept and slope terms respectively.
The arguments of the cost function and the functional form vary widely
over studies. 3
The primary difficulty in this approach is, again, the division of
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costs between fixed and variable components and the allocaton of
joint-production costs over different service units. Though subject to
the normal errors of statistical estimation, at least this approach lifts
the allocation of joint costs and the separation of fixed versus variable
costs out of some arbitrary framework. To the extent that fixed costs
are high, and that direct observation of cost/output relationships is not
feasible, statistical cost estimation may be recommended, especially
where particular characteristics of the railroad cost function (such as
economies of scale) are the major objective of the analysis. 4
For our purposes (the estimation of costs for a particular type of
service), however, this approach is suspect. Since there are relatively
few roads carrying virtually all the coal on railroads, the relevant
sample size would be far too small. 5  While the results of recent
analyses of special characteristics of railroad cost functions will be
used, no comprehensive study of this type has focused on coal explicitly,
and no original estimation will be undertaken.
Statistical methods have also been used to estimate costs as a
function of rates. In practice, most studies have not explicitly
accounted for the existence of railroad monopoly. A few other studies,
notably Zimmerman's, have explicitly modeled monopoly power. 6
Unfortunately, given today's competitive environment, the rate-making
process is less easily specified. The concise specification of rents as
related to the price of alternative fuels in Zimmerman's model is no
longer realistic for the new rate structures in the West. However, to
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the extent that the rate structure has been maintained in the East,
South, and Midwest, this approach is useful, and it will be employed to a
limited extent below.
ENGINEERING/ACCOUNTING COST ESTIMATION
The second basic approach to railroad cost estimation is
engineering/accounting analysis. Simply stated, the output parameters of
a particular service are observed, and the costs accountable to each unit
summed. This too is complicated by basic problems of joint-cost
allocation and separation of fixed from variable costs. However, for
coal these problems are mitigated with this approach for two reasons.
First, fixed costs on high-volume, long-distance unit-train shipments are
relatively low. Second, given the nature of unit-train service, where
equipment and even roadway are utilized in large part for coal traffic
alone, joint-production costs can be allocated over output units in a
less arbitrary fashion. On balance, for our purposes, where low fixed
costs exist, and where direct observation of cost/output relationships is
still difficult, but easier than usual, this approach is advisable
conceptually. 7
In practice, nonetheless, severe problems persist. Primarily, cost
estimates are based on an incomplete understanding of cost/output
relationships, in part due to the limited experience with unit trains,
and in part due to incomplete cost records. Most analyses of this type
depend on unit-cost data, and whether they are provided by the railroads
or obtained from ICC records, they generally represent average costs over
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different levels of output, not actual costs of particular services.
With few exceptions, these are simply all the data that exist.
Given our purposes, and given low fixed costs and more easily
observable output/cost relationships, an engineering/accounting analysis
is possibly the better approach. However, the fact is that the cost data
are imperfect or nonexistent. Though conceptually better, empirical
problems constrain the usefulness of this approach.
RAIL FORM A COST ESTIMATION
This problem leads us to a specific method of cost accounting
employed by the ICC for cost estimation: Rail Form A. Basically, total
costs are recorded for all expense accounts by territory and equipment
class (for example, yard expense, train expense, etc.) for all Class I
railroads in the United States. Total costs are then divided into fixed
and variable components. Variable costs are allocated over variable
output units, and fixed costs are allocated over ton and ton-miles or
allocated on a ratio basis. Then, for a particular service, unit costs
are aggregated to derive variable cost and fully-allocated cost
estimates. 8
Criticism of rail form A procedures has been extensive. In some
cases the criticisms are irrelevant to the coal movements; in others the
problems are pervasive in all estimating procedures, and the ICC
methodology is arguably no worse than others.9 A more basic problem
with ICC estimates is special to rail form A, and requires the following
extensive consideration.
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The problem is the ICC's division of expenses into fixed and
variable components. Initially the ICC estimated the following
regression over all Class I railroads:
y = a + x
where y = expense per mile of road
x = output per mile of road.
Percent variable is calculated as
, x equals the average level of output per mile of road.
a + 8X
The approach has been thoroughly criticized on several
grounds.10 Some of these criticisms are no longer valid given ICC
revisions. For example, a single percent variable figure was initially
used for all expense accounts. Currently the percent variable is
estimated separately for each expense account, using a different output
variable in each case. Also, a parabolic functional form (y = a + bx +
cx 2 ) has been substituted for the initial form. 11
The basic problem that persists is that given fixed costs, the
percent variable is in fact variable as a function of output. At a
higher output level, for a given sized plant, the percent variable will
be higher than at a lower output level. Therefore, to the extent that
output levels vary, calculating the percent variable at a given output
level will bias the estimate of variable costs.
In practice, a major source of the problem is giving too much weight
to the small Class I railroads that may have systematically different
percent variables than the larger railroads. For example, roads with 500
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miles or less of track comprise almost 50 percent of Class I railroads,
but only 5 percent of total costs. 12  The ICC calculates the percent
variable at the average level of output per mile of road. This approach
yields a percent variable for an arbitrarily defined average ton. That
is, it is not strictly the average ton moved. Rather it is
representative of average cost per ton-mile over all Class I railroads.
Now, if all railroads have the same average outputs per mile of
road, and the same average expenses per mile of road, this approach is
not unreasonable. (Of course, it could still be biased in application to
a particular shipment.) If, however, there is some well-defined variation
over size of railroads, then this approach is questionable at best.
In fact, there are several reasons to believe that small railroads
are different. First, and most important, we would expect less output
per mile of road for small railroads. That is, given indivisibilities in
railroad plant and facilities, a minimum-sized plant would in most cases
be able to carry efficiently more traffic than it is built to carry. ICC
data support this hypothesis of excess capacity. Output per mile of road
is on average 30 percent less for roads with less than 1000 miles of
roadbed. 13
Second, we would expect higher fixed costs per mile of road. Fixed
costs are: "those which are unaffected by increases or decreases in
production. Some of these costs are clearly independent of miles
of road; set-up costs for example. As miles of road increase, then, we
would expect lower fixed costs per mile of road. Unfortunately, data are
not available to specify the magnitude of this difference but we can be
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reasonably certain that it does exist.
Let cost equations 1 and 2 represent a small and large railroad
respectively.
(1) TC s = + BS xS
(2) TCL = aL + L XL
where:
TC = total cost per mile of road
a = fixed costs per mile of road
x = output per mile of road
= variable costs per unit of output
As noted above, variable costs per unit of output are approximately
constant:
(3) 
=
Also, we know from ICC data that total costs per mile of road do not
vary significantly over size:
(4) TCL = TC
And, that output levels are higher per mile of road for large railroads:
(5) xL >X
Therefore, total variable costs will be higher for larger railroads
(6) BL xL > 63 xS
and given that total costs are equal, it follows that fixed costs per
mile of road are higher for small roads:
(7) TCS - S xS > TCL ~ xL
aS aL
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For the same reasons that we expect a higher percent variable for
larger railroads, we would expect lower unit costs for larger railroads.
Fixed costs per mile of road will be less, and since output per mile of
road is greater, fixed costs per unit of output will be less:
(8)aL < asXL XS
Furthermore, this relationship will be inversely symmetrical. That is,
as the percent variable increases, unit costs will decrease so that our
estimate of variable costs per unit of output will be the same as the
ICC's:
(9) L XL L S xS S
(9) (SL + -- ) = x
aL + SLX L xL as X 3
And, from (9), fully-allocated costs per unit of output for large
railroads will be less than for small railroads:
From (4) above, we know aL + 6LXL = aS + Sx5, so from (9):
LL(L ) = x(X + )
LXL( L x L X SS xS
From (3) above, we know s= L, so:
L (L + ) = x(L +-- ), or
x L + a = x S +a
From (5) above, we know that xL > XS so:
XL L + cL < xSBs + as
xL XS
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Statistical evaluations of these points yield the same conclusions.
The most comprehensive analysis, by Griliches, separates railroads into
size groups, and estimates the percent variable as 90.0 to 99.1 percent
for large railroads, calculated for the "average ton," versus 60 to 70
percent for the small roads 15 Furthermore, variable costs per unit
of output are not statistically different over size groups, while fixed
costs per unit of output are significantly higher for small railroads.
We estimate, then, that variable costs are between 90 and 100 percent of
total costs, while unit costs are symmetrically less. Therefore, in
reference to rail form A cost estimates, the variable cost estimates are
accepted as reasonable, while the fully-allocated cost estimates are
believed to be high.16a
In summary, ICC rail form A costs suffer from serious estimation
problems. In some cases, the problems are not more or less serious than
those confronted in any approach to railroad cost estimation. In others,
especially determination of the percent variable, rail form A is more
seriously flawed. This analysis suggests that we can reasonably accept
the Rail Form A of variable costs, but that the 20 to 25 percent markup
of this cost to fully-allocated costs is misleading. In fact, due to the
biases of the Rail Form A allocation of fixed and variable costs, a
5 to 10 percent increase in fully-allocated costs is more reasonable,
especially when we consider the fact that a large proportion of the fixed
costs may be due to excess capacity accountable to other commodities, and
not to coal. Though far from being a certain estimate of long-run
marginal costs, this modification of Rail Form A is probably the best we
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can do, given existing data limitations and given our specific focus on
coal shipments.
Furthermore, the rail form A estimates have been improved in the
coal rate cases by, wherever possible, adding direct cost data. These
modifications mitigate some of the general problems in employing
system-wide average cost data.
Finally, one point on the specifics of ICC rail form A estimates
should be made. In the general case, "variable costs" as constructed by
the ICC are short-run average variable costs. However, by employing
actual cost data, and by using costs of incremental units, they
approximate LRMC. If excess capacity exists, SRMC may be less than
LRMC. In fact, however, the railroads have advocated including a
fixed-plant investment figure in variable cost components. Therefore,
the railroads' variable cost estimate seems to be a more reasonable
approximation of LRMC.
AN ANALYSIS OF RAILROAD COST ESTIMATES
BASED ON DATA SUBMITTED TO WESTERN COAL-RATE CASES
Given the deficiencies in the Rail Form A costing approach, and
given the suggested adjustments, we now proceed in analyzing the newest
and most comprehensive evidence on unit-train costs, that assembled for
the various ICC coal-rate cases and proceedings.
Since 1975, a large number of railroad rates have been submitted for
ICC investigation. Many of these have been rate incentive requests,
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filed by the railroads in accordance with the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act (4-R Act) provisions.16 Others have been
initiated by shipper protests. The vast majority have focused on western
originating rates, and Burlington-Northern, the largest western railraod,
has in the majority of cases been a defendant. The statements submitted
have therefore been conceptually similar, with differences primarily in
operating parameters.
The set of cases from which the bulk of this analysis is drawn
includes:
1) San Antonio, Texas versus Burlington Northern
2) Houston Light and Power versus Burlington Northern et al.
3) Nevada Power Co. versus Union Pacific
4) Iowa Power and Light versus Burlington Northern
5) Southern Electric Power versus Burlington Northern et al. 17
Lesser attention is focused on the major eastern rate case involving
Potomac Electric Power Co. (PEPCO) in Virginia.18 This set, though
by no means exhaustive, is representative of the issues and decisions in
other cases as well. The analysis also draws from recent ICC proceedings
focused either directly or indirectly on coal shipments. 9
Tables 1 through 4 provide a summary of the cost estimates presented
in four recently decided cases. The railroads have typically provided a
range of estimates, based on various assumptions on the cost of capital,
and various approaches for determining fully-allocated costs. Method 1
uses 11 percent cost of capital overall; method 2 uses embedded.debt
rates, except 8.7 percent on equipment; method 3 uses 11 percent, except
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Table 1
Wyoming to Flint Creek, Arkansas Cost Estimates
Decided May 21, 1979
(current dollars)
(Method 1)
Railroad
(Method 2)
Utility ICCl
(Method 3)
Variable cost $8.61
Fully-Allocated Cost:
Ton, Ton-mile Basis 12.98
Dollar-Ratio Basis
One-way mileage = 1036
11.15
Rate proposed by Railroad = $11.35 per ton July 1, 1978
Rate proposed by utility = $8.67 per ton.
Rate allowed by ICC = $10.24 per ton = $9.57 x 1.07
Method 1 = 11 percent after-tax current
all capital expenditures.
cost of capital is used for
2 = embedded debt rate is used on capital expenditures,
except cabooses and locomotives, for which the equipment
trust certificate rate of 8.70 percent after-tax is used.
3 = 11 percent after-tax current cost of capital is used for
all capital expenditures except cabooses and locomotives,
for which 8.70 percent is used.
Notes: 1. The ICC estimate reflects their "revenue-need level," not the
strict-cost level. See text.
2. See text for the explanation of these two methods for
increasing variable cost to fully-allocated cost.
Source: ICC, Decision no. 36970. Annual Volume Rates on Coal--Wyoming to
Flint Creek, Arkansas.
$8.49 $5.67$7.29
10.52
9.05
$7.21
12.86
11.03 9.57
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Table 2
Hiawatha, Utah to Moapa, Nevada Cost Estimtes
Decided July 31, 1979
(current dollars)
Railroad Utility ICCI
(Method 1) (Method 2)
Variable costs $7.48 $5.48 $4.50 $6.08
Fully-allocated costs:
Dollar-Ratio Basis 8.69 7.07 5.63 7.57
One-way mileage = 465
Railroad rate = $9.21 per ton, October 1, 1978.
ICC allowed rate = $7.91 per ton, October 1, 1978.
Method 1 = 11.3 percent cost of capital, after tax
2 = embedded debt level
Notes: 1. Revenue-need level.
2. Railroad-owned equipment.
Source: ICC Decision no. 37038, Bituminous Coal, Hiawatha, Utah to
Moapa, Nevada.
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Table 3
Wyoming to San Antonio, Texas Cost Estimates
Decided May 23, 1979
(current dollars)
Railroad Utility
(Method 1) (Method 2)
Variable costs $14.42
Fully-allocated costs
Ton, ton-mile basis
Dollar-ratio basis
22.45
18.38
$12.05 $9.79
20.08
14.80
$11.84
15.50
One-way mileage = 1640
Rate proposed by the railroad = $18.23 per ton, October 1977.
Rate allowed by ICC = $16.12 per ton, later increased to $17.23 per ton.
Cost levels, October 1977
Method 1 = 11 percent after-tax cost of capital
Method 2 = embedded debt rates, except 8.70 percent on locomotives,
cabooses
Notes: 1. Revenue-need level
Source: ICC Decision no. 36180, San Antonio, Texas versus Burlington
Northern et al.
ICCl
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Table 4
Wyoming to Council Bluff, Iowa Cost Estimates
Decided July 13, 1979
(current dollars)
Railroad Utility ICCl
(Method 1)(Method 2)(Method 3)
Variable costs $5.85 34.91 $5.67 $3.90 $5.23
Fully-allocated costs:
Ton, ton-mile 9.06 7.33 5.88
Dollar-ratio 7.55 6.10 7.38 6.78
One-way mileage = 663
Rate proposed by utility = $5.62 per ton.
Rate proposed by railroad = $7.30 per ton.
Rate allowed by ICC = $7.25 per ton.
Method 1 = 11 percent after-tax cost of capital.
Method 2 = embedded debt rate, 8.70 percent on locomotive, caboose
Method 3 = 11 percent, 8.7 percent locomotive, caboose.
Notes: 1. Revenue-need level.
Source: ICC Decision, I and S no. 9199, Unit Train Rates on Coal--
Burlington Northern, Inc. versus Iowa Power and Light Company.
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8.7 percent on equipment costs. The ton, ton-mile basis regresses fixed
costs over distance. The costs related to distance are allocated on a
ton-mile basis, the residual on a ton basis. In the dollar-ratio basis,
total expenses are divided by total variable expenses, and this ratio is
multiplied by variable costs to calculate fully-allocated costs. The
ton, ton-mile basis yields far higher estimates of fully-allocated costs,
largely due to the high density of coal shipments relative to other
shipments. The ICC has not uniformly recommended one method over
another, but in several recent coal proceedings, the ratio basis has been
judged more appropriate. 20
Tables 1 through 4 show the considerable variation in cost
estimates. In the Flint Creek, Arkansas case, for example, the
railroad's estimate of variable costs ranges from 129 percent to 152
percent of the canplainants' estimates. The next step is to analyze
these differences in detail. Though differences exist in almost every
cost category, the bulk of the variation is attributable in most rate
cases to three issues: cost of capital, fixed plant investment, and
equipment costs. Therefore, these three issues and their treatment in
the rate cases will be examined in depth.
COST OF CAPITAL
First, and most important, we will consider the cost of capital, or
the opportunity cost of funds provided to the firm. Until recently, both
the complainants (utilities) and the ICC held fast to the incorrect
concept that the cost of capital should be represented by the historical
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embedded debt rate, as generated by rail form A, of approximately 5.7
percent.21 Largely as a result of the insistent prodding of the
railroads in the western coal-rate cases and the provisions of the 4-R
act (see below), the ICC has gradually moved towards the correct concept
that the cost of capital is the current weighted average cost of each
type of capital used by the firm.22 The utilities, on the other
hand, have continued to advocate the use of historical embedded debt
rates, arguing, without a theoretical foundation, that rates above this
level. do not represent costs, but are, in fact, "profits
The last debate between the ICC and the railroads, with respect to
the current cost of capital, was largely one of semantics. The ICC in
fact advocated the use of the current weighted average cost of capital,
but defended the notion that capital costs above embedded debt rates were
not "costs in the strictest sense" but "rather reflect revenue need
levels." 24 With the decisions of the ICC investigations this too has
been clarified, and the accepted definition of the cost of capital is
correct.25
Though the conceptual differences have been mitigated in the past
year, considerable differences persist on the proper estimation of the
cost of capital. These differences are in part attributable to the fact
that actual estimation of the cost of capital is as much an art as a
science, and in part to fundamental misunderstandings of the determinants
of cost of capital.
The major problem area has understandably been the most difficult:
the cost of equity capital, or the change in the return to equity holders
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with respect to the change in their investment. A variety of approaches
have been utilized, and estimates range between 9 and 16 percent as the
1978 nominal after-tax return on equity capital. The most comprehensive
set of estimates is provided in a recent ICC investigation, Adequacy of
Railroad Revenues, where estimates from 11.5 to 15.5 percent are
presented. The high estimate of 15.5 percent is based on a comparable
earnings study. Dr. J. Rhodes Foster looks at "returns being earned on
book equities of unregulated undertakings having generally similar
financial risks." 26 The reliance on book values, the failure to
recognize variations in capital structure, and the imprecise
determination of risk classes are sufficient grounds to discredit this
estimate. 27 The second highest estimate, 14.1 percent, also
presented by Dr. J. Rhoades Foster, incorrectly includes a full one
percent margin for flotation costs, and can similarly be discredited.
The 11.5 percent estimate, presented by Dr. Shuman is based on an
equity risk premium analysis, where equity risk premiums are added to
current yields on long-term debt. Again, the data selected do not fully
take account of risk and capital structure, and this estimate can also be
discredited.
This leaves a range of estimates for the current cost of equity
capital between 12.5 percent and 13.6 percent. Estimates within this
range are based on two approaches: discounted cash flow and the capital
asset pricing model. The capital asset pricing model has been justified
on theoretical and empirical grounds, though it has not generally been
accepted in utility rate cases to date.28 Essentially, it adds the
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risk-free interest rate and the "systematic" risk premium required by
investors in the company. Under this formulation:
R =R + L (Rm - Rf) + E
where R = return on the jth asset
R = return on the risk-free asset
R = return on the market
= random disturbance term with usual properties
Cov(R , R )
= ,) m
L 
_Var Rm
Unfortunately, in the application of this formulation, two parameters,
the risk factor, and Rm, the expected market return, are inherently
uncertain, and are in good part judgmental. In the ICC proceeding, Dr.
Zepp estimates 6 as .87, based on his analysis of nine Class I
railroads. In estimating the market risk premium (Rm - Rf), he groups
the companies into portfolios, determines the betas for these portfolios,
and performs a regression on the returns and the betas of the portfolios
over several 50-year intervals. He calculates that the past market risk
premium falls between 7.4 and 7.8 percent.29 Using 7.0 percent as
the nominal current yield on Treasury bills, his estimate of the
after-tax, nominal cost of equity capital is:
7.0 + (.87 x 7.6) = 13.6 percent.
Another widely applied approach is the discounted cash flow method.
Under this formulation:
D.
R = + gjo
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where
R. = equity rate of return
DJ = dividend on the jth security in the current period
P = price of the jth security in the current period
g = estimated future growth of dividends.
Application of this technique yielded estimates of 13.0 and 13.14
percent. 30
This author applied the capital-asset pricing model to published
data to test further Dr. Zepp's estimates. First, we must identify firms
of homogeneous business risk. A sample of nine coal-carrying railroads,
five from the West and four from the East, was selected. All railroads
in the sample are diversified companies with 50 percent or more of their
revenues accountable to rail, and all railroads are major coal carriers.
Betas were obtained for this group of railroads from Value Line
Investment Survey. 3 1 The betas ranged from .80 to 1.15.
To account for variation in capital structure, the levered betas
were unlevered as follows
levered
unlevered I + (1 - T) * D/E
where T = .46, federal corporate tax rate
D = long-term debt
E = equity.
Note that several assumptions underly this adjustment: 1) the bond
beta is zero, 2) the current debt/equity ratio is close to the firm's
target D/E return, and 3) the firm's business risk has not changed
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dramatically over the recent past. Conversations with financial analysts
and railroad personnel indicate that these assumptions are in fact
reasonable approximations of reality. 32 Total debt and equity were
drawn also from the Value Line Survey.
Unlevered betas were averaged, then levered given the average D/E
ratio. The risk-free rate, including 6.0 percent inflation, of 6.4
percent was drawn from Ibbotson and Sinquefield's study of return over
the period 1929-1976.33 Average risk premiums, as noted, are to some
extent judgmental. One possibility is to use the average risk premium
over a long period of time in the past as an approximation of
expectations. Ibbotson and Sinquefield's estimate from 1929-1960 is 9.2
percent. This, however, may be too high for expectations. As a low
bound, 6.9 percent is employed, based on Ibbotson and Sinquefield's
expected return between 1976 and 2000. Based on this range, the minimum
required nominal equity return for railroads, financed with the usual
proportion of debt, is bounded by
R. = 6.4 + .95 (9.2) = 15.14
R. = 6.4 + .95 (6.0) = 12.10
with an average of 13.62.
Note from Table 5, however, that the calculated cost of equity
capital is higher for the western roads, bounded by 12.34 percent and
15.51 percent, as compared with 11.68 percent to 14.50 percent for the
eastern and southern railroads. This is attributable to the higher betas
for western railroads, indicating higher risks. Nonetheless, other
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Table 5
Cost of Capital
(millions of dol
Railroad
Wes t:
Burlin gton-Northern
Denver Rio-Grande
Santa Fe
Southern Pacific
Union Pacific
Total Debt
1135.3
111.5
760.2
1145.7
932.4
Net Worth
1950.7
236.1
1891.2
1967
2286
Debt/Equity
.58
.47
.40
.58
.41
East:
Chess ie
Illinois Central
Norfolk and Western
Southern
Total Sample
Average u =
Average D/E =
Average SL =
.71
.634
.95
Source: Value Line Investment Survey,
1979 and author's calculations
"Ratings and Reports," March 21,
Data
lars)
1.15
1.05
1.00
.80
.95
.88
.84
.82
.61
.78
1137.8
1287.9
647.8
842.3
1221
1206
1236.5
1105
.93
1.06
.52
.76
.85
.95
.80
.90
.57
.61
.63
.64
East
.61
.82
.88
West
.79
.49
.99
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financial evidence indicates that the risks for western roads are in fact
lower than these high beta levels indicate and that increased coal
traffic will generally contribute to an equalization of beta across
territories. Since other beta estimates suggest no regional variations
in betas, this difference should not be given too much credence.
The ICC accepted 13.0 percent on the basis of these proceedings.
Given the judgmental nature of the estimate, we cannot base an argument
on the small difference, and 13.0 percent is not unreasonable as a
system-wide average. Nonetheless, possible variations in this estimate
are conceivable.
The remaining calculations are by and large straightforward. An
extensive study of marginal corporate bond rates estimated an 8.5 percent
return. The average capital structure assumed was 40 percent, 60
percent, very close to the estimates obtained here (39, 61 percent). 34
The current average cost of capital is then:
(13.6 x .6) + (.54 x 8.5 x .4) =
8.16 + 1.84 = 10.00
The ICC calculates the cost of capital on new investments as:
(13.0 x .6) + [(1 - .46) x 8.50 x .4] = 9.66 percent.
The ICC also calculates the cost of capital for net investment, or
"investments that carriers were required to make at various times in the
past to perform the services represented by rail form A service
units." 35 . It is easy to be misled by this calculation. An
immediate reaction is that the ICC is charging the oncoming service for
investments that are "sunk," i.e., not incremental investments, and
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therefore not appropriately included in incremental costs. In fact,
these net investments are implicitly used as a proxy for the required
incremental investments for "ordinary" traffic. Furthermore, they are
expected to represent the long-run marginal costs of the service.
Therefore, the return on net investment is a real concern.
As a practical matter, however, approaching the problem this way is
ccmplex. The ICC estimates the required return on net investment as:
(13.0 x .6) + (7.0 x .4) = 10.6 percent
The 7.0 percent represents the estimated current embedded debt rate,
in contrast to the current marginal debt rate of 8.5 percent. The ICC
does not adjust for taxes, as they did in the new investment calculation
above. They justify this on the accounting grounds that the tax benefit
from the inclusion of interest expenses is currently reflected in the
income figure. Thus, they argue, the tax benefit is included in the
capital return on investment, and there is no additional basis for
reducing the cost of capital on net investment. 36 This argument
could be correct, but it is virtually impossible to verify empirically.
From a purely practical viewpoint, however, it is of little concern.
That is, using 7.0 percent without a tax adjustment, or 8.5 percent with
a tax adjustment generates a difference of less than one percent in
variable costs calculation. 37
Another problem with this approach is that applying current cost of
capital to book values in order to approximate incremental investment is
clearly flawed. Deoreciated book values are almost certain to understate
the costs of incremental investment. This problem suggests that we might
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use a higher cost of capital to offset this underestimation, or different
cost data based on actual incremental investment costs. This will be
considered further below in our discussion of investment additives and
related problems in the investment rate base. For a detailed analysis of
another facet of the rate base question, see Appendix A.38
To conclude, the ICC has only recently accepted the use of current
average weighted cost of capital. Even given this acceptance, there are
still problems in actually determining the required rate. Inherent in
the process is a not inconsiderable judgmental factor. The ICC figure,
as any other precise figure, can be argued. However, on balance it is
not unreasonable, and it is representative of the range of reasonable
estimates. For our purposes their estimates will be accepted, although
the sensitivity of costs to variations from 12 to 15 percent in equity
return (and 9.04 to 10.84 in weighted capital costs) will be analyzed
below.
EQUIPMENT COSTS
The second major issue to consider is equipment costs. Two problems
dominate this controversy; the imputed price of new equipment, usually
just locomotives and cabooses given the recent predominance of shipper-
owned cars, and the calculation of "cycle" or "round-trip" times.
Regarding the imputed price of new equipment, the essence of the
controversy is the nature of locomotive and caboose utilization.
Basically, locomotives purchased ostensibly for an incremental unit-train
service are not necessarily used exclusively for this service, but rather
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are added to the railroad's "locomotive pool," which is then allocated
over all services in an allegedly optimal fashion. The railroads contend
that the proper cost of locomotives to impute to the new service is the
price of the new locomotives. The utilities argue that since these new
locomotives benefit other services as well, the average pool price,
including the new locomotives, should be used.
The railroads are correct in theory. Given that a certain number of
locomotive units are essential to this incremental service, the new
locomotive purchase price should be used. The fact that other services
might benefit from the utilization of an improved locomotive pool is
irrelevant to the calculation of incremental costs.
However, what we cited as "given" above must be carefully
scrutinized. That is, the nature of the procedure provides an incentive
for the railroads to overestimate incremental requirements. Furthermore,
with the continuous retiring and adding of locomotives, real incremental
requirements are very difficult to estimate. 39
Evidence presented in the coal-rate cases manifests this problem.
In the Flint Creek case, the ICC decided in favor of the utilities that
the average pool price is appropriate. However, the railroad's estimate
of locomotive requirements was overstated, primarily due to an excessive
backup-unit requirement of 30 percent. After correcting for the
railroad's mistakes in the Flint Creek case, the ICC recommended use of
14.6 locomotive units, not the railroad figure of 17.65.
The second critical factor in calculating equipment costs is the
calculation of round-trip cycle time, or the total round-trip time.
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Clearly, this is an important calculation: the faster the cycle time,
the less equipment is required to deliver a given annual volume. In
theory, the appropriate calculation is clear. If investments in plant
and equipment are undertaken to reduce cycle times, and corresponding net
cost savings are realized, rates should be adjusted downward. The
railroads would ideally estimate planned investment to reduce cycle
times, estimate the net cost savings, and account for these savings in
future rates. However, given that contracts between the railroads and
the shippers have not been allowed to date, and given the consequent
uncertainty in future investment patterns, the ICC has been reluctant to
allow for future investments. The railroads have therefore advocated the
use of current cycle times based on investments to date. Given the ICC
constraint, this is a reasonable approach.
The utilities have advocated the use of future cycle times, yet they
exclude the future investments required to obtain these lower cycle times
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in their cost calculations. Clearly this is biased on the low
side. Given the possibility of faulty investment reporting, the extent
of this bias is unclear. That is, while we are interested in the past
investments undertaken to bring cycle times to current levels, the
railroads may include investments in fact expected to yield the lower
future cycle times. Unfortunately, untangling this issue is no simple
task. As we will see below, existing data do not allow for consistency
checks on actual investment requirements versus stated investment
requirements.
Another problem evidenced in this case, yet permeating other issues,
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is the indivisibility of railroad plant and facilities. Investment
undertaken today to decrease cycle times in the future will no doubt
benefit more traffic than just the given unit-train service. This
problem will also be considered in detail below.
Finally, the cost-of-capital percentage applied to equipment
acquisition is important. The railroads advocate the weighted average
cost of capital, 11 percent by their calculations. The ICC has decided
that the rate on equipment trust certificates, 8.7 percent, should be
used.. In many cases, applying a particular rate for a particular type of
financing is difficult. Even though a particular investment can be
related to a specific source of financing, lenders may actually examine a
firm's overall earnings potential and financial structure before deciding
to accept security based on specific collateral. However, in this
particular case, an alternative to issuance of equipment trust
certificates is equipment leasing. The railroads do in fact lease
equipment in many cases. Given this option, and the close correspondence
between equipment purchases and equiment trust financing, 8.7 percent is
a more realistic approximation.41
FIXED-PLANT INVESTMENT
The last, and possibly most intractable problem is the fixed-plant
investment additive. We will briefly summarize the controversy. The
railroads allocate funds each year to plant investments--track, roadbed,
sidings, etc. First, they contend that these investments can be clearly
separated between coal-related and non-coal related shipments. They note
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also that given the fundamental indivisibility of railroad plant, the
coal investment benefits not only a given service, but other coal
shipments that utilize the same track segment(s). Therefore, they
allocate the incremental coal-related investments over different coal
shipments according to volumes carried. 42
The utilities argue that these are not strict variable costs, but
rather fixed costs that are properly allocated according to the averages
in rail form A. For variable costs, they calculated this fixed-
investment additive as zero. The ICC takes an intermediate stance. They
state that in fact these are not "strict variable costs," but are also
not properly reflected in rail form A and therefore should be included.
The solution to this controversy is not easy. In addition to
extensive practical problems, there are real conceptual problems as
well. First, investments undertaken for a particular service are part of
LRMC. If the railroad spends X million dollars to move an incremental
shipment, then this is properly included in long-run marginal costs. In
theory, then, we would want to calculate the incremental fixed-plant
investment for a particular service and account for this in the cost
calculation.
Unfortunately, this straightforward approach is not possible, and
the basic problem is plant indivisibility. Building a roadway that
handles, say, 1.5 million tons for this shipment, then another for the
next shipment is inefficient. In fact, a minimum-sized facility can
handle far more than 1.5 MT.43 Therefore, any investment for this
incremental service will in fact benefit other potential users.44
96
In one sense the problems are similar to those for equipment cost.
In that situation we noted the fact that benefits that were realized by
other services were not relevant in determining the costs of the
incremental service. In a strict sense, this is true here also. But the
nature of fixed-plant investments forces a different interpretation from
a practical viewpoint.
The problem is, in essence, the problem of joint-production costs,
and as in all cases, there is no generally accepted way to allocate costs
unless all of the traffic is coal. In theory, these variables costs may
be synergistic, and so any division of them is by definition arbitrary.
In practice, even if synergism was not a problem, it is impossible
empirically to break down the indivisible investment into realistic unit
costs.
The problems of allocation aside, investment strategies can also be
disrupted. The railroads would prefer to estimate future coal flows,
estimate related investments, and then to allocate them as above.
However, the ICC prohibits this practice by failing to recognize future
investments and traffic flows beyond five years. Consequently, the
railroads have estimated coal flows five years in the future (i.e., 1983
for 1979 rate cases), and allocated investments, allegedly to support
this 1983 traffic level, according to 1983 shares. This clearly creates
problems. Specifically, it can be expected to have one of three
effects. First, the railroads actually invest now only for traffic
levels that will occur in five years. Given expected increases in coal
flows, this practice is unlikely, and probably inefficient. Second, the
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railroads invest according to long-run expected coal flows, and
hypothetically separate this investment between what is actually required
for 1983 levels, and what is required for post-1983 traffic levels.
Third, the railroads invest today for traffic volumes beyond 1983, yet
allocate the entire investment over 1983 traffic levels.
Clearly, all three outcomes are undesirable. The first is likely to
be inefficient, the second is exceedingly arbitrary, and the third could
place disproportionate burdens on 1983 traffic. In any case, the ICC has
created serious problems in making this calculation.
Furthermore, there is no conclusive way to monitor this accurately,
even given the ICC constraints. Clearly there are inconsistencies in the
railroads' reports. In one case, over a 14-month interval expected
investments were increased by substantial amounts, and at the same time
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expected traffic flows were substantially reduced. However,
monitoring the system beyond this is conplex. Not only must output
projections and investment requirements be monitored, but also the
relationship between the two, and even the railroads do not fully
understand these relationships.
This inherent difficulty is evidenced repeatedly in recent ICC
decisions. In the San Antonio case, fixed-plant investments as estimated
by the railroad were at one point reduced by 30 percent by the ICC.
Later the commission admitted that this reduction was arbitrary, and was
forced hesitantly to accept the initial figure.46 In another case,
Houston Light and Power, the ICC accepted the San Antonio estimate for
1976 investments, but not the Houston estimate for 1977 investments. As
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a general case, the monitoring of this investment has proved to be
extremely difficult, if not impossible.
In summary, the railroads' costs should include a component for
fixed-plant investment additive. However, given the indivisibility in
railroad plant, calculating specific traffic shares is by definition
somewhat arbitrary. Finally, given ICC restrictions, calculation of
shares is either inefficient or inequitable.
Another problem with the fixed-plant investment additive is more
technical. 47 The utilities argue that the fixed-plant investment
additive reflects double counting of coal-related investments. The ICC
has acknowledged this possibility. In order to mitigate this error, they
have attempted to ensure that investments specifically for coal traffic
are excluded from the rail form A cost accounts. However, the utilities
argue that this correction still overestimates investment costs. As
noted above, the fixed-plant investment additive should represent the
difference between incremental coal-related costs and the incremental
costs of "normal" traffic increases. The incremental costs of a normal
traffic increase are based on rail form A system-wide averages. So, if
the incremental costs of coal shipments exceed the incremental costs of
other shipments, we should add only the difference between the two. The
utilities argue that even if coal-related investments are deducted from
rail form A, costs can still be overstated since the railroad coal-
related incremental investments represent not the difference between them
and the normal traffic incremental investments, but rather represent the
total incremental investment. In other words., the railroads calculate
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first the normal incremental investment, and then add not just the extra
amount due to coal, but the entire incremental coal investment. It is
impossible to detect if this is in fact true, but written evidence
indicates that the possibility should not be deemphasized.
To conclude, calculation of fixed-plant investment costs is
inherently difficult, and the ICC has at least compounded these
difficulties. There is substantial evidence that the railroads have not
presented the most realistic estimates of incremental coal-related
investment costs. There is also evidence that the ICC arbitration is
biased towards excessive remuneration in a strict cost sense. However,
given the basic uncertainty in the calculation, and the possibility of
rail form A underestimation, adjustments to the ICC estimates cannot be
based on a sound economic foundation. Furthermore, it is possible that
even the railroads are underestimating their costs.
Given the well-established fact that railroads are spending large
sums of money on coal, and given that system-wide averages would
understate these coal-related costs, we draw the following conclusions.
First, rail form A proxies for incremental investment costs certainly
understate actual incremental cost for coal unit-train shipments, and
possibly even incremental costs for normal traffic. Second, the
fixed-plant additive will copensate for this possible understatement.
Third, it is conceivable that these estimates combined will overstate
incremental costs. Nonetheless, we have no concise foundation for
reducing the ICC adjusted estimates given the inherent uncertainties in
the calculations, and they will be reluctantly accepted.
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SUMMARY
To summarize, there are many differences between the complainants
and the defendants' variable cost estimates in the coal rate cases.
Three issues, however, account for most of the variation: cost of
capital, equipment costs, and fixed plant investment additive. In this
chapter we have analyzed these differences, and found that the ICC
position on them is justified conceptually in most cases. The current
weighted average cost of capital is economically justified rather than
embedded debt rates. Rail form A underestimates incremental investment
costs, and current cycle times are reasonable to use given ICC
restrictions on investment reporting. Only one specific detail of
equipment cost estimation (where the ICC recommends imputing average pool
costs rather than new equipment costs) is conceptually wrong.
Empirically, the adjustments to reflect these conceptual issues are
more difficult to judge. In large part, the empirical issues are simply
impossible to verify given data limitations. Nonetheless, there is no
solid basis for allowing the ICC calculations, with the exception of
equipment costs.
These detailed adjustments are summarized in Table 6 for the Flint
Creek, Arkansas case. The railroad estimate of variable cost at the July
1, 1978 level is $8.55 per short ton. The utilities' estimate is $5.67
per ton. The ICC estimate, adjusted for equipment cost differences, is
$7.31 per ton. Approximately 45 percent of the difference between the
ICC estimate and the utilities' estimates is explained by using the
current cost of capital versus the embedded debt rate. Another 32
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Table 6
Flint Creek--Detailed Adjustments1
(current dollars)
Terminal costs
Line-haul costs
Loss and damage
Additional M4+S2
Fixed plant investment
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Equipment capital cost
locomotive
caboose
Variable cost:
per carload
per ton
Fully-allocated cost
per carload
per ton
Railroads
$20.70
626.02
.72
20.26
1.55
1.80
10.14
17.39
31.34
113.51
2.04
846.07
8.55
1096.11
11.08
SwepCo.
$9.35
534.24
.73
0
0
20.23
.27
564.82
5.67
0
0
ICC
$9.50
613.35
.72
0
1.22
1.45
8.17
13.90
24.87
54.03
.50
727.72
7.31
966.41
9.70
NOTES: 1. July 1, 1978 cost levels.
2. Maintenance of way and structures.
SOURCE: Interstate Commerce Commission, Decision no. 36970, 36980,
Decided May 21, 1979. Appendix II.
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percent is accountable to the fixed plant investment additive.
Note that $7.51 per ton equals approximately 7.1 mills per
ton-mile. From Chapter I, the predicted rate for shipper-owned equipment
with operating parameters set equal to those on this movement is $8.42
for "old" shipments, and $10.55 for "post-1975" shipments, or 8 mills per
ton-mile and 10 mills per ton-mile respectively. The rate allowed by the
ICC was $10.24 per ton.
In the recent coal-rate cases, the ICC-adjusted estimates of
variable costs have also been substantially below the railroads'
estimates (see Tables 1 through 4). In the Moapa, Nevada case the
railroad's estimate for railroad-owned equipment variable costs, was
$7.48 per ton, versus $6.08 per ton by the ICC. In the San Antonio case,
the railroad estimated shipper-owned equipment costs as $14.42 (8.8 mills
per ton-mile) per ton, versus $11.84 per ton (7.2 mills per ton-mile) by
the ICC. In the Sergeant Bluffs, Iowa case, the respective estimates
were $7.35 per ton (9.8 mills per ton-mile), and $5.91 per ton (7.8 mills
per ton-mile) for a 753 mile shipper-owned equipment shipment. Note also
from Tables 1 through 4 that the ICC variable costs estimates are from
70 percent to 75 percent of the rate levels ultimately allowed by the ICC.
Given all of the uncertainties in this chapter, we cannot conclude
with certainty that the variable costs estimated by the ICC are
representative of long-run marginal costs. However, it is certainly
reasonable to state that these estimates represent a lower bound to
long-run marginal costs, and that rents between $2.00 and $4.00 per ton
exist on unit-train shipments. Variable costs range from 7 to 9 mills
per ton-mile for shipper-owned equipment, depending on distances.
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COMPARISON WITH OTHER COST ESTIMATES
The validity of other unit-train cost estimates is generally difficult to
ascertain. Most studies are not specific as to the basis for their
estimates: Are they average costs or marginal costs, long-run or
short-run; how do they treat capacity, how do they allow for rents in
unit-train shipments? A 1976 evaluation of western unit-train costs by
this author, adjusting as best we could for these problems, yielded a
range of 6 to 8 mills in 1975 dollars for long-haul, high-volume
shipments.48 Updating to January 1, 1979 rate levels yields a range
of approximately 8 to 11 mills per ton-mile for railroad-owned
equipment.49 The estimates in the higher range typcially did not
distinguish between rents and costs, so real costs are more likely to be
in the 8 to 10 mill range. Adjusting for shipper-owned equipment, this
would be approximately 6.5 to 8.5 mills, which is consistent with our
estimate from the rate case analysis of 7 to 9 mills per ton-mile. 5 0
These studies were completed by 1976. Since then, two extensive
analyses have been published. The first, by Michael Rieber et al.,
involved an extensive engineering/accounting analysis of track conditions
51and necessary expenses to move increased volumes of coal. It
admittedly represented the most pessimistic outlook for the railroads in
that all infrastructure improvements were allocated over a volume of coal
that was far less than full-capacity volume, and probably less than
optimal capacity volume. For long shipments in railroad-owned equipment,
he estimated unit-train costs from 7 to 9 mills per ton-mile. Escalated
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to December, 1978 dollars, this equals approximately 8.5 to 11 mills per
ton-mile 52
The other recent study was prepared by the Office of Technology
Assessment as evidence for the unit-train, slurry-pipeline Congressional
hearings.53 The cost estimates were prepared by the General Research
Corporation. As in Rieber's study, the methodology was an engineering/
accounting analysis. Volume projections were provided by Teknetron.
Given these, investment requirements were calculated for specific
routes. Incremental cost estimates for four routes are shown in Table 7
for railroad-owned equipment in 1977 dollars. The low figure (5.7 mills)
reflects a coal shipment with very high volume and long distance.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to adjust these costs for lower
tonnages. The Barstow, California, and Florida cases reflected tonnages
closer to actual practiced tonnages. The costs, however, are higher due
to poor terrain and extensive track upgrading required in these areas.
The significance of this for export movements to the West coast should
not be overlooked. It suggests that costs over undeveloped routes with
poor terrain may exceed costs in other cases. In these cases, rates at
existing levels might be required to recover costs. For example, the OTA
estimated rate to Barstow, California equals about 12 mills per ton-mile
in 1978. This is approximately equal to the railroad owned equipment
rate estimated in Chapter I.
To conclude, these other cost estimates cannot be given too much
weight. However, having made adjustments where possible, they at least
contribute to our conclusions on minimum cost levels.
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Table 7
OTA Unit-Train Cost Estimates
(1977 dollars)
Destination Annual Tonnage
(million tons)
Cost per Cost per
ton
(dollars)
ton-mile
(mills)
Gillette, Wyoming
Colstrip, Montana
Price, Utah
Tracy City, Tenn.
Houston, Texas
Becker, Minn.
Barstow, Cal.
Tampa, Fla.
SOURCE: Office of
Pipelines,
Technology Assessment, Task Report:
Volume II, Part I, 1919.
Slurry Coal
Origin
17
10
6
8
9.08
5.37
7.55
8.99
5.7
7.1
11.0
11.6
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EASTERN, MIDWESTERN, AND SOUTHERN COSTS
The last problem that confronts us is the estimation of costs in the
East, Midwest, and South. As noted, the only significant case that has
not dealt with western coal shipments involved the Potomac Electric Power
Company. The focus of that case was narrower, and many of the issues
raised above were not confronted. Consequently, the evidence presented
does not allow for firm cost conclusions.
Another possible approach is to work off the ICC carload cost scale
data.54 With this data we can approximate unit-train costs according
to regions. However, preliminary calcultions with these absolute data
resulted in estimates for the West far different from those presented in
the coal rate cases. The reason for this must be that a significant
number of actual marginal cost data were substituted for rail form A data
in the Western rate cases. In any event, direct calculations of this
type are not reasonable.
Instead we could look at the relative difference in costs over
regions. Analyzing the ICC carload cost scales (adjusted for unit
trains) showed that costs in the West are approximately the same as for
the South and the Midwest. Eastern costs were some 13 percent
higher.55  However, given the generally shorter distances in these
other regions, we cannot apply this information directly without a better
understanding of distance, cost relationships.
Given these problems, the best alternative action is to apply
results of a study undertaken by M.B. Zimmerman, with assistance from
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this author.56 Zimmerman estimated unit-train costs by regressing
1970 unit-train rates on the cost variables described in Chapter I, and a
rent variable. The hypothesis underlying the specificaton of the rent
variable was that alternative fuels, in this case natural gas, provided a
backstop to the delivered coal prices. The rent variable represented the
difference between the delivered price of the alternative fuel and the
delivered coal price, including transportation cost. The coefficient of
the rent variable represents the random proportion of this appropriable
rent that is actually appropriated by the railroads. Using Zimmerman's
notation:
(1) t = t + a(PGAS - FOB coal - t)
where
t = tariff per ton
t = the cost of the shipment
Since 0 depends on an indeterminate bargaining situation between the
railroad and the utility, a itself is a random coefficient. Thus:
(2) t = t +( + n)(PGAS - FOB coal - t)
where a is the expected value of a and the term n reflects the
indeterminacy of the bargaining process. Rewriting equation (2):
(3) t = t(l - + (PGAS - FOBCOAL) + n(PGAS - FOB COAL)
Adding the components of t to (3) yields
t = a0 + a (" - T)M + a2(l - T)IMAT + a 3 (l - )L + T(PGDD)
+ [n(PGDD - a0 - a M - a 2 IMAT - a 3L) + E:]
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where t = tariff in dollars per ton
IMAT = 1/minimum annual tonnage in thousands
L = loading plus unloading time
PGDD = (price of gas - price of coal FOB mine), in dollars
per ton of coal
PGAS = price of natural gas delivered to the utility
FCB0OAL = mine mouth price of coal.
Zimmerman's estimation revealed that in both the East and Midwest the
railroads were able to appropriate a significant piece of the possible
rent, 19 percent in the midwest, and 22 percent in the East. In the
Midwest the rents were, on average, 32.8 percent of the tariff, versus
only 1.3 percent in the East. This was due mainly to the higher gas
prices in the Midwest. 5 7
This model provided an explanation for rates as of 1970. However,
after 1970 natural gas shortages began to develop in wholesale markets,
and the price of natural gas no longer reflected an alternative to
electric utilities. After 1973, oil prices jumped and nuclear power
problems cumulated. For current purposes, the interfuel competition
model as specified by Zimmerman is not realistic.
However, in the East and the Midwest there is reason to believe that
the rate structure in 1970 holds today. Once the rate pattern is
established, the ICC has made it difficult to introduce a newly patterned
rate. In fact, Zimmerman's work has shown that very few new rates have
been posted since 1970 in the East, South and Midwest, and those that
have been posted since 1970 are not significantly different from the
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existing rate structure. In other words, the current rates should be
equal to the 1970 rates escalated according to cost increases, independent
of the changes in the competitive structure. Consequently, escalating
the cost components estimated for the 1970 sample to January 1, 1979 cost
levels should be a reasonable approximation of the current costs for
Eastern, Southern, and Midwestern shipments. Based on Zimmerman's
calculations, assuming minimum annual tonnages equals 1 MT, and that
loading plus unloading times equal 24 hours, the estimated costs at
January 1, 1979 levels for 250, 500, and 1000 mile shipments are,
respectively, $3.60 per ton, $6.22 per ton, and $11.50 per ton. 58
Note that for the 1000 mile shipment, the cost is in fact higher than our
estimate of western costs with railroad-owned equipment of $10.00 per
ton. We will use these cost levels for the integration below.
SUMMlARY
To conclude, the issue of cost estimation is, above all else,
confusing. However, it is important to understanding future developments
in both domestic and export stean coal markets. In this section we have
analyzed the materials in the recent coal rate cases to add conceptual
and empirical understanding about unit-train costs. There are many
complexities and uncertainties that we cannot resolve, but the conclusions
that rents are substantial in all regions of the United States and that
variable costs on long-run shipments with shipper-owned equipment in the
West range from 7 to 9 mills per ton-mile at January 1979 cost levels are
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reasonable. In the East, South, and Midwest, rate patterns are more
easily defined and costs can be approximated from earlier analyses by
Zimmerman. Though we cannot specify with certainty absolute rent levels,
there is clearly the possibility of rates being lowered, and still
covering long-run marginal costs. The significance of these possible
reductions for export steam coal markets will be analyzed below.
As noted in this chapter, the rates allowed by the ICC have been far
higher than variable costs, and even above fully-allocated costs. In
fact, costs are only one factor used by the ICC in rate determination.
The next chapter analyzes other important factors.
Il1
APPENDIX A
FURTHER NOTES ON COST-OF-CAPITAL ESTIMATION
A few further notes related to the cost of capital estimation are
important. First, when a particular road is evaluated, the cost of
capital may well vary according to variation in risk and capital
structure. The railroads have noted this problem, and suggested plugging
in the particular capital structure in the estimating equation. The ICC
has rightly rejected this approach. The reason is that the
cost-of-equity capital will also vary depending on capital structure.
Therefore, using the system-wide cost of equity capital with specific
capital structure inputs will yield unreliable results. Given the
problems of estimating the cost-of-equity capital, the ICC has advocated
using one estimate in all cases and has accordingly enforced input of
system-wide capital structures.
Another pending controversy in determining the cost of capital on
existing investments is whether to apply the current nominal cost of
capital, or some higher rate to compensate for using original book values
in the existing rate base.
The railroads' case, as presented by Foster, is that employing
original costs does not adequately account for the effects of
inflation. 1 He acknowledges the difficulty in applying a "fair value
rate base," and instead advocates utilization of a higher cost of capital.
His argument is essentially that the regulated firms' employment of
original costs puts investors at a disadvantage over investors in
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unregulated industries. He advocates, in particular, a rate of return on
equity based on a study of comparable earnings in unregulated firms. He
estimates the 1978 nominal return on equity capital at 15.1 percent,
versus the 13 percent estimate based on other approaches. 2
Dr. Foster's inclinations are correct. Using original values for
property can create problems.3 However, his treatment of the issue
is flawed in several respects.
Foster considers a $1000 initial investment, an 8 percent real
expected return, and a 6.5 percent annual inflation canponent. In the
regulated case, using original book values, he notes that each year the
investor will receive 14.5 percent of $1000, or $80 in real return, $65
as an inflation component. In the unregulated firm, he notes that the
first-year return will also be $145, however, in the second year, the
investor will receive 14.5 percent on $1065 (the inflated base) or 15.2
percent on $1000. He contends, based on this scenario, that the
unregulated firms' investor is at a disadvantage and is not being
canpensated for inflation.
The ICC replied that if those who made:
"the investment received a return on it over the years equal to the
market value cost of capital, they would be compensated for the
decline in the purchasing power of their book equity. That is,
since the market value of capital rises with inflation, the earnings
would have contained an inflation factor. Had the portion of their
money been reinvested, the basic equity would have increased over
the years." 4
Foster acknowledges this fact in part. Given this reinvestment of
the inflation premiums, he states that "the same situation as under
competition" would obtain.5 However, he argues that this
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reinvestment represents an economic sacrifice on the part of the
investors that should not be expected. "Why should the equity owners of
the railroad be asked to make a sacrifice not made by investors in
,6unregulated enterprise." In fact, this reinvestment is not an
economic sacrifice, but rather a rational use of funds. Foster's exanple
of an investor using these funds instead for "personal gratification," is
not a sound economic example. In fact, we could argue that just as much
a sacrifice is made by the unregulated investors, where the inflation
premium is held by the firm and not available for reinvestment.
A more basic problem with Foster's presentation is the calculations
themselves. Foster assumes that the 14.5 percent return is based each
year on the following:
1000(1.065) n-1
Therefore, in year 2 the unregulated firm's investors receive
(.145) x (1065). This is clearly speculative. The 1000 initial
investment represents the discounted present value of the expected future
returns. Inflation in year two of 6.5 percent does not necessarily mean
that this discounted present value will increase to $1065. In fact,
depending on market conditions, this $1000 could be $1500 or $500 or any
number within a reasonable range. That is, the rate base in each
succeeding year is not simply the inflated rate base, but the current
market value of the initial investment.
Furthermore, to the extent that replacement costs might be a
reasonable approximation of current market value, Foster's calculations
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are again unfounded in theory. We are interested in the replacement
costs of the asset as it stands in year n, not as it stood in year 1.
That is, the base must be adjusted for depreciation. Therefore, even if
current market values reflect closely replacement costs, Foster's simple
approximation of replacement costs is unjustified.
Note that it is important to know the relationship between book
value and current market value. Current market value will usually exceed
book value, so higher returns would be justified. However, data
constraints prohibit us from more than speculating.7
Now, one more problem should be considered. Foster assumes that
inflation will be constant, and that this constant rate will be equal to
expectations. In fact, this may not happen. For example, inflation may
exceed expectations in one year, but return to normal the next year.
This type of shock does in fact hurt the investors in the regulated firm,
but it also hurts other unregulated investors, for example, bond
holders. The question of whether this represents "fair treatment" is
judgnental, and, as Meyers has noted, depends on the understanding of the
investor-regulator pact. 8  If we presume that regulators should
absorb all risks of inflation, then using book value in certain
circumstances is unfair. If not, then it is fair. Since unregulated
firms do not absorb all the risks of inflation, and furthermore, since if
inflation is lower than expected in a given period the regulated firms
investors can gain, it is difficult to argue that use of original book
values is "unfair."
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Finally, after arguing for a higher cost of capital, which could be
but is not necessarily justified, Dr. Foster employs a comparable
earnings study of unregulated industries to estimate this higher cost of
capital. Given the inherent flaws in this approach, even had his other
arguments been accepted, it would be difficult to base conclusions on
evidence such as this.
Finally, it should not be inferred from this appraisal that using
book values as opposed to current market values does not present
problems. Actually, if current market values do not equal book values,
then resources will be misallocated. 9  However, this is not the same
as saying that investors are necessarily unfairly treated, or not
compensated for inflation by using original book values in the rate
base. In fact, they could conceivably be better off because of it. In
addition, as noted below, this does not suggest that using current cost
of capital with book values will not underestimate incremental investment
costs. O1 the contrary, it most certainly will. However, as we will see
below, incremental investment costs are accounted for in other ways as
well, and the overall treatment of incremental investment is complicated
in many other ways.
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II
ISeveral important studies that emphasize the difficulties in
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a. Friedlaender, A., The Dilemma of Freight Transportation
Regulation, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1969.
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the Regulated Transportation Industries," MIT PhD Thesis, Department
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problem of calculating the proportion of the long-run investment
chargeable to short-run traffic flow is critical to evaluating the ICC
coal rate cases, and consequently, critical to our investigation of
costs.
3See Spady, Griliches, Borts, Kneafsey, and Keeler, op. cit.
4See Meyer et al., op. cit., pp. 18-32.
5See also a recent criticism of statistical estimation of
railroad cost functions. Daughety, A. et al., "A New Approach to
Railroad Cost Estimation," Transportation Research Forum, Vol. XX, no.
1, 1979, pp. 188-197. The major criticisms raised are the basic
deficiencies of the ICC accounts that have been used in most previous
analyses. In particular, the ICC data ignores network canplications,
quality of service, and allocates costs arbitrarily. In this study a
new data set is compiled from actual firm data.
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6See Zimnerman, M.B.., "Rent and Regulation in Unit-Train Rate
Determination: Regional Discrimination and Inter-fuel Competition,"
MIT Energy Laboratory, June, 1978.
Charles River Associates, "The Economic Impact of Public Policy
on the Appalachian Coal Industry and the Regional Economy," June 1972,
pp. 3-20.
Friedlaender, A., Fergusen, W., and Sloss, J., "The Rate
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February 1978.
Also see:
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Co., "Rail Carloads Costing and
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9First, their method for dividing fixed costs between passenger
service and freight service is based on revenues and is arbitrary.
For our purposes this is unimportant, because, with the exception of
Conrail, passenger operations now account for less than 1 percent of
total operating expenses for major coal railroads. Second, joint
variable costs present problems. In this case, they are grouped with
all variable costs and allocated over different service units
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investment amounted to approximately 70 cents per ton, or
approximately 10 percent of variable costs. Using 9.6 percent cost of
capital, the return on net investment equalled 63 cents. The
difference of 7 cents equals 0.8 percent of variable costs.
38For a detailed analysis of another facet of the rate base
issue, see Appendix A.
3 9For example, see ICC Decision no. 36608, op. cit., p. 8.
4OThe difference is often substantial. Due to important
infrastructure expansions, the future cycle time in the Flint Creek
case was projected to be 112 hours, versus the current cycle time of
199 hours. This is, however, an extreme case. See ICC Decision no.
36970, 36980, pp. 19-20.
4lSee Bierman, H. and Smidt, S., The Capital Budgeting Decision,
MacMillan Publishing Co., Third Edition, 19/I, p. 144.
42This is not necessarily a contradictory statement. Certain
investments are made on track segments used exclusively for coal.
Also, it is often true that track strengthening is undertaken only for
coal shipments, even though other commodities may use the same route
segnent. Neither of these instances contradicts the basic
indivisibility of railroad investments.
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4 3For example, a single track with 2-mile sidings at 40-mile
intervals can handle between 5 and 8 trains in each direction each
day. This would allow as much as 70 MT throughput per year. For
analyses of railroad capacity, see:
a. DeSai, S. and Witten, J., "Rail Transportation Requirements
for Coal Movements in 1985," U.S. Department of Transportation,
December 1978.
b. Manalytics, Inc., "Coal Transportation Capability of the
Existing Rail and Barge Network, 1985 and Beyond," Electric Power
Research Institute, September 1976.
44Note again that this concern is not important to the direct
estimation of LRMC. It is, however, critical to the evaluation of the
ICC rate cases, and consequently is important to our indirect
estimation of LRMC.
4 5See ICC Decision no. 36579, op. cit., pp. 320-323.
46ICC Decision no. 36180, pp. 15-16. Decided October 19, 1978.
ICC Decision no. 36180, pp. 4-5. Decided May 23, 1979,
47Beyond this are additional technical problems. First, the
utilities argue that these investments should be allocated over all
services, not just coal services. However, if investments are
undertaken strictly for coal, the utilities' position is wrong. The
evidence suggests and the ICC accepts the conclusion that the
railroads would not have made "these investments but for unit coal
train service." (ICC Decision no. 36870, p. 18)--"these" investments
meaning the difference between the large coal-related investments
(track reinformcement, for example) and system average fixed plant
investments. As the ICC notes, "other shippers do not require, nor
have they asked for, this level of service. It would be unfair to
present them with a share of the bill." (p. 18, ICC Decision no.
36970).
Second, the utilities and the ICC question the railroads'
calculations of the betterment portion of improvements included in
operating expenses. This betterment portion is treated as a capital
iten. "This means that when 90 lb. rail is replaced with 132 lb.
rail, the 42 lb. difference (called the betterment portion) is treated
as a capital investment. The remainder is charged to the operating
expense accounts, and would have to be made without coal traffic.
Furthermore, a portion of the operating expenses should be allocated
to non-coal traffic." (pp. 37-39, Appendix C., ICC Decision no.
36970). The ICC makes a minor adjustment in this proportion in favor
of the utilities. They also make an adjustment for the railroads'
"improper" adjustment for the depreciation tax shield (pp. 39-41).
Both these issues are straightforward and minor factors. They need
not be discussed in detail.
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Third, one special case, Sergeants Bluff, Iowa, presented a
unique problem in the allocation of investments. In this case, the
utility had an option to terminate the contract with their coal
supplier after a five-year period. Given this, the railroads argued
that the service should be charged for all these investments in the
five guaranteed years. The ICC majority position was that 20 years
was more appropriate in that the five-year annuity would create the
possibility of double-charging at later dates. The minority position
was that the five-year period was in fact reasonable. Though a unique
situation, this too shows up the basic problems in monitoring the
system.
4 8Sargent, op. cit., pp. 30-52.
49Based on the AAR index change from 1975 to 1978.
5 0For data on car ownership costs, see:
ICC Decision no. 36970, 36980, op. cit.
ICC Decision no. 36180, op. cit.
ICC Decision, I and S 9199, op cit.
5 1Rieber, M., "Comparative Coal Transportation Costs: An
Economic and Engineering Analysis of Truck, Belt, Rail, Barge and Coal
Slurry and Pneumatic Pipelines," Illinois University at Urbana,
Champaign, August 1977.
521t should be noted that Rieber has provided cost evidence for
railroads in the slurry pipeline debates. His original estimates were
far below any other estimates, which of course benefited the
railroads' case. The work was flawed, and his updated estimates
adjust for these flaws, so the initial estimate itself is
meaningless. It does represent an interesting example of the
railroads' having their cake and eating it too.
530ffice of Technology Assessment, Task Report, "Slurry Coal
Pipelines," Vol. II, Part I, January 1978.
541CC, "Rail Carload Cost Scales," Statement no. ICI-75, 1975.
55Ibid.
56Zimmerman, 1978, op. cit.
57This difference is also due to the shorter shipment distances
in the Midwest.
58The equation used in these results is one developed by
Zimmerman and this author for the combined Eastern, Midwestern
shipments. The results are not significantly different.
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER II--APPENDIX A
'It should be noted that the following analysis focuses on the
particular issue of whether the use of book values for net investments
handicaps investors in the regulated firm in that it does not account
for inflation. In particular, it appraises Dr. Foster's argument for a
higher cost of capital to compensate for this problem. It does not
confront the closely-related issue of net investment as a proxy for
incremental costs. As we will see in a later section, we might
advocate a higher imputed rate of return to adjust for this problem.
Note finally that Foster's argument for return on old investments is
not per se appropriate as an incremental cost. The railroads and the
ICC seem to have lost sight of this fact. That is, to the extent that
other proxies are used for incremental investment costs, calculation of
return on net investment is incorrect, no matter what cost of capital
estimate is selected.
Foster's arguments are presented in: ICC, ex parte no. 363, The
Fair Return Camponent of Adequate Railroad Revenue Levels, 1979
Determination, Verified Statement of J. Rhoads Foster, June 1976.
2Ibid., pp. 88-108.
3See, for example, Meyers, op. cit., Morton, W., "Guides to a
Fair Rate of Return," Public Uti1TtiesFortnightly, Vol. 86, no. 2, May
1952, pp. 91-131.
4ICC Decision, ex parte no. 353, op. cit. Decided December 1,
1978, p. 34.
5ICC Decision, ex parte no. 363, op. cit., p. 76.
6 Ibid., p. 97.
70ne interesting specification of the problem is presented by
Meyers. He shows how in competitive equilibrium the current market
value (CNV) will be related to book value (BV) as LRMC is to LRAC. If,
as the railroads generally contend, LRAC is greater than LRIC, then BV
would in fact be greater than CMV. Meyers, op. cit., pp. 85-86.
8 Ibid., pp. 79-82.
91bid., pp. 79-87.
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CHAPTER III
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND RAILROAD COAL-RATE DETERMINATION
126
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter analyzed costs of unit-train shipments of
coal. While some uncertainties exist, the evidence supports the
conclusion that long-run marginal costs are substantially below railroad
rates.
To reinforce this conclusion, and to provide additional insight into
ICC regulatory policies and practices, this section will consider the
same problem from a different perspective. Where before we asked: "Can
rates be explained by costs alone?" we now ask: "Can we reject the
hypothesis that rates are partly explained by rents?" Our answer is a
resounding no. In fact, as we will see, the railroads advocate and the
ICC explicitly allows rates to exceed even Rail Form A fully-allocated
costs. In addition to demonstrating this practice, the possible
justifications for this practice will be analyzed.
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: PAST PRACTICES
Interstate Commerce Commission policies have been thoroughly
analyzed. Their inconsistencies and inefficiencies have been documented
and there is no need here for an extensive reconstruction of the
important arguments. Most authors conclude that restrictions on entry
and abandonments, and minimum and maximum rate regulation have decreased
competition and induced significant inefficiency in the provision of
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transportation services.I Nonetheless, a few general points
pertinent to our analysis should be made prior to the discussion of the
ICC's actions in the recent coal-rate cases.
First, though the initial intentions of Congress are debatable and
though the written intentions of the Interstate Commerce Act and related
amendments are chronically ambiguous, it is generally accepted that in
practice the ICC has been primarily committed to first establishing and
then reinforcing the position of the railroads in freight
transportation.2 The most recent amendment to the Act, the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4R Act), is the last of
many amendments designed to protect, enhance, or restore the position of
the railroads. 3  Its stated purpose is to:
Provide the means to rehabilitate and maintain the physical
facilities, improve the operations and structures, and restore the
financial stability of the railway system of the United States.3a
In fact, as will be seen below, the rate-making and regulatory
reforms (or the interpretation of these reforms) contained in the 4R Act
have been the catalyst for the current controversies over coal rates.
CONTROL OF ENTRY
Second, the most powerful tool that the ICC has used to protect the
railroads (though not always successfully) has been the control of
entry. Starting with the Transportation Act of 1920, which gave the ICC
the authority to limit the establishment of new railroads and to control
the extension and abandonment of railway lines, and continuing through
the 1940 National Transporation Policy Act, which added entry control of
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water carriers to that of trucks and rail, the ICC has been committed to
using this mechanism to "protect" the railroads and other modes from each
other and from external competitive threats.4
In the ICC's words:
It has consistently been held that existing carriers should be
afforded the opportunity to transport all the traffic which they can
handle adequately, economically, and efficiently in the territory
they serve before a new service is authorized. 5
On occasion the Supreme Court has criticized these policies. In a
1957 decision, for example, the Court overturned an ICC decision because:
To reject a motor carrier application on the bare conclusion that
existing rail service can move the available traffic, without regard
to inherent disadvantages of the proposed service, would give one
mode of transport unwarranted protection from others. 6
Nonetheless, the interpretation of "inherent advantage" has never
been clearly specified, and evidence suggests that restrictive policies
persist.7
Not surprisingly, the situation that has obtained is one where the
railroads frequently have exclusive access over a given
origin-destination group. Of course this is partly explained by the
nature of railroad operations--though railroads may not be natural
monopolists in a strict sense, optimal plant size in some markets would
justify service by only one railroad, independent of controls.8
However, the ICC has reinforced the railroads' monopoly position.
A recent National Coal Association (NCA) study analyzed in detail
the extent of railroad monopoly power for coal shipments.9 It
defines "captivity" as existing when both:
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1) a single rail carrier represents either the only present
transportation alternative for the entire shipment, or a
substantial share of the routes for the shipment in question;
and
2) the next best future transportation alternative (other rail
carriers or other modes) is one that would cause injury to the
shipper's competitive position if forced to adopt that
10
alternative.
The NCA determined that 93.81 percent of western unit-train
shipments, 89.22 percent of shipments originating in the central United
States, and 92.58 percent of Appalachia shipments are captive under this
definition. Clearly, this is not a rigorous definition of monopoly
power. Geographic and product competition are ignored. Nonetheless, it
is a firm indication of the fact that a given route is almost exclusively
served by only one railraod.
RATE REGULATION
The third major point to make is that the ICC has wide-reaching
legislative control over rates, but has for the most part interpreted
this control and implemented this control to further insulate
transportation in general, and the railroads in particular, from
competition, as is the case of entry control. More specifically, "all
charges shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust and unreasonable
charge--is prohibited and declared to be unlawful." The Act explicitly
prohibits personal discrimination, undue preference between persons,
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localities, and types of traffic, and the practice of charging more for a
short-haul than a long-haul over a common line. Further, they have
authority to determine maximum or minimum rates where these principles
are violated. 12
The obvious ambiguities in the Act as written have allowed room for
interpretation. The ICC's interpretation has been liberal, to say the
least. Historically, they have been primarily concerned with minimum
rate legislation, rejecting rate reductions due to their detrimental
impact on alternative modes. In other cases, the ICC's non-economic
definition of discrimination has kept unnecessary rates in effect. The
case of coal unit-train rates is particularly interesting. Due to ICC
policies, lower rates could be charged on unit trains only if all
service, independent of volumes, received the same rate. Eventually the
ICC relaxed this restriction, but it was largely due to increased
competition from alternative fuels and alternative unregulated
transportation modes. In this case and others, the ICC has on balance
maintained a higher rate floor than would otherwise have obtained.14
Conversely, examples of rate-specific maximum rate regulation have
been rare.15 Where maximum rates have been imposed on specific
shipments, they have usually been imposed at the point when rates are
first posted. In that most rates are initiated in competitive
environments, monopoly rents at this stage are not typical, so the fact
that few maximum rate cases have been heard is not surprising. Once a
rate structure has been established, rate increases have been limited to
the general rate level increases allowed by the ICC. In theory, new
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rates posted once this structure is established are kept in line with the
existing rate structure by the ICC. Therefore, if competition decreased,
the railroads' ability to realize higher rents would be constrained by
the ICC. In practice, however, given the historical competitive
pressures on railroads, the ICC has rarely had reason to do this. In the
current coal cases, however, the ICC's willingness to constrain rates is
being tested. Ole critical factor is the time lag between the first
posted rates and the point where large monopoly rents are appropriated.
If this time is very short, as it has been for western coal rates, then
the definition of the existing rate structure is more difficult, and the
ability of the ICC to set maximum rate levels is complicated.
Furthermore, we will see that even though maximum rate regulation is
authorized in a general sense, the limits that can actually be prescribed
by the ICC are nebulous at best.
In other instances the ICC has prohibited "discrimination" that is
not discriminatory in an economic sense. For exanple, long-haul rates
have been forced to be equal to short-haul rates, and these rates are
generally keyed to the long-haul distances on short hauls. Here also, the
ICC has exerted little pressure on the higher end of rate structure. 16
In other instances that are discriminatory in the true economic
sense, discrimination is rampant, yet has been sporadically prohibited.
In particular, value-of-service ratemaking, where consumers with
different elasticities of demand but otherwise identical situations have
received significantly different rates, has been ubiquitous. Where
discrimination in this sense has been protested, the ICC has further
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complicated the interpretation of discrimination to "undue
discrimination."11
Another example pertinent to our evaluation is export rates. The
ICC has the authority to establish "proportional rates," or maximum and
minimum proportional rates on export traffic, defining proportional rates
only as "those which differ from the corresponding local rates." 18
In this case, discrimination is explicitly allowed and practiced, as
export rates are historically higher than comparable domestic
rates .*9
The rate-setting structure that has obtained is essentially one
wfhere the ICC has shown great concern with minimum rate levels, yet
little concern with maximum rate levels. In the case of coal, rate
structures have been developed with only occasional interference from the
ICC to date.
SUMMARY
In summary, the railroads' position as monopolists has been
reinforced, if not created by ICC policies. Historically, there has been
little if any constraint by the ICC on maximum rate levels, yet a
definite constraint on minimum rate levels. As noted above, this is in
part attributable to the poor competitive position of railroads in the
past. Therefore, the interpretation should not be that the ICC will not
limit rates, but rather that they have not often done so in the past.
The current coal cases represent a break in tradition as the railroads
can and will attempt to appropriate monopoly rents. The likelihood of
the ICC limiting monopoly profits on coal shipments will be analyzed next.
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ICC REGULATION: CURRENT PRACTICE
IN THE COAL-RATE CASES
We have shown that coal-carrying routes are controlled by only one
railroad in most cases, and that the ICC policies to date have not
focused on maximum rate regulation. In this section, we will take a
close look at current coal-rate cases and the related testimony for two
reasons. First, to reinforce the contention that rail rates are higher
than costs, no matter how costs are estimated. Second, to consider
possible justifications for rates exceeding long-run marginal costs.
First, we will set the stage. The railroads in most cases have at
least some monopoly power, though the extent of this power is variable.
Once a contract has been signed between a utility and a coal company,
there is no doubt that the railroad has substantial monopoly power. This
power may be constrained by ICC regulations, but, more likely, the
utilities, in the role of a monopsonist, will battle the railroad for the
difference between the cost of using coal and the cost of the next best
alternative. 20 The proportion that each party in this bilateral
monopoly appropriates depends on their relative strengths. In theory, if
utilities get the rent the gain will be at best short-lived as
electricity rates decrease proportionately. These gains are disaggregate
over many people, suggesting the possibility that they have less
aggregate motivation. Conversely, if the utilities lose the surplus,
they can ultimately pass it on to consumers. The railroads, on the other
hand, will reap the monopoly profits. Nonetheless, it is risky to
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speculate as to the average outcome. It depends in each case on
unobservable bargaining conditions. In certain cases where the utility
controls several large plants, American Electric Power for example, the
railroads' ability to obtain large rents may well be constrained.
Prior to this stage, however, the extent of railroad monopoly power
is not so clear. Most importantly, competition from different coal
producers could curtail the railroads' power. Intraregional competition
might in some cases act as a constraint, but given the small number of
competing roads within each region, interregional competition is a more
likely limiting factor. However, there are two possible problems with
this. First, it is not unreasonable to project collusion between
midwestern and western railroads, say, on shipments to the Gulf Coast.
Second, though competition may exist at the supply point, many power
plants have only one carrier at the terminating point. With the existing
barriers to entry, this also could reduce the threat of interregional
competition.
Note that the amount of appropriable rent is by all estimates
substantial. There is uncertainty about the actual magnitude but most
studies estimate that the rates currently being sought by the railroads
could be increased further and still yield increased revenues. That is,
the existing rates are set at an inelastic point of the utilities' demand
curve. One recent study estimates that for shipments to Texas, rates
could increase from the current levels of $16.00 to $20.00 with no
significant change in demand. 2 1 The next-best option in most cases is
in fact coal from another region, i.e., Texas lignite or Southern Illinois
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bituminous coals. If the railroads collude in rate-setting, as suggested
above, it is conceivable that appropriable rents will be even higher.
We now proceed in analyzing recent coal-rate cases. Recall that in
the previous sections we estimated the costs of railroad coal shipments.
In most cases, the rates advocated by the railroad were approximately
equal to their fully-allocated cost estimates. In some cases they were
higher, in fewer still lower. This, however, is only part of the debate
raging in the coal-rate cases. The railroads contend, and the ICC
supports the contention, that cost of service is only one factor in
determining the reasonableness of a rate. The fact that a rate is above
costs by some margin is not sufficient grounds to reject it. In the
course of the debate, numerous issues are presented and evaluated. In
this section, only the major ones will be considered. 2 2
MARKET DOMINANCE
One major issue is the determination of market dominance. Its
importance, as is the case with many other issues, is raised in the 4R
Act. Section 202 states:
No rate shall be found to be unjust or unreasonable, or not
shown to be just and reasonable, on the grounds that such rate
exceeds a just or reasonable maximum for the service rendered or to
be rendered, unless the Commission has first found that the
proponent carrier has market dominance over such service.
In addition, "a finding that a carrier has market dominance over a
service shall not create a presumption that the rate or rates for such
service exceed a just and reasonable maximum." 23 Therefore, a
finding of market dominance is a necessary, but not sufficient condition,
for setting a maximum rate.
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As is typically the case, the 4R Act is ambiguous in its definiton
of market dominance. "Market dominance refers to the absence of
effective canpetition from other commodities or modes of transportation
for the traffic or movement to which a rate applies." 24
Equally unsurprisingly, the ICC's interpretation of the clause is
flawed. After extensive investigations, they ultimately described three
situations, any one of which creates the "rebuttable presumption of
market dominance ."
1) when the proponent carrier has handled 70 percent or more of
the involved traffic or movement during the preceding year:
the market share of the proponent will be defined to include
the share of any affiliates, and of any carrier participating
in the rate or with wiom the proponent carrier has discussed,
considered, or approved the rate in issue, or,
2) where the rate at issue exceeds the variable costs of providing
the service by 60 percent or more, or,
3) when affected shippers or consignees have made a substantial
investment in rail-related equipment or facilities which
prevents or makes impractical the use of another carrier or
mode.
The definition of market dominance is in any case a difficult task.
It is somewhat arbitrary and must be based on imprecise price and demand
estimates. This definition, nonetheless, is worse than most. Recall
that determination of market dominance is intended to be indicative of
non-effective competition, or, going one step further, of monopoly
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pricing powers. In the first criteria above, the fact that "70 percent
or more of the involved traffic" is carried by the railroad is clearly an
insufficient indication of non-effective competition.25 The
percentage is arbitrary, but more importantly it could just as likely
obtain given effective competition.
In the second criteria, prices above variable costs are a reasonable
foundation for determining non-effective competition, but the percentage
is again arbitrary, and the costing procedures of the ICC are unreliable
enough to question this approach.
In the third criteria, the investment requirement is conceivably an
indication of short-run market dominance. However, again it is arbitrary,
and the criterion could well apply where no market dominance exists.
The ICC definition seems to presume market dominance, and then
speculate as to ex post conditions likely to obtain given market
dominance. It is certainly not a valid ex ante determination of market
power.
It should be noted that the ICC's position is that if the criteria
are fulfilled, "there is not necessarily market dominance. The test is
merely a threshold determination for directing the commission's attention
to those situations in which competitive forces may not be sufficient to
insure just and reasonable rate levels." 25 This is certainly a
reasonable position. However, the criterion has in fact been employed and
in virtually all the coal cases the ICC has found that the railroad in
question has market dominance over the traffic in issue. Independent of
the ICC's cautious interpretation of this test, they have effectively
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removed the Congressional requirement for market dominance to set maximum
rates.
The railroads, among others, have noted these flaws. They have
rightly suggested that effective competition should consider geographic
and product competition. In this case, the railroads argue that coal
from other regions and other fuels are competitive factors. Independent
of the actual extent to which this would alter the conclusions, the
railroads' position is correct.
None of the parties have been quick to present different practicable
methodologies. In fact, any definition based on imperfect information
must be somewhat arbitrary. Ideally, we would want to consider
substitution possibilities in production and consumption: coal from
other regions, other fuels, and other possibilities than electricity in
final demand sectors. In other words, we would want to reflect the
choices that utilities and consumers have beyond coal from a given origin.
No precise definition will be presented here. Nonetheless, any
reasonable definition that adjusted for these flaws would no doubt yield
similar conclusions. Though the extent of market power no doubt varies
with the particular characteristics of the demand and supply centers, as
noted above, and though this market power may be largely the construction
of the ICC, coal-carrying railroads in most cases have considerable
monopoly power, and their pricing practices should be monitored. The ICC
is again reappraising the definition of market dominance. Hopefully a
new method will be formulated to alleviate the existing criticism, but
the conclusion should be the same.
139
Another important short-run concern is the nature of the bargaining
process between the utilities and the railroads and the possibility of
abuses. The utility must in the planning stages consider options and
select the least-cost option, based on negotiated but non-contracted rail
rates. Assume they decide to purchase coal based on these negotiations.
They then enter into a long-term contract with the coal supplier (usually
20 years or more), and conceivably build unloading facilities, and
railroad cars, in addition to the construction of the generating plant.
Now, when the coal begins to move, the railroads say that in fact they
will charge a higher rate. As devious as this may seem, it is a recurrent
problem in virtually all the recent coal-rate cases. The railroads argue
that early rates presented were merely "planning rates" and should not be
interpreted as actual rate estimates. Most evidence suggests, however,
that the railroads clearly led utilities to base plans on these rates.
In one particularly suspect case, the railroads had offered a rate
of $5.23 to Iowa Power and Light. 28  When the rate was to become
effective, the railroad offered instead a rate of $6.32, with the threat
that failure to accept this rate would invite the railroads to file a
capital incentive rate of $7.38. In this case, the ICC firmly
reprimanded the railroads for "bait and switch" tactics, and rejected the
capital incentive rate request. 29 It should be noted, however, that
the ICC reprimanded the railroads for this practice in 1978. In 1979,
the ICC allowed a rate of $7.25 and made little mention of the "bait and
switch" tactics. In other cases, the tactic has been prohibited, but, if
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other evidence supported higher rates, it has not been the dominant
consideration in rate-setting.
In future instances this element of monopoly power will be
minimized. The 4R Act allows for effective contracts where investments
in facilities are required.30 However, in current cases it is an
important factor in the railroads' ability to realize monopoly profits.
In summary, the ICC definiton of market dominance is clearly flawed.
However, given a more efficient indication of non-effective competition,
market dominance should in most cases of concern be established,
particularly in the cases we examine where contracts have not been
allowed. However, the future decisions of the courts and the ICC cannot
be predicted, and the intended constraint on maximum rate setting may be
reinforced, therefore allowing for long-lived monopoly profits.
COMPARABLE RATES
As noted above, determination of market dominance is not sufficient
evidence to set a maximum rate. The ICC then has to decide what is
"reasonable."
One basis for this determination in the past has been rate
comparisons. The ICC has given weight to evidence that shows a given
rate to be higher (or lower) than rates in the same geographic region
involving the same costs and services. In fact, their acceptance of
comparability has no doubt been one strong factor in keeping rate levels
down. That is, when rates first become effective, they are often set at
competitive levels. Once a rate structure evolves around this level, the
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ICC has made it difficult for individual railroads to respond to less
competitive conditions that might arise in the future.
However, this historical constraint has been ineffective in recent
coal cases. First, in the East, South, and Midwest, where coal-rate
structures have been long established and the ICC would not likely allow
variations from this structure, they have been allowing larger than usual
general rate level increases.31 Furthermore, in the western rate
cases, the ICC has adopted the position that "rate comparisons should be
given little weight in determining the reasonableness of the rate." 32
In one case they note "the lack of a well-defined western coal rate
structure." "Without such an established rate structure, rate
comparisons are of little value". 33
In a more recent case involving Council Bluffs and Sargeant Bluff,
Iowa, the ICC states:
Rate comparisons are useful as rough estimates of rate
reasonableness, but cost evidence takes precedence. This is
especially true where there is no well developed rate structure.
Further, the commission has announced a policy of increased
deference to carrier pricing. Thus the carriers will not be
required to establish and maintain elaborate and precise rate
relationships. In this setting, rate comparisons must be given
decreased emphasis in litigated cases. 34
The real problem has been that the parties have presented vastly
different comparable rate evidence. As always, part of the difference
relates to various interpretations of costs. But the major difference is
the role of "value-of-service" in rate-setting. For example, in the
Flint Creek case the railroads contend that only the post-oil embargo
rates are reasonable in comparison, in that only these rates reflect the
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current value of service. The shippers, Swepco in this case, contend
that pre-1975 rates should be the basis for comparability. "The new
rates are not probative of the going rate for this service in that
virtually all of these new rates are currently the subject of pending or
active litigation."35 The ICC is currently investigating the western
rate structure (ex parte 347) and they may ultimately give greater weight
to comparable rate evidence. However, given the short-lived western rate
structure, and the intentions of the 4R Act, this is unlikely.
Regardless, value of service will no doubt be an important factor in
camparability. In fact, the ICC's resolution of this issue will, in good
part, determine the extent to which the ICC acts as a constraint on
railroads' monopoly powers. The remainder of this chapter considers this
issue in depth.
VALUE-OF-SERVICE RATEMAKING
The railroads' statement in the Houston Light and Power case
presents the essence of value-of-service pricing. Note that the
statement is equivalent to the basic rationale for monopolistic pricing,
including price discrimination.
Santa Fe's ability to provide the shipping public with
canpetitive prices and efficient service is directly dependent on
being able to set freight rates based on value of service. The
railroads should be able to earn relatively greater profits for
providing service which is particularly beneficial to the
shipper.36
Considering wheat, Santa Fe's major commodity, they note:
Wheat frequently moves at rates above the variable costs level, but
below fully-allocated costs because of competition and the nature of
the commodity. Under these circumstances there must be other
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commodities which move at rates well above average costs if we are
to earn adequate overall revenues and be able to maintain our
service capabilities for the benefit of all shippers. There is no
unfavorable subsidization in this situation. Any traffic which
moves at rates in excess of variable costs makes a contribution to
fixed costs and therefore reduces the burden which must be borne by
other traffic.37
The ICC has historically permitted value-of-service pricing. In the
early 20th century, high-value manufactured commodities were carried
under rates above fully-allocated costs, while low-value bulk commodities
were carried at low rates. The term "value of service" is derived from
this practice, i.e., value-of-service used as an approximation of
elasticity of demand. Note that this concept used to be referred to as
"charging what the traffic will bear." In recent proceedings the ICC has
continued to accept value-of-service pricing.
The setting of rates for individual service is complicated by
the fact that a railroad incurs fixed or overhead costs from its
general operations, in addition to the specific costs caused by the
provision of particular service. Thus, its rates cannot be set
simply to cover the costs incurred in providing the particular
service, but must be set at a higher level where possible to make a
contribution to the coverage of fixed costs.38
Furthermore,
The railroads must be able to price some of their services
above full cost if they are to compensate for the fact that
competition forces them to price certain service above variable
costs but below full costs. 39
This explicit acceptance of value-of-service pricing is very
important. It says, in effect, that aside from the uncertainties in cost
estimation, and aside from the determination of the proper cost concept,
rates can exceed costs. Is this the same as explicitly stating that
rents exist on coal shipments. Basically, yes. However, given the
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possibility that these rents are used to subsidize other traffic, and the
notion expressed above that this is somehow not the same as pure
monopolistic pricing, the arguments for value-of-service pricing should
be analyzed in detail.
Justifications for Value -of-Service Ratemaking
The issue is a complex one, embracing both theoretical and practical
dimensions.40 Throughout the theoretical discussion, we will factor
out problems with the ICC costing procedures.
Value-of-service pricing is clearly price discrimination. Consider
first the case where long-run marginal costs (LRMC) are less than
long-run average costs (LRAC). This is the classic natural monopoly
where pricing at LRvC will generate insufficient revenues to cover total
costs. A number of solutions to this problem have been advocated:
average cost pricing, marginal cost pricing with subsidies, two-tier
pricing where a lump-sum fee is assessed over all users, while
incremental use is priced at marginal costs. Another option in theory is
price discrimination. 4 1 In fact, if first or second degree price
discrimination, where all the consumer surplus or approximately all of
the consumer surplus is appropriated by the producer, is practiced,
output levels that obtain will approximately equal the competitive output
level, and inefficiencies will be minimal. 4 2 On efficiency grounds,
the practice is preferable to average cost pricing. It does involve
substantial income transfers between consumers and producers, transfers
that are difficult to justify on grounds of economic expediency alone.
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Nonetheless, it is a conceivable approach to a difficult problem.
On the other hand, railroad price discrimination is better classified
as third-degree price discrimination. 4 3 Essentially, the railroads set
separate prices for separate demand groups, with different elasticities
of demand. Though less efficient than perfect price discrimination, in
certain cases charging a higher price to the group with an inelastic
demand curve than to the group with the elastic demand curves can lead to
more efficient plant size, larger output, and a net gain in social
welfare than were strict average cost pricing employed. 44
In fact, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that
LRAC exceeds LRMC in the strict sense.45 Consider, however, another
problem: excess capacity in the short run, so that SRAC exceed LRMC, and
pricing at LRMC levels yields losses.46 Assume also that this excess
capacity is attributable to problems with all traffic. Here third-degree
price discrimination can be applied in the same way. However, in this
case very different issues are involved. Consider two groups of
traffic. The railroad builds a system for the first traffic group, and
charges then prices equal to the system-average costs. Though this is
inefficient, it is necessary for the railroads to survive, and the
shippers can survive with these high average cost rates. Given inherent
plant indivisibilities, the system may well be able to handle additional
traffic. The second group of shippers can afford to pay only their
variable costs. Even though the average costs, given both traffic
groups, would be less, by charging the second group only their variable
costs, and by charging the first traffic group the higher average cost
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that they would have received anyway, capacity utilization increases and
no one is worse off because of this discriminatory pricing. In special
cases like this, price discrimination is not unreasonable.
These theoretical abstractions are very different from the actual
situation, and most arguments in support of value-of-service pricing have
ignored the important practical elements. In essence, the situation
described in the example above is one where the burden on the existing
traffic could be reduced by adding traffic with a more elastic demand
curve, and charging them rates equal to or above their marginal costs,
but below the expanded system's average costs. The inelastic demand
group may now pay rates above the expanded systems average costs, but
equal to or below their original average costs. The key is that the
inelastic demand group is not worse off than they were previously.
In the case of coal, however, the situation is different.
Basically, the bulk of the Western infrastructure was built for
agricultural commodities, especially wheat and grain. In the early
1970's there was excess capacity. Given the highly competitive
agricultural markets, and the high proportion of transportation costs to
wheat or grain costs, the railroads faced an elastic demand curve for
wheat and grain shippers, and were unable to set average cost rates.
Coal shipments developed in the early 1970's, and the railroads realized
that they faced an inelastic demand curve in this case. To support the
elastic demand traffic, they argued for charging rates above the expected
system's average costs. But, where in the example above no traffic group
is worse off than they were before, coal shippers may well be worse off
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with the existence of sub-profitable wheat and grain shipments. That is,
if the railroad system had been built to serve only coal and other
profitable shipments, the average costs of that system might well have
been less than the average costs of the existing system that also serves
wheat and grain shippers. Furthermore, by charging coal shippers rates
above the expanded system's average costs, the railroads are almost
certainly burdening coal shippers with problems accountable to
agricultural shipments. In summary, the statement by the railroaos that
wheat and grain shipments ease the burden on coal shipments is
incorrect. More likely, wheat and grain shipments increase the burden on
coal shipments. There may be other justifications for this practice, but
they are not the traditional economic ones for price discrimination.
Some other problems with value-of-service pricing should also be
noted. First, value-of-service pricing as practiced has created a
serious misallocation of resources. For exanple, truck rates are set
equal to the high railroad rates, and given better service, trucks have
diverted traffic from the railroads that the railroads could more
efficiently carry. 47
Second, in practice, some traffic is charged below even SRMC, while
other traffic is not charged rates as high as the market allows. 48
In the first case, the railroads acknowledge this problem and contend
that they are trying to eliminate these shipments. In the second case,
the ICC often sets rates in consideration of consuming industry
characteristics. Both these factors lead to excessive and exceedingly
arbitrary burdens on shippers.
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Third, the ICC Rail Form A cost estimates are flawed. As we
discussed in Chapter II, fully allocated costs are set in an arbitrary
and questionable way, and they may not correspond to LRAC. Consequently,
setting prices above Rail Form A fully-allocated costs may in fact be
even further above actual LRAC.
Fourth, the logical maximum for value-of-service pricing, i.e., the
average costs of serving the profitable traffic alone, is almost
certainly below the profit-maximizing price. So, in not being able to
determine average costs this way, allowing value-of-service pricing
allows for profit-maximizing price levels.
To conclude, allowance for value-of-service pricing as practiced by
the railroads is not consistent with economic principles, and given the
multitude of practical problems, it is difficult to justify on economic
grounds. Very simply, the increment charged over costs is rent.
One last issue must be considered. Allowing value-of-service
pricing does not necessarily mean that maximum rate regulations are
nonexistent. The railroads argue that any rate should be allowed as long
as overall revenue levels are not above adequate revenue levels. 4 9
The ICC has, however, been more restrictive, if inconsistent. Even given
the general allowance for value-of-service pricing:
The railroads should not be allowed to make up their entire
shortfall by extracting monopoly profits from captive shippers. It
is essential that some limit be placed on rates to prevent
unfairness to individual shippers and distortions in the economy.
The question is one of determining the extent to which some shippers
should subsidize others in the interest of producing a financially
viable rail system. 50
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This is a reasonable statement. Furthermore, in recent ICC cases
and investigations, the ICC has shown concern with problems of
mismanagement, traffic being charged rates below variable costs, and
other problems that I have noted above.51 In the Council Bluffs
case, for example, the ICC states a policy "to encourage innovative and
aggressive marketing and pricing policies on competitive traffic" and
expresses concern that value-of-service pricing will not further these
goals.52
However, no final decision has been made on the limit of rates above
fully-allocated costs. The ICC has suggested that only rates that are
53
180 percent or more of variable costs should be limited. However,
recent practice has been hesitant, and inconsistent. In the Pepco case,
rates as much as 200 percent above variable costs have been allowed. 5 4
In Houston Light and Power, anong others, rates as high as 20 percent
above fully-allocated costs have been allowed. 54  In contrast, in the
most recent coal cases, the ICC has allowed only 7 percent above fully
allocated costs, which equals approximately 135 percent of variable
costs. 55  The uncertainty over the future practice, however, is
evidenced in the minority position in the Council Bluffs, Sergeant Bluff,
Iowa case. The dissenting opinion states that:
Although the majority gives lip service to these principles
here (value-of-service pricing) the 7 percent ceiling imposed is, in
my opinion, so low as to make a mockery of the entire concept of
differential pricing.
and goes on to advocate rates as high as 30 percent above fully-allocated
costs, or 160 percent of variable costs. 56
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It is possible, then, that though value-of-service pricing will be
allowed, bounds will be placed on the railroads and the ability of
railroads to capture monopoly rents will be limited. Furthermore, given
the Congressional mandate to improve the railroads' condition, some
reasonable limit above actual long-run marginal costs, say 7 percent, is
difficult to argue against in practice. Nevertheless, it is a rent, it
is not strictly justified in economic terms, and it allows for the
possibility of rates still higher than existing levels.
Lastly, looking back at all of these issues, what is the appropriate
price to charge for coal shipments Average cost pricing is clearly
wrong. It is based on a necessarily arbitrary allocation of fixed costs,
and it induces inefficient capacity utilization. It is possibly advised
only where LRAC exceed LRMC. Even in this case, however, other
solutions, such as marginal cost pricing in conjunction with subsidies,
or two-tier pricing are probably preferable. Price discrimination is
another alternative, but the form of price discrimination practiced by
the railroads has created greater distortions than it has solved. If
LRMC equals LRAC, but SRAC exceeds LRMC, excess capacity exists. But in
addition to the problems cited above, average cost pricing which
allocates these excess capacity costs over all traffic implicitly burdens
coal shippers with problems that in large part do not exist because of
coal shipments. Adding even 7 percent onto average costs in the name of
value-of-service pricing only amplifies the burden.
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SUMMARY
Let us summarize our analysis to this point. We have established
the fact that large rents are appropriable in steam coal transportation,
and that the railroads are often in a position to appropriate them. On e
possible constraint on this power is the ICC. Historically, the ICC has
rarely acted in setting maximum rates. However, this is partly
attributable to the fact that railroads have historically been in a weak
competitive position. Furthermore, in instances where the railroads'
canpetitive position improved over time, the ICC has not allowed a change
in the overall rate structure so that initial rate-cost relationships
have been maintained.
Coal, however, is a unique case. Historically the railroads have
been in a weak competitive position--but given recent developments, this
position is suddenly very strong and getting stronger. The actions of
the ICC in this situation were uncertain based on past practices.
However, observing current practice, the 4R act has been a catalyst to
rapidly increasing rate levels and the ICC has not effectively limited
rents. In the East, Midwest, and South the long- established rate
structure has been upheld in that overall consistency between rates is
enforced, but very high general rate level increases in the recent past
have effectively mitigated the existing constraint on individual rates.
In the West, the ICC has acknowledged the non-existence of a well-defined
rate structure, and has been forced accordingly to arbitrate individual
rate cases. Though the monopoly power of the railroads may have been
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constrained to some limited extent, rates have been allowed far in excess
of long-run marginal costs as estimated in Chapter II, and even in excess
of fully-allocated costs as estimated with Rail Form A. The increments
over fully-allocated costs are justified by the ICC and the railroads as
reasonable and efficient business practice. However, as we have shown
above, they are not justified economically as they place a
disproportionate cost burden on coal shippers and they are fundamentally
equivalent to monopoly rates. What has obtained are rapidly increasing
coal rates nationwide. We can expect even greater increases in the
future.
Our conclusion that rates far exceed costs is pertinent to the
evaluation of stean coal exports. If rates are set close to costs on
export movements, the competitive position of the railroads in export
markets might be significantly improved. However, the nature of past
regulatory policies and practices complicates the issue. Even if the
railroads wanted to charge lower rates for exports, they have
interdependent concerns. Both the current export rate structure and the
current domestic rate structure could be jeopardized. It is unlikely
that the revenues on steam coal export markets would justify possibly
jeopardizing these existing rate structures. This will be further
considered below. First, however, the economics of alternatives to
railroad transportation for steam coal exports will be analyzed.
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CHAPTER IV
OTHER COAL TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
AND U.S. EXPORT ROUTE ANALYSIS
159
INTRODUCT ION
In this chapter we complete the analysis of current patterns of U.S.
inland coal transportation. In the first section the economics of
barges, trucks, intermodal transfers, and loading and unloading systems
will be analyzed. Barges are important to our analysis in that they
might provide cheaper transportation than the railroads, and thus
increase the canpetitiveness of U.S. coal in foreign markets. Trucks are
important to export markets only as connecting carriers. Intermodel
transfer costs, and loading and unloading costs are important to the
integration of all these other cost components.
3This integration is the subject of the second section of this chapter.
Potentially important steam coal export routes will be delineated, and
the range of costs for shipments over these routes will be assembled from
the preceding materials. Though the summary will point out the
transportation cost minimizing routes, the ultimate importance of this
section will not be realized until the transportation costs are
integrated with the supply and ocean transportation variables analyzed in
Part 8 and Chapter VII.
OTHER COAL TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
Two current alternatives to railroad transportation, both for export
and domestic coal shipments, are barges and trucks. The practicability
of both, however, is limited: barges, due to the geographic limits of
160
the inland waterway system; and trucks, due to the fact that they are
economical only for very short distances.
Barges, under favorable geographic conditions, might provide an
efficient alternative to railroad transportation. A brief analysis of
barge transportation economics is therefore appropriate. In addition,
truck transportation, though of limited use as a single carrier, will be
necessary as a link between coal fields and inland waterways loading
points. Therefore, truck costs, along with other short-range
transportation and transfer options, will also be briefly considered.
BARGE TRANSPORTATION
As in the case of railroad transportation, our purpose is to estimate
the long-run marginal costs (LRMC) and the relationship between LRMC and
rates for barge shipments of coal. Two major differences between railroad
and barge economics simplify the analysis. First, dry-bulk shipping in
general, and coal shipments in particular, are exempt from ICC regulation.
There are exceptions to this. For example, no more than three commodities
can be carried in the same vessel, and regulated commodities cannot be
moved with unregulated commodities if the unregulated commodities are to
maintain their status. Furthermore, in some states, Illinois for
exanple, intrastate movements of coal by barge are regulated.
Nonetheless, for all practical purposes, barge movements of coal, either
for domestic consunption or export are not regulated by the ICC.
The second major difference that alleviates many of the problems we
confronted in the railroad case is that cost estimation is far less
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canplex in theory. Primarily, the problem of joint-production costs is
significantly mitigated if not eradicated in the barge case. (There are,
of course, general overhead costs, but these are very small.) The main
reason for this is that the infrastructure is not owned or operated by
barge carriers, but by the U.S. government, specifically the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. This, then, is not to say that joint-production
costs do not exist, but rather that they do not show up in barge rates.
Not only is our task less complex in theory, but also in practice
since all the costs associated with the infrastructure, costs which were
in good part intractable in the railroad case, need not be estimated for
present purposes. It should be noted that user charges have recently
been levied on barge operations to 'cover part of the infrastructure
costs.2 The problem of cost estimation therefore will become more
canplex both in theory and in practice. However, in that the government
determines this charge, the estimation of ultimate costs as reflected by
rates is still straightforward.
The market structure in this unregulated industry is far more
canpetitive than the railroad industry. Comprehensive data on industry
structure are not available, but there are literally thousands of
for-hire service companies and private carriers. 3 A 1970 survey
identified 73 unregulated dry bulk carriers on the Mississippi River
system.4 The Keystone Coal Manual identifies 34 coal carriers in
1979. In fact, approximately 25 percent of the coal shipments are
handled by four companies: Ohio River Co., Counce Corp., American
Commercial Barge Line, Valley Line Co.5 However, the relative ease
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of entry, the large number of small firms, and the option of private
carriage, indicate a competitive pricing industry. Given this
canpetitive structure, we expect long-run prices to equal long-run
marginal costs, which are estimated below.
Barge Cost Estimation
Before we begin the actual estimation of barge costs, it should be
stated that we expect barge costs to be less than rail costs for a number
of reasons. First, as noted above, the infrastructure that allows for
river movements is financed, operated, and maintained by the U.S.
government, not by the barge carriers. As noted, user charges have been
recently implemented, but at levels which will pay for only a small part
of current and future system expenditures. 6
Second, the operating costs of moving commodities on the waterways
are cheaper for two reasons: 1) the tractive effort required to move a
given floating weight is less than on wheels; 2) the economies of scale
are more easily exploited on waterways than on land. There are, on the
other hand, factors that to some extent offset these cost advantages.
Mainly, barge transportation is circuitous and slow. Though significant,
they are dominated by the factors above.
The service provided for coal is characterized by towboats pushing
flotillas of integrated barges ahead of the towboat. The towboats range
in size from 1000 horsepower (HP) to 10,000 HP units. Open hopper barges
are used. Though many sizes are employed, three representative standards
for coal barges are 175' by 26', 195' by 35', and 290' by 50'. They
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carry, respectively, 1000 net tons, 1500 net tons, and 3000 net tons. 7
The selection of the flotilla and barge size is affected by waterway
and lock dimesions. In theory, the optimal decision is complicated by a
variety of factors.8 In practice, however, coal carriers generally
use 195' by 35' barges, and the flotilla size is constrained by the width
of the waterway, and the dimensions of the locks. As a general rule, the
maximum flotilla size, as constrained by locks, is the size that allows
for no more than one breaking of the flotilla to pass through a given
lock. For exanple, for a 110' by 1200' lock, the maximum would be 30
195' by 35' barges, arranged in two 3 by 5 blocks. For a 110' by 600'
lock, the maximum would be 15 barges. Technically, it is possible to
handle larger flotillas by triple-locking, but in practice this is rarely
realistic.9 Other factors important to flotilla size are the width
of the river, and the navigational characteristics. In some cases, as
few as 6 barges per towboat are practicable, while in other cases up to
45 barges per towboat can be used.
Given the maximum allowable flotilla size, a towboat is selected to
minimize costs. Again, this is in theory a complicated decision. Speed,
costs of delays, river depth and width are all important. 0 In
practice, the decision is less canplicated. Based on current practice
these cost calculations will assume 5600 HP for towing 15 barges, 8400 HP
for 30, 1800 HP for towing 6 barges. It is impossible to determine if
this is the optimal size, given limited data. Conversations with barge
canpany personnel indicated that they may be above the optimum in some
cases. Nevertheless, they are representative system averages.
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Other important variables are whether the flotilla is "fully-
integrated," and whether the service is "dedicated." In the first case,
fully integrated tows are constructed so as to approximate a monolithic
hull. This allows for faster speeds and lower costs. In the second
case, dedicated service is analogous to unit-train service. The towboat
remains with the barges during loading, unloadng, and round-trip
transport. This facilitates the use of integrated tows, faster
turn-around times, and the corresponding lower costs. In certain
instances these conditions may not hold. However, in that we are
interested in LRMC, which by definition reflects the most efficient
utilization of plant and equipment, the cost estimation will assume both
dedicated service and fully-integrated tows.
Given these general observations, we can proceed in calculating the
costs for particular services. Annual operating costs for towboats,
according to horsepower, and barges, according to size and type, are
taken from December 1976 U.S. Army Corps unpublished data.12 The
costs represent "average" new investment costs, and include return on
investment, administration and supervision, wages, and fringe benefits,
fuel, maintenance, and repairs, supplies, subsistence, insurance, and
"other." They are not commodity-specific. It is therefore possible that
coal costs might systematically vary from these figures. However, this
author has not found any reason sufficient to adjust these costs in any
direction. Maintenance and repairs would seem to be the only real
variant, and this comprises less than 5 percent of annual costs.
More difficult than the unit costs is the calculation of the number
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of units required to move a given volume over a given river segment. In
this case, few data exist on most of the important variables, for
example, loading, unloading times, lock delays, and line-haul transit
times. A survey of the existing literature led to assumptions on all of
these factors. These assunptions were later discussed with barge-company
personnel. In some cases the assumptions were modified as a result
of these conversations, but only in the direction of cost savings. That
is, where the literature suggested a high loading time, and the barge
canpanies suggested this was significantly overstated, the time was
reduced .
The assumptions made are: 1) 24 hours loading time, 24 hours,
unloading time; 2) 40 minutes for a single-pass through a lock, 90
minutes for a double-pass (a single-pass indicates that the flotilla does
not have to be split and then reconnected. In a double-pass it does); 3)
an additional 3 hours for pass through locks 52, 53 and Gallapolis on
Ohio River; 4) speeds drawn directly from Army Corps data.
Costs are escalated from December 1976 levels in the following way.
The proportion of costs accountable to fuel was calculated from the Army
Corps data. This proportion was escalated according to increases in
diesel fuel No. 2 prices. The increment varied over HP size but was
approximately 30 percent over the two-year interval. 4 The remainder
of the costs was escalated according to the Wholesale Price Index for all
industrial commodities. Conversations with Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) rate personnel established that this index was in fact used in
barge contracts.15 Given this, and given direct checks on
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purchase prices for new equipment and the lack of a useful overall index,
this practice seems acceptable. The increment over this two-year period
was approximately 20 percent.
Costs were estimated for five river shipments:
(1) St. Louis to New Orleans;
(2) Huntington, West Virginia to New Orleans;
(3) Wheeling, West Virginia to New Orleans;
(4) Shawneetown, Illinois to New Orleans, and
(5) Birmingham, Alabama to Mobile, Alabama.
It is possible that port facilities at Mobile will be required for export
coal, so that shipments from the first four origins to Mobile should also
be considered. However, given the'rigid constraint of the Gulf
intercoastal waterway (where as few as 4 barges per tow are practicable),
this option is unrealistic. The expansion of the Tombigbee-Warrior River
system will facilitate direct shipments to Mobile, but this will not be
serviceable until after 1985.
From St. Louis, a 8400 HP tow with 30 barges was assumed. From
Huntington and Wheeling, a 5600 HP towboat with 15 barges was assumed.
From Shawneetown, which is only 130 miles up the Ohio River from the
Mississippi River, it was assumed that an 8400 HP towboat would carry 15
barges to Cairo, Illinois, on the Mississippi, return to pick up another
15 barges, and then carry 30 barges over the lower Mississippi segment of
the haul. This procedure was not economically efficient for the origins
higher up on the Ohio River. Fran Birmingham, a 1800 HP towboat with 6
barges was assumed. All these assumptions reflect river and lock
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constraints of the specific river segments. Cost calculations are
presented in detail in Appendix A.
The cost estimates in 1979 dollars are:
(1) $3.84 per ton from St. Louis (3.6 mills per ton-mile);
(2) $4.19 (4.2 mills) from Shawneetown;
(3) $8.76 (5 mills) from Wheeling;
(4) $7.45 (4.8 mills) from Huntington; and
(5) $7.83 (7.2 mills) from Birmingham to Mobile.
To summarize and expand on uncertainties in these estimates, a few
points should be made. First, it is possible that less powerful
towboats, or larger flotilla sizes could be used on the lower Mississippi
River segment, leading to lower costs. Second, if standby loading and
unloading is not available, loading and unloading times may be so long
that it becomes more efficient to have more than one set of barges for a
given towboat. Related to this is the general problem of turn-around
time. One study by the Illinois Central Railroad assumed 72 hours
loading, 120 hours unloading time.16 This assumption was not
documented, and 24 hours was considered reasonable by barge company
employees. However, it should be noted that longer times are conceivable.
Finally, the related issue of capacity utilization is important.
Our estimates calculate a round-trip cycle time for each shipment. For
each year, 340 days (8160 hours) of operating time is assumed. Therefore,
if the cycle time is 400 hours, we implicitly assume approximately 20
trips per year. In practice, the evidence suggests that capacity
utilization is not so efficient. Though barge company personnel consider
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these assunptions reasonable, aggregate data indicate some greater
inefficiencies. As a rough approximation, in 1975 104 million tons of
coal were shipped on the inland waterway system. The average distance
was 350 miles, and approximately 3730 barges were used in this service,
with average capacity of 1160 tons. 17  If we assume 5 mph as a system
average, 48 hours loading and unloading time, and 10 barges per average
tow, each barge would make approximately 40 round trips per year. In
fact, given these assunptions, 25 trips per year would yield 104 MT of
coal, indicating that there is either excess capacity, or inefficient use
of existing capacity. This is not a precise test of actual capacity
utilization, nor does it alter our basic characterization of efficient
services. However, this and other factors above could in pratice
contribute to higher costs than calculated above.
Other Estimates of Barge Costs
In contrast to the extensive analyses of railroad costs and rates,
barge cost estimates are few. Some studies have attenpted to specify
cost relationships by regressing rates on cost-determining variables.
The Bureau of Mines estimated a regression as follows: 18
y = 61.5 + .244x
where y = costs per ton in 1973 dollars
x = one-way mileage.
For a thousand-mile shipment, this is approximately $5.00 per ton in
December 1978 dollars.
The Department of Transportation estimates a regression as: 19
Ln Rate = 1.94 + .587 Ln miles.
169
For a 1000-mile shipment, escalated to 1978 dollars the rate would be
$4.92.
Both these estimates are close to our cost estimate for shipments on
the Ohio River, higher than our cost estimate for the Mississippi River,
and lower than our cost estimates for the Tombigbee-Black Warrior River
systen. The problem with this approach, however, is that the rate
information is imperfect. Given the unregulated nature of barge
shipments, very little rate information is available. What is available,
for example, the Donley report from 1972, is used in many rate
analyses.20 Furthermore, most analyses of this type ignore
variations in costs due to specific river segment characteristics. As we
have seen, this is an important factor in practice.
Two other recent studies present engineering/accounting estimates of
barge costs. Both approaches are similar to the one used in this study,
and their results are equivalent to ours. Rieber estimates $2.79 per ton
from St. Louis to New Orleans in 1976 dollars (approx. $3.43 in December,
1978 dollars). Manalytics estimates $2.52 per ton for the same shipment
in 1975 dollars.21 1
Finally, this author cross-checked these estimates with two other
sources. First, Coal Week provides barge rates for metallurgical coal
shipments for selected origin-destination pairs.22 In December 1978,
for exanple, contract rates of $5.20 per ton were quoted from South
Central Tennessee to New Orleans, via the Tennessee and Mississippi
River. Second, a sanple of barge operators and consumers was asked for
representative barge rates. Due to the contractual nature of these
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shipments, most parties were unwilling to provide actual observations.
One direct observation was provided by a barge operator of $5.28 a ton
for a new long-term contract from Grand River, Kentucky to New Orleans
for metallurgical coal.23 Adjusting for distance and time, this is
close to our estimate. Finally, rate personnel at TVA suggested 5 mills
on the lower Mississippi River, and 6 mills on Ohio River. 24
Escalating our December 1978 estimates to the present yields estimates
slightly below this. Nonetheless, given the contingencies listed above,
and recent fuel price increases, these other estimates do not contradict
the estimates developed above.
One other issue should be discussed, As noted above, the user
charge on barges will be implemented in 1980 at 4 cents a gallon,
increasing by 2 cents a year until it reaches 10 cents a gallon. 25  It
is not a simple task to determine the exact effect of the user charge on
barge rates since we have an imperfect understanding of fuel consumption.
If we assume current fuel prices of 40 cents per gallon, and we assume
that fuel comprises 30 percent of total costs, then in 1980 a 4 cent per
gallon charge would amount to approximately a 3 percent increase in
costs. At the 10 cent level, the corresponding increase would be at most
7.5 percent.26 Finally, there are no firm conclusions as to what the
total burden of the user charge on shippers would be, other than the fact
that the legislated charge accounts for only a small proportion of
infrastructure costs. Most estimates indicate that the 4 cent level will
account for 10 to 20 percent of total current and future costs. 2 7
Assuming 15 percent, this indicates the possibility of costs increasing
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20 percent above the base level (excluding user charge) if user charges
covered total costs. Though it is unlikely that the full burden will
fall on barge operators, Congress will reevaluate the existing rules, and
the possibility of future increases in user charges should not be
ignored.28
To conclude, we estimate barge costs ranging from 3.6 mills to 7.2
mills over the river segments that concern us. Though incomplete and
imperfect, most other evidence supports our conclusions. The one factor
that may restrict this cost level is capacity utilization. Furthermore,
user charges as legislated will increase rates by approximately 3 percent
in 1980, rising to no more than 7.5 percent in 1983, and conceivably by
as much as 20 percent in the future. The importance of all these factors
to the canpetitive position of U.S. coal in export markets will be
considered in Part B. Nonetheless, it is clear that barge transportation,
where practicable, is far cheaper than rail on a ton-mile basis.
TRUCKS AND TRANSFERS
A final task is to review the economics of truck transportation, in
the limited role as a connecting mode, the economics of intermodal
transfers, and the costs of loading and unloading for the different
transportation modes.
Trucks
First, consider trucks. As is the case for railroad transportation,
trucks are in most cases regulated by the ICC. Aind, analyses of motor
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carrier regulations have been just as extensive as in the railroad
case.29 If trucks represented a realistic alternative to long-haul
transport by rail or barge, we would be forced to consider in detail the
implications of regulation for rate-making purposes.
In fact, truck transportation is not a realistic alternative except
for very short movements of coal. This is due to the fact that terminal
costs for truck transportation are far less than for railroads, while
line-haul costs are far greater and not affected by economies of size or
distance. Consequently, on a very short railroad haul, the terminal
costs dominate unit costs, and lead to costs in excess of short-haul
truck costs. However, as distance and volume increase, the inherent
advantages of rail transportation take over, and, somewhere between 30
and 100 miles, trucks become more costly. 30
For our ultimate purposes, the evaluation of stean coal exports, the
distances required for inland transportation are far longer than the
point where trucks are campetitive with rail. As a single carrier, then,
they are unimportant. They are an important connecting mode, primarily
for shipments from mines to waterway terminals. However, in this case
regulation is largely unimportant.
Actually, the regulatory restrictions vary depending on whether the
shipment is local, intrastate, or interstate. In most cases, the
shipment could be subject to regulation. However, if these regulatory
forces, be they state or ICC, biased rates to levels above costs, then
the coal companies would logically pursue their legal option of
purchasing their own trucks, which would then be unregulated. In any
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case, there is little evidence in practice, and no strong explanation in
theory for regulation having any impact on truck rates for these short
connecting modes. Given this, we can reasonably expect truck rates to
equal marginal costs. 31
Estimation of truck costs is relatively straightforward. As in the
case of barges, the basic infrastructure, in this case the highways, is
constructed and maintained by the U.S. government. Trucks absorb some of
this burden through fuel taxes that all motor vehicle operators pay, but
far less than the incremental costs that these heavy vehicles incur in
coal transportation.
The costs that are reflected in rates include terminal costs and
line-haul costs. Costs are not highly sensitive to variations in
distance or tonnages above, say, 3 miles or 20,000 lbs. They are
sensitive to variations in roadways, for exanple, hilly roads, or roads
that require slow speeds will lead to increased cost levels.
Despite this relative simplicity, very few studies have estimated
truck costs. However, those that have estimated costs generate a narrow
range. The most comprehensive recent analysis was by Rieber. 32
Using an engineering/accounting approach, he estimates costs for a
variety of truck sizes, annual volumes, distances, and truck speeds. For
annual tonnages in excess of 250,000 tons per year, 5 axle trucks, and
distances greater than 10 miles, his estimates range from 3.4 to 5.8
cents per ton-mile in 1976 dollars.
The Bureau of Mines also estimates truck costs.33 Their
estimate, based on an analysis of truck rates, equals 5 cents per
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ton-mile. Another study presented at a recent symposium on coal
transportation authored by Robert Greene cites truck costs at
approximately 6 cents per ton-mile in 1978 dollars.34 Given recent
fuel cost increases, the six cent estimate will be used throughout our
analysis. Conversations with officials in coal companies have indicated
that this is a conservative estimate, and in almost all cases a
reasonable maximum.
Note furthermore that railroad rates over less than 100 miles range
from 3 to 10 cents per ton-mile. Finally, shipments by conveyor belt
cost between 5 and 30 cents a ton-mile. They are an efficient
alternative to trucks only for very high volumes, and very short
distances (less than 5 miles).
Transfers
It is also necessary to consider costs related to shipments that are
not directly accounted for in transportation rates, specifically,
intermodal transfers and loading and unloading costs. For this
estimation we rely in large part on a ccmparative analysis of transfer
costs by Manalytics.35 They evaluate different loading and
unloading options for barge and rail transport and calculate costs
according to various annual throughputs. In 1978 dollars, they estimate
rail loading costs (which will be reflected in coal prices) at 25 cents
per ton, and rail unloading at 31 cents per ton. Barge loading costs are
estimated at 60 cents per ton, and barge unloading costs at 38 cents per
ton. The transfer cost from rail to barge would be 91 cents per ton, or
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approximately $1.00 per ton at December 1978 price levels.
Finally, less evidence was available for estimates of truck
unloading and loading times. One estimate is provided in Greene's
study. He estimates 50 cents a ton for both truck loading and unloading.
To conclude, we will use 6 cents per ton-mile as a represetnative
cost for truck connections and $1.00 per ton for intermodal transfers in
the integration of transportation costs below.
UNITED STATES EXPORT ROUTE ANALYSIS
Our ultimate purpose is to estimate the United States role in future
steam coal export trade. The previous sections have analyzed the
important transportation features that might affect this role. In this
section we will apply our conclusions on transportation costs and
regulation to potential export movements and estimate the range of
transportation costs for particular export links. In later sections
these results will be integrated with supply and demand factors, and the
sensitivity of the U.S. role in steam coal export trade to changes in
transportation variables will be explained.
The analysis focuses on eight representative supply districts, and
eight port destinations. There are, of course, a far greater number of
possible supply districts and port destinations. However, this degree of
disaggregation is sufficient for capturing the important variations in
supply price, transportation costs, and ultimate consuming regions.
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The eight supply points and the supply regions they represent are:
1) Billings, Montana for the Powder River Basin,
2) Rock Springs, Wyoming for the Hanna Basin;
3) Price, Utah for coal fields in*Utah and Colorado;
4) Gallup, New Mexico for Arizona and New Mexico coal fields;
5) Harrisburg, Illinois for Southern Illinois and Western Kentucky;
6) Lynch, Kentucky for Central Appalachia;
7) Wheeling, West Virginia for Northern Appalachia;
8) Birmingham, Alabama for Southern Appalachia.
The eight port destinations are:
1) Portland, Oregon in the Northwest;
2) San Francisco, for central California;
3) Los Angeles, Long Beach for Southern California;
4) Houston for the western Gulf Coast;
5) New Orleans for the central Gulf Coast;
6) Mobile for the eastern Gulf Coast;
7) Baltimore; and
8) Newport News, Viriginia, for the mid-Atlantic seabord.
The ports have been selected to represent the range of geograhical
alternatives for inland transportation. A secondary criterion is the
existence of coal facilities, or plans for the expansion of coal
facilities. 36
The selection of transportation mode for these routes is currently
constrained to barge and/or rail with trucks or rail serving as
connecting modes. Coal slurry pipeline development has to date been
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constrained by the railroads. The possibility of future development of
coal slurry pipelines will be discussed in Chapter V.
From western supply points to the West Coast destinations, only rail
is practicable, as is the case for shipments to Houston from western
origins. From Harrisburg to New Orleans, barge or rail shipments are
practicable. Shipments from Harrisburg to Houston could involve
all-rail, or all-barge including a segment via the intercoastal waterway
from New Orleans to Houston. Shipments from Harrisburg to Mobile could
involve rail, or barge movements from New Orleans via the intercoastal
waterways. Shipments from Birmingham to Mobile could be via barge or
rail. Shipments from Harrisburg to Baltimore or Newport News could be
all rail, or rail combined with barge. Shipments from Lynch and Wheeling
to the Atlantic ports will be all rail, and to the Gulf ports could
involve all rail or all-barge movements.
Another issue that must be considered is the length for connecting
hauls. Clearly, the longer the distance between the mine and the river
system, the less the advantage of barge transportation over rail
transportation. It is therefore important to scrutinize carefully the
lengths of connecting hauls.
First, there are very few uncontracted waterside mines, so some
intermodal connection is inevitable.37 Even though Wheeling is
effectively at water's edge, it is likely that some connection will be
required. Furthermore, to impute a lesser connecting cost for the
designated origins closer to the river system than for those further away
might bias the actual allocation of costs from various origins to various
destinations.
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Given this, the following strategy was pursued. Based on Bureau of
Mines data and conversations with coal companies, the average haul to the
river system from each origin point was estimated.38 From Harrisburg
this was 70 miles, from Wheeling 50 miles, from Lynch, 110 miles, and
from Birmingham, 25 miles. Then rail rates and truck costs were analyzed
to estimate connecting costs. As a practical matter, the difference
between 50 and 110 miles was of little importance since at the low range
truck and rail costs are approximately equal at 4 to 6 cents per
ton-mile, while at the high range, rail costs are approximately 2 cents
per ton-mile. On balance, connection costs were approximately $2.00 a
ton for Harrisburg, Wheeling and Lynch origins, and $1.00 a ton for
Birmingham. It should be made clear that this is only a system average.
To the extent that mines closer or further away are available, the costs
should be adjusted. Nonetheless, given the limited availability of
water-accessible mines, this estimate seems reasonable.
The next task is to determine the least-cost mode over these
conceivable routes. It should be clear from the previous sections that
this is not a certain task. However, based on the understanding of the
complexities discussed above, a reasonable range of estimates can be
calculated.
First, barge rates, as noted above, can be assumed equal to long-run
marginal costs. The low end of the range can be based on the cost
estimates in this chapter. The high end, based on current conditions,
would increase these costs to reflect full user costs.
Trucks will be used exclusively as a connecting mode for barge
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shipments. Again, costs of truck transportation are relatively
straightforward They are summarized in this chapter.
Rail rates are far more difficult to specify. The low end of the
range should reflect long-run marginal costs. For western shipments
these are based on evidence in the recent coal-rate cases, as adjusted In
Chapters II and III. For midwestern and eastern shipments, the cost
estimates developed by the application of Zimmerman's work will be used.
Note that U.S. exporters might have to charge the lower cost-based
rates on export shipments to canpete with other suppliers in
international steam coal markets. However, in doing so they might
jeopardize the existing domestic unit-train rate structure. That is,
lower rates would either indicate that the railroads marginal costs are
below the levels that they have presented in the ICC rate cases, or that
export traffic is being subsidized by other more profitable traffic. The
gains through the export market certainly will not offset the losses if
the domestic rate structure is knocked down. Consequently, the
probability of applying these lower rates on export shipments is
uncertain. We will give further consideration to this issue in the
analysis of railroad deregulation in the concluding chapter.
The high end of the railroad rate range is largely indeterminate at
this point. There is clearly no restriction on export rates exceeding
domestic equivalents, and so supply and demand variables must be analyzed
to determine the profit-maximizing rates. This will be undertaken
below. As we will see, it is not of great importance since rates higher
than existing levels would almost certainly eliminate the United States
from steam coal export markets.
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More important will be intermediate rate levels and their effect on
future export rates. In the West, if rates on exports are set according
to the new domestic rate structure, we can expect rates as established in
Chapters I and II This serves as a reasonable high end.
In the East and Midwest a realistic high end of the range is the
existing export rate structure, based on single-car shipments. Another
important reference point is the existing domestic rate structure. This
is difficult to apply to the export rates with certainty in that no
annual unit-train shipments move over the routes in question. All export
shipments are posted as single-car rates. Consequently, a rate precedent
is nebulous at best. This is particularly true with respect to Gulf
Coast destinations. Applying Zimmerman's model yields zero rents for
shipments to Mobile and New Orleans. If on the other hand, rates to
these destinations are consistent with the existing regional rate
structure, they would be far above Zimmerman's predictions. In Table 1,
the higher rate levels are presented along with Zimmerman's cost
estimates. For East Coast and Gulf Coast destinations, the existing rate
level presented in Table 1 is based on this author's analysis of rates in
Chapter I.
It should also be noted that rail rates on shipments to the river
system for transfer beyond in barges are generally higher than they would
otherwise be. For example, shipments from Wyoming to East St. Louis are
carried at 15 mills per ton mile, versus 12.5 mills for shipments to the
area but not for transfer via barge. This practice is not surprising.
It reduces the benefit of rail/barge transport and biases allocation to
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all rail shipments. The importance of this policy to our analysis is
minimal, in that the optimal routes are not sensitive to this variation.
Nonetheless, it should be noted.
All of these estimates and the calculation of transportation costs
are presented in detail in Table 1. The estimates are adjusted to
reflect January, 1979 price levels.
A few major points should be made. First, shipments from western
origins to western ports will be moved exclusively by rail.
Transportation cost savings of $3 a ton could be realized by a reduction
in rates to long-run marginal cost levels. Transportation costs to Los
Angeles are lowest from Gallup. Transportation costs to Portland are
lowest fran Billings, and to San Francisco they are lowest from Price,
Utah.
Transportation costs to Gulf Coast ports are minimized on shipments
from Harrisburg to New Orleans and Houston, and from Birmingham to
Mobile. What is interesting in this case is that rail costs are
capetitive with barge transportation costs given the additional costs of
intermodal transfers and shipments from the mines to waterway terminals.
However, rail rates, as representative of domestic unit train rates, or,
worse yet, export rates, are much higher than barge costs. If user
charges reflected full system costs, barge costs would still be lower
than rail rates, but above rail costs. For example, from Harrisburg to
New Orleans the barge cost would be $8.02, versus the rail cost of
$7.40. Also interesting is the fact that shipments from Lynch to Gulf
Coast ports are less expensive via rail than barge, even at unit-train
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Table 1
U.S. Railroad and 3arge Coal Rates and Costs
January 1, 1979
(Dollars per short ton)
3 4
L.A. Hous-
ton
5
N.0.
6
Mo-
bile
7 8
Balt. Hamp-
ton
1 12.20 18.56 19.05
9.61 14.18 14.52
2 12.75 12.75 12.75
10.00 10.00 10.00
23.27 25.63
17.55 19.24
20. 46
16.00
19.79 23.16
15.05 17.47
20.83
17. 20
26.10 27.87 29.69
19.58 20.85 22.15
24.86 27.87 29.69
18.69 20.85 22.15
3 13.08
10.24
12.08 9.82 18.74 22.62
9.52 7.90 14.36 17.08
23.68
18.00
4 24.79 13.24 9.13
18.64 10.38 7.40
5
14.09
10.96
10.94
9.98
Wheeling 7
24.57 29.05 30.81
18.48 21.70 22.95
18.03 21.18 30.21 30.50
13.79 15.20 22.52 22.73
8.71
7.40
7.18B
12. OE
10.12
8.76
10. 45B
13.51
12.15
11.67B
7.98
6.63
8.28B
10. OOE
8.90
7.55
11.75B
12.46
11.18
12.80B
4.75
3.41
4.82B
6. 99E
12.51 13.30
7.71 8.47
8.20
6.52
11. OOE
7.29
5.10
10.50E
8.10
6.68
11 . OOE
8.89
6.76
10.50E
1
Port-
land
2
S.F.
Billings
Rock
Springs
Price
Gal lup
Harris-
burg
Lynch 6
Birming-
ham
8
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TABLE 1 (continued)
NOTES: 1. For origins 1-4,
First number equals rail rate
Second number equals rail cost
Third number equals rail rate/barge cost
Fourth number equals rail cost/barge cost
For origins 5-8,
First number equals rail rate
Second number equals rail cost
B = barge rate
E = export rail rate
2. All rail rates are through ex parte 357, Jan. 1979.
3. Barge, rail transshipments cost $1.00
4. Transportation to riverway from:
Wheeling = $2.00
Lynch = $2.00
Harrisburg = $2.00
Birmingham = $1.00
5. Billings to St. Louis = 1100 rail miles
Rock Springs " = 1221
Price = 1425
Gallup = 1379
6. Western rail rate equation:
-5.75 + .0127*M + .0596*u + .668 DUMEQ + .929 IMAT + .00124 DM
+ 2.134 + DUMT
U=14
MAT=1,000,000
DUMEQ, DM=l i.e., rail-owned equipment
DUMT = new rate level
See Chapter I
West costs = 10 mills per ton mile -- see Part A, Chapter I.
7. Eastern, mideastern rates as estimated in chapter I.
-. 07 + .0105*M + .00237*U + .369*IMAT + 1.21*DUMR + .0016*0M
+ 1.005*DUMEQ
DUMR = 1 East, 0 Midwest
DUMEQ = 1 railroad, 0 shipper
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8. Eastern, Midwestern costs:
a. If i = 5 - 7, j = 5 - 6, TA = [.133136 + (8.691*IMAT)
+ .009543*L) + 54(MDUM) + (.004595*M) + (.0188*PGD)
+ (.0358*PDUM)]2.29
Rent = (.0188*PGD) 2.29
b. If i = 7, j = 7 - 8, same but BDUM = 1, PGD is positive
c. If i = 8, j = 5 - 6, PGD = 0, use a
d. If i = 8, j = 7 - 8, PCFOB = 8.09, PG 40, BTU = 28,
BDUM = 1, use a
e. PG, PCFOB from MBZ computer printout
(all as B.P. still x (1.09)
See Chapter II.
9. a. For destinations 5 and 6, and origins 6-8, Zimnerman
estimates rents at zero. Rate levels are based on this
author's regressions. (See note 7.)
b. For destinations 5 and 6, and origin 5, Zimmerman estimates
rents at 12 cents per ton. Rate levels are based on this
author's estimation.
c. For destinations 7 and 8, and origin 5 Zimmerman's rate
estimates are $13.17 and $13.92. Table one includes this
author's rate estimates.
d. For destinations 7 and 8, and origin 6, Zimmerman's rate
estimates are $8.34 and $8.40 versus this author's
estimates of $8.20 and $8.10.
e. For destinations 7 and 8, and origin 7, Zimmerman's rate
estimates are $6.45 and $7.98, versus $7.29 and $8.89
estimated by this author. Zirrnerman's cost estimates are
$4.53 and $6.06. Cost estimates in Table one are equal to
this author's rate estimate adjusted by the proportionate
difference between Zimmerman's rates and costs.
10. Barge rates -- see barge section -- Appendix A.
Source: Author's calculations.
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Table 2
Distances Between Supply and Demand Points
(Statute Miles)
1 2
Port. S.F.
3 4 5
L.A. Houston N.0.
6 7 8
Mobile Balt. Hampton
1. Billings
2. Rock
Springs
3. Price
4. Gallup
961
1000
1024
1864
1418 1452
1000 1000
952
1038
790
740
1755
1505
1924
2149B
1747
2270B
1430 1708
2474B
1096 1379
13 78R
1049B
2427B
1958
1869
1848
1520
2085 2215
2215
2170 2295
2252 2273
5. Harrisburg
6. Lynch
7. Wheeling
8. Birmingham
Notes: 1. For origins 1-4, B represent
to St. Louis, barge fran St.
2. For origins 5-8,
connecting haul
joint rail-barge distance. Rail
Louis to New Orleans (1049 miles)
B represents barge distance plus short
(less than 100 miles in all cases).
Source: Railroad Atlas of the United States, Rand-McNally,
American Waterways Operators, Inc., Big Load Afloa
D.C., 1973.
N.Y., 1975.
t, Washington,
642
1001B
776
1542B
1100
1760B
335
573
660
1000
266
396B
889
594
392
799
955
584
545
800
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rates. Barge costs for shipments from Wheeling to New Orleans are
cheaper than rail rates.
Transportation costs to Atlantic ports are minimized with rail
shipments fran Wheeling or Lynch. However, if the existing export rate
structures are applied to steam coal exports in the future, distortions
will arise. For example, coal from Lynch, Kentucky will be more cheaply
moved to New Orleans than to Baltimore or Newport News.
Lastly, it should be noted that the difference in rail costs between
shipments from the West to the Gulf and shipments from the West to the
Atlantic Coast are relatively small.
To conclude, this section has assembled inland transportation cost
estimates over important potential steam coal export links. The range
from long-run marginal costs to effective rates is substantial in all
cases, and the pricing practices of the railroads could be an important
factor in the development of steam coal trade. In Part B we will
integrate these results with supply and demand prices so as to determine
the ultimate importance of inland transportation variables. In the next
chapter we will consider long run factors in United States coal
transportation.
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APPENDIX A. BARGE-COST CALCULATIONS
This appendix presents the details of the barge cost calculations.
1. Unit Costs: December, 1976 levels
1800 HP 5600 HP 8400 HP
Towboats, annual operating
costs: $730,220 11 ,594,600 32, 202,700
195' x 35', 1500 tons capacity
Open hopper barges,
annual operating costs: $24,000
SOURCE: Army Corps. of Engineers, unpublished data.
2. Operating Parameters:
a. Annual operating days = 340 (8160 hours)
b. One spare barge required per fifteen barges
c. Fuel component escalated according to diesel no. 2 price
increases, 31 percent to December 1978.
d. Residual cost component escalated according to wholesale price
index, all industrial commodities, 20 percent to December, 1978
3. a. Fuel cost per hour, December, 1976
8400 HP, 32 barges = $106.7 per hour
5600 HP, 16 barges = $69 per hour
1800 HP, 6 barges = $22 per hour
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b. Fuel cost per ton for various origins.
St. Louis: $38,838 per trip fuel cost: 87 cents per ton
= 29 percent of 1976 tariff
Shawneetown: $44,814 per trip fuel cost: 100 cents per ton =
29 percent of 1976 tariff
Wheeling: $45,126 per trip fuel cost: 200 cents per ton
= 28.4 percent of 1976 tariff
Huntington: $38,788 per trip fuel cost: 172 cents per ton
= 28.4 percent of 1976 tariff
Birmingham: $4,224 per trip fuel cost: 47 cents per ton
= 20.4 percent of 1976 tariff
SOLRCE: Army Corp of Engineers, unpublished data.
4. St. Louis to New Orleans:
Distance = 1049 statute miles
Barges = 30 + 2 spare = 32
Towboat = 8400 HP
Loading, unloading = 24 hours each
Speed = 5 MPH upstream, 10 MPH downsteam
Locks = 0
Hourly costs = $364 Annual fuel costs = $875,394
Hours per trip = 364.7 Trips per year = 22.36
Total costs = $132,751 Annual volume = 1,006,200
Tons = 30 x 1500 = 45,000 Fuel cost = 87 cents per ton
Cost per ton = $2.95 December, December, 1978 cost =
1978 1.31 x .87 + 1.2 x 2.08
= 1.14 + 2.50
= $3.64 per ton
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5. Shawneetown to Cairo:
Distance: 871 mile on the lower Mississippi, 130 miles on the Ohio
Barges: 32; 15 per flotilla on Ohio, double time necessary
Towboat: 8400 HP
Speed: 5.0 MPH upstream full, 6.5 MPH upstream loaded on the
Ohio
6.0 MPH downstream full, 7.5 MPH downstream empty on the
Ohio
Speed on the Mississippi, 5 MPH upstream, 10 MPH downstream
Locks: 6; 3 double (1.5 hour delay), 3 single (.67 hour delay)
3 hours extra for locks 52, 53 for waiting time
Hourly costs = $364
Hours per trip = 420.30
Total costs = $152,989.20
Costs per ton = 313.40, December 1976
34.18, December 1978
6. Wheeling to New Orleans
Distance: 871 miles on lower Mississippi, 889 miles on the Ohio
Barges: 15, 1 spare = 16
Towboat: 5600 HP
Speed: same as 4
Locks: 25; 14 single, 11 double.
Add 3 hours for 52, 53, and Gallopolis.
Hourly costs = $242.46
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Hours per trip = 654
Total costs = $158,568.84
Tons per trip = 22,500
Cost per ton = $7.05, December 1976
$8.67, December 1978
7. Huntington to New Orleans
Distance: 871 miles on lower Mississippi, 671 on Ohio River
Barges: 16
Towboat: 5600 HP
Speed: Same as 4
Locks: 17; 10 single, 7 double
Add 3 hours for 52, 53
Hourly costs: $242.46
Hours per trip: 562
Total costs: 136,262.5
Cost per ton: $6.06, December, 1976.
$7.45, December, 1978.
8. Birminghami to Mobile:
Distance: 396 miles
Barges: 6
Towboat: 1800 HP
Speed: 6 MPH
Locks: 6, all single
191
Hourly costs: $107.64
Hours: 192
Total costs: 120,666.8
Costs per ton: $2.30, December 1976
12.82, December 1978
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CHAPTER V
LONG-RUN FACTORS IN UNITED STATES
COAL TRANSPORTATION
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INTRODUCT ION
In the previous sections we have analyzed the economic and
regulatory issues affecting coal transportation in the United States,
based on past and present conditions. We observed the fact that
railroads are the dominant mode for coal transportation, and the fact
that railroads currently seem to earn substantial monopoly rents on coal
shipments. There are, however, possible future economic and
institutional developments that could significantly affect the situation
in coal transportation. This section considers three major
interdependent possibilities. First, coal-slurry pipelines. The
commercialization of this alternative transportation mode could increase
canpetition in coal transportation, and decrease railroad monopoly
rents. Second, the full or partial deregulation of U.S. railroad
transportation. This development could in fact enhance the railroad's
ability to realize rents. Third, the long-run ability of the railroads
to finance capacity expansion.
COAL-SLURRY PIPELINES
A slurry pipeline is basically any pipeline that carries a solid
material suspended in a liquid carrier. While the idea of using a
pipeline for the transport of solids in a slurry form is not new (it was
conceived over 80 years ago), until recently such use has been limited to
relatively short lines, primarily within the mining industry. Today,
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commercial slurry pipelines are scattered throughout the world, operating
in Tasmania, South Africa, Japan, and both North and South America,
carrying a wide range of commodities, including limestone, iron, copper,
zinc-concentrate, gilsonite, kaolin, and coal.
The first experience with coal-slurry pipelines in this country was
the Consolidated Coal Company's line in Cadiz, Ohio. This line was first
operated in 1957, transporting 1.3 MTPY of thermal coal through a
108-mile, 10-inch-diameter pipeline. Its construction was spurred by the
high railroad tariffs prevailing in Ohio at that time. However, the
threat of this competition was met by the railroads through the
implementation of unit trains with lower rates, and after six years, and
the hauling of approximately 7 MT of coal, the line was shut down.
The world's longest (273 miles) and largest (18 inches in diameter)
coal-slurry pipeline is in the United States. It carries coal from the
Black Mesa coal fields in Arizona to the Mohave Generating Station in
southern Nevada. It began operating in 1970 and is still in operation,
presently carrying 4.8 MTPY.
There have been numerous plans for coal slurry pipelines in recent
years. The Oil and Gas Journal reported seven current proposals in
September, 1979. Six of the seven are planned to originate in
western coal fields. Destination points are the West and Gulf Coasts.
One other, the Florida pipeline, is planned to originate in Appalachia
and carry coal to Florida power stations. The most prominent among these
is the line being planned by the Energy Transportation Systems, Inc.
(ETSI). This involves a 1036-mile, 38-inch-diameter line from mines in
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Gillette, Wyoming, to a series of electric plants around White Bluff,
Arkansas. The throughput for this line is estimated at 25 MTPY. Another
major plan is a 38-inch line proposed by Brown and Root, Inc. It would
carry between 25 and 38 MTPY from the Wyoming-Montana border to Houston,
Texas, a distance of 1260 miles. Combined, the projected capacity of the
seven lines already planned is approximately 125 MTPY.
While the technology of coal-slurry pipelines has been thoroughly
discussed in the literature, and varies from situation to situation, a
brief description of the system is useful. Since the Black Mesa line is
the only one currently existing in this country, it will be used as a
representative illustration.
The process involves three main components: preparation,
pipelining, and separation. First, coal is delivered by conveyor belt to
the preparation plants, where it is pulverized, mixed with an equal
weight of water, and then delivered to storage tanks. Next, the slurry
product is pumped through a pipeline by four pumping stations located
over the 273-mile line. Upon arrival at the power plant, the slurry is
stored in four 7.8 million-gallon storage tanks. Next, it is pumped into
a battery of centrifuges, where 72 percent of the water is removed. The
resulting coal "cake" is further dried down to 25-percent moisture by
burning natural gas in the drying air stream and is finally delivered to
the pulverizers to be reduced to a size suitable for firing in the power
boiler system.
Although extensive plans exist for coal-slurry pipelines, and have
existed for more than five years, actual construction has not yet begun.
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To understand this fact we must consider both the costs of coal-slurry
pipelines, and institutional barriers to pipeline development.
COST ESTIMATES
Although elaborate plans for coal slurry pipelines have been
formulated, the limited operating experience with high-volume, long-
distance shipments contributes to significant uncertainty in slurry
pipeline cost estimates. In theory, costing of pipeline operations is
relatively straightforward. In practice, however, a wide range of costs
have been estimated. In part this reflects various technological
uncertainties in the pipeline operation. Also, this reflects operational
uncertainties such as water costs and availability, start-up times, and
gathering and distribution costs. Before we confront these issues in
detail, however, some generally accepted points about coal slurry
pipeline costs should be noted.
First, for short hauls, say less than 500 miles, and/or low annual
throughputs, less than 5 million ton per year (MTPY), railroads are a
more efficient transportation option. Second, for very high annual
throughputs, say 20 MTPY, and/or. long hauls, 1000 miles and above, coal-
slurry pipeline costs are at least as low as railroad costs. The reasons
for this are technological economies of scale, and high fixed costs.
Coal-slurry pipelines have long-run decreasing costs primarily due to the
fact that the cost of the pipeline is a function of the surface area, and
thus proportinate to its diameter. The capacity of the pipeline is
proportionate to the square of the diameter. Therefore, as throughput
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increases, unit costs increase far less rapidly. With respect to
distance, fixed costs, independent of distance, such as preparation and
dewatering costs, are large so that shorter distances yield higher unit
costs. Though the break-even point between slurry pipelines and
railroads has not been determined, the general conclusion that pipelines
are economic only for long distances and large annual throughputs can be
accepted.
Beyond this general observation, there is considerable dispute about
slurry pipeline costs. A previous analysis by this author showed a range
of 5 to 12 mills per ton mile (1975 dollars) for 1000 mile, 25 MTPY
shipments.2 After factoring out glaring deficiencies, a more
reasonable range was from 6 to 11 mills per ton-mile. Two more recent
extensive analyses, by Rieber et al and the Office of Technology
Assessment, support the low level of this range.3 Reiber estimates
costs at approximately 8 mills per ton-mile in 1976 dollars; OTA
estimates a range from a low of 5.7 mills per ton-mile to a high of 19
mills per ton-mile.
A number of important factors account for this variation. First,
the cost of water is an important determinant in slurry pipeline costs.
The first studies by Bechtel estimated intrinsic water costs at
approximately $5 per acre foot (1975 dollars). 4 This contrasts with
current estimates ranging from $20 to $80 per acre foot.5 Given water
shortages in the West, the pipeline planners have become aware that water
does not come cheap. The difference between $20 and $80 in intrinsic
water costs would amount to approximately 1 mill per ton-mile.
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Possibly more important than the intrinsic costs of water is the
simple availability of water. To date, water rights at originating
points have been tenuous, at best, and non-existent, at worst. The
alternative is to recycle water from a remote source, the Arkansas River
in the ETSI case. Estimates of this extra cost vary depending on the
pipeline route, but the extra cost has been estimated as 20 to 30 percent
above previously planned practices .6
Another considerable problem in slurry pipeline systems is gathering
and distributing coal. In many of the early studies this problem is given
only cursory attention, or not dealt with at all, and a hypothetical
single-origin, single-distination system is considered. In fact, this
hypothetical case is unrealistic, especially when 25 MTPY shipments are
considered. Recent analyses have shown that both extensive gathering and
distribution systems are essential to the systems planned, and can amount
to as much as 20 percent of total delivered prices. Not only does
this create extra investment and operating costs, but the necessity of
organizing several consumers has created serious negotiating problems as
well.
Another consideration is the start-up assumptions used by the
pipeline companies. They generally assume full-capacity utilization by
the third year of operation, and relatively minor drop-offs in later
years. This has been shown to be overly optimistic. In fact, full
capacity may never be achieved, and start-up and drop off periods could
be far more important. The difference could conceivably increase tariffs
by 10 percent. 8
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There is considerable uncertainty with the economics of coal-slurry
pipelines vis-a-vis unit trains. Other factors, however, favor
coal-slurry pipelines. First, it has been argued that the relative
escalation rates of the various factor costs for each transportation mode
would favor slurry pipelines. Specifically, labor costs will increase
while capital costs are constant, and the proportion of labor costs to
capital costs is higher for railroads than for pipelines. The
calculations in support of this factor have been incorrect, and the
actual advantage is far less than the pipeline companies have stated, but
proportional savings do exist, and cost advantages to railroads of as
much as 10 percent at start-up time could be offset in future operating
years by this factor.
Second, railroad routes are in practice more circuitous than
pipelines need be. As a rule of thumb, railroad routes are generally 20
to 30 percent longer than pipelines. 0 This is sometimes due to
geological barriers prohibiting railroad construction, and at other times
to the necessary utilization of the already existing railroad
infrastructure.
Third, there are some important service-quality dimensions that have
frequently been ignored in modal comparisons. Where unit trains deliver
large quantities in single blocks, pipelines deliver a constant flow over
long time periods. In addition, questions of reliability may prove
important. Consensus holds that slurry pipelines are a more reliable
mode, less subject to intermittent failures, than railroad
operations. However, offsetting this is the fact that railroad
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operations are generally more flexible. While a breakdown in a pipeline
would eliminate service for a period of time, railroad traffic could
normally be diverted over other routes when problems arose. Little
empirical evidence is available on these considerations. Nonetheless,
these brief remarks should serve as an indication of general
uncertainties.
The effect of these various factors on the utilization of pipelines
for coal export trade should be considered. First, the only links where
pipelines might be practicable are the western coal fields to the West
coast or the Gulf Coast ports, and Southern Illinois, Western Kentucky
fields to the Gulf ports. The West-to-West Coast shipments are less
likely to be cheaper via pipeline for two reasons. -First, the terrain is
extremely rough. Of course, this holds for railroad shipments also, but
in their case roadbeds already exist, though considerable improvements
may be required. One useful approximation of this problem is included in
the recent OTA analysis where a shipment from Price, Utah to the Southern
California Coast was estimated to be 30 percent more expensive than rail
transport, even though rail transport costs on this link were
significantly higher than over other routes.12
Campounding the problems for a pipeline to the West Coast is the
fact that in the foreseeable future, high enough volumes to benefit from
pipeline economies are not likely in that export trade levels will be far
below 25 MTPY, and domestic West Coast coal consumption will be small.
One current plan for pipeline transportation over this route has initially
planned a 10 MTPY throughput. Negotiations for this tonnage have
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been difficult, and secondary plans have involved a five MTPY line, with
the addition of a parallel 5 MTPY line in the future.14 Although the
uncertainties in pipeline cost estimation are significant, the relation-
ship between costs at various output levels is reasonably well understood.
Bechtel Corporation, for example, estimates that unit costs in 1975
dollars would increase from 5 mills at 25 MTPY, 1000 miles to 7.5 mills
(approximately the level of 1975 unit train rates) at 10 MTPY, to 10.5
mills at 5 MTPY.15 Furthermore, the relative disadvantage that
pipelines have at low volumes could well mean that even if far larger
volumes obtain in the long-run, railroads will have already contracted
the service.
Shipments from the West to the Gulf, and Southern Illinois to the
Gulf face a more favorable environment in both these respects. The
terrain is less difficult, and domestic markets for steam coal in the
Gulf region are rapidly developing. To the extent that slurry pipelines
represent an efficient alternative to rail, these links are the most
likely to be developed.
All these factors considered, the following conclusions are
reasonable. First, long-distance, high volume coal slurry pipeline
transportation costs are between 8 and 15 mills per ton mile at January
1979 cost levels. Under ideal circumstances, costs may be below railroad
costs (as opposed to rates) by a significant but small margin. Under
difficult circumstances, such as extensive gathering and distribution
systems, water rerouting, and rough terrain, pipeline costs almost
certainly exceed railroad costs by some margin. In general, it is safe
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to say that there is limited applicability for coal-slurry pipelines, but
in ideal situations, such as the Western coal fields to the Gulf coast or
Pacific coast, they might represent a realistic transport alternative.
The actual cost savings are uncertain, but their existence should not be
ignored.
COAL-SLURRY PIPELINE REGULATION
Note, however, that railroad rates are currently far higher than the
best estimate of rail long-run marginal costs, and that railroads have
cited serious problems in capacity expansion. Under these conditions we
would expect, at the very least, commercialization of pipelines in the
ideal situations cited above. In fact, only one pipeline is currently
operating: a 273-mile, 18-inch diameter pipeline carrying coal from the
Black Mesa coalfields in Arizona to the Mohave generating station in
Southern Nevada.
Several factors have constrained slurry pipeline development. Most
important, the railroads have not allowed pipelines to cross under
railroad lines, and Congress to date has not granted the right of eminent
domain to pipeline companies. An alternative course of action is to
receive eminent domain from individual states. The ETSI pipeline has in
fact accomplished this, though the route length has become more circuitous
16
than initially planned. In other cases, the roadblock persists.
This controversy has been raging since 1975, and the Congress has
come increasingly close to approving slurry pipeline bills in various
forms. Unfortunately, the proceedings have focused primarily on
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the uncertain question of which mode is generally cheaper, while
neglecting the more basic question of whether the economy is better off
with or without competition, engendered by the question of pipelines
right to eminent domain, and possible economic justifications for
restrictions on pipeline development. This author has previously written
on the possible justifications for restrictions on pipeline
development. 18  The most frequent arguments are: 1) that railroads are
natural monopolists, and efficient provision of transportation services
mandates the existence of only one supplier; 2) that railroads will not
be able to finance required capacity expansion if profits are not
assured; 3) that the transportation system will be subject to destructive
campetition; and 4) that coal- slurry pipelines will only service the
high-volume, more lucrative markets, leaving smaller, less profitable
shipments to the railroads. In all cases the justifications for
restricting pipeline development were weak.18 If these issues alone
are considered, the firm conclusion was that pipelines should be granted
eminent domain. However, given the uncertainty in cost estimation, the
acceptance of this position has lagged behind realities. The bill will
come up again this year, and given the administration's coal program
goals, and the fact that some key adversaries to the pipelines in
Congress and the Senate have not been reelected, passage is again
conceivable, though uncertain.
Even so, the bill as stated would not give unilateral approval to
all slurry-pipeline development. Rather, a certificate of "public
convenience and necessity" must be granted by the Department of The
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Interior. If the proposed project "is in the national interest," and
could serve as a common carrier, this certificate would be granted. 19
Given the ambiguity in these criteria, however, at the very best slurry
pipelines would be limited to some extent.
Some lines will be built even without eminent domain. ETSI, as
noted above, has cleared this hurdle and Federal eminent domain would
only allow for a less circuitous route. Other proposals cite eminent
20domain as a surmountable hurdle in most cases. A more pressing
problem appears to be water availability. Again, ETSI has negotiated
with the state of Wyoming, and received clearance for 20,000 acre feet
per year, but this is an exception. In other cases, plans have been
delayed or postponed due largely to this constraint. Alternatives to
water have been considered, for example, liquid carbon dioxide and
fuel-grade methanol, and even oil.21 However, in the foreseeable
future, this problem may be insurmountable.
To conclude, there are no doubt circumstances where coal-slurry
pipelines represent a less costly transportation alternative.
Furthermore, even where pipeline costs equal or exceed rail costs,
pipeline costs would in many instances be less than the current high
railroad rates, and even the threat of pipeline competition could bring
down railroad rates. To date pipeline companies have not received the
right to eminent domain, and this has effectively prohibited their
development. If eminent domain is granted in the future, and other legal
and regulating constraints and water problems can be circumvented,
pipelines will at least offer an attractive alternative to rail rates,
possibly forcing these rates down.
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In reference to export movements, the most likely areas for
application are the Western coal fields to the Gulf coast and Pacific
coast. Given the uncertainties in costing, we cannot specify the savings
with pipeline transport, but the possibility should riot be neglected.
RAILROAD DEREGULATION
The future course of coal slurry pipeline development is important
to our second long-run concern, railroad deregulation. The pros and cons
of railroad deregulation have been extensively analyzed, and there is no
need to rephrase these arguments. In essence, most authors conclude that
restriction on entry and abandonments, and minimum and maximum rate
regulation have decreased canpetition and induced significant inefficiency
in the provision of transportation services, and that full deregulation,
or partial deregulation including some form of maximum rate regulation,
is the preferable alternative.22 However, some observations on the
importance of railroad deregulation to coal transportation in particular,
and on recent proposals for railroad deregulation, in general, should be
made. 23
First, consider full deregulation of freight transportation. The
literature, past and present, has extensively analyzed the anticipated
gains and losses from rail deregulation. The gains to deregulation most
frequently cited are increased efficiency in the provision of
transportation services and elimination of enormous administrative costs
borne both by the regulators and the transportation companies. The
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arguments presented most frequently against deregulation are, broadly,
that competition in transportation services would be destructive, and
that railroads are natural monopolies. Related concerns are the problems
of inadequate investments, technological innovation, excess capacity, and
cream-skimming. As noted earlier, this author has previously written on
these justifications for the particular case of coal transportation.
Though each argument has some validity, the overwhelming conclusion in
this case was that the justifications are weak. Other authors have
similarly concluded that the justification for regulation on these
grounds never existed, do not exist, and probably never will exist. In
fact, problems of investment, pricing, excess capacity, and technological
innovation have more likely been compounded by transportation
regulation. Most analyses have concluded that deregulation is a
preferable alternative.
The one factor that argues strongly against total transportaton
deregulation is monopoly pricing by transportation modes, especially the
railroads. For most commodities, the railroads lack significant pricing
power, so the problem is non-existent. In our case, however, where
considerable monopoly power exists, the issue is of primary importance,
and is a critical factor in the advisability of full deregulation or some
partial alternative.
The foundation of this concern is of course the fact that railroads
do possess significant monopoly power over many coal hauls. The critical
question however, is whether regulation as such constrains this monopoly
power, and whether deregulation would, at least in the long run, mitigate
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monopoly power. To the extent that we answer no and yes, respectively,
to these queries, this factor loses some relevance in the arguments
against deregulation. To the extent that we answer yes, and/or no,
respectively, the concern is more pressing.
In response to the first query, "does regulation constrain monopoly
power," the answer, based on the analysis in previous chapters of past
and present ICC policies, is "only to a limited extent." Recen t
practices have been erratic, and though in some instances rate increases
have been prohibited, the allowed rates have still exceeded long-run
marginal costs. If profit-maximizing monopoly rates are in fact even
higher than today's rates, and the railroads attempt to increase rates to
these higher levels, the increased stress on the system might force the
ICC to take a stronger stand in holding rates down. However, to say that
the problem of monopoly pricing is mitigated through existing regulation
is arguable at best. Furthermore, the administrative costs, and the
related inefficiencies of rate regulations almost certainly offset the
benefits of ICC rate regulation as practiced today.
Second, will total deregulation mitigate monopoly power in the long
run? In this case the answer is uncertain. In the short run a consumer
may be forced to employ one railroad's services. In the long run,
however, with no entry barriers, a realistic constraint on monopoly
pricing is entry by slurry pipelines or competing railroads. The entry
of canpeting railroads is a less certain constraint. In some instances,
as noted, only one railroad can efficiently serve a particular route.
However, coal flows out of the West have reached such high levels that
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canpetition is more likely to be constructive. The expansion of
infrastructure by, say, the Union Pacific Railroad, to compete in
Burlington Northern territory is not an unreasonable possibility. Of
course, in this small numbers game the possibility of oligopoly pricing
exists. However, given deregulation, this would be subject to the same
anti-trust regulations that other oligopolies confront. Note also that
anti-ccrnpetitive practices in pricing by a railroad monopolist could
similarly be constrained by anti-trust regulations.
In summary, the major justifiable concern with respect to railroad
deregulation is monopoly pricing. On balance, however, the ICC does not
do a very good job as it is (though, as noted above, until recently they
have rarely been called upon to do so), and the railroads' long-run power
to set monopoly prices might be reduced by the threat of canpeting modes
and judicial actions.
With respect to export shipments, the importance of railroad
deregulation is also uncertain. In metallurgical coal export markets,
U.S. railroads have traditionally charged discriminatory tariffs on
export shipments. However there are two reasons to suggest that this is
less likely to be important in steam coal markets. First, the United
States has historically held a strong monopoly position in metallurgical
coal markets.24 In recent years this position has been eroded.
Rates are still well above domestic equivalents, but the gap has
decreased. In contrast, the United States is currently in a weak
ccnpetitive position in international steam coal markets, and therefore
is less able to charge monopoly rates. Though they may continue to do
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so, this would be more a reflection of bad business than economic sense.
Second, metallurgical coal prices are generally double steam coal prices,
so that the demand for metallurgical coal is less responsive to increases
in transportation tariffs. Furthermore, the most likely steam coal
export shipments will originate in western coal fields and cover
distances much greater than most current metallurgical coal shipment
distances. Given these two factors, the importance of deregulation to
export steam coal markets is less important than to domestic coal markets.
The one positive force of deregulation is that the uncertain
restrictions on future steam coal export rates vis-a-vis domestic rates
and existing export rates would be reduced. That is, the threat of
jeopardizing domestic rate structures with low export rates would
disappear. In this sense, deregulation would represent, at worst, a net
gain; at best, significant improvement for the U.S. coal export
position.
In fact, total deregulation of railroad transportation is unlikely
to obtain in the foreseeable future. Partial deregulation in some form
is more likely. The most recent legislative proposal (S.796) by the
Carter administration, currently being heard in Congress, is repre-
sentative of partial deregulatory schemes.25 Its principal
canponents are less rigid requirements for railroad abandonments,
alterations of merger and acquisition rules, greater restrictions on
price discrimina- tion, termination of rate bureau evaluations of single
line rates, termination of anti-trust immunity, and, most important to
our analysis, increased flexibility in rate setting. In specific, the
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railroads would have "the flexibility to charge rates within a zone of
reasonableness of 7 percent per year in 1980 dollars." Rate changes
within the zone would be deregulated, while changes outside the zone
would continue to be regulated by the ICC. Rates above the zone would be
subjected to a three-step procedure which involves canpetition and
reasonableness. Rates below the zone would be subjected to a predatory
pricing test. On rates above the zone, the shipper must prove that
he/she is captive, i.e., he/she has no reasonable transport alternative
(reasonable defined as 120 percent of existing transport cost if trucking
is an alternative, 110 percent if barging is an alternative). If the
shipper can prove the above condition, the carrier must prove that the
rate is reasonable (justified on the basis of cost). If not, the ICC
sets the rate.
Extensive arguments for and against this bill have been presented.
The major arguments in favor cite, for example, increased efficiency,
competition, and reduced regulatory interference. The major argument
against the rate regulation principles is that the zone of reasonableness
provides insufficient protection to the captive shipper; or, from the
railroad perspective, that the zone of reasonableness is too restrictive.
The bill unfortunately ignores several important issues, all of
which are critical to the effects of deregulation. For example, coal-
slurry pipelines are not considered explicitly, nor are acquisitions and
construction, and intermodal ownership. With these omissions, the extent
to which partial deregulation would significantly affect current rate
levels on coal shipments is uncertain. Rates would no doubt increase
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from today's levels, but it is possible that they will increase even
given the existing regulatory structure. Given the inherent uncertainties
with total deregulation, an incremental step towards partial deregulation
such as this is not unreasonable, but by enacting more rigid constraints
on coal rates, or by allowing for freer entry of competing railroads and
slurry pipelines, the efficiency of the coal transportation system could
be increased.
FINANCING CAPACITY EXPANSION
As noted repeatedly above, a major impetus to deregulation and
recent ICC decisions is the 4R act, and the major impetus to the act was
the deteriorating financial position of certain railroads. The reasons
for railroad deterioration are wide-reaching and complex and will not be
considered here. 26 However, a particular facet of this broad
concern, the ability of railroads to attract capital for expansion, has
been repeatedly raised by public and private observers and should be
considered briefly. Two factors are important. First, the profitability
of coal traffic alone. Second, the profitability and financial stability
of railroads as a whole.
In the first case, there is virtually no doubt that coal traffic is
profitable at rates far below existing levels. Given proper calculation
of the cost of capital, there is little doubt that the railroads will be
able to attract capital in the long run, based on the coal operations
alone. In essence, coal markets are financially sound, and in most
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cases, the railroads have an inherent advantage over competing transport
modes. There is, of course, debate about the precise profitability of
coal shipments, but it is safe to say that if non-coal operations are
financially sound, the railroads ability to attract capital for capacity
expansion is as certain as can be expected given inherent uncertainties
in financial markets.
The more pressing concern, then, and the one that permeates all
recent controversies, is the overall financial position of the
railroads. To the extent that non-coal operations are not profitable,
and that campany-wide profitability is accordingly low, the ability of
the railroads to finance capacity expansion must be questioned. In some
cases, such as equipment trust obligations, for example, the overall
financial status of the railroads is not that important since these costs
are tied to particular assets, not company-wide assets. Even in case of
bankruptcy, these debts have been fully paid. The most pressing
financial concern is the expansion of roadway and structures where the
corresponding risk is greater.
In fact, the financial condition of the railroads is widely variable.
In some cases, the railroads are considered very good investments. Union
Pacific, Southern Pacific, Seaboard Coastlines, Southern Pacific, Norfolk
and Western, and the Chessie systems fall in this category. Their ability
to raise funds is unquestioned by financial analysts. At the other
extreme, some railroads, primarily in the Northeast and Midwest, are in
poor financial condition. Recent comprehensive analyses have shown
dangerously low levels of working capital, insufficient cash flows,
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inadequate earnings and rates of return on both net investment and
equity, and low and decreasing fixed charge coverage.27 These roads
are in definite need of additional revenues. In between lie railroads in
generally sound, but questionable financial condition. As a rule, with
the exception of Louisville and Nashville, railroads in the South and
West are in the stronger set financially. Recent financing operations
have indicated that the large coal-carrying railroads will not have
difficulty in long-run capacity expansion. Though exceptions may occur,
it is unlikely that the railroads will not meet future capacity
requirements.
Nonetheless, for roads in the middle range of financial stability,
for example, the Burlington-Northern, a particular danger exists. In
trying to recoup losses on other traffic due to poor management, ICC
constraints, and adverse ccmpetitive conditions, the railroads may price
coal traffic at exceedingly high levels in the short run, and in so doing
will jeopardize the entire operation in the long run. In these cases,
coal shipments, though profitable in their own right, might not be able
to pull the railroad out of overall financial difficulties, and attempts
to do so could result in extensive losses in the long run. Whether or
not this is a real danger is uncertain, but the inefficiency of railroad
management in the past suggests that it not be overlooked.
To conclude, there has been considerable concern with the railroads'
financial condition and their ability to attract capital for capacity
expansion. In the case of coal-hauling roads, the problem does not seem
to be a long-run constraint. Coal shipments alone promise to improve the
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railroads overall financial stability, and most coal carrying roads are
relatively strong as is. Roads with poor financial conditions on overall
operations will have greater problems, but even these should not be
severe when coal operations are the subject of capital financing. One
realistic concern, however, is that overall railroad operations are in
such poor shape that revenues on coal traffic cannot salvage them. If
the railroads attempt to salvage them with coal revenues, the overall
operations may deteriorate even further.
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CHAPTER VI
FOREIGN COAL TRANSPORTATION
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INTRODUCTION
We have analyzed coal transportation patterns in the United States
in the previous sections. Our purpose was threefold. First, the
analysis of economic and regulatory factors underlying U.S. coal
transportation was essential to projecting the U.S. role in international
steam coal markets. Second, the analysis contributed to a better
understanding of domestic steam coal transportation. Third, the analysis
was an interesting case study in transportation economics and regulation.
We will analyze coal transportation patterns and prices in other
potentially important steam coal importing and exporting countries in the
following sections. Broadly, we are interested in the role of inland
transportation in the development of international steam coal markets.
Specifically, we are interested in the patterns of coal transportation in
these countries, the tariffs charged for coal transportation, and the
relationship between tariffs and long-run marginal costs. The analysis
serves two main purposes: first, it provides the input necessary to
estimate optimal trade routes and to establish country-by-country
comparative advantages in international steam coal trade; second, it
provides us with an interesting contrast to the U.S. coal transportation
experience. It contributes to our understanding of rate-setting
practices in non-U.S. countries, and shows that the experiences in these
countries are not dissimilar from the U.S. case.
The analysis is far more limited than the U.S. case. Tariff informa-
tion, where available, was often incomplete. More difficult was the
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approximation of long-run marginal costs. As evidenced in the previous
sections, this is an exceedingly complex issue, but an important one to
understanding future coal transportation developments. Data constraints
in other countries prohibited any rigorous estimation of long-run
marginal costs. At best, rough inferences from regulatory patterns and
general economic variables could be drawn to approximate cost levels. It
should be noted that the data constraints were, in part, attributable to
the basic difficulties of international communications, and, in part,
attributable to the unwillingness of the various transportation organiza-
tions to publicize data. Nonetheless, a more pressing constraint was a
chronic lack of data on transportation costs, especially railroad costs,
in all the countries studied. Aggregate expense data are, of course,
compiled, but incremental costs, or even average costs for particular
commodities are with few exceptions (primarily South Africa) poorly
compiled. In this respect, cost data for the United States, with all the
problems noted above, seem to be far in advance of those for the other
countries studied.
The sections are organized as follows. First, coal transportation
in Australia and Snuth Africa will be analyzed in detail. In both cases:
1) the existing patterns of coal transportation; 2) the institutional
structure; 3) the existing tariff structure; 4) the relationship between
tariffs and long-run marginal costs; and 5) the extent of future capacity
constraints will be discussed. Second, the same issues will be analyzed
for Canadian coal transportation. The analysis will be less detailed,
largely due to the similarities to the U.S. experience. Third, the
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importance of coal transportation in Western Europe and Japan will be
briefly appraised. 1
SOUTH AFRICA
The coal transportation system in the Republic of South Africa is
less complex than in the other countries in our analysis. Several
underlying factors jointly account for this: 1) Coal transportation is
controlled by a government-owned monopoly; 2) export coal is carried
almost exclusively over one major inland transportation route; 3)
virtually all export coal is carried by rail; 4) rates and rate increases
fit a well-defined and consistent pattern; and 5) existing network
capacity, and capacity expansion are relatively well-understood.
EXISTING PATTERN OF COAL TRANSPORTATION
Coal shipments in South Africa are carried almost exclusively by
rail. Inland barge transportation simply does not exist as an option,
and trucks are used mostly as connecting carriers. Volumes carried from
coal fields increased from approximately 6 million metric tons in 1910 to
29 million metric tons (MT) in 1965.2 Between 1965 and 1975, Coal
transportation was relatively stable at approximately 25 million metric
tons per year. Only in 1976 did rapid increases develop. By 1978,
approximately 40 MT of coal were carried. This amounted to approximately
27 percent of all freight carried.
Export steam coal originates almost exclusively in the Transvaal
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coal fields, and is carried exclusively to Richards Bay Harbour on the
Southeast coast of South Africa; a rail distance of between 450 and 600
kilometers.* Coal export levels have been controlled historically by the
Government. Beginning in December 1970, the government granted approval
to the Transvaal Coal Owners Association to export not more than 108
million tons of coal from Transvaal coal fields, at a rate of not more
than 9 million tons per year to begin in 1976 with 2.7 MT contracted with
Japanese consumers. With the "fuel crisis" in 1973, the Government
subsequently gave approval for the export of additional quantities of
coal. 3 Since then, the ceiling has steadily increased according to
market forces, and the railroads have kept pace with capacity expansion.
In 1979, approximately 24 MT of coal were exported, of which 7 MT are
metallurgical, 1.5 MT anthracite, and the remaining 16.5 MT steam coal.
This compares to total coal exports of 13.3 MT in 1978 (33 percent of
total coal tons carried), and allowances for 40 MT in 1985, with all the
increment attributable to steam coal flows. 4
The transport of Transvaal coal to Richards Bay entails the running
of 13 unit trains daily, each train comprised of 76 to 80 wagons, with
trainloads of 4013 and 4224 tons respectively (approximately 50 ton
carloads). This contrasts with the U.S. unit trains which generally
consist of 105, 100 net ton cars. The South African practice is dictated
*The one exception is coal from the Natal region. This coal is
primarily anthracite and amounts to less than 5 percent of export
volumes. It will not be an important factor in steam coal trade
development and will be largely ignored in this analysis. See supply
section for additional details.
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by the fairly narrow standard track gauge (1063 millimeters), which, in
turn, is dictated bv engineering and economic considerations at the time
of original construction. Most important is the mountainous terrain
throughout the provinces. Rapid loading and unloading installations are
in place at both mines and ports with current practice at 3 hours for
each. The line-haul train speed on the Transvaal to Richards Bay route
averages approximately 19 mph.
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The South African Railways (SAR) came into being with the
establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1909.6 At that time
they assumed responsibility for the railroad infrastructure constructed
by the British Government in the last half of the 19th century, primarily
for diamond, gold, and coal movements. In their initial charter they
were given control over the railways throughout the four provinces of
South Africa. In later years they further assumed responsibility for
harbors, pipelines, road transport, and airways.
The SAR functions in a strict sense as a government department,
administered by the Ministry of Transport. In a practical sense, however,
the administration of SAR, under the direction of the Railways and
Harbour Board, is in large part independent. Nonetheless, given
government ownership, the SAR is subject to control by the Parliament,
and Parliament sanction is required for new rail lines and harbors, and
for the annual SAR budget. In reference to this budget; operating
expenses come from railroad revenues, capital for investment comes from
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treasury loans in perpetuity, and, to a limited extent, foreign loans.
In addition, all revenues go into the Railways and Harbours Fund, from
which moneys necessary to meet SAR expenditures approved by Parliament
are withdrawn.
Restrictions on the SAR within the boundaries of parliamentary
control are nebulous. The central guideline in the SAR charter states
that:
The railways, ports and harbours of the Republic shall be
administered on business principles, due regard being had
to agricultural and industrial development within the
Republic and t, the promotion, by means of cheap
transport, of the settlement of an agricultural and
industrial population in the inland portions of all
provinces."
(Section 103(l). Republic of South Africa. Constitution
Act.)
The only other substantive provisions advocate maintaining a balance
between revenues and expenditures and prohibit excessive profits:
Total earnings shall not be more than are sufficient to
meet the necessary outlays for working, maintenance,
betterment, depreciation, and payment of interest due on
capital.
(Section 103(3a). Republic of South Africa. Constitution
Act.)
As is the case in the U.S. Interstate Commerce Act, the guidelines
for administration are subject to various interpretations. In general,
the only firm inference is that the initial intention was to run the
railways on "business principles." However, the reference to national
interests clouds even this observation. More specific evidence on
interpretations will be provided below.
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SOUTH AFRICAN TARIFFS
South African railroad tariffs for all shipments of coal, whether
domestic or export, steam or meturallurgical coals, are based on an SAR
tariff schedule.7  The schedule sets tariffs per 100 kilograms (kg)
for distances between 1 and 5000 kilometers (km). Statistical analysis
of the 1979 tariff schedule (provided by SAR) showed that these tariffs
fit a parabolic form:
TA = C + a +a
where:
TA = tariff-rands per metric ton
M = one-way distance, in kilometers
The regression results under this functional form are:
TA = 1.349 + .0142 x M - .340E-05 x M2
Standard Error .013 .778E-04 .875E-07
T-stat. 103.67 182.6 -38.8
R2 = .9999
F st. = 15643
It is clear from these results that the rate schedule is in fact
constructed to fit this relationship though the formula is not official.
Though there has been considerable debate by railroad analysts over this
functional form's accuracy in approximating costs, it does represent that
form used extensively in railway cost estimation in the past.
Unit train rates in South Africa are systematically less than these
levels. Table 1 presents representative unit-train rates from Transvaal
coal fields to Richards Bay, as well as the normal tariff from the SAR
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rate schedule. As a rule, unit-train tariffs are 40 percent less than
the normal tariffs. The unit-train tariffs are conditioned on the
conveyance of 18 MT per year, three-hour loading times at the mines,
specified origins and destinations, and specified commitments of not less
than 1 year. If these conditions are not met, intermediate rate levels,
"block rates," are set 5 percent below the normal tariff levels.
RATE/COST RELATIONSHIPS
Unit-train tariffs, converted to U.S. dollars (according to the 1979
average exchange rate, 1.20 U.S. $ per rand) equal approximately 15.5
mills per short ton-mile. Based on the analysis in Chapter I, the U.S.
midwestern and eastern rates for railroad-owned-car shipments of
approximately 600 km are approximately 16.0 mills per short ton-mile and
19 mills respectively. Do these levels approximate long-run marginal
costs, or do they reflect other factors, as is the case in the United
States This is an important question. Unfortunately, the data simply
do not exist to specify the relationship between costs and rates
rigorously. The best we can do is draw some rough inferences from the
data and information that do exist.
First, consider the regulatory framework. The charter of the South
African Railways is even more nebulous regarding rate setting than the
U.S. Interstate Commerce Act. As noted above, "the railways shall be
administered on business principles, with due regard being had to
agricultural and industrial development." Beyond this there is no
explicit reference to rate-setting procedures. From a more pragmatic
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Table 1
South African Unit-Train Tariffs -- April, 1979
Unit-train
Forwarding
Station
Distance
Conveyed
(kilometers)
tariffs/ton
All-inclusive
(rand)
Normal Tariff/ton
(rand)
Saalwater
Blackhill
Ermelo
Vandyksdriff
Broodsnyersplaas
Source: "Information on Steam Coal Transportation,"
South Africa Railways,
599
633
445
583
564
5.27
5.51
4.63
5.09
4.86
8.89
9.27
7.25
8.77
8.57
Internal
Matpr ials, 1979, unpubl ished .
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viewpoint, the structural setup of the SAR, where all revenues are
funneled into a fund to be used only for parliamentary approved SAR
expenditures, suggests that excessive profit levels are not encouraged.
However, though this limits aggregate profits, it does not explain
anything about the railroads individual rate-setting procedures.
Beyond this, there has been criticism of SAR rate policies. Two
commissions have established a variety of discriminatory rate-setting
practices that resemble those in the United States. 8  The base for
these policies is "charging what the traffic will bear," which, as a
practical matter, has been manifest in discrimination between classes of
goods. The SAR has 14 classes of goods, rated in order of value, and in
the past, the tariff on class one goods has been as much as 10 times that
on class 14 goods. 9
Other observations raised in these proceedings have been the power
of the farmers' lobby in obtaining low rates on agricultural goods,
which, given the SAR mandate of balancing their budget, forces higher
rates elsewhere. Also, nearest port rates and special rates to centers
of distribution have been practiced. In' general, rate-setting practices
resemble closely those in the United States.
Unfortunately, though these g'eneral observations are ubiquitous in
analyses of the SAR, observations on coal rates and the relationship
between these rates and costs have not been obtained by this author.
Accordingly, though this general evidence suggests the possibility of
almost any relationship between rates and costs, they do not allow us to
pinpoint any particular cost/rate relationship.
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Another indirect approach to specifying cost-rate relationships is
to evaluate aggregate railroad cost data. A recent study divided total
system-wide freight revenues by total freight ton-miles for various
countries including the United States. 10  Using an estimate of U.S.
unit-train costs as a base, railroad rates in these countries- were
estimated by adjusting the U.S. cost estimate by the difference between
the U.S. revenue per ton-mile estimate and the given countries' revenue
per ton-mile estimate. For example, if the U.S. unit-train cost estimate
is 10 mills per ton-mile, and South African system-wide revenues per
ton-mile are twice as high as U.S. revenues per ton-mile, then the South
African rates are estimated to be 20 mills per ton-mile. This approath,
either for rate or cost estimation, is badly flawed. It ignores, among
other things, the effect of subsidies on rates, the commodity
distribution of traffic, the geographical distribution of traffic, the
specific infra-structure characteristics of a country's railroad system,
and accounting practice variations. Had this approach been used to
estimate South African rates, the estimates would have been 25 to 27
mills per short ton-mile versus the actual 15.5 mills. With regard to
costs, even greater error is probable.
Unfortunately, more detailed cost information is not available from
the SAR. Another conceivable approach is to consider component costs.
Labor, in particular, accounts for 50 to 60 percent of railroad
expenses. Adding locomotive and railroad car costs, and the cost
of supplies (railroad ties specifically) might give us a fair
approximation of intercountry cost variations. Again, however, this
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approach provides little specificity. We do know that labor is far
cheaper in South Africa; for example the per employee cost for the SAR is
U.S. $3,600 versus U.S. $18,000 for U.S. Class 1 railroads (1975
12dollars). However, we do not have detailed data on the cost of
labor for specific skills. In fact, the SAR uses 5 times as many
employees per route mile (normalized for density), indicating either
greater labor intensity in their production function or lower average
13
skills, or, most probably, a combination of both. In either event,
conclusions on the effect of these lower costs on aggregate costs are
uncertain at best.
Equipment costs are easier to estimate conceptually, but more
difficult to obtain empirically. Direct price data are unavailable from
either the SAR or equipment manufacturers. This is due to the fact that,
especially with regard to locomotives, individual prices are controlled
by a few large firms, and for competitive reasons, are confidential.
However, given the distributional system of locomotive parts, where 40 to
60 percent of ultimate price is accountable to U.S. produced exports, and
given representative freight rates for these component parts, locomotive
prices in South Africa are probably no more than 15 percent in excess of
U.S. prices. 14 Railroad cars are less reliant on complex technologies
and are largely produced in foreign countries. Direct price data were
again unavailable, but a 15 to 20 percent margin is realistic.
These imprecise estimates do not get us very far in final cost
estimation. Furthermore, even with precise estimates, an equally or more
important factor is the particular operating parameters in foreign
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countries. For examole, in South Africa the terrain is mountainous, and
a narrow track gauge (1063 milimeters) is used system wide. This forces
use of smaller locomotives (2600 horsepower versus 3000 horsepower and
above in the United States), and smaller trainloads (4000 tons versus
11,000 tons). The impact of these factors on final costs is impossible
to determine without a complete cost analysis, the data for which simply
do not exist.
To conclude, though present rate levels in South Africa are certain,
the relationship between costs and rates cannot be estimated with any
certainty given data constraints. It is possible that, given the
historical practice of cost-based rates on mineral commodities, the rates
do not exceed costs by substantial margins. However, transportation rate.
discrimination may well exist on coal shipments. Furthermore, unlike the
U.S. unstable environment, it is unlikely that rates would be reduced.
In fact coal companiss in South Africa have commented on their "extremely
attractive rail rates." Whether this indicates their feeling that rates
equate costs, or simply indicates the strong competitive position of
South African coal in foreign markets is unclear.
CAPACITY
A final concern is railroad capacity in South Africa. Given the
export structure, where one railroad invests for a centralized group of
coal producers and shipments are carried on one route, we would expect an
efficient investment program, constrained only by serious capital
shortages or physical constraints. Practice supports this expectation.
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The government has steadily increased capacity to 25 MT, and has plans to
increase capacity to 60 MT. Communications with the SAR indicate an
extensive understanding of and planning for capacity utilization. 15
For example, intermediate increments in traffic will be handled by
greater car size and more trains per day, and segment by segment
improvements for increases beyond 30 MT are well-defined. Furthermore,
SAR and coal company officials estimate that rates will not change in
real terms as a function of capacity expansion up to 60 MT.16  This
has been the case for capacity increments from 5 to 25 MT, as capital
costs have offset volume increases.
Beyond 60 MT, the constraints on capacity expansion are uncertain to
this author. Presently, export levels are not allowed to increase beyond
40 MT in 1985. To the extent that demand might justify exports above
this level, we will further consider this problem below.
AUSTRALIA
Coal transportation in Australia holds similarities with both the
U.S. and South African experiences, but the combination of elements from
each forms a very different overall transportation system. Most
importantly, railroad transportation is govenment owned and controlled,
as is the case in South Africa, but. road transportation is a private
industry, subject to regulation . The combination of these different
structures, reinforced by problems in transportation faced by most other
nations, has contributed to a complex transportation system riddled with
political and economic problems, uncertainties, and anomalies.
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EXISTING PATTERN OF COAL TRANSPORTATION
The two states in Australia from which virtually all coal production
originates are New South Wales and Queensland. These two states are
contiguous, comprise approximately one-third of the area of Australia,
and lie on the eastern part of the continent, bordered to the East by the
Pacific Ocean. For export coal issues, only these two states directly
concern us.
In New South Wales approximately 40 million metric tons (MT) of coal
were transported from mines to consumers in 1978. Coal transportation was
allocated between rail (31.7 percent), road to off-site rail-sidings (14.5
17
percent), all-road (27.7 percent), and conveyor belt (26.1 percent).
The rail share, 16.5 MT, is carried exclusively by the Public
Transport Commission of New South Wales. Coal freight accounted for
approximately 50 percent of total railroad freight tonnage and 35 percent
18
of total freight revenues.
Coal exports in 1978 were 17.5 MT. Rail moved 12.1 MT of this
amount, and truck transport accounted for the remaining tonnage. Of this
12 MT, 2 MT were steam coal, and 10 MT metallurgical coal. Of the 17.5
MT exports, 12 MT were destined for consumers in Japan, the remainder
allocated over other countries in the Far East and Western Europe.19
Transportation of coal in Queensland amounted to 25 MT in 1978. Of
this total, 22 MT were carried by the Queensland Government
Railways.20 Exports to overseas consumers were approximately 20 MT.
The largest single consumer was again Japan (14.3 MT). As compared to
New South Wales, the vast majority of coal was transported by rail. The
3 MT not carried by rail were carried by truck.
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INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Regulation of freight transportation is imperfect in all countries,
but the experience in Australia seems to have magnified these generic
diff icul ties. A brief discussion of the regulatory environment is
helpful to our understanding of rates and their relationship to
21
costs.
The regulatory system is complex, and varies from state to state.
The fundamental reason for this variation is the fact that interstate
transportation is unregulated, with the exception of health and safety
regulations. The issue of interstate transportation regulation has been
the subject of repeated court debates. These debates rotate around the
various interpretations of Section 92 of the Australian Constitution.
Though ambiguous, the interpretation of this section, given in numerous
decisions of the High Court of Australia, has been that Section 92
22.
guarantees the absolute freedom of interstate trade. It is
doubtful that this interpretation will change in the foreseeable future.
Independent of this, however, interstate regulation will affect export
movements only indirectly since all existing inland routes to ports are
intrastate.
Given the non-existence of interstate transportation regulation, the
responsibility for the transportation system lies with the individual
states. Regulation in each of the five Austral ian states has certain
similarities, but important differences. For our purposes we need only
consider New South Wales and Queensland.
With regard to the railroads, both Queensland and New South Wales
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rail systems are wholly owned and controlled by the State Government.
The administrative system is similar to South Africa's, with a railway
board acting as a largely independent unit, subject to budgetary approval
by Parliament. In both cases, government transportation acts are unclear
on guidelines for pricing and investment policies. The general conflict
between economic and social objectives, that is prevalent also in South
Africa, is not given the explicit attention it is in the South African
Constitution. The New South Wales Government Railways Act defines conduct
towards the customers in terms equivalent to the U.S. Interstate Commerce
Act, citing, for example, reasonable tolls and charges, the government's
authority to set maximum charges, and the illegality of discrimination.
However, the railroads are not given explicit directions to operate their
enterprise profitably or otherwise.23 The Queensland Railway Act is
similar in focus, setting -general guidelines for rate-setting, but
offering no criteria for railway management in an aggregate sense.24
As a general rule, the railways have enormous lattitude, with no
well-defined guidelines. In both cases the practical interpretation of
transportation acts has been to maximize railway traffic, subject to no
binding constraint.
Road regulation has historically been used to protect the railroads
traffic share. Over time, a variety of taxation and licensing schemes
has been practiced in Queensland and New South Wales, primarily to reduce
truck competition. The effects of these regulations have generally been
disastrous. In some cases truck competition was not eliminated, and
railroads have either lost traffic or, in competing with trucks, held
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unprofitable traffic and incurred heavy financial losses. 25
Currently, truck regulation in Queensland takes the form of entry-
control and road-maintenance taxes.26 With respect to coal,
intrastate movements of 25 km or less are.not controlled. For shipments
longer than 25 kin, licenses are required, and are generally not provided.
In New South Wales, truck transportaion was deregulated in 1973/1974.
Prior to that, taxation and entry control had been practiced. One might
suspect that deregulation would lead to increased utilization of truck
transport. However, the isolated effects of regulation are not possible
to determine given additional recent changes. (See below). In many
instances truck regulation in New South Wales was circumvented by
"border-hopping," that is, a shipment would make an intermediate stop at
a station just over the border. As an interstate movement, it therefore
became exempt from intrastate regulation.
The transportation system that has obtained from this system of
combined government ownership and regulation is, bluntly, a mess. First,
as in most countries, rail rates are set according to value, with large
variation between the varous goods classifications. However, even with
truck regulation, the railroads are not perfect monopolists, and
competition from trucks has to a significant extent undermined value-of-
service pricing. In some cases, particularly high-value commodities, the
railroads have almost jealously sought to hold this traffic, even when
trucks may have an inherent advantage, and for that matter, even when
rail movements are unprofitable. In other cases, the railroads have lost
traffic to the trucking industry. What has obtained is a gross
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misallocation of traffic, and heavy financial losses by the
railroads.27 In New South Wales, for example, on revenues of 437
mill ion A $, a deficit of 39P mill ion A$ was incurred. Of this loss, 248
million A $ was accountable to passenger traffic, but even freight
operations lost 149 million A $ on revenues of 282 million A $.28
With no competition from trucks, revenues from high-valued
commodities would, no doubt, exceed costs. However, with this
competition, trucks have either diverted traffic to themselves, or
successfully eroded profits in these cases. The result has been that
mining and agricultural commodities, (the commodities for which rail has
a strong inherent advantage), and coal in particular, have been used to
finance part of this deficit. Although no exact figures for coal alone
exist, it is widely believed that revenues exceed expenses by
considerable margins. 29
This basic problem has contributed to other ills. Given pricing
practices largely independent of costs, misallocations have arisen, and
investment planning has been inefficient. It has not generally been
keyed to prices, but rather to maximize railroad traffic levels.
Finally, uneven service, poor maintenance, and inadequate financing have
further contributed to a poor railroad system.
AUSTRALIAN TARIFFS
Coal rates in Australia reflect these problems. Data on coal trans-
portation rates are imperfect, but some firm conclusions can be drawn.
. First, unit trains are the predominant method of movement.
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Generally 3600 HP locomotives move 5000 net ton volumes in trainloads of
70 to 80 wagons. New South Wales railroad rates were provided by the
Public Transport Commission. A schedule headed "Contract Shipment Coal
in Commission's Wagons from 1.4.79" listed rates per tonne from 1 to 644
km over various short intervals.30 The schedule fits a parabolic
form, as for South Africa. The extimated regression results are:
TA = Tariff per metric ton, A $
M = one-way kilometers
TA = 1.35150 + .0395 x M - .331E-04 x M2
Standard Error = .08 .0071 .115E-05
T-stat. 16.87 55.76 -28.8
R2 = .9939
F-stat. = 5977
Rates for owners' wagons are 10 percent less than these, independent of
distance. 31
The most important point to make is' that these rate are very high
relative to U.S. unit-train rates. Converting to U.S. dollars based on
the 1979 average exchange rate (1.13 U.S. $ per Australian $) for 50 km
the tariff amounts to 10 cents per short ton-mile in U.S. $, for 100 km,
8 cents, and for 200 km 6.6 cents per short ton-mile. The longest
distance represented in the schedule is 644 km, or 400 miles. The tariff
is 3.4 cents per short ton-mile. In all cases these levels are orders of
magnitude above comparable rates in. South Africa and the United States.
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For example, the U.S. East and Midwest tariffs for 400 mile shipments are
approximately 19 and 16 mills per short ton-mile respectively. For a 200
km shipment, the U.S. East and Midwest equivalents are 4.3 and 3.3 cents
per short ton-mile respectively.
What is not certain is the extent to which actual contract rates
equal these scheduled rates. Even communications will the railroads and
coal companies did not totally eliminate this uncertainty. Nonetheless,
the following conclusions seem to be accurate. First, the schedule rates
are maximum rates for coal movements. Second, rates below these levels
are provided in some cases. In general, concessions are allowed on the
scheduled rates for the provision by the mines of fast loading/unloading
facilities meeting certain requirements, and also for the longer hauls to
the seaboard from western and north-western coal fields. A list of
concessions as of January 1978 was provided by the coal companies. 32
Though the concessions were varied in certain instances, 80 percent of
them ranged between 60 and 80 Austral ian cents, and the amount was
independent of mileage. If we assume that the concession stayed the same
proportionately between 1978 and 1979, the tariff levels reflecting these
would range from 8.1 cents per short ton-mile at 40 km, to 6.7 cents at
111 km and 5.9 cents ar 207 km. These are still far in excess of U.S.
rates noted above. Note howevar that no data have been provided for 1979
concessions, which may well differ from previous concessions. Also note
that the percentage increase in tariffs, as represented by the schedules
for 1977, 1978, and 1979, is different for different mileages. From 1977
to 1979 tariffs for 25 km shipments- increased by 21 percent, tariffs for
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100 km shipments increased by 14 percent, and tariffs for 200 km shipments
increased by 13 percent. Finally, note that concessions do not apply on
all shipments, so that this reduction in tariffs on all routes would
underestimate transport costs overall. For example, a sample of 12
tariffs from the coal companies as of August 1979 showed that only Western
Main and Lithgow to Balmain received a concession from the rate schedule.
Less information was available on truck rates in New South
Wales. 33 As a general rule, truck rates for distances below 25 km
are marginally less than rail rates. For example, the 13 km distance
from South Bulli to Port Kembla costs A $1.67 via rail and A $1.30 via
road. For longer distances, up to say 200 km, truck transportation rates
per ton mile are generally competitive with rail. In some cases,
however, where rail access is not close to the mines, truck
transportation is far cheaper. For example, Wollondilly coal to Port
Kembla must be diverted by approximately 30 km to a rail siding at
Glenlee for transfer. In addition, truck routes are often more direct
than the circuitous rail lines. The Woolondilly Washery, for example, is
78 km from Port Kembla (via Picton). Th'is compares to 30 road km to
Glenlee, and 142 km via rail From Glenlee to Port Kembla.
An interesting comparison of coal transportation patterns, provided
by Clutha Development Pty., shows the optimal transportation modal
selection for eight different shipments. 34  Road rates range from 8
cents to 10 cents per ton mile. On five of the eight movements, all-road
movements represent the cheapest alternative. One other movement is best
served by a road, rail combination.- Table 2 compares the tariffs for the
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same routes given that railroad service is used wherever possible, and
given existing infrastructure. It is interesting that shipments from
Glennlee to Port Kembla will cost A $6.55 via rail versus A $4.61 via
truck, while Wollondilly coal to Port Kembla will cost A $8.95 via rail
versus A $5.95 or A $5.11 via truck (depending on routing). It is clear
that if the government continues to push railroad transportation, and to
curtail truck transportation, significant economic losses will obtain.
We have less information on Queensland coal rates. In general,
longer hauls to ports are involved in Queensland (170 to 380 km), and
rail carries virtually all of these export movements. Six tariffs as of
August 1979 have been provided by the coal companies. 35 These range
from approximately 3.8 U.S. cents per short ton-mile to 3.1 U.S. cents
per short ton-mile over distances from 177 km to 343 km. In comparison,
the U.S. East and Midwest-rates for 177 km shipments are approximately
3.1 to 4.3 cents per short ton-mile respectively. For 343 km shipments,
the corresponding rates are 2.2 and 2.6 cents per short ton-mile. This
compares with scheduled rates of 7.0 cents at 177 km and 5.1 cents at 343
km in New South Wales, or approximately 4.5 to 6.4 cents given possible
concessions (all in U.S. dollars). This comparison can be deceptive,
however, for a number of reasons. First, the New South Wales rates are
keyed to shorter-distance shipments, mostly below 150 km and often as
short as 20 km. In Queensland, the longer distances suggest more
efficient system-wide use of rolling stock. Furthermore, coal companies
have noted that New South Wales shipments are primarily along relatively
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Table 2.
New South Wales Coal Transportation Alternatives
(A $/metric ton)
Wollondilly Coal
Glenlee to Balmain
Glenlee to
Port Kembla
Wollondilly to
Port Kembla via
Picton
Wollindilly to Port
Kembla via Narella
Tahmoor Coal
Tahmoor to Balmain
Tahmoor to Port
Kembla
Other Coal
South Bulli to
Port Kembla
Coalcliff to Port
Kembla
Coalcliff to Port
Kembla
Present mode
(Road) (+Rail) (Total)
3.65
4.61
5.11
5.95
2.20 3.65
1.30
1.93
2.45
Rail haulage maximized
(Road) (+Rail) (Total)
3.65
4.61
5.11
5.95
2.40
2.40
3.65 3.65
6.55 6.55
6.55 8.95
6.55 8.95
5.85
1.30
1.93
2.45
Source: Private correspondence with British
and Clutha Development, Pty, Ltd.
Petroleum, London, U.K.
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congested old track. Most Queensland traffic moves to Hay Point on
relatively newly constructed and uncongested lines. Finally, this line
was completely funded by the Central Queensland Coal Associates on a
security deposit basis. According to coal companies, the freight rate
includes three components: 1) operating costs; 2) profit or tax
component; 3) amount to repay the Central Queensland Coal Associates
security deposit. 36 Nonetheless, this financing system may, in part,
account for lower rates.
In addition, recent rail rates for new developments have been
planned at far higher levels than currently exist. In 1977, the
government planned a freight rate of A $6.90 from Norwich Park to Hay
Point.37 Assuming an increase at 10 percent to current dollars, this
amounts to A $7.59 or approximately 4.7 U.S. cents per short ton-mile.
What rate will actually develop is uncertain.
RATE/COST RELATIONSHIPS
As in the case of the United States and South Africa, the next
question is, are these transportation rates equal to costs First,
consider trucks. The trucking industry is competitive in Australia, and
rates should reflect costs including a normal profit. The Long Distance
Road Association of Australia estimates road costs as a function of truck
size and annual miles.38 They range from 6 to 9 Australian cents per
ton-mile. Given the relative density in New South Wales, and a
10 percent markup of rates for normal profits, we can say with reasonable
certainty that rates approximate long-run marginal costs. Note of course
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that, as in the United States, road infrastructure costs are not included
in this estimate. Note also that the difference in Australian costs
versus U.S. costs is attributable to high equipment costs (for example,
5-axle truck: U.S. $80,500 versus U.S. $55,000; 3-axle truck: U.S.
$38,000 versus U.S. $22,000), and higher fuel and labor costs.39
In regard to rail costs, estimation of rail/cost relationships is
not possible. It is doubtful whether even the state railways know their
costs. 40 Nonetheless, some gene-al observations are possible.
First, rail costs -in both Queensland and New South Wales no doubt
exceed costs in the United States. Equipment costs are approximately 20
percent higher, labor unions are very strong, and fuel costs high.
However, as is the case with South Africa, evaluating these factors
independent of other factors in the production functions is hazardous at
best. (See South Africa Section).
Second, there is little doubt that the higher cost levels in
Australia do not justify the extremely high rail rates. With reasonable
certainty we can say that the rates include substantial rents. Coal
traffic is used to subsidize other traffic, and this practice is
explicitly acknowledged by the states. 41
Unfortunately, the extent of 'this margin is uncertain. However, the
possibility that rates can be lowered so that they are closer to costs to
attract traffic cannot be ignored, and this must be considered as an
important factor in Australian involvement in international steam coal
trade.
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CAPACITY
The last subject to discuss in the case of Australia is the future
ability of the transportation infrastructure to carry increased volumes
of coal. This has been a large concern of observers and participants in
the Australian coal market, and a considerable amount of planning has
been undertaken. A number of points should be made.
First, increments in coal transport will be mostly carried by rail
as trucks are prohibited to greater and greater extents.42 There are
two explanations for this prediction. First, the traditional interest of
the railroads is to maximize rail traffic. Second, and largely as an
impetus to the railroads' goals, there are increasing health and
environmental concerns with truck movements in New South Wales. The
public has become increasingly outraged with large coal trucks moving on
mountainous terrain in rural areas, largely as a result of serious truck
accidents, often involving cars and property, along the routes.43 As
a general rule it is unlikely that trucks will carry incremental export
movements.
Given this, the ability of the railroads to handle increased volumes
of coal has been questioned. In response to this concern, the Public
Transport Commission has evaluated in detail the capacity of the existing
rail network and the investments required to have additional tons of coal
moved to export destinations The system presently carries approximately
12 million metric tons per year, and the Commission estimates a
theoretical capacity of 30 MT.44 However, to carry the 1985 forecast
export tonnage of 48 mill ion metric- tons per year economically, an
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investment of A $78 million in track and A $73 mill ion in associated
signalling would be necessary; together with A $273 million in equipment.
The Public Commission predicts that the increased volume levels should
service these capital expenditures at current real rate levels. 46
More interesting than these aggregate figures is the plan itself,
which has been subject to considerable controversy. In essence, the
government has decided which port facilities to improve or construct, and
it has planned related railroad improvements accordingly. However, the
goal in doing this has been primarily to maximize rail traffic, and
system-wide operating efficiency has in some instances been neglected.
In the Northern District (Hunter Valley), new port infrastructure
developments at Port Waratah and Newcastle have been planned. However,
all road traffic must he phased out over a ten-year period. A penalty of
40 Australian cents per metric ton in $1979 is intended to obtain this
goal.47 In that the Hunter Valley is accessible to rail facilities,
this particular facet of the government's plan has not been controversial.
More controversial are the coalfields in the West, South, and
Southwest of New South Wales. These producers have been well-positioned
traditionally for export shipments. However, for increased volumes,
expanded port facilities and transportation infrastructure are required.
The realistic options involved building a new coal loader at either Port
Kembla or at Port Botany. Since Port Kembla would put Burragorang Valley
Coal at a serious geographical disadvantage, and Port Botany afforded
greater freight economies due to larger size ships, the producers agreed
to locate the new coal loader at Port Botany. This provided the least
cost alternative.
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However, with the change of State Government, the decision of the
previous government to approve, in principle, the Port Botany plan was
overturned. In June 1977, Port Kembla was nominated instead.
Furthermore, truck traffic received at Port Kembla will be limited to 2
MTPY from nominated collieries. The producers argue that in seeking to
maximize rail traffic, the objpct of efficiency has been removed. The
government, in contrast, cites the existing rail facilities to Port
Kembla and environmental concerns in their decision. 48
To conclude, two factors in long run development in New South Wales
should be considered. First, large investments will be required to carry
additional coal volumes. Second, the government plans for infrastructure
development will impose greater costs on large producers in the western
coal districts, both due to questionable selection of port facilities and
reduction of truck transport. On balance, even though we have concluded
that rates are far above costs, it is unlikely that rates will be reduced
given these developments.
Finally, brief notes on Queensland should be made. First, the rail
system in Queensland is in a general sense in better shape than that in
New South Wales. Expansion to carry increased exports will no doubt be
less expensive, although no estimates exist similar to those for New
South Wales. More important is the indication that the Queensland
government is trying to appropriate coal company profits. Since the A $6
per ton coal levy has been repealed, freight rates are the easiest
mechanism by which to reap profits earned by large multinational
companies.49 As much as anything, the issue reflects the political
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embarassment of large profits being earned by non-Australian firms. A
variety of factors enter into the issue: employment at coal fields,
foreign investments, and the economic picture as a whole. The focal
point of the political debate is Utah Development Companies Norwich Park
project, where very high rail rates have been negotiated by the
Government. Though any forecast is speculative, the prospect for rail
rates in Queensland is increasing instability and possibly increased rate
levels.
CANADA, WESTERN EUROPE, JAPAN
We consider inland coil transportation prices and patterns in
Canada, Western Europe, and Japan in this section. Our primary purpose
is to assemble the information required for the analysis of delivered
coal prices and coal demand. Other issues that have been analyzed in the
United States, Australian, and South African cases will be given little
or no attention for the following reasons. First, in the case of Canada,
their coal transportation system closely parallels coal transportation in
the Western United States. In addition, Canada's situation has been
extensively analyzed by others in recent years.50 Second, in Japan,
power stations have been and will continue to be located at coastal
sites, and this locational choice is virtually independent of fuel
choice. Although nuclear power would conceivably free the Japanese of
this constraint, nuclear power plants have also been located at coastal
sites. Third, in Western Europe, most coal-fired power plants will also
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be located at coastal sites. Where they are not, transportation
distances will normally be short relative to the inland movements in
exporting countries. Fourth, in many cases very little transportation
rate or cost data are available.
CANADA
Our main concern in Canada is with western coal reserves and the
shipment of coal to West Coast ports. Although coal reserves in eastern
provinces (Nova Scotia in particular) could be developed for export, the
amounts are small, the costs high, and their importance is minimal (See
Part B, Chapter I). Of Canadian coal reserves, 99 percent are in the
western Provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan.
British Columbia and Alberta have bituminous coal; Saskatchewan has only
lignite. These coal fields are from 600 to 1000 miles east of the West
coast port facilities: Roberts Bay, Port Moody, and North Vancouver.
The only existing transportation mode over this route for coal is
rail. Also, coal shipments over this route are almost entirely
metallurgical coal, mainly destined for consumers in Japan. In 1978,
approximately 14 million metric tons (MT) of export coal were carried by
the railroads.51 Furthermore, export coal movements were the largest
single commodity in tons and revenues for the entire Canadian rail
freight system.
The railroad system in Canada is unique. All long-haul coal
shipments, in fact virtually all rail freight shipments, are handled by
one of two railroads-the Canadian National Railway (CN), which is
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government owned and controlled, and the Canadian Pacific Railways (CP),
which is privately owned and controlled. The regulation of railroad
transportation resembled closely rail regulation in the United States
until the Canadian National Transporation Act of 1967. Similar to
current U.S. deregulation proposals, this act removed most of the rate
restrictions that had previously existed. Specifically, the new act only
prohibits non-compensatory rates, defined as below variable cost levels
(as calculated by the commission), and unreasonably high rates under
monopoly conditions, defined as more than 250 percent above variable
costs. 52  In this system the railroads have considerable control over
rate levels, and most destinations are serviced by only one railroad.
Rail transportation of coal is predominantly in unit trains. The
distance of existing export movements ranges from 560 to 730 miles. The
operations resemble the most efficient services in the Western United
States, with 3000 HP locomotives and 100 net ton cars. Unit-train rates
from mid-1977 ranged from 1.40 to 1.68 cents per short ton-mile (Canadian
dollars).53 Escalating this to mid-1979 levels (AAR index), and
converting to U.S. dollars (.85 U.S. $ per Canadian dollar), yields an
average of 1.6 cents per ton-mile in U.S. dollars. This compares to the
Western U.S. rate of approximately 1.2 cents per ton-mile for a shipment
of 700 miles.
As before, we are interested in the relationship between rates and
costs. Again, however, there is no solid evidence on this
relationship. Given the significant monopoly power of the railroads,
the possibility of rents certainly exists, but data are not available to
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specify rent levels accurately. One empirical estimate of rents on
Canadian coal shipments was made by James Sloss. Using company
expense and revenue data, and estimating the allocation of expenses and
revenues over unit train export movements in 1969 and 1975, Sloss
generated "an extremely approximate estimate of the gain or loss
experienced by the participating railroads in hauling unit coal trains in
the year 1975." He concluded that for CN marginal revenues were 147
percent of marginal costs, and for the CP, 338 percent of marginal
costs. 55 However, given the data deficiencies that Sloss himself notes,
this conclusion is not sufficient for adjusting actual rate levels.
Current CP rates are not systematically higher than CN rates, and it is
difficult to imagine long-run cost differences between the railroads of
this magnitude.
To conclude, the unit-train rates of 1.6 cents per ton-mile may well
include a significant rent component. The main factor affecting rent
levels is the railroads' monopoly position. Factors suggesting lower
rents are the extremely mountainous terrain on export routes and the
competitive metallurgical coal market. We do not have the data to
specify costs exactly. As a lower-end Western U.S. cost estimates are a
reasonable approximation.
UNITED KINGDOM
The British public utility, The Central Electricity Generating Board
(CEGB), consumed 75.5 million metric tons (MT) of coal in 1978.
Coal-fired power stations are distributed throughout the country, but the
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greatest concentrations are in the Southeast (London), the Midlands
(Nottingham, Birmingham), the Northeast (Harrogate, Leeds), and the
Northwest (Manchester).56
The location of these plants has gone through several stages. As a
general rule, it is more economical to locate base-load stations near the
fuel source and then to transmit electricity to markets than to put power
stations at the markets and carry coal to them. In practice, however,
this has not always happened, largely because generating capacity becomes
obsolete so quickly. A given plant in the past did not contribute to
base-load generation for more than a few years, after which it was used
to meet middle and peak demand. Since it was not economic to transmit
middle or peak power over any distance, plants were often built close to
.57
markets for long-run cost savings.
Since nationalization, however, the power industry has moved to
minimization of transport costs, and large new stations are built near
fuel sources. This explains the large number of coal-fired stations in
East Midlands and Yorkshire. Finally, the most recent trend has seen a
move to oil-fired and nuclear power stations at coastal sites. In
addition, all of the coal-fired power stations commissioned in 1978-1979
are located at or close to the coast.58
Several transportation modes are used to distribute coal to power
stations. In 1977, the CEGB received 68.75 MT: 54.9 MT by rail; 7 MT by
truck; 4 MT by coastal shipping; 2 MT by conveyor belt; and .75 MT by
canal. For the most part, hauls are over short distances, less than 50
km. 90 percent are over distances less than 100 km. 5 9
258
Railroad transportation of coal is moved exclusively by the
government owned British Railways. The British Railway's largest single
customer is the CEGB, and their contractual arrangement is an important
factor underlying British coal transportation patterns. The agreement
with the British Railways is to transport coal by rail to any rail
connected power stations unless "it is inconvenient to do so." In
return, the British Railways give the CEGB a "generous review of freight
rates in return."60
Road transport is chiefly to old stations low on the merit order and
lacking rail connections. In some cases, road transport is in fact
cheaper than rail, but under normal circumstances its use is not possible
under the contractual arrangement between the British Railways and the
CEGB.
Rail movements in Britain are primarily in unit trains, or
"Merry-go-round" (MGR) trains, in the British vernacular. In 1978, 75
percent of coal movements on the CEGB were MGR service, and virtually all
the new rail connections are of this type. Typical service involves 2500
HP locomotives, cars with 30 ton capacity, and trainloads of
approximately 1000 tons. 6 1
Rail rate informaton is unav'allable given the contractual
arrangement. In fact, given this system, individual rail rates may have
little meaning. One imperfect estimate of average freight rates is as
follows. In 1977, the total CEGB rail bill amounted to 55 to 65
million pounds. The average distance, weighted by tons, was 50 km, and
tons-carried amounted to 54.8 mill ion metric tons. 62 This indicates
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a tariff of 6.5 to 7.5 U.S. cents per short ton-mile for a 50 km haul
(assuming the average 1979 conversion rate of 2.24 dollars per pound).
United States shipments of less than 50 km range from 5 to 9 cents per
ton-mile. Given the tight concentration of distances on this average,
this estimate can be used as a reasonable approximation of rail rates.
To conclude, coal power plants in the United Kingdom using imported
coal will most likely be located at coastal sites. To the extent that
inland stations use imported coal, short-hauls will be the norm, and a
tariff of 7 cents per short ton-mile is an imperfect, but reasonable
approximation. Note finally that this is considerably lower than
short-haul rates in Austral ia, and approximately equal to short-haul
rates in South Africa, and the United States.
WEST GERMANY
Limited data have also been obtained for West Germany. Two facets
of West German Coal transportation are important to our analysis: the
costs of Ruhr Valley coal in German consuming centers, and the costs of
transporting coal from ports to German consuming centers.
First, consider Ruhr coal. This coal is carried by rail, barge, and
truck. Truck movements are only economical on short-hauls of 60 km or
less. Intrastate barge movements are regulated at levels above marginal
costs. They are very high relative to the United States. For example, a
shipment from Furst Leopold to Stuttgart (601 km) in 1979 costs DM 30.30
per metric ton, or approximately U.S. 4.0 cents per short ton-mile.63
As a general rule, intrastate rail rates are competitive with
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intrastate barge shipments only if unit-train rates are prescribed and
the receivers cannot be reached directly by barges so that an additional
connecting mode is required. The railways set higher rates when barge
competition is weak; for example, from the Ruhr Valley to Munich. Unit
train concessions depend on volumes carried and frequency of shipments.
As an example of this adjustment, a unit-train rate from Hervest-Dorsten
to Hannover is DM 22.62 per metric ton, compared with the base rate of
DM30.40. Even with this adjustment the rates are extremely high. The
unit train concession rate to Hannover amounts to approximately 7.5 U.S.
cents per short ton-mile. 64
Second, consider import movements. In this case data are available
for barge shipments from Rotterdam to various German destinations. 65
These intercountry rates are unregulated and far lower than- intracountry
rates. For example, the intracountry barge rate from Furst-Leopold to
Stuttgart is DM 30.30 (610 km). The intercountry barge rate from
Rotterdam to Stuttgart is DM 22.00 (860 km). In U.S. dollars the
intracountry rate is approximately 4.0 cents per short ton-mile, versus
2.1 cents per short ton-mile for the intercountry shipment (.55 U.S. $
equals 1 DM). Note that even the intercountry barge rates are as much as
four times higher than U.S. equivalents.
OTHER COUNTRIES
Finally, a few words about the remaining countries. First, in
Japan, all non-hydro existing and planned power stations are located at
coastal sites. Inland transportation is therefore not important to
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consider in our study. Of course, some method of distribution from ports
will be required, but this will almost certainly be performed by small
seagoing vessels since the dockside facilities at coastal power plants
are limited to receiving smaller ships.
In European countries other than Great Britain and Germany, the
importance of inland transportation is less certain. The location of
power plants involves a set of non-transportation factors, including
environmental constraints, existing coal facilities, and patterns of
electricity demand. In- most cases coal power plants will be located on
the coast, but this simple assumption could be misleading. Even so, in
most other cases, due to simple geography, inland coal hauls will be
relatively short relative to U.S. hauls, and only a small factor in the
development of steam coal trade. Given this, and serious data
limitations, the general assumption will be coastal power stations,
unless otherwise noted.
In Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands, this appears to be a sound
assumption. (See Demand Section for details on power plant location).
In France, coal power stations wil either be coastal,'or possibly in the
Paris region. In the later case, barges from the Le Havre will be
employed. Barge rates in France are not available. We will assume that
they are equal to West German intercountry rate levels.
SUMMARY--FOREIGN COAL TRANSPORTATION
Several salient points from th-is brief analysis should be
reemphasized. First, the predominant mode of coal transportation in all
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the countries studied, in the past, the present, and most likely the
future, is the railroads. Second, railroad coal rates in foreign
countries are at least as high as in the United States, and in some
cases, notably New South Wales and West Germany, far higher. Third,
although there are wide international variations in the structure of
railroad ownership and regulation, a common denominator across all the
countries studied is significant monopoly power held by the railroads,
and value-of-service pricing. Fourth, with the possible exception of
South Africa, our limited evidence suggests then coal rates exceed
incremental costs by significant margins in all the countries studied.
Fifth, the profits on coal shipments are used to finance the deficit
incurred by other railroad traffic, freight and passenger. Sixth, even
with this subsidization of other traffic, all the foreign raikoads
operate at large system-wide deficits. Finally, as coal is in many cases
one of only a few profitable commodities, it is unl ikely that reductions
to cost levels will be obtained in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes the role of ocean transportation in
international steam coal trade development. The purpose is to estimate
the long-run marginal cost of ocean transportation of coal. A cost
model is estimated for coal movements over potentially important steam
coal trade routes. The model incorporates ship size-distance trade-offs,
backhaul opportunities, and alternative vessel technologies. The cost
calculations will be integrated with the other cost variables in Part B.
Two related topics are analyzed in lesser detail. First, the market
structure and price formation in bulk carrier markets. The interaction
of prices and costs, and various supply alternatives in ocean
transportation are explained. Second, the role of port facilities in
steam coal trade development is evaluated in Appendix B.
OCEAN-SHIPPING MARKETS
Two related markets are important to ocean-going coal shipments:
bulk commodity markets and oil markets. Table 1 shows major bulk
commodity and oil seaborne trade from 1967 to 1978.
Coal trade in 1978 equaled 122 million metric tons (MT),
approximately 75 percent of which vas metallurgical coal. 1Only
grain and iron ore shipments exceeded coal shipments in volume (149 MT
and 265 MT respectively). Other major bulk commodities are bauxite and
phosphate, with shipments in 1977 of 46 MT and 44 MT respectively. 2
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The tanker market includes crude oil and oil products. Seaborne
shipments from 1967 to 1978 are also shown in Table 1. In 1978, crude oil
shipments equaled 1440 million tons, almost three times the volume of iron
ore, coal, and grain shipments combined. Oil product shipments amounted
to 270 MT in 1978, approximately equal to iron ore shipments in that year.
Table 2 depicts the world shipping fleet from 1967 to 1979. Oil
tankers serve the oil and oil products market, bulk carriers serve the
bulk commodity markets, and combined carriers serve both markets.
Combined carriers are classified as either ore-oil carriers (0/0), or
ore-bulk-oil carriers (OBO). Note in particular the increasing importance
of combined carriers between 1967 and 1979. In 1967 they amounted to
3 percent of total deadweight tonnage (DWT), versus 10 percent in 1979.
The market in both cases closely approximates the perfectly
competitive paradign.3 In the bulk carrier market certain suppliers
(for example U.S. Steel) control a large proportion of the available
tonnage. However, the ownership of the residual tonnage by brokers,
shipping campanies, and financial institutions undermines any effective
collusion. Easy and cheap entry, the lack of significant economies of
scale in vessel ownership, the lack of regulation (with the exception of
safety regulations), and the mobility of vessels between markets makes
market control next to impossible in theory.4 In practice, there is
no evidence to contradict this hypothesis. 5
SUPPLY ARRPNGEMENTS
In both bulk carrier and tanker markets, a chain of supply
arrangements is provided by the market. In bulk carrier markets the
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Table 1
World Seaborne Trade 1967-1978
(million metric tons)
Other Cargo
Coal Grain Estimate
67
73
83
101
94
96
104
119
127
127
126
122
83
78
71
89
91
108
139
130
137
146
147
149
685
727
789
804
825
866
940
1045
995
1075
1120
1185
Oil Total Trade
Total Trade
Estimate
1864
2041
2237
2481
2575
2762
3120
3247
3043
3320
3409
3431
Source: Fernley and Egers Chartering Co.
1979, Table 1, p.
Ltd. Review 1978,
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Crude
Oil
672
768
871
995
1068
1184
1365
1360
1259
1418
1467
1440
Oil
Products
193
207
209
245
247
261
274
264
233
260
273
270
I ron
Ore
164
188
214
247
250
247
298
329
292
294
276
265
Norway,
14.
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Table 2
World Fleet 1967-1979
(Numbers of shipsl and million dead weight tons)
Oil Tankers
2860- 95.6
2911-104.1
2984-116.1
3008-131.5
3094-151.0
3206-171.1
3193-188.9
3293-215.6
3406-254.6
3439-290.9
3384-320.5
3301-331.9
3130-327.4
Combined Carriers
109- 4.4
153- 7.8
175-10.4
195-12.4
221-15.6
251-21.1
301-29.0
355-37.4
386-42.1
398-44.2
414-46.8
419-48.3
416-48.7
Bulk Carriers
1271- 30.9
1498- 39.3
1761- 48.2
1964- 55.1
2131- 61.7
2345- 70.4
2580- 79.9
2781- 89.4
2992- 97.8
3197-105.7
3464-116.6
3826-129.0
3671-135.3
1. Includes vessels over 10,000 DWT.
Fearnley and Egers Chartering Co. Ltd. Review 1978, Table 3,
page 15.
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Notes:
Source:
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options are dimensioned mainly according to time and risk, ranging from
vessel ownership by the coal company to various forms of chartering.
Chartering is done indirectly through brokers, or directly by vessel
owners. At one end of the chartering spectrum is spot, or single-voyage,
charters. In this case the charterer specifies the cargo (commodity and
tonnage), loading and discharge ports, when the 'vessel is to be available
for loading, and payment per cargo ton. Since all vessel costs are
covered by the owner, the terms normally specify loading and discharging
times, and demurrage fees. The elapsed time between the agreement to
charter and the shipment itself is rarely more than a month and often
only a day or less.
At the other end of the spectrum are bareboat charters, where a ship
is chartered for five years or longer and the charterer pays all costs
except capital charges and sometimes repairs. In many cases a bareboat
charter will extend for most of a vessel's useful life. In between these
two extremes are 1) trip charters, usually for one voyage, where the
charterer specifies the vessel size and speed, date of availability, and
payment on a daily basis; 2) time charters, where the vessel, employing
the owner's crew, is taken for a period which may range from a few months
to several years, and where payment is per vessel deadweight ton (D~N );
and 3) contracts-of-affreightment, where large quantities of a commodity
are transported on a particular route for a specified period of time. In
the latter case usually more than one ship is involved and a rate per ton
delivered is agreed upon. Financing for newbuilding is often hard to
obtain without this type of arrangement.
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The distribution of tonnage over these various supply alternatives
varies between markets. Coal and iron ore markets have traditionally
relied on vertical integration and contracts-of-affreightment. Though
exact figures are not available, it is estimated that less than 10
percent of coal movements are contracted on the spot market, and that 80
percent or more are carried by contracts of affreightment, supplier-owned
vessels, and time charters.6 In the iron ore business, large steel
ccmpanies own the majority of their tonnage, or they have binding
relationships with a shipping company which effectively ties the vessels
into the steel ccnpanies' service for the useful life of the vessel (for
example., D.K. Ludwig in Wes t Germany with U.S. Steel). In Japan a
similar practice is frequently used. Japanese flag carriers are almost
exclusively tied in for life to Japanese producers and rarely show up on
the charter market. In coal, Kaiser Resource and Utah International are
two examples of large vertically integrated coal exporters. 7
PRICE FORMATION
To understand this pattern of supply arrangements requires some
ccrnprehension of the complex relationships between the various chartering
forms within and between different markets. The various types of
chartering arrangements approximate a complete set of substitutes, bound
together by the market's perception of the net advantage of one over
another at any point in time. The "advantage," however, is a function of
many variables, both endogenous and exogenous to, in our case, the coal
trade. In the former case, the advantages of long-term arrangements to
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the shi pper are lower procurement costs, better coordination, and
increased efficiency as optimal ships can be employed. In the latter
case, exogenous factors, the advantage or disadvantage is tied to shifts
in supply and demand, and equally important, expectations of future
shifts in supply and demand in any of several interrelated markets.
These shifts play a critical role in price formation and price
relationships across alternative contractual arrangements. A brief
explanation of them is important. In essence, as demand increases in the
short run in a market, spot rates increase dramatically, the actual
increase being dependent on the elasticity of demand for vessels, which
in turn is dependent on the proportionate share of spot contracts in the
given market and related markets. Where spot contracts comprise a
smaller percentage of vessel tonnage, a shift in demand for coal will be
translated into a larger shift in spot rates. Furthermore, to the extent
the ore carriers, say, are substitutable for coal carriers, an increase
in demand for coal tonnage might draw spot market ore tonnage to the coal
market .
These price/quantity shifts will in turn affect the levels of trip
charters and time charters, a somewhat surprising result. There are
cases where current spot rates should affect time charters. For example,
if spot rates are above long-term equilibrium rates due to a permanent
upward shift in demand, a ship-owner must be paid the present discounted
value of the revenue stream P sE, depicted in Figure 1, in order to enter
into a long-term contract in year to. However, in the case of the
shorter-run disruptions that are generally observed in shipping markets,
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Figure 1
Rate Relationships
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P
L E
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the effect of current spot rates should be less significant, and time
charters should more heavily depend on the owners' and charterers'
expectations about long-run equilibrium rates. The fact that current
spot rates are so important in determining charters may simply be a
reflection of the speculative nature of ship owners. When spot rates are
higher than long-run costs, owners are reluctant to charter their vessels
for lower rates, preferring instead to play out the game, and risk vessel
lay-offs as the market drops. When spot rates are low, the owners might
take a time charter at some higher rate, probably below long-run costs,
to avoid costly layups. Shippers in this case are reluctant to pay the
long-run price, also preferring to play out the game. in sun, when spot
rates are low, time-charters will be low, but above spot rates. When
spot rates are high, time charters will be high, but below the spot
equivalent.
The strange, but not implausible, market mechanism is in turn
reflected in newbuilding activity and newbuilding prices. As time
charters increase, newbuilding activity increases, or the pressures on
newbuilding activities increase, and newbuilding prices rise. 8
Certainly newbuilding activity should be affected by signals that long-
term rates are increasing. However, they should not be heavily affected
by short-run disturbances in spot rates. Consequently, if time charters
are heavily affected by spot rates, as suggested above, the relationship
between newbuilding activities and time charters should not be as
strong. Norman presents one conceivable explanation. He suggests that a
prospective ship owner might charter the new ship for anything up to 20
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years at the time he signs a contract with the shipbuilding yards.
"Rather than doing his own independent analysis based on his own
expectations regarding future demand/supply conditions," he could base his
decision on profitability on the time charter rate existing at the time
of contracting, on the assumption that time charters reflect charterers'
assessments of future market conditions.9 This is possible, and
consistent with the basic speculative nature of the shipping business.
Compounding the complexity of rate relationships are vessel
substitution possibilities across markets, for example, between grain and
coal, or oil and coal. In some cases substitution possibilities might
dampen spot rate volatility in a given market. OBOs probably serve this
purpose in the oil trade. However, where the complement market is more
volatile than the central market, then the substitution possibilities
could increase volatility. Grain, for example, might act this way with
coal. As the highly volatile grain markets shift, vessels allocated to
the coal trade will be drawn into (or out of) the grain trade, increasing
(or decreasing) spot rates for grain. On balance, shifts spurred by
volatility in other markets might compound the volatility that would
exist in coal markets if no substitutions were possible.
Given these brief explanations, let us return to the initial
question--the advantages of long-term charters. First, the actual
observed advantage or disadvantage of one contractual form versus another
is always shifting, as market prices are in constant adjustment to
reflect changing circumstances. As Adelman notes, "The (spot) rate curve
whips up and down, above and below the long-term rate which serves as its
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(movable) anchor point." 0 Though we cannot quantify the advantage
in static terms, we can specify the constant perception of the advantages
to shippers and vessel owners in long-term contracts--reduced risk--and
the reduction extends at least through contracts of affreightment.
Furthermore, in coal markets, where volumes are large and relatively
certain, and where a large premium on vessel size and specifications and
vessel coordination exists, and where the cost of service delays are
high, this trend towards long-term charters observed in practice, is
logical in theory.10a It says in essence that the expected losses in
efficiency from spot charters are greater than the expected long-run
gains from speculative purchasing.10b
These explanations are essential to evaluating coal trade. They
tell us several things. First, spot prices are a very poor approximation
of long-run costs. Second, tim charters, though a better approximation,
are also a biased indicator of long-run costs. They are significantly
tied to spot rates, and also tied to second-hand vessel prices which in
themselves are highly volatile.10c Based on these observations, an
estimate of long-run marginal costs cannot rely on spot or time charter
data. Contracts-of-affreightment or bareboat charter data might be a
better approximation. However, these data are unavailable.
Consequently, we must resort to an engineering-accounting estimation of
long-run costs. Nonetheless,, the above explanations also tell us that
care should be taken with this approach.
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THE LONG-RUN COSTS OF OCEAN-BORNE COAL TRANSPORTATION
In this section we estimate the long-run costs of ocean-borne coal
transportation. First, the cost calculations will be summarized.
Second, the sensitivity of these cost estimates to changes in cost
variables will be considered. Third, canparisons will be drawn between
the cost estimates and comparable ocean-freight rate data. Fourth, the
importance of return cargoes to ocean freight costs will be appraised.
Finally, alternative shipping technologies and their effect on future
ocean transportation costs will be discussed.
COST CALCULATIONS
Long-run marginal costs include four elements: capital costs,
quasi-fixed operating costs, fuel costs, and port and canal charges. For
a specific route and ship specification, annual costs are divided by
annual cargo transported to obtain the required freight rate (RFR) per
ton to cover all the expenses of the incremental ship. Appendix A
explains the cost calcualtions and the underlying assumptions.
Based on these assumptions and procedures, the cost calculations are
presented below at January, 1979 cost levels. Table 3 summarizes costs
for each route for 60,000 DWT vessels, the smallest sized ship likely to
be employed for long-distance ocean coal movements. It highlights, where
important, the trade-offs between distance and the canal charges and
delays. Where the shorter route requires canal passage, the lowest
required freight rate corresponds to the canal passage with the exception
281
Table 3
Cost Calculations - 60,000 DWT
(Required Freight Rate, dollars per metric ton, January 1979)
Yokohama
Gladstone
Port Kembla
Richards Bay
Baltimore
Hanpton Roads
Mobile
Los Angeles
Vancouver
8.32
8.75
13.47
19.19(P)
18.96(P)
18.34(P)
9.55
8.61
Taranto
19.58(S)
19.19(S)
13.94(H),
9.36
9.16
11.08
17. 35( P)
19.22(P)
Rotterdam
23.60(S),
12.88(S)
22. 57 ( H)
13.28(H)
7.73
7.52
9.47
16.04( P)
17.96(P)
Notes: S = Suez Canal
P = Panama Canal
H = Cape of Good Hope
Where one Required Freight Rate is given
this table is cheaper than the alternati
table .
, the route specified in
ve listed in the mileage
Source: Author's Calculations.
24.15(H)
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of Australian shipments to Rotterdan, where a slight economic advantage
is realized by the Cape of Good Hope routes. From Australia to Taranto,
the Suez Canal routing provides the lowest rate.
Based on these calculations, Japan is served most cheaply by
Vancouver and Australia. Los Angeles is a reasonably close competitor
with a RFR of $9.55 to Yokohama, versus $8.32 from Australia to Yokohama
at January, 1979 price levels. Freight rates from South Africa to Japan
are $5.00 higher per ton than rates from Australia. Freight rates from
the U.S. Gulf Coast to Japan are $10.00 higher per ton than rates from
Australia.
The U.S. East Coast is the optimal supplier for Taranto. Shipments
originating on the U.S. Gulf Coast are approximately 32.00 more expensive
per ton. South African shipments to Taranto are $4.00 more expensive,
and shipments from other supplying points cost from $8.00 to $10.00 more
than shipments originating at Hampton Roads.
With respect to Rotterdam the same relationships hold approximately.
One exception is Australian rates. They are as much as $17.00 per ton
higher than are rates from Hampton Roads to Rotterdam.
In fact, port constraints are not equal worldwide, but vary
considerably even among the major ports analyzed here (see Appendix B for
details on draft constraints). And, as port constraints are alleviated,
freight rates are reduced.
The proportional savings in greater vessel size increase with
distance, and decrease with size, while the absolute savings are
approximately constant. Table 4 presents the cost calculations for each
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Table 4
Economies of Vessel Size
(Required freight rates, dollars per metric ton, January 1979)
Hampton Roads to
Rotterdam
(3591 miles)
DW T
(00s)
60 7.52(2.09)
80 6.46(1.80)
100 6.07(1.65)
120 5.81(1.62)
150 5.62(1.57) 5.92(1.65)
180 5.80(1.61)
200 5.68(1.58)
250 5.52(1.54)
Richards Bay to
Rotterdam
(7118 miles)
13.29(1
11.27(1
10.41(1
10.27(1
9.40(1
.87)
.58)
.46)
.44)
.32)
Port Kembla to
Rotterdam
(12617 miles)
10.03(1.41)
9.76(1.37)
9.50(1 .34)
9.24(1.30)
22.57(1
18.83(1
17.31(1
16.26(1
15.39(1
.79)
.49)
.37)
.29)
.22) 16.44(1 .30)
16.07(1.27)
15.60(1.24)
14.80(1.17)
Notes: Numbers in parentheses equal mills per ton-mile. The column shift at
150,000 DWT represents the shift from diesel to steam turbines.
Source: Author's calculations.
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size vessel over three different routes; Hampton Roads to Rotterdam,
Richards Bay to Rotterdam, and Port Kembla to Rotterdam. Between 60,000
and 120,000 DWT, the percentage reductions in the required freight rates
range from 23 percent to 28 percent depending on distance. Above 120,000
DWT, the difference is dampened due to decreasing economies of size, and
the switch to steam turbines with higher fuel consumption rates. A
reference point is provided at 150,000 DWT to show cost changes given
constant fuel consumption rates. For practical purposes, to obtain
significant savings beyond 120,000 DWT, a vessel of at least 180,000 DWT'
must be contracted to offset the greater fuel consumption rates. The
savings in moving from a 120,000 DWT vessel to a 250,000 DWT vessel range
from 5 to 9 percent, again depending on distance. With the exception of
very long routes, this saving is not likely to justify significant port
facilities expansion beyond the capacity to handle 120,000 DWT vessels.
(See Appendix B for more details.)
Based on the existing port constraints, the effects of size
differential on ocean freight rates are summarized in Table 5. Shipments
from Baltimore, Los Angeles, and Port Kembla are constrained to 60,000
DWT. Shipments from Hampton Roads and Mobile (McDuff terminal) can be
carried on 80,000 DWT vessels. Shipments from Gladstone can be carried
on 120,000 DWT vessels. Shipments from both Richards Bay and Vancouver
can be carried on 250,000 DWT vessels. However, only Rotterdam can
receive these ships. Taranto and Yokohama are constrained to 120,000 DWT
vessels. The Panama Canal is constrained to 60,000 DWT vessels, and the
Suez Canal to 120,000 DWT vessels.
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Table 5
Cost Calculations--Existing Size Constraints
(Required Freight Rate, dollars per metric ton, January 1979)
Yokohama Taranto Rotterdam
Gladstone 6.37 (120)1 15.05 (120) (S) 17.39 (120) (H)
Port Kembla 8.75 (60) 19.19 (60) (S) 22.57 (60) (H)
Richards Bay 10.00 (120) 10.47 (120) (H) 9.85 (120) (H),
10.18 (120) (S) 9.50 (200) (H)
Baltimore 19.19 (60) (P) 9.36 (60) 7.63 (60)
Hampton Roads 18.96 (60) (P) 7.83 (80) 6.48 (80)
Mobile 18.34 (60) (P) 9.40 (80) 8.08 (80)
Los Angeles 9.55 (60) 17.35 (60) (P) 16.04 (60) (P)
Vancouver 6.56 (120) 19.22 (60) (P) 17.96 (200) (P)
17.58 (200) (C)
16.72 (250) (C)
Notes: S = Suez Canal
P = Panama Canal
H = Cape of Good hope
C = Cape Horn
Numbers in parentheses indicate the existing ship size
constraints in thousand DWT.
Source: Authors Calculations.
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Given these revisions, Los Angeles freight rates to Japan are more
expensive relative to rates from Vancouver and Australia, the difference
now amounting to 33.00 a ton. For shipments to Rotterdam, the gap
between Richards Bay shipments and Hampton Roads shipments decreases from
$6.00 to 33.00 per ton. Australia and Vancouver ship rates are still
considerably more expensive than Hampton Roads rates ($10). To Taranto,
a similar shift is observed. Note in all cases, however, that the
least-cost supplier is not charged for any of the consuming regions.
Note also that the use of the Suez Canal is no longer economical in
shipping from Gladstone to Port Kembla, while from Richards Bay to
Taranto the advantage is only 30 cents a ton. The only route that still
depends on the Suez Canal is from Australia to Taranto, where the losses
in Cape Horn transit amount to $4 per ton from Port Kembla, and 35 per
ton from Gladstone. Given the current instability in the Suez region,
this is an important variable to consider.
Finally, with reference to the Panama Canal, the only case where it
is uneconomical to use it is from Vancouver to Rotterdam, where ships
above 200,000 DWT can be used more economically around Cape Horn.
The significance of these differences and the advisability of port
expansion in various areas will be discussed in Part B. For a more
detailed discussion of existing port capacities, and problems of port
expansion see Appendix B.
COST SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
As noted earlier, some of the assumptions used in the cost
calculations are uncertain. Consequently, the sensitivity of costs to
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shifts in variables should be considered.
First, consider the seisitivity of required freight rates to fuel
price. The elasticity depends on distance and size but is constant as a
function of fuel increases for a given distance and size. For a 20
percent increase in fuel prices, required freight rates increase from 4.5
to 6.0 percent. The elasticity of the required freight rates (RFR) with
respect to fuel prices therefore equals .22 to .24. Note that as fuel
prices increase, the proportional increase in required freight rates does
not vary substantially with distance. However, the absolute increase
will be very large on the longer shipments. For example, a 50 percent
increase in fuel prices would increase ocean freight rates from Gladstone
to Rotterdam by $2.30 per metric ton. The same fuel price increase would
increase rates from Hampton Roads to Rotterdam by only 70 cents per
metric ton. Given the rapid recent increases in fuel prices, the
significance of this factor to the competitive structure in international
steam coal markets will be assessed in Part B.
The sensitivity of rates to port changes depends primarily on
distance. For shorter routes the effect is larger. For example, from
Richards Bay to Rotterdan, the elasticity of the RFR with respect to port
charges equals .08. The sensitivity to changes in port delays is
approximately equal to the sensitivity to changes in port charges.
For capital costs, an increase of about 20 percent in the capital
recovery factor yields a 6.8 percent to 7.7 percent increase in the RFR,
depending on distance. For operating costs, the elasticity is equal to
.25. The various elasticities are summarized in Table 6.
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Table 6
Sensitivity Analysis
Elasticity of Required Freight Rates with Respect to:l
Hanpton Roads to Richards Bay to
Rotterdam Rotterdam
Fuel price .22 .24
Port charges .10 .08
Days in port .14 .10
Capital costs .39 .44
Operating costs .25 .25
Notes: 1. Elasticity = percent change in RFRpercent change in fuel price
Source: Author's calculations.
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RATE/COST COMPARISON
It is interesting to compare these costs to rates. A perfect
conparison is not possible due to time lags and route and ship
specification variations. However, observing recent rates does further
our conprehension of rate-cost relationships.
Tables 7 and 8 presents spot rates from various supply areas to
11
demand points in 1979. Over this period rates were increasing
steadily. Only recently have they dropped in response to the termination
of U.S.-Russian grain sales. These rates are almost always lower than
the long-run cost estimates, although the actual difference varies over
geographical areas. For example, rates from South Africa are very low
relative to estimated long-run costs while rates fran Mobile are very
close to estimated long-run costs. The lower spot rates are not
surprising given the depressed state of shipping markets until late in
1979. This was reflected in low spot rates, time-charter rates,
second-hand vessel prices, and newbuilding prices. 12
Table 9 summarizes time charter rates in 1979. It shows the range
of rates per DWT per month in 1979. These can be compared to the capital
and operating costs estimated above, and shown in Column 2.
With the exception of the 60,000 DWT and 150,000 DWT categories,
time-charter rates were considerably below long-run costs early in 1979
and have recently exceeded long-run costs (at January 1979 levels). The
primary reason for this is the very low second-hand vessel prices in
early 1979 which have escalated rapidly in the past 12 months.
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Table 7
Spot Rates: Canada, South Africa, Australia
DestinationOrigin
Canada
Ship Size
(-DW T)
Date
Rate per
Metric Ton
(US $)
Roberts Bank
Roberts Bank
Roberts Bank
South Africa
Richards Bay
Richards Bay
Richards Bay
Australia
Hay Point
Gladstone
Port Kembla
Port Kembla
Hay Point
Hay Point
Japan
Dunk irk
Japan
Japan
Ho 11 an d
Con tinentl
Continent
Japan
Le Havre
Continent
Continent
Rotterdam
Notes: 1. Continent refers to ports from Rotterdam to Hamburg, W. Germany.
Source: a. Skaarup Shipping Corporation, unpublished data. Compiled by
David Elsy.
b. Rodriguez Sons Company, Inc., "Coal Trade Freight Report,"
various issues.
55,000
50,000
95,000
100,000
115,000
120,000
60,000
50,000
55,000
50,000
140,000
140,000
2/79
7/79
8/79
1/79
7/79
9/79
11/78
3/79
5/79
7/79
9/79
11/79
6.90
20.00
8.30
5.25
13.00
4.35
13.50
/.50
18.00
23.00
14.25
17.00
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Table 8
Spot Rate: United States
Origin
Mobile
Mobile
Mob iI e
Mob il e
Mob i 1 e
Hampton Roads
Hampton Roads
Destination
Taranto
Japan
Japan
Taranto
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Dunkirk
Italy
Piombino
Ensted
Dunkirk
Piombino
Port Talbot
Hamburg
Ship Size
(DWT)
50,000
55,000
55,000
55,000
55,000
55,000
55,000
50,000
55,000
55,000
55,000
50,000
55,000
50,000
60,000
50,000
60,000
75,000
50,000
67,000
50,000
Date
7/79
7/79
11/79
11/79
12/79
2/79
3/79
6/79
7/79
8/79
9/79
9/79
11/79
12/78
2/79
6/79
6/79
7/79
7/79
8/79
8/79
Rate per
Metric Ton
(US 3)
11.65
18.60
18.65
15.50
19.00
10.25
14.00
18.00
18.45
16.30
18.45
21.00
19.30
7.00
6.80
18.00
11.65
11.25
11.47
8.00
11.00
Notes: 1. Continent refers to
W. Germany.
Source:
ports from Rotterdam to Hamburg,
a. Skaarup Shipping Corporation, unpublished data. Compiled by
David Elsy.
b. Rodriguez Sons Company, Inc., "Coal Trade Freight Report,"
various issues.
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Table 9
Time Charter Rate and -Cost Canparison
(1979)
Ship Size
(000's of DWT)
Time-Charter Rate
(Dollars per DWT per month)
Long-Run Cost
(Capital
cost per
plus operating
DWT per month)
3.20 to 5.25
3.00 to 6.15
2.75 to 5.00
2.20 to 4.50
1.80 to 3.75
Source: Time-charter rates, Skaarup Shipping Corp. Long-run costs,
author's calculations.
60
80
100
120
150
5.76
4.77
4.35
4.08
3.93
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RETURN CARGOES
In the cost calculations above it was assumed that the return leg on
each trip was entirely in ballast. Clearly, if a return cargo can be
secured at the coal delivery point destined for the coal originating
point, the cost per ton transported will be reduced by approximately 50
percent.
In practice, direct backhauls are rare. In our case, Europe and
Japan offer no suitable backhaul commodities for shipments to coal
exporting regions. The only conceivable direct backhaul might be steam
coal from South Africa to the United States, and then metallurgical coal
to South Africa.13
Nevertheless, some reduction in required frieght rates can be
achieved with multi-leg shipments. This section reviews the economics of
multi-leg shipments applicable to possible steam coal trade routes.
First, consider bulk commodities. Several bulk commodities are
traded internationally; iron ore, bauxite, phosphate rock, alumina, and
grains are the major ones. Grain is not a realistic backhaul possibility
given that grain supply regions correspond closely to coal supply regions,
and given the difficulties in cleaning ship holds for coal to grain -
transfer. All of the other commodities are possible for backhauls.
However, with the exception of iron ore, they are usually moved in 20,000
to 40,000 DWT vessels, and in most cases they offer limited freight rate
reductions at best. Iron ore on the other hand moves in large bulk
carriers and offers significant backhaul possibilities.
The major origin points for iron ore are West Africa, South America,
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Australia, Asia, North America, and Scandinavia. The current exports
from these areas are listed in Table 10. West African and South American
exports are best situated for backhauls in coal trade routes. The likely
destination points for iron ore within coal trade patterns are the U.S.
Gulf Coast, the U.S. East Coast, and Japan. Current imports in these
areas are also depicted in Table 10. The actual multi-leg journeys that
could benefit from iron ore shipments are listed in Table 11.
Where backhauls in bulk commodities are not available, another
possibility is backhauls in petroleum or petroleum products. For these
journeys OBO's are used. 14 The important supply points for petroleum
are North Africa, Persian Gulf, Indonesia, and Alaska. The multi-leg
journeys involving petroleum shipments are also included in Table 10.
Costs are calculated for these multi-key journeys under the
following revised assumptions.15
1. Cleaning time between oil and coal: 72 hours per round trip.
2. Cleaning time between ore and coal: 48 hours per round trip.
3. Oil port time: 75 percent of coal port time.
4. Ore port time: 100 percent of coal port time.
5. OBO ship acquisition costs: 10 percent greater than traditional
bulk carrier acquisition costs for a 60,000 DWT vessel, and
12 percent greater for a 120,000 DWT vessel.
We must also decide how to allocate the total costs of the journey
for each commodity. This is a cl'assic joint-production cost problem, and
as in all cases there is no meaningful way to allocate the joint-costs,
in this case the cost of the ballast portion of the journey. From a
practical viewpoint, we might assume the existing ore journey, and
calculate the increment costs of the coal journey. On this basis, the
coal journey incremental costs will approach zero as the ballast distance
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Table 10
Iron Ore Seaborne Trade,
('000's metric tons)
To: UK/Cont.
From:
Mediterranean
Other
Europe USA Japan Others Total
Scandinavia
Other Europe
North Africa
West Africa
S/E Africa
North America
S. America,
Atlantic
S. America,
Pacific
Asia
Austral ia
Other
16517
2759
230
15725
4639
10131
22132
1601
68
4224
620
2060
6036
678
557
10078
1204
1523
4534
212
400
857
200
155
87 968
43 21249
1 5628
27 81 100
1820 1490
254 6944
906
100 24216
12657
799 7500 3639 453 24582
5637 8555 23912 1406 67678
64 1610 9694
1150
591
752
12046
- 20210 200 22117
310 65649 4336 82487
- - - 1956
14444 20318 132587
Source: Fearnley and
Table 10, p.
Egers
19.
Chartering Co. Ltd. World Bulk Trades,
1977
Total 84650 16884 6639
1977.
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Table 11: Return Cargo Possibilities
United States Gulf to Japan--60,000 OBO
New Orleans to Yokohama
Yokohama to Bahrain
Bahrain to New Orleans
Vancouver to Europe
Vancouver to Toronto
Toronto to Oran
Oran to Hampton
Hampton to Vancouver
(P)1
(P)
Los Angeles to Japan2
Los Angeles to Yokohama
Yokohama to Valdez
Valdez to Los Angeles
Richards Bay to Japan
Richards Bay to Yokohama
Yokohama to Bahrain
Bahrain to Durlan
Durlan to Richards Bay
Gladstone to Rotterdam
Rotterdam to Liberia
Liberia to Yokohama
Yokohama to Aust.
Hampton Roads to Rotterdam
Rotterdam to Liberia
Liberia to Hampton
Hampton Roads to Rotterdam
Rotterdam to Liberia
Brazil to Hampton
Mobile to Rotterdam
Rotterdam to Liberia
Liberia to Mobile
9126,
6541,
9104,
9651,
1037,
3538,
5854
4839,
3440,
2220,
coal
ballast
oi 1
coal
ballast
oi 1
coal
ballast
oi 1
7230, coal
6541 ballast
4900, oil
110, ballast
13526, coal (H)
3391, ballast
11500, ore
4090, ballast
3591,
3391,
3900,
3591,
5300,
4723,
coal
ballast
ore
coal
ballast
ore
4795, coal
3391, ballast
4621, ore
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Table 11 (Continued)
Richards Bay to Rotterdam
Rotterdam to Liberia
Liberia to Yokohama
Yokohama to Richards
7118, coal
3391, ballast
11,000 ore
7230, ballastBay
Notes: 1.
2.
P = Panama Canal.
Vancouver shipments
opportunity, yet no
to Japan offer a similar backhaul
savings are realized on balance.
Source: Author's calculations.
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approaches zero. However, this may not be a realistic long-run picture.
In the market, the price of the coal shipment will end up somewhere
between zero and the price of shipping coal alone--the actual point is
indeterminate. From the vessel owners viewpoint, and for purposes of
illustration, we will allocate the total costs of the round trip
according to the ratio of the coal loaded distance to the oil or ore
loaded distance.
Finally, for ore and oil supply points, we use: Monrovia, Liberia
for West Africa; Bahrain for the Persian Gulf, San Nicholas for Peru,
Sepetiba for Brazil, Oran for Algeria, the Sundra Strait for Indonesia,
and Valdez for Alaska.
The cost calculations for major coal trade routes are presented in
Table 12. The reductions in required freight rates range from 6 to 30
percent. Do these reductions affect the optimal coal trade patterns?
The only major routes where no advantages are realized are Australia to
Japan, and Vancouver to Japan and Europe. To Japan, Australia is still
the cheapest supplier. However, Mobile and Los Angeles freight rates
given backhauls are closely competitive with rates from Australia. To
Europe no significant shifts are observed, but shipments originating in
Australia become more competitive given backhaul possibilities.
Should we impute these reduced rates to coal movements? This
depends on two issues. First, are the shipments likely to be available
on a regular basis? This depends on the relative volumes of on ore and
coal, or oil and coal. In the cases listed, the return cargoes will
cover probable coal export volumes.16 However, there will be other
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Table 12
Return Cargo Rates
Origin
R. Bay
L.A.
Vanc.
Gladstone
Mobile
R. Bay
Hanpton
Mobile
Hampton
Des tination
Yokoh ama
Yokohama
Yokoh ama
Rotterdam
Japan
Rotterdam
Rotterdam
Rotterdam
Tor on to
Ship Size
(DW T)
120,000
60,000
120,000
120,000
60,000
120,000
80,000
80,000
80,000
Return Cargo
(Cargo,
Supply Point)
oil,
oil,
oil,
ore,
oil,
ore,
ore,
ore,
ore,
Bahrain
Valdez
Valdez
Liberia
Bahrain
Liberia
Liberi a
Liberia
Liberi a
RFR With
Return
Cargo
9.45
8.57
6.71
12.49
12.92
8.19
4.95
6.52
5.98
RFR With-
out Return
Cargo
10.00
9.55
6.56
17.39
18.34
10.00
6.48
8.08
7.83
Source: Author's calculations.
300
commodities competing for the coal leg on these journeys, and there is no
quarantee that the reduced rates will obtain. Second, will this
advantage favor coal more than oil in electricity generation? Probably
not since oil will benefit to the same extent. Consequently, we will use
fully built-up costs, but also evaluate the importance of reductions
through backhauls on international steam coal trade.
ALTERNATIVE SHIPPING TECHNOLOGIES
Three alternative ocean shipping technologies should be considered
briefly: self-unloaders, slurry carriers, and restricted draft
vessels.17
First, self-unloaders are currently used for short voyages where
there is a high loading and unloading frequency, or where terminal
facilities are limited. Trade in the Great Lakes is one situation where
they have been employed. The primary advantage is the high discharge
rate (as high as 20,000 tons per hour). The disadvantage is higher
acquisition cost and limited flexibility since most self-unloaders can
handle only one commodity. Acquisition costs are estimated as 20 percent
higher than traditional bulk carriers for 60,000 DWT vessels, and 10
percent higher for 120,000 DWT vessels. 18  Hydronautics calculations
show that for long-haul, high volume shipments, required freight rates
exceed those for traditional carriers by 5 percent to 8 percent.
Second, restricted draft vessels are also used. As noted earlier,
these vessels have different ship dimensions so as to maximize DWT for a
given draft constraint. The new design concepts include the development
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of wide beam hull forms to obtain greater displacement at a given draft,
while retaining the seakeeping and handling characteristics of
conventional ships. Increases in DWT for a given draft can range as high
as 30 percent by departing from conventional designs.
Hydronautics calculations show reductions in RFR from 12 percent to
16 percent.19 However, the pen-alty for this savings is greater costs
at deeper drafts. That is, a restricted draft design will reduce the RFR
for a given draft, but given the DWT, deeper draft vessels are cheaper to
run. Furthermore, a problem with the new designs is compatibility with
the dimensions of existing loading and unloading facilities. It is
probable that there will be an increase in restricted draft vessels in
the longrun and a consequent downward pressure on costs. However, the
degree of this shift cannot be specified.
Third, coal-slurry carriers are a possible shipping technology. In
this systen, coal slurry is pumped from shore storage tanks to special
storage tanks via submarine pipelines. The cargo is then dewatered to
the maximun degree consistent with port time. The advantages are reduced
cargo handling time, less pollution, the ability to operate from offshore
terminals, and canpatibility with inland slurry pipelines. The
disadvantages are higher acquisition costs per DWT, due both to expensive
handling machinery and the water content of the coal. In the latter case,
a 75 percent coal, 25 percent water mixture is probable. This means that
a 250,000 DWT slurry carrier will carry less than 200,000 DWT of coal.
The RFR for slurry carriers is estimated to be as much as 36 percent
higher than traditional bulk carriers.20 The higher capital costs
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per DWT, due both to handling machinery and the water content of the
slurry mixture, dominates the economies of ship size. Nonetheless, in
certain special circumstances, where port facilities are limited, the
savings in ship size and loading and unloading costs might yield some
advantage to slurry carriers. 2 1
The results of this analysis will be integrated with the analysis of
coal supply prices in Part B.
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VII
1
"The Platou Report," Oslo, Norway, 1979, p. 24.
2Fearnley and Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., "World Bulk Trades," 1977,
Table 1, p. 5. Some minor bulk commodities and their 1977 seaborne trade
in millions of metric tons include: Manganese ore (7.2); non-ferrous
ores (8.2); petroleum coke (6.7); gypsum (7.4); limestone (1.2); salt
(6.4); cement (12.5); raw sugar (11.1); scrap (5.1); sulphur (6.7).
Fearnley and Egers, "World Bulk Trades," 1977, p. 40.
3For a detailed analysis of tankship markets, see Adelman, M.A.,
The World Petroleum Market, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
Maryland, 1972; and Zannetos, Z., The Theory of Tankship Rates, M.I.T.
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966.
4With regard to vessel ownership, one possible economy of scale is
in acquisition costs. That is, as more vessels are contracted, a cheaper
unit price from the shipyard is probable. Nonetheless, this is not
especially important in the aggregate. Hydronautics estimates that unit
costs for a run of ten vessels are 80 percent of unit costs for a run of
one vessel. (Roseman, D., "Relative Costs of Alternative Modes of Ocean
Transportation of Coal," Appendix II, Hydronautics, Inc., October 1979.)
5Possible exceptions are cases where special ship types, unique
cargo handling gear, or integrated transportation systems are necessary.
Some monopoly power has been observed in these special instances. See
Norman, V.D., "The Economics of Bulk Shipping," in "Reading Materials,"
Department of Ocean Engineering, Course 13.69, Professor Ernst Frankel,
M.I.T., p. 13.
6 Hettena, Ran, "Economics of Oceanborne Coal Transportation,"
presented at the Symposium on Critical Issues in Coal Transportation
Systems, Maritime Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C.,
June 14, 1978, p. 14.
7H.P. Drewry, Inc., "Organization and Structure of the Dry Bulk
Shipping Industry," No. 63, June 1978.
8In fact, the increase in time-charter rates is initially reflected
in increases in second-hand vessel prices. These increases are in turn
reflected in newbuilding activity increases.
9Norman, op. cit., p. 18.
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10Adelman, op. cit., p. 115.
10aIt contrasts the situation in grain, where up to 25 percent of
tonnage is carried on the spot market. H.P. Drewry, op. cit., p. 36.
It is interesting to note that as bulk shippers have moved to
long-term contracts or vertical integration to avoid risk in the voltaile
spot markets, the volatility of spot markets has by definition increased.
lObOne final issue worth noting is the possibility of extended
profits by shippers from operating on-the-spot o'r time-charter markets.
It is conceivable that the vessel markets are in long-lasting or ever-
lasting disequilibriuu. If so, the advisability of vertical integration
might be questioned. There are certainly extended periods of excess
capacity in vessel markets, lasting up to 5 years. Hettena, in fact,
offers the possibility of this being a permanent bias. If the elasticity
of supply exceeds the elasticity of demand, a trend toward permanent
excess capacity could develop (analogous to the Cobweb Theorem). Hettena
cites poor coordination and an unstable balance between bulk shippers and
shipbuilders as an explanation for this hypothesis. The possibility
should not be ignored, and it certainly warrants additional research.
However, the risks could still exceed the potential gains, and it is
unlikely that market relationships would be altered. Furthermore, in a
true long-run sense, if it were proven that this long-run disequilibrium
holds, instititutional and market adjustments would likely eliminate the
market imperfection over time. Hettena, op. cit., pp. 21-24.
lOcTime charters will approximate equilibrium in some cases. For
example, when new building activity is increasing, we can expect that
time charters are approximating long-run costs.
11A11 rate information is drawn from: Maritime Research, Inc.,
"Weekly Newsletter;" Rodriguez Sons Canpany, Inc., "Coal Trade Freight
Report;" and a sample compiled by David Elsy, Skaarup Shipping Corp.
12See The Platou Monthly, December 1979, for an evaluation of 1979
shipping markets. Also see Fearnley and Egers Chartering Co. Ltd.,
"Review 1979," for summary and second-hand vessel prices.
13There have been recent statements by Gulf Coast utilities about
the advantages of South African coals versus Powder River Basin coals.
However, no actual contracts have been signed to date to the author's
knowledge. Based on the cost calculations in this thesis, the price of
South African coal delivered to Houston is $1.68 per million Btu while
the price of Western coal is $1.50 per million Btu.
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141n practice OBOs are often assigned to one commodity trade for
extended time periods, and not to multi-commodity trade. The reason is
that it is costly to clean the holds between cargoes. The incentive to
purchase an OBO is nonetheless strong since it allows the vessel owner
greater flexibility in chartering and the additional capital acquisition
costs are low.
15Based on assumptions used in Roseman, op. cit., App. II, and
discussion with various shipping industry anaTysti7
16For a comprehensive analysis of future commodity movements, see
Marad, op. cit., Appendix A.
For a detailed discussion of alternative vessel technologies see
Roseman, D.P., et al., "Characteristics of Bulk Products Carriers for
Restricted Draft Service," in Transactions of the Society of Naval
Architects and Marine EngineersV974; Jones, R.M., et al., "A Study of
Large Self-Unloading Vessels," in Transactions of the Society of Naval
Architects and Marine Engineers, 1972; Roseman, D.P. and Tomassoni, C.L.,
"A-Preliminary Feasibility Study of Steam Coal Slurry Marine Transport
Systems," Hydronautics Technical Report No. 7692-1, April 1977.
18Roseman, 1979, op. cit., pp. 4-6.
19Roseman, D.P., "Alternative Modes of Ocean Transportation of
Coalm" Hydronautics, 1978, pp. 9-11.
20Roseman, 1979, op. cit., pp. 7-9.
21See, for example, a joint Marad/Boeing study which evaluates
pipeline systems for U.S. coal exports to Japan. The economic analysis
in this study suggests that the slurry carrier system will be cheaper
than alternatives. However, the data are vague, and recent developments
indicate that the estimates may have been optimistic. Phase 0 and Phase 1
Report, Mared/Boeing Study Dept. of Commerce, Contract No.
UU-Aul-/-UU-JUd6, July 9/8.
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APPENDIX A
COST MODEL FORMULATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
Long-run marginal costs include four elements: capital costs,
quasi-fixed operating costs, fuel costs, and port and canal charges. For
a specific route and ship specifications, annual costs are divided by
annual cargo transported to obtain the rate required per ton to cover all
the expenses of the incremental ship. This appendix explains the cost
calculations and underlying assumptions.
First, consider ship sizes. In the past decade, the distribution of
ship sizes, according to deadweight tonnage (DWT), has steadily shifted
toward larger ships. In 1968, only 35 percent of coal tonnage was moved
in ships larger than 40,000 DWT. In 1977, this figure increased to 67
percent. The largest coal-carrying vessels in use today are
approximately 150,000 DWT. Table Al shows the distribution of bulk
carrier and combined carrier ship sizes in 1969 and 1979. Also important
to our analysis are combination carriers, specifically ore-bulk oil
carriers (OBOs). The distribution of OB0's according to size is also
depicted in Table Al.
The most important range for our purposes are vessels from 50,000
DWT to 120,000 DWT. Ships much below 50,000 (Panamax size) are very
costly to run, whereas ships above 120,000 DWT are constrained in use to
only a few bulk carrier facilities worldwide. However, smaller vessels
may be used for regional distribution, and larger vessels may have
broader applicability in the future as port facilities expand.
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Table Al
Bulk Fleet 1969-1979 -- Development of Size Distribution
1969 Percent 1979 Percent
Combined Carriers--Total 175 100 418 100
10- 60000 88 50 48 11
60- 80000 48 27 72 17
80-100000 31 18 53 13
100-150000 8 5 133 32
150-200000 - 79 19
200- 300000 - 33 8
Bulk Carriers--Total 1761 100 3960 100
10- 18000 557 32 765 19
18- 40000 918 52 2280 58
40- 60000 223 13 487 12
60- 80000 55 3 266 7
80-100000 6 - 29 1
100-150000 2 - 122 3
150000- 11 -
Source: Fearnley and Egers Chartering Co. Ltd., World Bulk Fleet,
January 1979. Table 3, p. 5.
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Consequently, costs will be estimated for the following
60, 80, 100 120, 150, 180, 200, 250 (000s DWT).
Costs are estimated as of January 1, 1979 levels.
calculated as follows:
RFR = (0RF x SAQC) + OC + Fuel + PortVPY
ship sizes: 30,
They are
where:
RFR
CRF
OC
SA QC
Fuel
Port
VPY
The
= required freight rate (RFR), in U.S. $ per metric ton
= capital recovery factor
= operating costs
= ship acquisition costs
= fuel costs
= port and canal charges
= volume shipped per year in metric tons.
related calculations and assunptions are discussed in detail
below.
1. The Capital Recovery Factor
Administration calculations. 2 It is
i(1 + inCRF = E x n -
(1 + i)n - 1
where:
CR F
E
P
i
is based on United States Maritime
calculated as follows:
m(l - t)x [1 + m(l - t)]n
(1 + m(1 - t)]n-1 1 - t
= capital recovery factor before taxes
= percentage of equity, = 25 percent
= percentage of debt, = 75 percent
= return on investment after taxes = 10 percent
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m = interest rate on loan = 8 percent
t = tax rate = 48 percent
n = economic life, loan life, and depreciation period = 20 years.
Based on these assunptions, the capital recovery factor is 11.8
percent.
2. Ship Acquisition Costs are derived from an acquisition cost
computer model developed by Hydronautics, Inc. 3  The costs are based
on the weights of the ship structure and outfit, main propulsion
requirements, and electric power requirements. The costs are for
double-skinned side-shell configurations. There are some operating
advantages to this design, but the acquistion costs are greater. 4
Hydronautics uses the double-skin configuration to permit direct
comparison with similar sized combination carriers. For single-shell
configurations, the normal design of traditional bulk carriers,
acquisition costs are reduced by 10 percent.5
The ship acquisition cost data developed in the Hydronautics study
are based on American Shipyard construction costs, adjusted for the
maximum United States construction differential subsidy (CDS) of
50 percent. The CDS has been the subject of extensive controversy.
Newbuilding prices may vary significantly from this ratio at any point in
time, so that the COS of 50 percent may be insufficient to attract buyers
to U.S. shipyards.6 Currently analysts contend that prices in the
United States are at least twice those in Europe and Japan. In 1979
Japanese prices were even less given the declining value of the yen.
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However, with respect to construction costs, the U.S. Maritime Administra-
tion concluded that U.S. costs have historically been twice that of an
equivalent foreign-built ships. Given an interest in long-run
marginal costs, the 50 percent adjustment is therefore employed. 8
3. Annual Fixed Operating Costs are the expenses that are incurred
in the day-to-day running of bulk vessels, excluding interest,
depreciation, fuel costs, and port charges. They include labor and
subsistence, stores and supplies, maintenance and repair costs, and
insurance. They are not strictly fixed costs, but rather they are
approximately constant for a vessel in full service. They can be reduced
or eliminated only if the vessel withdraws from the market. They vary
considerably according to vessel registry, ownership, and age and type of
vessel.
The operating cost calculations present several problems. In
specific, the difference between U.S. flag and foreign flag operating
costs for bulk carriers is not certain, and it has yet to be proved that
the operating differential subsidies close the gap, especially "given the
stringent terms and conditions laid down in the current legislation. The
fact that not one conventional bulk carrier has been constructed to date
under the subsidy program for operation in foreign trade indicates the
extent of the problem." 9
Consequently, Hydronautics data, based on U.S. operating costs, are
not directly used. Instead, other published data were analyzed for
60,000 DWT carriers, and a slightly lower estimate was developed.
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However, for other size ships, similar data were not available.
Hydronautics estimates for U.S. operating costs had to be used indirectly
in this case. Based on an earlier Hydronautics study with 1976 data, the
relative shifts in operating costs as a function of ship size were
calculated according to the following formulas: 10
1. Labor and subsistence are constant.
2. Stores and supplies = 3 [SHP + 14500 + .21(DWT + 9500)]
SHP = shaft horsespower
DWT = total deadweight tonnage.
3. Maintenance and repairs = 3[(90400 + CN - 1500).69)]
LBP x B x D .
100 = cubic number
LBP = length between perpendiculars in ft.
B = breadth, molded, in ft.
D = depth, molded, in ft.
4. Insurance, hull and machinery = SAQC [.01 l00006 DWT1000
Insurance, Protection and Indemnity = 3(750N + .61 CN)
N = ship's complement = 27.
Since the ratio of one cost camponent to another varies between
foreign and U.S. flags, operating differential subsidies have to be
applied to these equations in order to approximate actual relationships.
They are as follows:
312
labor and subsistence, 70 percent
maintenance and repairs, 30 percent
insurance, 30 percent
Given these relationships, operating costs were calculated for each
ship size, and proportional relationships were determined. The 60,000
DWT base point, calculated from current data, was adjusted accordingly.
It is possible that the cost ccmponents have shifted disproportionately
in magnitude over the past few years so that current proportions would be
slightly different, but no way of adjusting for this possible bias was
determined. 11
4. Two variables used in the operating cost calculations have not
been discussed: horsepower and ship dimensions. Both variables are
determined by a complex set of economic and engineering relationships,
subject to certain engineering constraints.
The ship and power plant are designed to minimize the required
freight rate. Hydronautics calculations show the following.12 For
bulk carriers, the lowest freight rate, subject to two engineering
constraints (LBP/B > 5 and LBP/D _ 15), corresponds to the following
rules:
1. Given draft, choose the biggest DWT design,
2. Given DWT, pick the deepest draft design, which corresponds to
the minimum length design.
The first principle is not representative of current practice. To
date, most owners have specified a "normal" deadweight vessel for a given
draft constraint. Recently, however, vessels have been designed that
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increase the DWT for a given draft. The advantage is lower costs for a
given draft, while the disadvantage is higher costs for a deeper draft.
For flexibility, owners have preferred traditional designs. The future
developments in this area will be considered below.
Given the second objective, subject to the constraints, a "normal"
vessel is used for the base calculations. The assumed relationships
13
are:
d/D = .70
L/D = 11.0
L/B = 6.0
CB = .82
where d = draft
D = depth
L = length
B = breadth
CB = block coefficient LxLxB xD
V = displacement in cubic meters.
The dimensions of each ship size are calculated from these
relationships.
Horsepower requirements are also a complex multi-variable decision.
Horsepower is a function of displacement, speed, and fuel consumption.
This relationship shifts with shifting fuel prices and other prices. The
Hydronautics study revealed that lower service speeds correspond to the
lowet rquied feigt rte.14lowest required freight rate.1. Throughout the study, we assume a
service speed of 15 knots. Horsepower ratings for each size ship are
calculated from an Odense Steel Shipyard Ltd. report. 15
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5. Fuel consumption is a function of horsepower and the resistance
of the ship hull to water. The relationship is linear, but varies across
types of propulsion machinery. For bulk carriers, ships use either
low-speed diesel engines or steam turbine engines. The latter are used
for very large ships, say, 150,000 DWT and above. 16  We assume .32
lb/HP/hour fuel consunption at sea, plus auxiliaries ranging from 2 to 4
tons per day, depending on ship size. For steam turbines we assume .48
lb/HP/hour.17
Fuel consumption in port is more difficult to specify. Based on
Marad data approximately 15 percent of the fuel consumption per day at
sea is assumed for port fuel consumption. Adjusting for fuel price
variations, fuel consumption rates are listed in Table A3. 18
6. Days in port are a function of loading and unloading times,
waiting times, and navigation times, and are widely variable from port to
port. In theory, there is an optimal port time for each size ship on
each route. It would equate the marginal cost of vessel time with the
marginal cost of the loading or unloading operations. However, the
calculation requires data that are not available. For example, the costs
of loading and unloading operations, separated into fixed and variable
components, and the changes in these component costs as a function of
loading, unloading rates, and stevedoring costs. Furthermore, in
practice the optimum is not likely to obtain. Vessel owners lose money
as they wait, but the gains in waiting time to the loading facility (as
berth occupancy increases) are, on the one hand, not likely to be
perfectly responsive to waiting time, and on the other hand, not likely
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to be transferred to ship owners since loading and unloading costs are
usually paid by the vessel owner. In practice, what is more likely is a
maximum acceptable waiting time, in proportion to berth time.
Nonetheless, within this inefficient system, some reasonable principles
can be developed to help construct the port time curve.
1. Nominal loading rates vary from 2000 tons per hour (Tph) to
8000 TPH. Discharge rates vary from
loading rates, depending on the type
70 percent of nominal rates. As a ru
higher loading and unloading rates. 19
2. The marginal cost of a ship's time in
constant as a function of time (based
3. The marginal cost of a ship's time in
than proportionally, as a function of
words, the decrease needed in loading
1000 to 4000 Tph. Actual
of system, vary from 60 to
le, larger facilities have
port is approximately
on my calculations).
port increases, but less
ship size. In other
or unloading costs for
larger ships is less per ton, but more per ship.
4. The longer the route, the less the proportional cost increases
of increased time in port. That is, the longer the route, the
smaller the proportion of port time to round trip time. Thus, a
one-day increase in port time increases the round trip time by
a smaller proportion for larger routes.
5. As waiting time increases relative to berth time, berth
occupancy increases. In addition, as the number of berths
increases, the berth occupancy ratio (occupied time divided by
operating time) increases for a given ratio of waiting time to
berth time. 20
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6. The optimal waiting time as a percentage of loading or
unloading time will decrease for bigger ships. That is, a
one-day increase will yield a lower percentage increase in the
berth occupancy ratio (BOR), so there are less savings to the
facility. So, if the cost per unit time to the ship is
constant over time, and cost savings to the facility decrease
as days increase, the optimum will obtain at a lower ratio.
(Note, however, that if there is a tendency towards more berths
at larger facilities, then for equivalent waiting time, the BOR
will be higher for larger ships.
7. The optimal waiting time in absolute terms is probably higher
for bigger ships, but data are insufficient to verify this
hypothesis.
Given these hypotheses, a curve is estimated for port delays. It
has been cross-checked with several other sources. It is roughly
equivalent to assuming a single berth at all facilities, constant loading
and unloading times, and a .33 BOR for 200,000 DWT ships, a .44 BOR for
120,000 DWT ships, and .60 BOR for 60,000 DWT ships.
6. Port charges are widely variable across ports, not only in
component prices, but in components charged. An example of a port charge
for a 120,000 DWT vessel, loaded with 90,000 tons, in October 1978 at
Dunkirk is: 2 1
Pilotage - 30,500
Boatage - 5,000
Towage - 81,900
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Dues - 207,500
Clearance - 2,300
Federal Tax - 2,400
Agency Fees - 1,500
Other - 14,000
TOTAL - 345,000
At the December 1978 exchange rate, this equals approximately U.S.
370,000. At the same time, a Panamax size vessel at Dunkirk was charged
175,000 francs.
A survey of port charges showed variation from as little as 15 cents
to $1.00 per ton. In the United States and South Africa, port charges
are at the low end, while in Northern Europe, they are typically at the
higher end of this range. In the Mediterranean (Taranto) charges are in
between. In Australia port charges are as high as U.S. $1.00 per ton.
Some exanples are set out in Table A2. For the base calculation, we
assume 75 cents per ton per round trip.
For canal charges, we assume U.S. $1.50 for a Panama Canal round
trip, and U.S. $2.00 for a Suez Canal round trip. The sensitivity of
total costs to changes in these variables will be determined below.
8. Other Assumptions
a. Working days are assumed at 345 per year.
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Table A2
Port Charges
Port
Richards Bay
Dunk irk
Rotterdam
Tar an to
Redcar
Gladstone
Ship Size
110,000
120, 000
50,000
120,000
120,000
120,000
Date
Oct.,
Oct.,
Oct.,
Nov.,
Oct.,
Oct.,
Aug.,
78
78
78
78
78
78
79
Charges
315,000
345,000 francs
175,000 francs
365,000
8,068,900 Lire
32,000 pounds
A 80 cents per
ton
Source: David Elsy, Skaarup Chartering Corp., Greenwich, Conn.,
unpublished data.
319
b. Hours per day - 24 hours. (Note: generally true from survey,
though an overtime wage scale is effective after 16 hours in
many cases).
c. Stores per day = 20 tons at sea.
d. Deadweight cargo tonnage (DWCT) = (Fuel per day x days per
one-way trip) - (stores per day x days per one-way trip). We
would expect some variation in this due to required bunker
price variations, but on average this is a reasonable
approximation.
e. Fuel costs are extremely volatile. For example, high quality
diesel oil (180 CST) was priced on the spot market in Rotterdam
in January 1980 at $188 per metric ton. By February, the price
was $160.00 per metric ton. The price as of January 19, 1979
was $87 per metric ton. The price used in this analysis is
$100.00 per metric ton. 22
f. Canal delays: we allow round-trip delays beyond normal transit
time of one day in the Panama Canal, and two days in the Suez
Canal.23
9. Finally, connecting points for coal movements must be
specified. For the cost analysis, a subset of ports, representative of
the important supply and demand regions, are selected. These are:
South Africa - Richards Bay
Australia - Gladstone, Hay Point
Canada - Vancouver
U.S. East Coast - Hampton Roads
320
U.S. Gulf - Mobile
U.S. West - L.A., Long Beach
Northern Europe - Rotterdam
Mediterranean - Taranto
Japan - Yokohama
Connecting distances, in nautical miles, are calculated from U.S.
Navy tables.24 Several key geographical trade-offs should be
highlighted.
First, from the West Coast of the United States or Canada to Europe,
the route options are the Panama Canal or Cape Horn. The additional
distance via Cape Horn is 4945 miles to the Mediterranean (Straits of
Gibraltar), and 5575 miles to Northern Europe (Bishops Rock or Ushant).
Second, from the U.S. East Coast or Gulf Coast to Japan, the route
options are the Panama Canal or the Cape of Good Hope (versus Cape
Horn). From Mobile to Yokohama, the additional distance is 6500 miles.
From Hampton Roads, the additional distance is 5766 miles.
Third, from South Africa to Europe, the route choice is between the
Suez Canal and the Cape of Good Hope. To Northern Europe, the Cape of
Good Hope route is shorter. To the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal route
is shorter. For example, to Taranto from Richards Bay the mileage via
the Cape is 7224. From Richards Bay to Taranto via the Suez Canal, the
mileage is 5411.
Fourth, from Australia to Europe, several route options must be
considered. If the originating port is in New South Wales, the route
through the Wilson Strait is shorter to both the Cape of Good Hope and
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the Suez Canal. If the originating port is in Queensland, the route
through the Torres Strait is shorter to the Suez Canal, while the route
through the Wilson Strait is shorter to Cape of Good Hope. For shipments
from Australia to Europe, it is always shorter to use the Suez Canal than
to go around the Cape of Good Hope. For example, from New South Wales to
the Strait of Gibraltar, it is 1263 miles shorter, and from Queensland to
the Strait of Gibraltar, it is 1927 miles shorter.
Fifth, the choice between Kiel Canal and Skaggens Odde for shipments
to Denmark will be ignored in the calculations. The additional distance
is less than 200 miles. Given the draft constraint in the canal (30,000
DWT), the diseconomies in ship size will clearly offset the shorter
distance.
10. Oe final assumption that is only indirectly important here,
but will be required for the integration of costs is loading and
unloading cost. In most cases, these costs are separate from port
charges. Australia is an exception to this, and in Baltimore the dumping
charge is included in the rail rate. A survey of port facilities showed
a range from U.S. $1.00 to U.S. $4.00 for services at either end of the
trip including unloading the ocean vessel, storage, and loading the
inland carrier. Most facilities charged between $2.50 and $3.50 per
ton. For the maritime component (only unloading or loading the vessel),
the charge ranged from $1.50 to $2.00 within the $2.50 to $3.50
range. 25 None of these costs is reflected directly in ocean rates.
They will, however, be applied in the integration below.
The important cost variables and connecting mileages are summarized
in Tables A3 and A4.
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Table A3
Cost Calculation Assunptions
Deadwei ght
Shi p
Requisi-
tons tion costs
(000s) (millions
30
60
80
100
120
150
180
200
250
15.5
22.4
24.8
28.4
32.8
40.2
45.0
48.0
57.7
Opera-
ting Fuel Consumption
Costs
1092
1680
1848
2100
2260
2650
2970
3200
3910
at Sea
(tons per day)
38
50
56
64
71
78 (110)
86 (126)
93 (136)
105 (152)
Fuel Consumption
in Port
(tons per day)
5.70
7.50
8.40
9.60
10.65
11.70
12.90
13.95
15.75
1. Numbers in parentheses represent steam turbine fuel
consumption rates. Others represent diesel rates.
2. Fuel consinption is adjusted for auxiliary price
differentials.
3. All costs at January, 1979 levels.
Source: See text.
Days
in Port
4.0
5.0
5.6
6.3
7.0
7.7
8.2
8.6
9.5
Notes:
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Table A4
Distances Between Ports
Y
Gladstone
Port Kembla
Richards Bay
Baltimore
Hampton Roads
New Orleans
Mobile
Los Angeles
Vancouver
okohama
4090
4350
7230
9626( P
9504( P
9126( P
), 15270(H)
), 15709(H)
4839
4262
Tar an to
9442(S),
9203(S),
5411(S),
4726
4604
5830
5777
8532( P)
9651 (P)
13626( H)
12723(H)
7224( H)
Rotterdam
11800(5),
11615(5),
7118(H)
3714
3591
4850
4795
7755(P),
8874(P),
Notes: P = Panama Canal routing
H = Cape of Good Hope routing
C = Cape Horn routing
S = Suez Canal routing
Source: Distance between ports, U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office,
Washington, D.C., 1965.
13526( H)
12617(H)
13330(C)
14449( C)
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VII-APPENDIX A
1Fearnley and Egers, World Bulk Trades, 1977, p. 28.
2U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Office of
Commercial Development, "Development of a Standardized U.S. Flag Dry Bulk
Carrier," Appendix E, p. 16-17.
3Roseman, D., "Relative Costs of Alternative Modes of Ocean
Transportation of Coal," Hydronautics, Inc., Oct. 1979.
4Ibid., p. 2.
5 Ibid., Appendix II.
6As an example of variations in newbuilding prices, Japanese
newbuilding prices for a 60,000 DWT bulk carrier were $21.6 million in
1976, $19.9 million in 1977, $17.6 million in 1978, and $25.0 million at
the end of 1979. U.S. Department of Commerce, Appendix C, p. 258;
op. cit., , The Platou Monthly, Dec. 1978, p. 3.
7 Marad, op. cit., App. C., p. 257.
8The Marad estimates for foreign flag construction costs are
3 percent to 6 percent lower than the Hydronautics estimates. However,
they also use a higher capital recovery factor for foreign flags due to
different tax and depreciation conditions. On balance, the annual
capital costs are very close. Marad, op. cit., App. E. For a detailed
analysis of operating and construction differential subsidies in U.S.
shipbuilding, see Marcus, H. and Frankel, E., Federal Port Policy in the
United States, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1916.
9Marad, op. cit., App. C, p. 257.
10Roseman, D. and Tomassoni, C., "A Review of Coal Slurry Carrier
Transportation Costs," Hydronautics, Appendixes 1, 2, November 1977.
IIAfter this exercise was completed, additional operating cost data
were obtained frcm Marad. There was insufficient time to reperform the
calculations. Preliminary checks, however, closely corresponded to the
above results.
12Roseman, 1979, op. cit., p..3.
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13There is no precise definition of a normal vessel. These
parameters are based on a review of actual traditional bulk carrier
designs, Hydronautics assumptions, and Marad design parameters. Marad,
2p. cit., App. E., Design Selection.
14Roseman, op. cit., 1979, p. 3.
15 World Coal Study, Maritime Transport, Odense Steel Shipyard Ltd.,
Odense, Denmark, June 1979.
16 This point is an approximation based on an analysis of actual
ship specifications, and discussions with ship brokers. Note that some
very large ships may instead use two diesel engines.
17Roseman, op. cit., 1979, App. 2, Odense Steel Shipyard Ltd.,
op. cit., p. 8.
18The price relationships between fuels change over time. Based on
an analysis of worldwide fuel prices reported by Bunkerfuels Corp.,
bunker C fuel for steam turbines was assumed to cost 90 percent of the
price of 180CST diesel, which in turn was assumed to cost 55 percent of
higher quality maritime diesel oil.
19 H.W. Drewry, "Ports and Terminals for Large Bulk Carriers,"
No. 46, 1976, London.
20 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see E.G. Frankel,
"Port Capacity, Productivity and Effectiveness Measures," U.S. Department
of Commerce, Maritime Administration., undated.
21Port charge data provided by David Elsy, Skaarup Chartering
Corp., Greenwich, Connecticut.
22Bunkerfuels Corp., "Monthly Report," January, 1979.
23 International Energy Agency, Economic Assessment Service, "The
Long-run Economics of the Ocean Transport of Coal," December, 1978, p. 20.
24
"Distances between Ports," U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office,
Washington, D.C., 1965.
25No adequate documentation on loading and unloading costs
existed. These estimates are drawn from personal communications with
port and shipping authorities in the U.S., Canada, South Africa,
Australia, and Europe.
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APPENDIX B
POR TS
The following section reviews the role of ports in steam coal trade
development. First, the location and water depth of existing facilities
are presented. Second, the issues of current port capacity and future
port capacity are discussed.
PORT FACILITIES
The existing port facilities capable of handling large coal carriers
are summarized in Tables BI and B2. A brief discussion of each port
region follows.
Exporting areas
In the United States, there are three important export regions: the
Gulf coast, East coast, and the West coast. On the East coast, Hampton
Roads, Baltimore, and Philadelphia are all capable of handling coal.
Hampton Roads is the most accessible, as Baltimore and Philadelphia
require longer trips up the Chesapeake Bay (150 miles to Baltimore).
Hampton Roads also can receive larger ships, up to 80,000 DWT vessels
(conventional design), while Baltimore can receive 60,000 DWT vessels,
and Philadelphia can receive 40,000 DWT vessels. However, the Hampton
Roads facilities are old and heavily congested.
In the Gulf coast, three areas are important. Mobile and Myrtle
Grove, a new facility designed primarily for intercoastal movements to
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Table B]
Exporting Ports
Port Draft
(meters)
U.S. East Coast
Baltimore
Philadelphia
Hampton Roads
U.S. Gulf Coast
Devant
New Orleans
Mobile
Myrtle Grove
U.S. West Coast
Galveston
Houston
Los Angeles
Long Beach
San Francisco
Portland
Seattle
Canada
Vancouver
Sydney
South Africa
Richards Bay
Durban
Australia
Gladstone
Hay Point
Port Kembla
Sydney
Newcastle
12.2
11.3
13.7
11.6
10.7
13.4
11.8
13.4
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
19.8
11.0
18.0
11.0
17.0
17.0
12.2
12.2
12.2
Maximum Size
(000's DWT)
60
40
80
45
35
75
50
75
60
60
60
60
60
250
38
200
38
120
120
60
55
55
Source: Same as Table B2.
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Florida power plants, can receive 75,000 DWT and 55,000 DWT
respectively. In the New Orleans area, Devant lies below New Orleans; on
the Mississippi river. It is capable of receiving 55,000 DWT ships. New
Orleans itself can receive 40,000 DWT ships. Further to the west,
Galveston and Houston have the draft to receive larger ships, but both
has virtually no current capacity.
On the West coast, Los Angeles and Long Beach can both receive 60,000
DWT ships, but both have limited loading facilities. No other West coast
port can currently handle large bulk carriers. Possible areas for future
development are in the San Fransisco/Oakland area and in the
Portland/Seattle area.
In Canada, Western coal is moved to facilities in the Vancouver
area. The Roberts Bank terminal can receive ships up to 250,000 DWT.
The Neptune and Pacific coast terminals can receive 95,000 DWT and 55,000
DWT ships respectively. In eastern Canada, Sydney, Nova Scotia can
handle 40,000 DWT ships.
For shipments from both the United States and Canada, Great lakes
ports are possible, but due to the size limitations for access to the
Atlantic Ocean (30,000 DWT) they are far too expensive for long ocean
movements.
In South Africa, Richards Bay is expected to handle virtually all
future South African coal exports. Ships up to 200,000 DWT can be
received. Approximately 200 km to the Southwest, the port of Durban is
possible for overflows, but Durban can receive only 40,000 DWT ships.
In Queensland, Gladstone and Hay Point will handle most of the
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projected coal exports. Each can receive 120,000 DWT vessels. Bowen and
McKay are possible locations for future developments. In New South
Wales, Port Kembla, Newcastle, and Sydney will handle coal exports. Each
can receive vessels up to 60,000 DWT.
Finally, briefly consider other potential exporting countries, which
will not be dealt with in detail in this study. China's main coal port
is Lu-Tu, capable of handling 30,000 DWT ships. Colombia can handle
30,000 DWT ships in Cartagena. India's exports will probably move
through Haddia (60,000 DWT capacity) or Paradap (50,000 DWP capacity).
The Soviet Unions exports could move through Vostochyny, on the Pacific
Coast (100,000 DWT) or Ilichevsk on the Black Sea (40,000 DWT). In
Poland, Godensk can handle 100,000 DWT ships.
Importing areas
In Europe, three regions should be analyzed: the Mediterranean,
Northern Europe, and Scandanavia. In the Mediterranean, the largest
facilities are Taranto (150,000 DWT capacity) and Marseilles (180,000 DWT
capacity). Scattered throughout the region are several smaller
facilities. East of Taranto is Trieste (80,000 DWT capacity). Between
Taranto and Marseilles are Piombino, La Spezia, Genoa, and Savona, where
vessels from 40,000 to 60,000 DWT can be received.
In Northern Europe, the major port is Rotterdan, where 250,000 DWT
vessels can be received. There are, however, many other smaller
facilities throughout the region: Gijon (80,000 DWT) and Bilbao (75,000
DWT) in Spain; Le Havre (70,000 DWT), Dunkirk (75,000 DWT) and Rouen
(35,000 DWT) in France.
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Table B2
Importing Ports
SPA IN
Gijon
Bilbao
FRANCE
Marseilles (fos)
Dunk irk
Le Havre
Rouen
ITALY
Trieste
Taranto
Piombino,
La Spezia
Savona
Genoa
BELGIUM
Antwerpen
Ghent
NETHERLANDS
Rotterdam
Amsterdam
Ismuiden
Dr a ft
Draft
(meters)
13.4
14.0
19.5
13.4
12.8
10.0
13.7
15.2
11.9
11.0
11.6
12.2
13.1
12.2
Maximum Size
(000's DWT)
75
80
180
75
70
35
80
100
50
38
45
55
70
55
250
80
80
19.8
13.7
13.7
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Table B2 (Continued)
Delfzijh
Ternuezen
LINITED KINGDOM
Port Talbot
Redcar
Hunterston
Immingham
WEST GERMANY
Emd en
Hamburg
Nordenhaven
Bremershaven
Brunsbuttle
Wi lhelmshaven
DENMARK
Ens ted
Stignaes
Esberg
Kalunberg
Studstrup
Aalberg
SWEDEN
Goteborg
Draft
(meters)
12.8
12.2
15.2
16.0
17.1
11.0
11.3
14.5
12.8
10.0
11.3
14.0
16.0
16.0
9.5
11.0
11 .9
10.0
Maximum Size
(000's DWT)
65
55
100
120
150
35
40
90
65
30
40
80
120
120
30
38
50
30
19.8 250
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Table B2 (Continued)
Draft
(meters)
Maximum Size
( 000 's of DWT)
JAPAN
Muroran
Kash ima
Chiba
Kimitsu
5. Mizushima
6. Fukiyama
7. Kure
8. Kobe
9. Kakogawa
10. Wakayama
11. Sakai
12. Hirohata
13. Kamaishi
14. Yawata
15. Kohure
16. Oita
15.8
15.8
17.1
15.8
18.0
17.1
18.9
11.9
16.5
13.7
14.0
12.5
13.1
16.0
16.0
24.8
110
110
145
110
185
145
185
50
125
60
80
60
70
120
120
250
H.P. Drewry, Inc.
Carriers," Report
"Ports
no. 46,
and Terminals for Large Bulk
London, 1976.
Ports of the World, Thirty-third Edition,
Ltd., London, 1980.
Benn Publications,
International Energy Agency, Economic Assessment Service, "The
Long-Run Economics of Ocean Transport of Coal," Report no.
01/78, London, England, December 1978.
Sources:
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In the United Kingda, Port Talbot, near Swansea in the English
Channel, can receive 100,000 DWT ships. Redcar, near Middlesborough on
the North Sea, and Hunterston, also on the North Sea, can handle 120,000
DWT and 150,000 DWT vessels respectively.
In Belgiun, Antwerpen (100,000 DWT) and Ghent (55,000 DWT) are
possibilities. In the Netherlands, kmsterdam (80,000 DWT), Delfzijl
(65,000 DWT), Ijmuiden (84,000 DWT), and Ternuezen (55,000 DWT) are
alternatives to Rotterdam. In West Germany, Wilhemshaven (80,000 DWT)
and Hamburg (90,000 DWT) are the major facilities. Smaller ports are
Emden (48,000 DWT), Bremerhaven, (35,000 DWT), Nordenham (65,000 DWT) and
Brunsbuttle (40,000 DWT).
In Denmark, Ensted and Stignaes can both handle ships up to 120,000
DWT. Other receiving points are Kalundburg (45,000), Studstrup (60,000),
Esbjerg (50,000), Copenhaven (30,000), and Aalburg (40,000). In Sweden
the major port is Goteburg, whiich can handle 250,000 DWT vessels.
Finally, in Japan, several areas are important. In the Northern
Province of Hokkaido, Muroran is the main facility, capable of receiving
110,000 DWT vessels. In the Southern Province of Kyushu, Yawata, Kohura,
Oita, and Nagasaki can receive coal ships. Oita is the largest of this
group, capable of receiving 250,000 DWT ships. In the Honshu province,
several facilities are located near Tokyo: Koshima, Chiba, Kimitsu, and
Yokohama are the major ones. Ships from 100,000 to 150,000 DWT can be
received. Near Osaka there are several major facilities: Kobe, Kakogawa,
Wakayama, Sakai, and Hirohota handling facilities range in size from
50,000 to 80,000 DWT vessels. Nagoya, between Osaka and Tokyo can receive
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70,000 DWT vessels. Kamaishi, north of Tokyo, and Mizushima, Fukiyama,
and Kure, Southwest of Osaka, are other possible coal receiving ports.
The maximun permissable draft and ship sizes (traditional design)
are presented in Tables Bl and B2.
PORT CAPACITY
Two concerns remain: existing port capacities and the expansion of
port capacities. In both cases, the answer is canplex and subject to
significant uncertainties. Nonetheless, some brief remarks are essential
to our overall appraisal of steam coal trade.
First, consider existing port capacity. Some recent studies have
made reference to existing capacities of port facilities. However, only
vague reference is made to how these figures are calculated and what they
really mean. In fact, capacity estimation is a very ca;nplicated
calculation, dependent on several uncertain variables. We will discuss
several of these uncertainties.
First, the capacity of the loading and unloading facilities alone,
that is, isolated from the rest of the ports' operating characteristics,
must be determined. Capacity, or annual throughput, can be defined as:
WH x OD x (U/L) x BOR x NB
where:
WH = working hours per day
00 = operating days per year
U/L = actual loading or unloading rates in tons per hour
BOR = berth occupancy rate
NB = number of berths
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The values selected for these variables depend on our objectives.
If, for example, we want to maximize capacity, the berth occupancy ratio
would be set close to 100 percent. This, however, would require a
waiting-time-to- berth-time ratio of close to 20 (given 2 berths).
Clearly, maximizing capacity is not a useful concept. 2
What is more important is optimal capacity, subject to some
objective function, say cost minimization or profit maximization. In
this case, each variable would be chosen to maximize the profits of the
operation. For example, the berth occupancy ratio would be set where the
marginal costs of waiting to ship owners equals the marginal benefits of
greater berth occupancy. Working hours viuld be set based on the labor
supply curve, which reflects wage increases as the operating portion of
the day increases. If the data were available, the optimal capacity
could be simply canputed.
Unfortunately, the data are not available. (Furthermore, facilities
do not operate in this way, as was noted earlier.) A more likely
practice is maximum acceptable waiting times, and additional constraints
on labor availability, and working days. Instead of the optimal
capacity, we could make a reasonable approximation of actual capacity.
From a survey of the ports, operating days are set at 345. Working
hours are set at 24 hours per day. However, stevedoring costs increase
by up to 50 percent for night shifts and weekend shifts. 3
Nominal loading and unloading rates can also be obtained. 4
These must be adjusted for lost time in berthing, deberthing, and hatch
shifting (4 hours per ship) and losses in loading efficiency, depending
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on the type of loading equipment. Continuous belt loader have approxi-
mately a 75 percent efficiency.5 The number of berths can also be
obtained by survey.6 Lastly, the BOR depends on the size of ship,
distance of haul, and costs of loading and unloading. It is impossible,
given data limitations noted earlier, to determine the optimal BOR, but
reasonable approximations are possible. A reasonable assumption would be
that the maximum acceptable waiting time is 50 percent of berth time,
decreasing with ship size. Thus, if only one berth exists, the BOR is
set at 35 percent. If two berths exist, the BOR is set at 58 percent,
and if three berths exist, the BOR is set at 68 percent. What is most
important is consistency. Some studies, for example, set very high berth
occupany ratios, and yet calculate very low ocean freight rates. In
fact, a high BOR means long waiting times relative to berth times, and a
higher freight rate.
Even given an estimate of actual capacity in this way, two other
factors must be considered: storage capacity and the capacity of the
port as a whole, both for inland transport access and vessel access. As
storage capacity is reduced, the BOR will decrease. This is a common
constraint on the West coast of the United States. Port congestion is
also a common problem, especially in Hampton Roads.
Furthermore, even if we have a reasonable estimate of the capacity of
a facility, this in itself says nothing about excess capacity. To the
extent that a facility is contracted to metallurgical coals, assessment
of this capacity 'is meaningless and alone serves a limited purpose.
Nonetheless, some guidelines on relative capacity magnitudes are
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helpful. Based on direct calculations as described above and a survey of
the literature, a brief assessment of existing capacity follows]
First, consider the United States. In 1979, Hampton Roads handled 31
million metric tons (MT), and in 1978 15 MT. Baltimore handled 7.6 MT in
1978, while Philadelphia handled virtually nothing. The maximum tonnage
moved in the past 5 years was 36.7 MT through Hampton Roads, 8.2 MT
through Baltimore, and 1.3 MT through Philadelphia. This suggests that
at least some excess capacity exists. Our estimate of capacity, based on
the assunptions above, is 23.5 MT in Newport and, 41.7 MT in Norfolk, or
a total of 65.3 MT for Hampton Roads. For Baltimore we estimate 15.4 MT
of capacity, and for Philadelphia 3.6 MT of capacity. Fran these
imperfect calculations, there appears to be a great deal of unused
capacity on the U.S. East Coast.
In the U.S. Gulf, there is virtually no existing capacity at
Galveston. Houston's general cargo terminal could handle approximately
2 MT according to Houston Port officials. Devant can handle approximately
4.1 MT, Mobile 4.5 MT, and Myrtle Grove, 3.5 to 4.5 MT. Current exports
and imports suggest that approximately 90 percent of this capacity is
being utilized.
On the West Coast, only Los Angeles and Long Beach can currently
handle coal. Their combined capacity is between 4 and 5 MT. Most of
this is available for incremental coal shipments according to port
officials.
As a rough estimate then, there is approximately 36 MT excess
capacity on the East coast, 4.5 MT on the Gulf Coast, and 3.6 MT on the
West coast.
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South African capacity is unclear. Current exports are 20 MT. Given
the integrated plan, which calls for exports of up to 40 MT in 1985, we
can assume that port capacity will build up to this level. In Vancouver,
there is 15 MT capacity, 9 of which is in Roberts Bay. Of this amount
very little is unutilized.
In Australia, the Joint Coal Board estimates the following capacities
and current utilization: Newcastle 21 MT, (9.0 actual); Sydney 3.0 (2.31
actual), Port Kembla, 7.5 (6.32 actual), Hay Point 20, (14.15 actual),
Gladstone 13, (6.37 actual). Based on these estimates, total excess
capacity is approximately 26 million tons.
In consuming areas, fewer data are available. In Japan, very little
excess capacity exists. This is evidenced by the plans for a offshore
coal receiving and distribution center. In France, Dunkirk has
approximately 12 MT of capacity (5 MT actual), and Le Havre 6 MT of
capacity (5.2 actual in 1978). In the Netherlands, capacity has been
estimated at 30.6 MT, 14 MT of which was utilized in 1978. Most of this
capacity is divided between Rotterdam and Amsterdam. In Germany, there
is approximately 6 MT capacity, virtually all of which is currently
used. In Denmark, capacity is estimated at 15.5 MT, 10.5 of which was
used in 1978. In Italy, no firm data are available.
To conclude, even this rough approximation of existing capacity
indicates that for large increases in coal trade, port facilities must be
expanded, with a possible exception being the U.S. East Coast.
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FUTURE CAPACITY
A more important question than the level of existing capacity is the
future availability of port facilities. This section briefly discusses
this issue.
The first, and best indication of the problem is existing plans for
capacity expansion. In Australia, extensive expansions are already in
progress, and extensive long-run developments have been formulated. In
Newcastle, the harbor is being dredged from 11.0 to 15.2 meters and
ultimately to 17.2 meters to receive 110,000 DWT vessels. Completion is
expected by 1982. This will increase the capacity of the facility from
20 to 30 MT. Possible additional expansions have been considered, for
example, at Koorangang Island (25 MT). In Port Kembla, new loading
facilities are being constructed that will increase capacity from 7.5 MT
to 14.0 MT and allow for 110,000 DWT vessels by 1982. There is a
possibility of expansion to 17.2 meters and an ultimate capacity of 24
MT. At Gladstone, a major new loader is scheduled for canpletion in
1981, and plans for expansion to 45 MT and 170,000 DWT vessels have been
formulated.8
In Vancouver, there are plans for expanding the Roberts Bank
terminal, and constructing a new port north of Vancouver. The total
ultimate capacity is estimated at 60 MT. 9  In Rotterdam, a new
Maasvlakt facility is being constructed capable of handling 25 MT per
year. In Denmark, there are plans for the expansion of Kalundborg to
120,000 DWT vessel capacity, and possible new ports in the Jutland or the
Fenen area. In Japan, there are plans for an offshore coal center. In
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South Africa, current plans call for expansion to 40 million tons. In
France, there are plans to dredge Le Havre and Dunkirk to 23 meters, and
Fos to 20 meters, and plans for new loaders at Le Havre (12 MT) arid
Dunkirk (10 to 12 MT). In the United States, Galveston and Houston have
plans for large export, import terminals and Los Angeles is considering
an expansion to 65 feet, 180,000 DWT, 15 MT. Finally, there have been
various discussions for new facilities in the Northwest. 10
In Australia and South Africa there seems to be little doubt of
significant port expansion. In Northern Europe, Rotterdam will grow, and
France and Denmark do not seem to have major constraints. However in all
cases the costs of expansion and the possible long-run constraints on
expansion should be considered.
Consider physical constraints. In all major cases except in the
United States, dredging to receive 120,000 DWT vessels is possible. In
the United States, however, physical constraints are more binding. In
Baltimore, it is possible to dredge the channel to 50 feet (Soros), but
this involves dredging 36.6 miles of channel. In Philadelphia the channel
length is even greater. In Hampton Roads, they can dredge to 58 feet
without interfering with the Chesapeake Bay Bridge Tunnel and the Hampton
Roads Bridge Tunnel. In New Orleans, dredging to 50 feet is possible,
but very high siltation rates make it costly. In Mobile, there are 26
miles of channel. The most likely area for future expansion in the
gulf region is Galveston, where 150,000 DWT ships could be handled.12
Another major physical constraint is land for storage and loading
facilities. San Francisco and Seattle are cases in point. In San
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Francisco, the rights to land that could be used for facility are being
battled in court.
In all cases, another important constraint is environmental. Los
13Angeles is a good example. They plan to dredge the current
facility to 65 feet. However, to carry this out they need a permit from
the Army Corp of Engineers, who in turn require approval by the
Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Bureau. The potential effect
in biological production in the area is a serious constraint. Also, air
pollution from trains and ships and from the loading area are a problem.
In Los Angeles case, the state of California has jurisdiction over this,
and is likely to be a rigid constrant.
Other areas are similarly plagued with environmental restrictions.
Vancouver has not approved the expansion of Roberts Bank, nor gained
approval for a new port facility. In Australia, the Port Botany
expansion was rejected on environmental grounds. A plan under study by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to deepen the main channels at Hampton
Roads has also encounted stiff environmental resistance. No one can
predict the long-term implications, but environmental constraint on
expansion, especially in the United States and Canada, should not be
ignored.
Finally, the last important issue is what will future expansion
cost. First, consider harbor expansions. There are limited data, and
the details of expansion plans vary from port to port. However, some
exanples provide us with a rough indication of costs. In Newcastle, the
expansion from 11.2 to 15.2 meters is estimated to cost $70 million.
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Expansion from 15.2 to 17.2 meters is estimated to cost A $45 million. A
Port Kembla expansion from 15.2 meters to 17.2 meters is estimated to
cost A $43 million. The IEA estimates 50 cents to $1.00 per ton 14
for expansion in general. However, these are little more than guesses.
Furthermore, even if we know the costs exactly, there is no consistent
relationship between costs and port charges. In some cases, the costs of
expansion will be reflected in charges. Australia, for example, has
charged fees consistent with port expansion costs. In others, however,
they are not. It depends on the institutional structure, which varies
enormously across countries, and on particular demand, supply conditions
in the given countries. The chances are that port charges will increase,
but we can not predict by how much. 15
With respect to new loading facilities, prices do correspond closely
to costs, at least where the facilities are private. There is, however,
no reason to expect loading and unloading costs to increase significantly
in real terms.
To conclude, port expansion will be necessary to handle large
increments in the coal trade. Unfortunately, the costs and constraints
on expansion cannot be specified with any certainty. In most cases,
costs will probably not change significantly in real terms. The one area
that could be seriously constrained is the United States. We will
evaluate the importance of this constraint below.
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER VII--APPENDIX B
lPort data are obtained from the following sources: H.P. Drewry,
"Ports and Terminals for Large Bulk Carriers," No. 46, 1976.
"Guide to Port Entry," Vol. 1, in Port Information, produced by Colin
Pielow, 1979/80.
Ports of the World, Thirty-third edition, Benn Publications, Ltd.,
London, 1980.
Personal Communications with David Elsy, Skaarup Shipping Corp.,
Greenwich, Conn.
International Energy Agency, Economic Assessment Service, "The
Long-Run Economics of the Ocean Transport of Coal," Report No. D1/78,
London, England, December 1978.
2For a detailed evaluation of port capacity estimation see Frankel,
op. cit. Note that the berth occupancy ratio equals the percentage of
operating time that the berth is occupied. It ranges from 0 to 1. It is
a function of waiting time, service time, and the number of berths
available. The relationships cited in the text are drawn from a table
relating waiting time/service time ratios to berth occupancy for a given
number of berths. The calculations are based on a queueing theory
formula with poisson arrivals and exponential service times with
first-come, first-served queue discipline.
3Ports of the World, op. cit.
4Drewry, op. cit., No. 46.
5Based on discussions with Ernst Frankel, Professor of Ocean
Engineering, MIT..
6Ports of the World, op. cit.
7Drewry, op. cit.; IEA, op. cit.; Black Coals in Australia, 1978-79,
op. cit.; World Coal Study, op. cit.,, ;"The Ports of Greater
Hamptoin Roads," Annual, 1980; Conversations with Port Authorities.
8 Black Coal in Australia, op. cit., 1977-1978 and 1979-1980
editions. The Queensland Coal Boarc, 28th Annual Report, June 30, 1979;
"Coal Exports Strategy Study," Commissioned by the New South Wales State
Government, June, 1979.
9Private correspondence with Kaiser Resources, Vancouver, British
Columbia.
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10Port plan specifications based
authorities, and Kaiser Resources in
Rotterdam; Nordel, 1980 For Denmark;
Japanese officials, WOCO for France,,
Gulf.
on discussions with port
Canada; International Coal Trade for
personal correspondence with
SOROS Associates and ORBA for U.S.
IBased on estimates by Soros Associates Inc
System Concepts," A Report Submitted to the U.S.
Maritime Administration, N.Y., 1977, Part 1.
. "Offshore Terminal
Department of Commerce,
12For details of Galveston plan, see "The Galveston Regional Coal
Distribution Center Plan," ORBA Corporation, Fairfield New Jersey.
13Based on correspondence with Los Angeles port authorities.
14 Australian estimates from Coal Exports Study, op. cit., IEA, Steam
Coal: Prospects to 2000, op. cit.
15See Walters, A. and Bemathon, E., Port Pricing and Investment
Policy for Developing Countries, A World BTkResearch Publcation,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, England, 1979.
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PART B
INTERNATIONAL STEAM COAL MARKETS:
AN ANALYSIS OF DELIVERED PRICES AND DEMAND
346
INTRODUCTION
In Part A we analyzed the economics of coal transportation. The
ultimate purpose was to determine the importance of coal transportation
to the development of international steam coal markets. In this part we
will relate the transportation analysis to an analysis of stean coal
supply and demand, and explain the importance of transportation, and
supply and demand variables to the development of international coal
trade.
Part B is organized as follows. Chapter I analyzes coal supply in
Australia, Canada, the United States and Australia. The emphasis is on
current coal prices, and prospective changes in these prices as coal
output cumulates, and market and governmental factors shift. Chapter II
integrates the supply price information with the transportation cost
information developed in Part A to determine cost-minimizing trade
patterns on the basis of existing economics and policy. The relative
economic importance of inland versus seaborne transportation,
transportation versus coal supply prices FOB mine, and the competitive
position of each country will be assessed. In addition, the effect of
non-incremental structural shifts in transportation and supply variables
on future trade patterns will be appraised.
Chapters III through V focus on the demand for steam coal. Chapter
III explains the existing structure of stean coal demand in Western
Europe and Japan. Chapter IV reviews several recent estimates of steam
coal demand in these regions. We will see that these-estimates are
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deficient in several respects. Consequently, in Chapter V we will
analyze further the economics and policy of steam coal demand in two
especially important countries, Japan and France.
Finally, we will summarize the results of Part B, and discuss
further critical transportation, supply, and demand factors underlying
the development of international steam coal trade.
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CHAPTER I
INTERNATIONAL STEM COAL SUPPLY
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IN TRODU CT ION
In Part A we have estimated inland and ocean freight coal
transportation costs. In order to calculate delivered coal prices to
coastal coal-fired power stations in Western Europe and Japan, this
chapter analyzes the current and future prices of steam coal at the mine.
Four countries will be analyzed: Canada, Australia, South Africa,
and the United States. There are several reasons for choosing this set.
Most importantly, these countries will probably account for most steam
coal exports into the 21st century. The World Energy Conference
estimates that they account for approximately 40 percent of hard coal
reserves that are technically and economically recoverable, and
50 percent of brown coal reserves. Their production of bituminous
coals and anthracite amounts to 30 percent of the world total, and their
exports comprise 55 percent of the world total. Excluding the U.S.S.R.
2
and Poland, their exports comprise 89 percent of world coal exports.
Consider other important potential steam coal exporters. Reasons
for not focusing on them are varied. First, in Russia and other Eastern
European countries (primarily Poland and Czechoslovakia), information
beyond general industry appraisals was unavailable. Also, the likelihood
of increased exports from them to non-Communist nations is small. In
fact, it is more likely that exports from these countries will decrease
in the future. Poland, traditionally a major supplier of coal to Western
Europe, has manifested this by withdrawing coal supplies from the
European market in favor of expanded sales to the Eastern Bloc nations.
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Second, in coal-producing countries, such as the United Kingdom, West
Germany, Japan and Korea, increments to production will be small, and
prices are far too high to encourage their significant participation in
steam-coal export markets. Third, in countries where coal industries are
developing, primarily India, China, and Columbia, the coal industry
production and transportation infrastructures are severely limited, and
their contribution to stean coal markets more uncertain and more distant
in the future. 3 To conclude, though this is clearly an imcomplete
view of the future markets, the four countries analyzed will as a group
dominate steam coal exports in the next 20 years.4
The chapter is organized as follows. First, the existing pattern of
coal production will be described. Second, the reserve base of each
country will be described. Third, the structure of developing steam coal
markets will be considered. A more detailed evaluation of all of these
subjects is provided in Appendix A. Fourth, current coal prices will be
analyzed. Fifth, long run changes in coal prices will be evaluated. In
the next chapter, coal prices and transportation costs will be integrated
to calculate and explain cost minimizing delivered prices to Western
Europe and Japan.
RES ER VES -PRODUCTION PND MARKET STRUCTURE
COAL CHARACTER ISTICS
Before we can actually discuss reserves of coal, the various types
of coal should be explained.
Coal is not a homogeneous substance. Rather, there is a wide range
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in the canposition and in the chemical and physical properties of
different kinds of coal. Since variations over this range are important
to end-uses, an explanation of the various coal classifications is
essential prior to the analysis of coal reserves, prices, and production.
Fundamentally, variations in organic composition yield variations in
coal type (e.g., humic or sapropelic); different temperatures to which
coals were subjected determine the rank (e.g., peat, lignite,
subbituminous, bituminous, anthracite); the composition and rank
determine the various properties of coal (heating value, ash content,
sulfur content, ash fusion temperature, moisture content, volatility,
grindability, density), including those that are used to assess its
grade. For example, density (weight per unit volume) is low for
bituminous coals; heating value increases from peat to bituminous;
higher ranks correspond to lower volatile matter.5
The relative importance of these different coal properties depends
on the end-use. Coking coal is used for metallurgical purposes,and steam
coal primarily for power generation. Coking coal:
... should be of high grade and calorific value with a low
ash content; it must swell to some extent, and be moderately
plastic, and it should have a volatile content on a dry,
ash-free basis of 21-30 percent (medium volatile, bituminous
rank). A combination of these characteristics gives a strong,
high quality coke. Low sulfur content is also important as a
higher sulfur content causes brittleness in steel, as well as
metal corrosion and air pollution. 6
For stean generation, the most important characteristics are heating
value and sulfur content. Also important are volatile matter, moisture
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content, ash content, ash-fusion temperature, and grindability. For
steam generation, setting these variables is more largely a function of
economics at the design stage, while for metallurgical purposes certain
qualities are technologically essential for coking (i.e., plasticity).
There is no precise boundary point between steaming and coking
coal. That is, some "steaming coal" may be used for "coking coal" and
vice-versa. With the recent increase in the premium on low-sulfur coal
in the United States and Japan, this distinction is especially vague.
Though coal is classified as coking or steaming coal, and though the
end-uses for coal from particular mining properties are generally power
generation or metallurgical purposes, this substitutability should not be
overlooked.
COAL PRODUCTION
World bituminous and anthracite coal production in 1978 was
2630 million metric tons (MT). Lignite production amounted to 940
million metric tons. Bituminous and anthracite production by region
and principal-producing countries are presented in Table 1.
Three countries, China, the U.S.S.R., and the United States, account
for 66 percent (1735 million metric tons) of the total bituminous and
anthracite coal production. The top 12 producing countries account for
95 percent of the total production. They are shown in Table 1. Canada,
Australia, South Africa, and the United States account for approximately
30 percent of world bituminous and anthracite production. However,
excluding China, U.S.S.R. Poland and Czechoslavakia, the four accounted
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Table 1
World Production of Bituminous and Anthracite Coal--19781
Million Metric Tons
North America:
United States
Canada
South America:
Europe:
Germany (F.R.)
U.S.S
As i a
594
565
25
10
483
90
122
193
United Kingdom
Poland
.R.:
China
India
Korea2
Africa:
South Africa
Ocean i a:
Australia
World Total:
556
819
618
101
63
95
90
74
72
2630
Notes: 1. Data for some countries were
were available.
2. Includes North Korea (45 MT)
estimated where no statistics
and South Korea (18 MT).
Source: Coal International,
No. I, May 9/9-.
Zinder-Neris, Inc. Washington, D.C., Vol. 1,
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for 61 percent of the world's coal production. 8
More important for our purposes Ss the role of these countries in
the coal export market. Worldwide they accounted for 55 percent of total
exports in 1977, and 89 percent of exports excluding the U.S.S.R. and
Poland. Coal exports are shown in Table 2.
Appendix A presents a more detailed description of coal production
patterns in Australia, Canada, South Africa, and the United States. For
the reader not interested in that level of detail, some major points are
included here.
Two Australian states, Queensland and New South Wales, account for
approximately 92 percent of Australian black coal reserves, and 95
percent of Australian black coal production. New South Wales raw coal
production was 50.5 million metric tons (MT) in the 1978-1979 fiscal
year. Saleable coal production was 42.4 MT, 56 percent of which was
consumed domestically, and 44 percent exported. 76 percent of the
exports were used for metallurgical purposes, and 22 percent for
electricity generation. Virtually all of the coal was low-sulfur
bituminous coal, and 76 percent of the raw coal production was from
underground mines. The New South Wales coal mines are relatively close
to ports, ranging in distance from 25 kilometers (km) to 100 km. 9
Queensland raw coal production in 1978-1979 was 37.3 MT. Saleable
output was 26.9 MT. In contrast to New South Wales, 88 percent of the
raw coal production was from open-cut mines, and only 12 percent from
underground mines. Exports in 1978-79 equaled 18.8 MT, 99 percent of
which were used for metallurgical purposes. The low-sulfur, bituminous
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Table 2
World Coal Exports--1978
Million Metric Tons
United States 37
Canada 14
Germany (F.R.) 19
United Kingdom 2
U.S.S.R. 261
Poland 40
Australia 39
South Africa 15
Total 192
World Total 1992
Notes: 1. Estimated.
2. Includes France, Belgium, Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, other.
Source: Coal International, Zinder-Neris Inc., Washington, D.C. Vol.
no. 3, 19/9.
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coal mines are further fran port facilities than are New South Wales
mines, ranging in distance from 177 to 490 km. 10
South African coal production was 90.4 MT in 1978, 15.4 MT of which
were exported. 1979 exports increased to 22.5 MT. Approximately 90
percent of these exports were for electricity generation. The largest
producing region in South Africa is the Transvaal State, which accounted
for 71 percent of the 1978 output. Coal in this region is high-ash, low
to medium sulfur (.5 percent to 1.2 percent), bituminous steaming coal.
The average distance to port is 540 km.1
Total Canadian coal production was 30. 4 MT in 1978. Exports equaled
13.6 MT, more than 90 percent of which were used for metallurgical
purposes. The most important producing districts for export are British
Columbia and Alberta. British Columbian production in 1978 was 9 MT,
virtually all of which was exported for metallurgical uses. Almost all
of the production was surface-mined, low-sulfur, bituminous coal.
Alberta coal production of bituminous and sub-bituminous, low-sulfur coal
equaled 13.5 MT in 1978. Approximately 50 percent of the Alberta
production was subbituminous coal used in domestic power stations. The
remaining bituminous production was exported for metallurgical purposes.
Distances to West coast ports range from 700 to 800 miles. 12
United States bituminous and lignite coal production equaled 603 MT
in 1978, approximately 38 MT of which was lignite. Exports were 37 MT,
virtually all of which were used for metallurgical purposes. There are
three major coal producing regions: the West, the Midwest, and
Appalachia. Western coal production is low-sulphur bituminous and
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subbituminous coal. 1978 output equaled approximately 159 million metric
tons, more than 90 percent of which was from surface mines. Midwestern
production was approximately 112 MT in 1978. Roughly 68 percent of this
total was produced from surface mines. The coal is typically medium to
high sulphur bituminous coal. Appalachia production in 1978 was
approximately 333 MT, most of which vas medium to high sulphur bituminous
coal produced from underground mines. Finally, Western mines are on
average 1000 miles from West coast ports, Midwestern mines are
approximately 600 miles from Gulf Coast ports, and Appalachian mines
range from 300 to 600 miles from Atlantic Coast ports. 13
COAL RESERVES
Current coal production statistics tell us about existing coal
markets, and possible short-term developments, but very little about
future supplies and markets. Coal reserve data should guide us in
predicting availability and production costs in the long-run.
Unfortunately, reserve classification systems do not fully provide
the amount of economic and geologic information that we need. We know
that there is lots of coal in the ground, and that much of it is
economically and technically recoverable, but we are unable to predict
with confidence the change in production costs as output cumulates.
Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the classification systems and the
problems with them so as to add meaning to country coal-reserve data.
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United States Coal Reserves
The reserve classification systems in the United States have been
thoroughly criticized elsewhere. 4 The basic categorization was
developed by the United States Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.). Total
resources are separated into identified and undiscovered resources, the
latter category including hypothetical resources (surmised to exist in
known mining areas), and speculative resources (possible resources in
areas where coal has been previously discovered). The volume of
identified resources is so large that speculative and hypothetical
reserves need not concern us for at least the remainder of the
century. 15
The U.S.G.S. classifies identified resources according to the
certainty with which deposits are known and the physical characteristics
of deposits. The physical dimensions include depth of the seam from the
surface (less than 1000 ft, 1000-2000 ft, 2000-3000 ft), and the
thickness of coal seams (14" to 28", 28" to 42", and 42" and greater).
The certainty dimension is subdivided into measured, indicated, and
inferred categories.
They are defined as:16
o Measured: Measured resources are resources for which tonnage
is computed from dimensions revealed in outcrops, trenches,
mine workings, and drill holes. The points of observation and
measurement are so closely spaced, and the thickness and extent
of the coal are so well defined, that the computed tonnage is
judged to be accurate within 20 percent of the true tonnage.
Although the spacing of the points of observation necessary to
demonstrate continuity of coal differs from region to region
according to the character of the coal beds, the points of
observation are, in general, about half a mile apart.
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o Indicated: Indicated resources are resources for which tonnage
Ts cmputed from specific measurements and partly from
projection of visible data for a reasonable distance on the
basis of geological evidence. In general, the points of
observation are about one mile apart from beds of known
continuity. In several states, particularly Alabama, Colorado,
Iowa, Montana, and Washington (where the amount of measured
resources is very small) the measured and indicated categories
have been combined.
o Inferred: Inferred resources are resources for which
quantitative estimates are based largely on broad knowledge of
the geologic character of the bed or region and for which few
measurements of bed thickness are available. The estimates are
based primarily on an assumed continuity in areas remote from
outcrops of beds, which in areas near outcrops were used to
calculate tonnage classes as measured or indicated. In thle
intrest of conservatism, the areas in which the coal is classed
as inferred are restricted as described under the heading,
"Areal Extent of Beds." In general, inferred coal lies farther
than two miles from the outcrop in areas for which mining or
drilling information is available.
The United States Bureau of Mines (U.S.B.M.) has refined this
classification with the purpose of restricting the definition of reserves
to "economically available reserves". Their demonstrated reserve
base includes measured and indicated reserves in bituminous seams greater
than 28" and less than 1000 ft below the surface. Subbituminous and
lignite reserves are included if they are in seams greater than 5 ft. The
demonstrated reserve base is defined as a whole as:
. that portion of the identified coal resource that can
be economically mined at the time of determination. The reserve
is derived by applying a recovery factor (approximately 30
percent) to that component of th identified coal reserve
designated as the reserve base. 1c
In Zimmerman's words, the U.S.B.M. claims that:
the reserve base, once adjusted for a recovery factor,
represents coal that is economically available according to the
joint definitions of the.U.S.G.S. and the U.S.B.M. 19
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Finally, the demonstrated reserve base is divided into underground
and strippable reserves. In general, the portion of the reserve base
that lies less than 120 ft below the surface is categorized as strippable.
This classification scheme has marked deficiencies as a guide to the
behavior of costs as output cumulates. Zimmerman has shown that in
several ways the classification simply does not measure what it claims to
measure--that is, economic availability.20 A brief diversion into
mineral economic theory is essential to understanding this deficiency.
Three principles are important. First, mineral economic theory
tells us that the cheapest resources will be exploited first. Second,
economic theory predicts that in long-run competitive equilibrium the
cost of the marginal output (including user cost) will equal minimum
average production cost. In the case of coal (and other minerals),
however, mines with more favorable mining conditions will produce
simultaneously with less favored mines and earn higher rates of return.
Third, the "incremental mine" is the last or least favored mine opened to
meet demand, and its minimum average cost is the long-run marginal cost
21
of the industry. As a conseqence of these three principles,
changes in output levels are not sufficient to predict changes in
production costs. Equally important are variations in geologic
conditions. To predict production cost changes we must evaluate the
geologic conditions of the incremental mine at various output levels. If
the incremental mine is extracting reserves that lie on the boundaries of
the USBM reserve definition, then the definition is a reasonable guide to
today's economically recoverable coal reserves.
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In fact, Zimmerman has argued that the United States reserves
include a lot of coal that cannot be ecomomically extracted with current
technology at today's prices.22 Furthermore, the broad
categorization of seam thicknesses and the omission of other important
mining condition data (roof, floor, water, etc.) do not allow for
accurate predictions of production costs as output cumulates. In
essence, the data ignore important cost-determining conditions and this
has led to incorrect interpretations of reserve data. Hear Zimmerman:
... Reserve and resource data tell us that there is a
great deal of coal in the ground. Even the narrowest reserve
classification is broader than what it was intended to be.
Needed information is lacking. There have been attenpts to
deal with this missing information and to fill the gaps, and
there have been some tentative conclusions, but more
information is necessary if we are to make more confident
predictions. We lack information on unobserved characteristics
and on the distribution of seam thickness. There have been
attenpts to fill that lack but, at this point, we can only
characterize the results as tentative. 23
South African Coal Reserves
The deficiencies in the reserve classification systems of other
countries are equally troublesome. In South Africa, the 1975 Report of
the Commission of Inquiry into the coal reserves of the Republic of
South Africa (A.K.A. Petrick Report) assessed South Africa's coal
reserves. The commission estimated resources in terms of:24
a. total mineable in situ resources; that portion of the coal
in situ which can be mined by existing technologies, and
b. total extractable resources; that portion of the mineable
coal in situ which is extractable in prevailing or slightly
less rigorous economic conditions.
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Mineable coal is subdivided into proven, indicated, and inferred
categories, and then further subdivided into types (steam, netallurgical,
anthracite) and grade (according to heating value). Extractable coal is
subdivided into underground and surface mining resources. The estimates
are based on an ash content of less than 35 percent, a seam thickness of
at least 1.2 meters (for bituminous coal) and a mining depth of less than
300 meters (for bituminous coal). For metallurgical coal and anthracite,
the corresponding figures are .7 meters, and 500 meters. 25 Though
the ccnparison is imperfect, the South African mineable and extractable
categories correspond roughly to the U.S. demonstrated reserve base and
recoverable reserves, respectively. Note, however, that extractable
resources are approximately 58 percent of mineable resources in South
Africa, while recoverable reserves are approximately 30 percent of the
demonstrated reserve base in the United States. Given the lack of
details on the determination of recovery factors, the reason for this
difference cannot be specified with any certainty.
Ellis, among others, has analyzed the Petrick report classification
system.26 Though the specific objections vary, the conclusions
parallel Zimmerman's for the U.S. system: the classification fails to
adequately describe economically extractable coal in South Africa. Not
surprisingly, other studies have estimated economically available
reserves as both much higher and lower than the Petrick report
figures. 27
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Australian Coal Reserves
Australia's coal classification system closely parallels the U.S.
systen. The National Energy Advisory Committee completed an assessment
of Australia's energy resources in December, 1977, which adapted the
U.S.G.S.-U.S.B.M. methodology. 28 However, the adaptation falls short
in several respects. First, physical properties are categorized more
broadly. Overburden is listed for reserves under 600 meters, and under
300 meters only. Seam thickness is only constrained at the minimum point
of 1.5 meters (1 meter in special circumstances). Second, demonstrated
economic resources includes reserves in deposits with less than 600
meters of overburden, whereas the demonstrated reserve base in the United
States sets a maximum of approximately 300 meters.29 Note also that
the recoverable coal is approximately 55 percent of the demonstrated
reserve base. This is again much higher than the U.S. estimate, and
approximately equal to the South African recovery factor estimate.
A more thorough analysis of coal reserves was completed in 1979 by
the New South Wales Joint Coal Board (JCB).30 Within the same basic
classification system, sean thicknesses and depth ranges are estimated
for each seam within mining areas. The reserves are further subdivided
into twelve categories formulated by the board as being representative of
the coal products marketed by New South Wales. Volatile matter, ash
content, and coking or non-coking uses are specified characteristics.
The exact estimation procedure is unclear. The JCB notes that "where
necessary, quality was estimated from borehole data and by comparison
31
with adjacent areas". Furthermore:
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There is a considerable range in the reliability of the
resource estimates presented. Those within allocated areas
generally fall within the measured or indicated reserve
classes; while those within the unallocated areas are generally
indicated or inferred reserves. 2 2
Finally, one further category estimated by the JCB (and South
Africa) is marketable (or saleable) coal. This is a subset of
recoverable coal, calculated on the basis of market expectations with
regard in particular to coking and non-coking markets.33 The actual
mechanics of this calculation were unavailable, so its usefullness cannot
be criticized. Conceptually, however, it is a useful measure of market
potential.
In Queensland, the 28th annual report (1979) follows more closely the
1977 national report. Reserves are categorized as measured, indicated,
and inferred. They are subdivided on a geological basis (Permian or
Mesozoic eras) and in strippable (less than 60 meters) and underground
categories.
Canadian Coal Reserves
Canada's system also closely parallels the U.S.G.S.-U.S.B.M.
sys ten. Identified resources are classified by the Geological Survey of
Canada as measured, indicated, and inferred.35 However, physical
properties are deficient. This author was only able to find average
regional physical properties. In various Canadian reports estimates of
recovery factors have also varied significantly, and no official figure
is provided. Further work is being undertaken in Canada to obtain a more
accurate assessment of coal reserves and to arrive at a figure of
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economically recoverable reserves in terms of current operating
conditions and markets.
Reserve estimates for these four countries are presented in Tables 3
through 6. It should be obvious that camparisons have limited value
given the substantial variation in restrictions and definitions in the
various systems, and that economic interpretations are likely to be
fallacious given the imperfect correspondence between economic
recoverability and the various reserve categories. Nonetheless, the
estimates provide at least a reasonable ordinal picture of coal reserves
in these four countries. Specifically, the United States demonstrated
reserve base is approximately twice the reserve base of Canada,
Australia, and South Africa combined. The U.S. recoverable reserves also
far exceed the other countries' recoverable reserves combined. Of the
remaining countries, Canada and Australia demonstrated reserves combined
are approximately equal to the South African demonstrated reserves.
World Energy Conference Coal Reserves Estimates
The World Energy Conference (WEC) has attempted to integrate these
and other national classification systems into two categories:
1. Geological resources: these are understood to mean
resources that at some time in the future may acquire an
economic value for mankind; and
2. Technically and economically recoverable resources: used
to cover only those reserves that, under technical and economic
conditions, are applicable to the present day, and are
considered to be exploitable.
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Table 3
DEMONSTRATED RESERVE BASEa OF COALS IN THE UNITED STATES
ON JANUARY 1, 1976, ACCORDING TO RANKb
(million short tons)
State An
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky, E.
Kentucky, W.
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
New Mexico
N. Carolina
N. Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Penn. 7
S. Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wyoming
TO TAL
thr a c i te Bituminous
-- 2,008.7
-- 697.5
-- 32~5.5
96.4 270.1
25.5 9,144.0
-- 0.9
4.4
-- 67,969.3
-- 10,714.4
-- 2,202.2
-- 998.2
-- 13,540.1
-- 12,460.8
-- 1,048.3
-- 126.8
5,014.0
-- 1,385.4
2.3 1,859.9
-- 31.7
-- 19,230.2
-- 1.618.0
-- c
109.4 23,727.7
-- 965.1
-- 6,551.7
137.5 4,165.5
-- 255.3
-- 38,606.5
-- 4,002.0
7,371.1 228,924.6
Subbituminous
5,446.6
4,121.3
103,416.7
2,735.8
17.
-- 1
1,316.7
51,369.4
168,425.0
Li gnite
1,083.0
14.0
25.7
2,965.7
C
15,766.8
10,145.3
426.1
3,181.9
8.1
33,616.6
Source: U.S. Bureau of
1978, p. 694.
Mines, as reprinted in Keystone Coal Industry Manual,
lotal
3,091.7
6,1 58.2
325.5
392.2
16,256.4
0.9
4. 4
67,969.3
10,714.4
2,202.2
998.2
13,540.1
12,460.8
c
1,048.3
126.8
5,014.0
120,568.9
4,598.0
31 .7
10,145.3
19, 230. 2
1,618.0
17.5
30,837.1
426.1
965.1
3,181.9
6,552.8
4,302.9
1,580.1
38,606.5
55,371.9
438,337.3
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Table 3 (continued)
Notes:
aIncludes measured and indicated resource categories as defined by the
U.S.G.S. and represents 100 percent of the coal in place.,
bData may not add to totals shown due to rounding.
cQuantity undetermined (basic resource data do not provide the detail
required for delineation of reserve base).
dRecoverable reserves equal 68,340 million tons of bituminous coal, 56,227
million tons of subbituminous coal, and 2,234 million tons of anthracite.
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Table 4
SOUTH AFRICA'S COAL RESERVES AND RESOURCES
Mineable in situ Resources Million Metric Tons
Raw Bituminous Coal 81,274
Metallurgical Coal (washed)l 3,451
Anthracite (washed) 744
TOTAL 85,469
Extractable Resources (underground mining)
Raw bituminous coal 24,915
Metallurgical coal (washed) 705
Anthracite (washed) 375
TO TAL 25,995
Extractable Resources (Surface mining)2
Raw bituminous coal 23,680
Metallurgical coal 124
Anthracite 32
TO TAL 23, 836
Notes: 1. I.e., on a washed-coal basis.
2. Assuming a strippable ratio, i.e., ratio of overburden
volume to tons of coal, of 10:1.
Source: South African Department of Mines, Minerals Bureau, Internal
Report no. 48, Coal in South Africa, 1979, p. 16.
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Table 5
AUSTRALIA-DEMONSTRATED ECONOMIC RESOLRCES OF BLACK C)ALl
(106 metric tonnes)
New
South
Wales
Queens-
1 an d
Tasmania
Western
Australia
South
Australia
Tota 1
in
Situ
16,150
17,360
120
1 , 950
Bituminous
in Situ
(percent)
98
98
100
0
720 0
TOTAL 36,300 91
Depth of Cover
Less than
300 meters
13,080
16,270
120
1,550
720
31,740
Recoverab le
New Coal
9,030
10,130
60
390
650
20,260
Notes: Australia's Black Coal category is almost exclusively bituminous
coal. Negligible amounts of anthracite and subbituminous coal
are also included. Lignite is classified as "brown coal" in
Australia. More specifically, coal with a gross specific energy
value of less than 20.00 MJ/kg (approximately 19 million Btu per
metric ton) is classified as brown coal. Coal with a gross
specific energy value of 27.00 MJ/kg (approximately 25.7 million
Btu per metric ton) is classified as Black bituminous coal.
Coal between these limits is black subbituminous coal.
Source: National Energy Advisory Committee, Australia's Energy
Resources: An Assessment, December, 1977, p. 51, 59.
Total
Saleable
Coal
7,556
8,112
Saleable
coking
Coal
4,890
4,020
50
390
650
16,758 8,910
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Table 6
COAL RESOURCES OF WESTERN CPNADA BY PROVINCE
(Millions of short tons)
Province
B.C.
Alberta
Sask.
TOTAL
Measured
7,329
2,204
292
9,824
Indi cated
11,175
32,096
7,024
50,296
Inferred
40,953
12,940
4,698
58,592
To tal
59,547
47,240
12,014
118,7 11
Source: Latour, B.A. and Chrismas, L.P. Preliminary Estimate of Measured
Coal Resources Including Reassessment of Indicated and Inferred
Resources in Western Canada; Geological $urvey of Canada,
paper 70-58, 1970.
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In making the distinction between these two categories, depth limits
for "geological resources" were "advised" at 2000 meters for hard coal,
and 1500 meters for brown coal. For "technically and economically
recoverable reserves," the corresponding restrictions are 1500 meters
for hard coal, and 600 meters for brown coal. The minimum seam
thickness for technically and economically recoverable reserves "is
generally in the range of around 0.6 meters in the case of hard coal,
and 2.0 meters for brown coal." 36
The last sentence should evidence the problems pervasive in this
study, or, for that matter, in any effort to integrate various national
reserve estimates. In essence, reserves are not estimated in accordance
with international agreements of standard guidelines. Rather, reserve
numbers estimated by each country according to their classification
system are made to fit into the two WEC categories. In many cases this
calls for a two-inch dowel to be forced into a one-inch bore-hole. The
WEC acknowledges these problems to some extent:
The difference in the international criteria of assessment,
together with the very considerable worldwide difference in the
degree of geological exploratory work carried out on the coal
deposits in the various countries restrict to a large extent
the possibility of affecting a comprehensive and generally
valid appraisal of raw material deposits, particularly those of
coal.37
In fact, the matching of WEC categories to various national categories is
very difficult, and ccmparisons based on the WEC categorization scheme
are likely to be misleading, especially in the geological resource
category. This author was unable to consistently match even the
technically and economically category to what seemed to be reasonably
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equivalent national categories. In particular, the WEC U.S. estimate of
technically and economically recoverable reserves is substantially higher
than the actual U.S. recoverable reserve estimates, while the WEC South
African and Australian estimates are reasonably consistent with those
countries' estimates of recoverable reserves. Possibly the WEC imputed a
higher recovery factor in the U.S. case. In any event, the WEC estimates
of technically and economically recoverable reserves are presented in
Table 7. Though inconsistent, they also present a reasonable ordinal
picture of coal reserves.
To conclude, we know there is a great deal of coal, and that these
four countries own a large share of it. However, the reserve estimates
must be used with caution both in international evaluations of production
costs and in international comparisons of output potential. We will
briefly return to the former case in the discussion of depletion costs
below. For a more detailed description of coal reserves and production,
see Appendix A.
MARKET STRUCTURE
Another important determinant of prices in steam coal export markets
is market structure. However, in a largely undeveloped market such as
this, where entry is taking place as new firms are buying up coal
reserves, and where the extent of interregional campetition is still
unclear, relatively little can be said about future competition and the
ability of producers to realize rents in international steam coal
markets. Nonetheless, a brief review of the existing market structure in
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Table 7
WORLD ENERGY ONFERENCE
TECHNICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY RECOVERABLE RESOURCES
(Million Tons of Coal Equivalent)
Afr ica:
South Africa
North America:
U.S.
Canada
Asia:
China
USSR
India
Australia:
Europe:
U.K.
Germany
Poland
TO TAL
143,892
Canada, US,
Australia, South
Africa
Brown CoalHard Coal
34,033:
29,903
126,839:
113,236
8,708
219,226:
98,883
82,900
33,345
18,128
94,210:
45,000
23,919
20, 000
492,472
38 percent
90:
71,081:
64,358
673
29,626:
N.A.
27,000
355
-9,225
33,762:
10,500
1 ,000
49 percent
Notes: N.A. indicates "not available."
Hard Coal = bituminous and anthracite
Brown Coal = Subbituminous and lignite.
Ton of Coal Equivalent = 7x10 6 Kcal
Source: World Energy Conference, Coal Resources, 1978.
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each country will improve our understanding of existing prices and future
price changes.
Additional details on the existing market structure are included in
Appendix A. To summarize them, in Canada most current export production
is for metallurgical purposes. The Alberta mountains region and the
British Columbian producers are campetitors with one another. The
Herfindahl Index for the six producers in these regions equals
0. 26 4 .37a The reciprocal, 3.78, indicates that the industry performs
like about four equal suppliers.
Current steam coal production is primarily in the Alberta plains.
Very little of it is exported. The Manalta mines produced 6.97 MT of the
8.30 MT total. Hawever, some of their mines are actually owned by public
utilities. Two other conpanies in the Alberta plains produced less than
1 MT per year. Another British Columbian company, Byron Creek, produced
0.52 MT of steaming coal for export.38
In South Africa, three campanies controlled 75 percent of total
production. The largest six companies controlled approximately 88
percent of total production. The Herfindahl index is 0.247, indicating
that the industry performs as four equal firms. Equally important to
canpetition in South African export markets, however, is the marketing
structure in South Africa. Major producers' associations are assigned
export quantities by the government, and they in turn allocate these
quantities to their member companies. Although recently some large mines
have been able to circumvent this system, this marketing arrangement sets
the foundation for a non-competitive pricing industry. 39
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In Australia, Queensland and New South Wales producers compete with
one another. Like Canada, the relative dominance of metallurgical coal
producers clouds the future campetitive structure for stean coal
exports. The three major steam coal districts, Kianga-Moura, Blackwater,
and Blair Athol, are controlled by seven canpanies, though various sets
of these companies have formed conglomerates in different areas. This
joint-ownership might mitigate the capetition that would otherwise
obtain from this many firms. In New South Wales, steam coal production
is greater than in Queensland, but the data does not allow for separation
between steam coal and metallurgical coal output. Nonetheless,
there are ten canpanies in New South Wales that produce over 1 MT of
coal. Given competition between Queensland and New South Wales, the
Australian industry seems to be a very competitive one.40
Lastly, consider the United States. Zimmerman has evaluated coal
industry market structure in the United States, and the following
conclusions can be drawn. In the East, competition is strong.
Taking the reciprocal of the Herfindahl Index for the top 15 producers
suggests that the industry behaves as 13.2 equal firms. In the Midwest,
markets are far more concentrated. In Districts 9, 10, and 11, the
reciprocal of the Herfindahl Index is 5.73. In the West, there are a few
very large firms. Five conpanies control almost 50 percent of the
Western production. However, these five companies are almost equal
canpetitors, and the large number of smaller companies should check any
anti -competitive collusion. 4 2
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To conclude, steam coal markets are not yet sufficiently developed
to offer any firm conclusions on the extent of competition. More needs
to be known about the long run development of each country's steam coal
export industry. In addition, these countries will not be sealed from
each other, so that in certain cases the relative market will include all
four of them, and the fact that one nation's industry, say South Africa,
is not canpetitive is only important if South Africa has a camparative
advantage over other nations in certain markets. The extent of
international ccnpetition will be discussed in Chapter II. Based on the
existing structure, it seems likely that future markets will be
conpetitive. If, however, South Africa is positioned to realize large
locational rents in international markets, the existing structure
suggests that they could well do so. We will return to this below.
Note finally that existing markets do seem to be competitive.
Though this is uncertain, it suggests then the prices we analyze in the
next section are competitive prices, and do not include significant
monopoly rents.
PRICES
We would like to estimate long-run equilibrium prices and quantities
in international steam coal markets, but this is beyond the limits of
this research. However, by analyzing current prices we can construct a
foundation for the steam coal market, from which we can begin to develop
a better understanding of stean coal markets in the future. Questions of
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particular interest are: What is the importance of location to patterns
of market development? Which subset of countries are likely to be
canpetitors for a given demand region? Which supply region's exports are
likely to increase by the greatest amount?
After analyzing current prices, we will then consider changes in
real prices as output cumulates, and, in the next chapter, the amount
demanded at these price levels. Recall that these are not equilibrium
prices. Nonetheless, they are important indicators of future prices,
especially if markets are capetitive and if supply is highly elastic.
First, by way of background, consider the types and dimensions of
coal prices.
Coal is sold for varying contract periods. Spot contracts typically
have a duration of less than one year. In a spot contract, both the coal
company and the consumer (say, utility) are exposed to high risk. A
miners' strike, or inclement weather, or other short-term disruptions in
normal practice can leave the utility at a disadvantage. The coal
canpany will lose when demand is lower than expected. Also significant
for the utility is the problem of securing the coal quality for which his
boiler was designed.
As in other markets (i.e., shipping), long-term contracts are signed
to reduce buying and selling costs and to smooth out short-term market
fluctuations. The longest contracts (say 20 to 30 years) should therefore
accurately reflect producers' and consumers' expectations of long-run
price and cost developments (given that they call for the initial
delivery of coal in some period after the contract is negotiated, so as
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to allow for full market adjustment). Unfortunately, data on long-term
contracts are rarely available, and any thorough analysis of them is
impossible.
Instead, we are left with spot price. data and contract price
estimates which weight spot and long-term expected prices. We know that
spot prices will vary around long-term equilibrium prices according to
the direction and expected duration of a market fluctuation in demand or
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supply conditions . Consequently, we must be careful in
interpreting price observations.
There are several important dimensions to coal prices. First,
consider heating value. Clearly, coal with a higher British Thermal Unit
(Btu) content will be more valuable per ton than coal with a lower Btu
content. To adjust for this, it is useful to set prices per million
Btu. Still, a higher heating content per ton means lower transporation
and handling costs per Btu. Transportation costs must be applied per
ton. Handling cost variations are a negligible component of delivered
prices.
Second, consider ash content. Lower ash content is significant for
several reasons. It reduces handling and transportation costs per
million Btu; it reduces ash disposal costs; it reduces operating and
maintenance costs of pulverizers, and it reduces precipitator capital
costs. However, within the range of ash contents reported in price data
(that is after beneficiation), the variation in costs is also
negligible.45 Note, however, that the cost of beneficiation must be
considered when calculating coal production costs from FOB pier prices.
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Third, consider moisture content. Again, moiture increases the
costs of handling and transportation. It is picked up by calculating
transportation costs per ton, and then converting to costs per million
Btu.
Fourth, ash fusion temperature is a critical variable in boiler
design. Given an existing boiler, changes in ash fusion temperature may
be very important to boiler operating and maintenance costs. However,
given constant coal quality, this variation should not be that important
in the planning stages.
Fifth, consider sulfur content. Sulfur content of coal has become
increasingly important as air pollution regulations have stiffened. In
some cases, coals with a certain sulphur content can simply not be
burnt. In other cases, high sulfur content requires greater capital
expenditures on cleaning equipment. In general, there is a premium on
low-sulfur coal.
In the U.S. markets this premium is critical. The ability of
western coal to compete in eastern or mideastern markets depends on the
relative economic advantages of low-sulfur versus high-sulfur
coal.46 In this analysis, however, the importance is less. In Japan
and the Far East, sulfur limitations are stringent, and all of the likely
suppliers (Australia, Canada, and western United States) have low-sulfur
coal. In Western Europe, an option exists between low-sulfur South
African coal and high-sulfur U.S. eastern or mideastern coal. However,
existing regulations in Western Europe are very slack relative to the
United States or Japan, and the premium is small. We will assess the
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importance of this factor below. In general, however, given the
locational parameters of international coal markets, the lowest-sulfur
coal will be selected.
CURRENT PRICES
As noted, price information is limited by the confidentiality of
coal contracts. We are forced to rely on imperfect information, but
useful guidelines can nonetheless be constructed.
For the United States, two biweekly price series are published in
Coal Week: "current contract and spot marker steam coal prices," and
"current international spot steam coal prices." 47
In the first price series, spot and term prices (FOB mines per short
ton) are presented for Bureau of Mines Districts according to Btu/lb,
sulfur content, and ash content. The
"prices quoted do not represent actual transactions. They are a
synthesis of market conditions for each producing district based on
the characteristics of Coal Week's market prices. Prices reflect
the state-of-the-trade as perceived and discussed in confidence by
buyers, sellers, traders, and brokers for unwashed coal of the
market's specifications. Prices are updated bi-weekly as noted.
Quality specifications are derived by computer analysis of utility
coal purchase statements submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (see Table 8-a).".
Also important is the fact that "contract markets coal prices are based
on a 20,000 to 30,000 ton per month contract over five to ten years.
Sellers, traders, and brokers are the source for the 'ask' prices; buyers
for the bid prices."48 Clearly, this is not an ideal reflection of
long-run market conditions. However, it does contribute to our
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estimation of current contract prices.
Our eight supply points correspond to the U.S.B.M. districts as
follows: Wheeling, 1-4; Lynch, 7-8; Birmingham, 13; Harrisburg, 9-11;
Price, 16,17,20; Gallup, 18; Rock Springs, 19 south; Billings, 19 north,
22. Prices for various periods in 1978, 1979, and 1980 are presented in
Table 8.
Note that price increases on contracts have been very small. In
fact, between March 1979 and January 1980 reported contract prices were
constant; and between September 1978 and March 1979 some reported prices
actually declined by small amounts.
In March 1979 Coal Week began to present contract terms for
low-sulfur eastern coal. This subdivision is useful for our purposes.
At this time, prices per million Btu ranged from 92 cents to $1.16 in
Districts 1-4 (Wheeling). Ohio coal was significantly more expensive.
Ignoring Ohio coal, and subtracting the 1.0 percent sulfur coal in
central Pennsylvania and the high Btu coal in West Virginia, the range
was $.92 to $1.05 per million Btu. Low-sulfur coal (1.0 percent) in
central Pennsylvania was priced at $1.10 per million Btu, or 20 cents per
million Btu more than the 2.0 percent sulfur coal from the same district.
In the Lynch area, districts 7 and 8, low-sulfur coal (0.7 percent)
was priced at $1.27 to $1.28 per million Btu, again 20 cents per million
Btu less than coal in the 1.5 percent to 1.6 percent sulfur category.
In the Midwest (districts 9,10, 11), high-sulfur coal (3.5 percent)
was priced at $1.00 per million Btu. 0.9 percent sulfur coal in West
Table 8-a
CURRENT CONTRACT AND SPOT MARKER BTEAM COAL PRICES
Producing FOB Mines $/t Adjustment FOB
Districts* Btu/lb. Sulfur% Ash% Ask Bid Ask Bid Mines $/tAdjQt
'[rmsi Spot Term Spot Term sipot lerm Term Spot SIjXt
(1) Cential PA 12,000 12,100 2.0 20 15.7 13.8 $19.50 $18.75 - - $21.00 13.25
(2) Westctn PA 11,600 12,000 2.5 2.3 16.5 13.6 18.00 17.75 - - 23.25 13.50
(3) Notillithn WV 12,600 12,200 2.4 2.1 12.0 13.6 21.00 20.00 - - 25.00 13.00
(4) Oil 11,100 10,900 3.6 3.2 16.0 16.0 20.50 20.00 - - 22.00 12.25
(7) Southeastrn WV 11,300 12,000 1.1 1.0 17.5 12.5 25.00 , 22.00 - - 28.50 1.2.00
& pats of VA
(8) Southern WV, 11,800 11,700 1.3 1.3 13.5 13.1 25.50 22.50 - - 27.75 -
eastern KY,
northern TN
& parts of-VA.
(9) Western KY 11,000 11,200 3.6 3.5 14.2 13.3 22.50 20.50 - - 25.00 12.00
(10) 11. 10,800 10.800 3.0 2.9 11.4 11.6 19.25 18.50 - - 20.00 -
(11) IN 10,800 10,900 2.8 2.7 11.0 11.6 18.75 17.25 - - 18.75 -
(12) IA 9,200 9,300 3.5 4.8 15.4 17.3 15.00 14.00 - - 12.00 -
(13) AL & southern TN 1,700 31,900 1.5 1.5 14.7 13.4 25.00 23.00 - - 27.00 10.25
(15) KS. MO & 10,200 11,900 4.4 3.8 19.8 13.6 15.00 14.00 11.00 10.25 18.00 11.00
parts o? OK"
(16) & (17) CO & 10,900 11,200 0.5 0.6 9.3 10.6 17.50 17.00 - - 17.00 10.75
nor theastern NM
(18) Putts of NM & AZ 10,000 10,600 0.5 0.4 14.7 8.2 14.00 13.75 - - 15.00 -
(19) Soutliern WY 10,500 10,500 0.6 0.6 8.5 8.5 15.50 14.50 - - 15.00 -
(19) Northeasteri WY 8,100 8,100 0.5 0.5 6.0 6.0 6.75 6.25 - - 7.75 -
(20) UT 10,900 11,400 0.5 0.5 10.3 10.8 17.50 17.00 - - 18.00 -
(22) MT 9,000 8,600 0.6 0.9 7.5 8.8 8.75 8.50 - - 8.00 -
*a% defined by Bituninous Coal Act of 1937 tprices adjusted bi-weekly as warranted
"exclutding TX lignite
C%*J
0o
PRICES qut,,ed don't represent at tnal ransac tiotts. They are a synthesis of market
conditions for aIh produc iog distrit based on the characteristics of Coal Weeh's
"market oals. Ptices reflr the state-of-the-trade as perceived and discussed its
ronfidete by buyers, sellers, traders and brokers for unwashed coal of the marler's
spetifications. Prites are updated bi-weekly. as warranted.
QUALITY SPECIFICATIONS for each marker moal are derived by computer analysis
of utiltity t oal purchase statements submitted to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. They are updated quarterly. The current specs reflect repons in the third
Source: Coal Week, March 6, 1978.
quat ier, 1977. Coal Week adjusts spens off the omputer. where warranted, toaccount
lor differences between historical interest and current interest in a higher quality
produit t.
PRODUCING DISTRICT 19 (Wyoming) is subdivided to reflect the quality
differetces between northeastern and southern Wyoming coals.
CONTRACT marker coal prices are based on a 20.000 to 30.000 ton per month contract
over live to 10 years. Sellers. traders and brokers are the surce for "ask" prices; buyers,
the "bid" prices.
Table 8-b
CURRENT CONTRACT AND SPOT MARKER STEAM COAL PRICES
Producing
Districts*
(1) Central PA
(2) Western PA
(3) Northern WV
(4) Oil
(7) Southeastern WV
& parts of VA
(8) Southern WV,
eastern KY,
northern TN
& parts of VA
(9) Western KY
(10) I L
(11) IN
(12)
(13)
(15)
(16)
(18)
(19)
(19)
(20)
(22)
IA
AL & southern TN
KS, MO&
parts of OK**
& (17) CO&
northeastern NM
Parts of NM & AZ
Southern WY
Northeastern WY
UT
MT
FOB Mines $/t Adjustment FOB
Btu/lb. Sulfur% Ash% Ask Bid Ask Bid Mines $/t
lerm
12,000
11,800
12,500
11,200
11,200
Spot
12.000
11.800
12,200
10,800
12.000
I rm
1.9
2.4
2.5
3.5
1.0
Spot
2.1
2.3
2.0
3.2
1.1
Term
15.7
15.6
12.1
15.6
17.2
Spot
13.8
14.4
13.3
16.6
12.8
Term
S23.00 $22.00
22.50 21.00
23.75 23.25
24.25 23.75
24.50 21.75
11,700 11,800 1.2 1.3 13.4 12.9 25.00 22.00
11,000
10,700
10,800
9,500
11,700
10,100
11.100
10,800
10,900
9,100
11,900
11,700
3.5
2.9
2.8
3.8
1.5
4.4
3.4
3.0
2.6
3.7
1.5
3.5
10,900 11,000 0.5 0.5
10,000
10,500
8,100
10,800
9,000
10,700
10,500
8,100
11,500
8,400
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.4
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.7
* as defined by Bituminous Coal Act of 1937
*excluding TX lignite
Source: Coal Week, September 4, 1978.
14.1
11.5
10.8
15.4
14.2
19.4
12.7
11.7
10.9
17.8
13.0
13.5
23.00
22.50
21.50
16.00
24.00
17.50
20.00
20.50
19.25
15.00
22.00
16.00
9.5 9.2 17.75 17.25
15.2
8.5
6.0
11.0
7.3
8.6
8.5
6.0
10.4
10.9
17.25
16.75
7.00
18.00
9.50
16.75
15.75
6.50
17.75
9.00
Term Spot
$21.75
21.25
21.50
23.00
24.75
AJ,
Spot
t 0.25
- - 22.50
- - 20.75
- - 18.00
- - 17.0W
- - 12.00
- - 22.75
- - 18.25
18.00
- ' - 17.50 -
- - 16.00 -
- - 8.00 -
- - 19.00 -
- - 8.75 -
tprices adjusted bi-weekly as warranted
00
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Table 8-c
CURRENT CONTRACT AND SPOT MARKER STEAM COAL PRICES
Producing
Districts*
(1)Central PA
(2) Western PA
(3) Northern WV
(4) OH
(7) Southeastern WV
& parts of VA
(8) Southern WV,
eastern KY,
northern TN &
parts ofVA
(9) Western KY
(10) IL
(11)IN
(12) IA
(13) AL & southern TN
(15) KS. MO &
parts ofOK**
(16) Northern CO
(16) & (17) CO &
northeastern NM
(18) Parts ofNM& AZ
(19)WY
(20)UT
(22)MT
Btu/lb. Sulfur%
12,M30)
12,500
12,500
12.800
12,300
13,000
11,200
11,800
12,500
12,000
12,200
13,000
11,000
12,000
10,500
11,700
10,500
11,300
9,500
12,000
12,500
11,500
12,000
10,700
11,600
10.000
10,500
8,100
11,500
8,600
9,300
2.0
1.0
3.0
2.5
3.0
2.5
3.4
3.0
1.5
0.7
1.6
0.7
3.6
0.9
3.5
2.5
3.0
2.5
4.0
1.6
0.75
3.5
2.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.4
FOB Mines $/t
Ash% Term Adj.it
*as defined by Bituminous Coal Act of 1937
**excluding Texas lignite
07f,".
At
'.1-1
6Y3
1.v
?i Ct'
f.I
,- L
api
SDot Adj.t
28.00
22.00
26.00
22.00
27.50
21.50
24.00
24.00
26.75
23.00
29.50
tprices adjusted bi-weckly as warranted
Source: Coal Week, March 26, 1979.'
co
(Cf)
13.0
10.0
15.0
9.0
13.0
9.0
15.0
11.0
12.0
10.0
13.0
9.0
14.2
11.0
13.0
8.5
12.0
9.0
15.0
13.1
10.0
11.0
10.0
9.1
9.0
10.5
8.5
6.0
9.0
8.0
6.0
$23.50
29.00
23.00
27.00
23.00
28.50
22.50
25.50
26.75
30.50
26.25
33.25
22.00
28.25
21.00
27.50
20.00
26.50
S17.00
26.00
29.50
17.00
24.00
17.50
19.00
16.00
16.50
6.75
19.75
8.50
9.75
19.25
26.75
18.50
25.00
17.75
24.00
15.75
21.75
27.00
16.00
23.00
16.75
18.00
15.00
15.50
6.25
19.00
8.00
8.75
Key to price table
Coal Week's current marker
coal prices are derived from
confidential discussions with
buyers, sellers, traders and bro-
kers for coal of the marker's
specifications. "Marker" prices
reflect state-of-trade and don't
necessarily represent actual
transactions. Prices are up-
d ated bi-weckly, as warranted.
Quality specifications are con-
stant, so that price trends may
be plotted. Specifications are
derived from market sources
and represent coals of current
~ interest. In some cases, a pro-
ducing region is sending both a
low- and a high-quality coal
into the market. Coal Week's
prices reflect that situation.
Spot prices relate to theoretical
deliveries that span one year or
less time.
Users of this data are reminded
that coal prices vary with
quality differences. Deviations
from the marker coal's specs
for heat value, sulfur and ash
content should be considered
when comparisons are made
with coals of personal interest.
Table 8-d
CURRENT CONTRACT AND SPOT MARKER STEAM COAL PRICES
roducing
Districts*
FOB Mines $/t
Btu/lb. Sulfur% Ash% Term Adj.t
(1) Central PA
(2) Western PA
(3) Northern WV
(4) 11
(7) Southeastern WV
& parts ofVA
(8) Southern WV,
eastern KY,
northern TN &
parts of VA
(9) Western KY
(10) IL
(11) IN
(12) IA
(13) AL & southern TN
(15) KS, MO &
parts of O K**
(16) Northern CO
(16)& (17) CO &
northeastern NM
(18) Parts of NM & AZ
(19)WY
(20)UT
(22) MT
12,3()
12,500
12,500
1 2,80()
12,300
13,000
11,200
11,800
12,500
12,000
12,200
13.000
11,000
12,000
10,500
11,700
10,500
11,300
9.500
12,00
12,500
11,500
12,000
10,700
11,600
10,000
10,5(X)
8,100
11,500
8,600
9,300
2.0
1.0
A3.0
2.5
3.0
2.5
3.4
3.0
1.5
0.7
1.6
0.7
3.6
0.9
3.5
2.5
3.0
2.5
4.0
1.6
0.75
3.5
2.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.4
13.0
10.0
15.0
9.0
13.0
9.0
15.0
11.0
12.0
10.0
13.0
9.0
14.2
11.0
13.0
8.5
12.0
9.0
15.0
13.1
10.0
11.0
10.0
9.1
9.0
10.5
8.5
6.0
9.0
8.0
6.0
*as defined by Bituminous Coal Act of 1937
**excluding Texas lignite
$23.50)
29.00
23.(X
27.00
23.01
28.50
22.50
25.50
26.75
31.50
25.00
35.25
22.00
28.25
21.00
27.50
20.00
26.50
17.00
26.00
31.00
17.00
24.00
17.50
19.00
16.00
16.50
6.75
19.75
8.50
9.75
Srot Adj.t
$22.00
27.25
21.50
26.00
21.25
27.50
21.00
24.00
22.50
27.00
21.75
31.00
19.25
26.75
18.50
25.00
17.75
24.00
15.75
21.75
28.00
16.00
23.00
16.75
18.00
15.00
15.50
6.25
19.00
8.00
8.75
tprices adjusted bi-weekly as warranted
Source: Coal Week, September 10, 1979.
Key to price table
Coal Week's current m arker
coal prices are derived from
coil ldni hal discussions wvith
buyers, sellers, traders and bro-
kers for coal of the marker's
specifications. "Marker" prices
reflect state-of-trade and don't
necessarily represent actual
transactions. Prices are up-
dated bi-weekly, as warranted.
Quality specifications are con-
stant, so that price trends may
be plotted. Specifications are
derived from market sources
and represent coals of current
interest. In some cases, a pro-
ducing region is sending both a
low- and- a high-quality coal
into the market. Coal Week's
prices rellect that situation.
Spot prices relate to theoretical
deliveries that span one year or
less time.
Users of this data are reminded
that coal prices vary with
quality differenccs. Deviations
from the marker coal's specs
for heat value, sulfur and ash
content should be considered
when comparisons are made
with coals of personal interest.
Table 8-e
CURRENT CONTRACT AND SPOT MARKER STEAM COAL PRICES
Producing
Districts*
(1) Central PA
(2) Western PA
(3) Northern WV
(4) 0H
(7) Southeastern WV
& parts of VA
(8) Southern WV
eastern KY,
northern TN &
parts of VA
(9) Western KY
(10) IL
(I1) IN
(12) IA
(13) Al. & southern TN
(15) KS, MO &
parts of OK**
(16) Northern CO
(16) & (17) CO &
northeastern NM
(18) Parts of NM & AZ
(19) WY
(20) UT
(22) MT
FOB Mines $/t
Btu/lb. Sulfur% Ash% Term Adj.t Spot
12,30()
12,5(X)
12,500
12,800
12,3(0)
13,000
11,200
11,8))
12,5(K)
12,000
12,200
13,000
11,0)
12,000
10,5 (X)
11,700
10.5(X)
11,300
9,500
12,000
12,5(K)
11,5(0)
12,0(0)
10,700
11,600
10,00)0
.10,500
8,1 ()
11,5(0)
8,600
9,300
2.0
1.0
3.0
2.5
3.0
2.5
3.4
3.0
1.5
0.7
1.6
0.7
3.6
0.9
3.5
2.5
3.0
2.5
4.0
1.6
0.75
3.5
2.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.4
,as dclincd by Bituminous Coal Act or 1937
**excluding Texas lignite
13.0
1 ). )
15.0
9.0
13.0
9.0
15.0
11.0
12.0
10.0
13.0
9.0
14.2
11.0
13.0
8.5
12.0
9.0
15.0
13.1
10. )
11.0
10.0
9.1
9.0
10.5
8.5
6.0
9.0
8.0
6.0
$23.50
29.00
23.00
27.00
23.00
28.50
22.50
25.50
26.75
31.50
25.00
35.25
22.00
28.25
21.00
27.50
20.00
26.50
17.(K)
26.00
31.00
17.00
24.00
17.50
19.00
16.00
16.50
6.75
19.75
8.50
9.75
Adj.t
$21.00
27.25
20.00
25.00
20.00
27.00
21.00
24.00
22.50
27.00
21.75
31.00
19.25
26.75
18.50
25.00
17.75
24.00
15.75
21.75
28.00
16.00
23.0()
16.00
17.00
15.00
15.50
6.25
18.00
8.00
8.75
t prices adjusted bi-wcckly as warrantcd
Source: Coal Week, January 21, 1980.
co
Key to price table
(oal' Week's current marker
coal prices are derived f rom
con fidential discussions with
buyers, sellers, traders and
brokers for coal of the marker's
specifications. "Marker" prices
reflect state-of-trade and don't
necessarily represent actual
transactions. prices are up-
dated bi-weekly, as warranted.
Quality specifications are con-
stant, so that price trends may
be plotted. Specif'ications are
derived from market sources
and represent coals of current
interest. In some cases, a pro-
ducing region is sending both a
low- and a high-quality coal
into tlie market. Coal i1'eA's
prices reflect that sitnation.
Spot prices relate to theoretical
deliveries that span one year or
less tiime.
Users of this data are reminded
that coal prices vary with
quality differences. Deviations
from the marker coal's specs
for heat value, sulfur and ash
content should be considered
when comparisons are made
with coals of personal interest.
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Virginia cost $1.18 per million Btu. The price of low-sulfur coal
(0.75 percent) in Alabama was also $1.18 per Btu.
In the West, Price coal (districts 20, 10, 17) ranged in price from
82 cents to 86 cents per million Btu for 'sulfur levels of 0.5 percent to
0.6 percent. Gallup (District 18) coal was close in quality and price at
80 cents and 0.5 percent sulfur. Rocksprings bituminous coal was in the
same range at 79 cents and 0.6 percent sulfur.
The subbituminous coal in the Powder River basin ranged in price
from 42 cents to 52 cents per million Btu. Coal Week reports showed
Wyoming coal at the low end of the range relative to the nore expensive
Montana coal.
These prices reflect domestic market conditions, which nay not be in
line with international market conditions. A ccnparison with the Coal
Week "current international spot steam prices" will clarify the
relationship between current spot export prices and domestic long-term
prices.
Table 9 presents spot coal prices FOB piers (per metric ton) in
Mobile, Baltimore and Hampton Roads. Since late 1978, Hampton Roads
prices have been close to $38 per metric ton, FOB pier; for coal that has
12,500 Btu per lb, approximately 1 percent sulfur, and 13 percent ash
content. This equals approximately $1.38 per million Btu. Compare this
to the Central Pennsylvania FOB mine price in March 1979, for 12,500
Btu/lb, 1 percent sulfur, 10 percent ash coal. The FOB mine price was
reported as $1.16 per million Btu. Transportation from Central
Pennsylvania at that time was approximately $11 .00 per short ton, or 44
cents per million
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Btu. The total delivered price would be $1.60 per million Btu. Adding a
small dumping fee and possible preparation costs might yield an expected
cost of $1.64 per million Btus. This suggests that spot export prices
are significantly lower than domestic prices. Given the current minimal
role of U.S. exports, and the slack eastern coal markets, this is not a
surprising result.
For Baltimore, the calculation yields the same conclusions. For
Mobile, the price was approximately 334 FOB pier per metric ton ($1.29
per million Btu). Coal quality at the pier was reported as 11,200
Btu/ib., less than 1.0 percent sulfur, and 11.0 percent ash. From
Western Kentucky, the FOB mine price was approximately $1.18 per million
Btu, and transportation costs were approximately .45 cents per million
Btu. The total delivered price would be $1.63 per million Btu. From
Alabama, coal would be priced at $1.24 FOB mine, and transportation at
3.28 per million Btu. The total, $1.52 per million Btu, is still well
above the spot export rate of $1.29 per million Btu.
South African coal prices can be specified with greater accuracy,
since the exporters associations set a price FOB pier for all steam coal
exports. In 1979, the price set was Rand 21.08 per metric ton. The
typical coal quality FOB pier is reported as 11,300 Btu/lb., 1.0 percent
sulfur and 15.0 percent ash. Based on the 1979 average exchange rate,
49this equals approximately US 325.30 per metric ton.
We can add some meaning to this price by looking at transportation
costs, and the government controlled pithead prices for domestic
consunption. In 1979, railroad rates average about 5 Rand per metric ton
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Table 9
INTERNATIONAL SPOT STEAM COAL PRICES
(U.S. dollars per metric ton FOB export pier)
Date
3/9/77
Hanpton Roads
12,000 Btu
per lb.
12% ash,
<1% sulfur
131 .50/ton
6/6/77 31.50
7/20/77 35.00
8/1/77 35.00
9/26/77 35.50
1/9/78 37.50
2/6/78 37.50
3/20/78 42.50
4/17/78 43.00
5/29/78 43.00
6/22/78 40.75
11/13/78 12,500 Btu/
lb., 11.0%
ash, 1.5%
sulfur,
39.00
2/12/79 12,000 Btu/
lb., 13% ash
<1% sulfur
33.00
United States
Bal timore
11,500 Btu
per lb.
20% ash,
2.0% sulfur
$21 .00/ton
25.00
25.00
30.00
30.50
12,000 Btu/
lb., 14.5%
ash, 1.5%
sulfur, 29.00
29.00
39.25
39.75
39.75
34.00
33.50
Mobile
12,200 Btu
per lb.
14.0% ash,
1.25% sulfur
329.00/ton
29.00
29.00
29.00
30.00
30.00
30.00
38.00
38.50
38.50
35.00
34.75
South Africa
Richards Bay
11,300 Btu
per lb.
15% ash,,
<1% sulfur
$19. 00/ton
19.00
19.00
22.00
19.25
19.25
20.50
20.50
20.50
20.50
20.50
20.50
Australia
Port Kembla/
Newcastle
10,800 Btu
per lb.
17.0% ash,
<1% sulfur
125. 00/ton
25.00
25.00
25.00
25.00
25.00
12,000 Btu
/ lb.,5
15.0% ash,
<1 .0%
sulfur,
26.75
20.75
20.75
30.50
30.50
30.50
33.00 34.50 20.50 30.50
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Table 9 (Continued)
INTERNATIONAL SPOT STEAM COAL PRICES (per metric ton)
United States
Hanpton Roads
2/26/79 33.00
Bal timore
33.00
Mobile
11,200 Btu
11.0% ash,
<1% sulfur
32.00
South Africa
Richards Bay
20.50
Australia
Port Kembla/
Newcastle
30.50
6/18/79 12,500 Btu/
lb., 11.0%
ash, 1.25%
sulfur
38.50
7/16/79 12,000 Btu/
lb., 13.0%
ash, <1%
sul fur
37.00
10/8/79 37.00
1/7/80
38.00
12,500 Btu/
lb., 12.0%
ash, 1%
su 1 fur
38.50
38.50
38.50
12,500 Btu/
lb., 12.0%
ash, 1%
sul fur
39.50
32.00
32.00
32.00
33.00
20.50
20.50
24.50
a. 11,300 Btu/
lb., 15%
ash, 1.0%
sulfur
24.50
b. 11,000 Btu/
lb., 15.5%
ash, 1%
sul fur
28.00
30.50
30.50
32.75
a. 12,000 Btu/
lb., 13.0%
ash, < 1.0%
sulfur
32.75
b. 11,400 Btu/
lb., 15.5%
ash, 1.0%
sulfur
26.50
12,000 Btu/
lb., 13.0%
ash, 1.2%
sulfur
40.50 39.50 33.00 a. 26.50
b. 11,000 Btu/
lb., 13%
ash, 1.5%
sul fur
35.25 b. 28.00 b. 27.00
Prices," various
Date
2/4/80 a.
a. 32.75
Source: Coal Week, "Current International Spot Steam Coal
issues.
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or U.S. 56.00 per metric ton. Loading charges are in the vicinity of
$1.50 per metric ton. This suggests a price FOB mine of approximately
$17.80 per metric ton.
The FOB local price for Grade A coal in 1979 was $9.02. Clearly,
even allowing for substantial benefication costs, prices to the coal
companies on exports far exceed domestic prices. Either exporters are
realizing significant rents, or domestic prices are set below the
incremental mine's production costs.50
For Australia and Canada, available price data are even less
satisfactory than for the United States. In both cases only sparse
observations can be made.
First, consider Australia. Coal Week reports spot prices to
Port/Kembla or Newcastle since 1977. (See Table 8.) For coal with
12,000 Btu/lb., less than 1.0 percent sulfur, and 13 percent to
15 percent ash, spot prices have increased from 525 per metric ton ($.95
per million Btu) in late 1977 and early 1978, to $30 in mid 1978
($1.14 per million Btu) to $32.75 ($1.24 per million Btu) in early 1980.
Does this make sense? Unfortunately, we have little data to cross-
check this with. Depending on the origin and mode of transportation,
transport charges could range from $2 to $10 per ton. We will
tentatively assume an origin in the Singleton-Northwest district,
approximately 100 km from port (see Appendix A). The transportation
charge would be approximately 35.65 per metric ton. Adding a $1 state
royalty, and say, $1.50 per ton loading charge, we expect the FOB mine
price, for a FOB pier price of 525, to be $16.85. At FOB pier $32.75,
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the FOB mine price would therefore be approximately $24.60.51 Again
however, we do not know whether the producing mine is open-cut or
underground, so only very tentative conclusions can be formed.
A literature survey and contacts with Japanese utilities added
clarity to this picture. In mid-1979, contracts were being signed with
Australian producers for approximately $30 per ton CIF Japan. As an
example, a Japanese utility contracted 200,000 tons per year of low-
sulfur coal (.65 percent), with a heating value of 24.2 million Btu per
metric ton. The contract is scheduled to begin in 1981 and continue
through 1983 at $30/ton, CIF Japan, subject to escalation. The producing
mine is Lithgow Valley, which is 158 km from Sydney and 237 km from Port
Kembla. The 1979 rail freight to Sydney is $6.58 (Aust $), or
U.S. $7.41.52 The open-cut production in this area is negligible, so
we assume an underground mine.
Ocean freight charges are approximately $7 per metric ton. The
state royal ty is $1 per ton. Subtracting these costs alone yields an
estimate (FOB mine) of $14.58 per ton or 60 cents per million Btu. This
is certainly more consistent with the $25.00 FOB pier price than with the
$30.00 FOB pier price.
These observations lead us to question the currently high spot
prices. The industry consensus is that the spot market in Australia is
very tight in recent months since most production, even through 1985, has
been contracted out. Whether $30 CIF Japan is a reasonable long run
approximation, or whether $30 FOB Australia is an accurate approximation
is very difficult to say in the early market stages.
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In the case of Canada, information is even more limited. This is
not surprising, given the fact that negligible quantities of steam coal
are currently exported. Coal Week's series does not even include
Canadian price data. Industry sources estimate FOB pier prices at $25 to
$30 per short ton.5 3 Rail rates are approximately $13 per short
ton. Adjusting for dumping charges, the FOB mine estimate would be
fairly close to Montana coal. In fact, given mining conditions and coal
quality similarities between the two areas, it is reasonable to assume
that production costs in Southern British Columbia and Southwestern
Alberta will be equal to production costs in Utah, and that Alberta
plains production costs will be equal to Powder River Basin production
costs.
LONG-RUN CHANGES IN COAL SUPPLY
There are a number of factors that may significantly affect coal
prices in the future. In this section we will briefly discuss some of
the more important ones: 1) the effect of depletion on production costs
as output cumulates; 2) changes in labor and capital costs; 3) changes
in the competitive structure of international coal markets; 4) changes in
governmental policy.
Depletion
First, consider depletion. As noted earlier, as coal output
cumulates producers are forced to move to less favorable mines to satisfy
the incremental coal demand. The extent to which the geological
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conditions at the incremental mine change as output cumulates determines
the change in production costs, and therefore the change in coal prices
in conpetitive markets.
Martin Zimmerman has modelled this supply phenomenon for the United
States. 5 4 Basically, he estimates a cost function based on an
engineering model of coal production that explicitly accounts for the
impact of geology on the cost of production. He then estimates the
distribution of coal in the ground according to geologic conditions (seam
thickness, overburden ratio, and other factors). The cost function is
combined with the reserve distribution to yield cost as a function of
cumulative output.
Table 10 summarizes Zimerman's results. For each producing
district, and for three different sulphur categories the table shows the
effect of depletion as output increases from 1975 levels by 5 times and
20 times.
For low-sulfur coal, the effect of depletion of reserves west of the
Mississippi is very small. Powder River Basin coal production costs per
short ton increase by only 27 cents (1977 $) if production stays at 42.37
million short tons for twenty years. In percentage terms, other Western
regions are equally unaffected by depletion.
In the Appalachian districts depletion is far more significant for
low sulfur coal. In southern Appalachia, which is subdivided into
Birmingham and Lynch in this study, coal supply prices will increase by
33 percent, from $36.44 per short ton to $48.45 per short ton, if
cumulative production is increased by a factor of twenty. In northern
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Table 10
THE EFFECTS OF DEPLETION ON U.S. COAL PRICES
APRIL 27, 1978 SIMULATION: BASE CASE'
(million short tons)
1975.
Low Sulfur Prod.
(0 - .84%) Vol.
N. App. 1 7.678
S. App. 2 117.452
Midwest 3 na
Powder
River Basin 4 42.373
Utah, Col. 5 16.195
Ariz, N.M. 6 14.755
Medium Sulfur
(.85 - 1.84%)
1 45.892
2 87.381
3 10.717
4 3.485
High Sulfur
(1.85 - 9.00%)
1 124.998
2 13.074
3 130.019
1975
Prod.
Vol.
*5
38.39
587.26
na
211.865
80.975
73.775
229.46
436.905
53.585
17.425
624.99
65.37
650.095
1975
Prod.
Vol.
*20
153.56
2349.04
Prices
1 Year
35.93
36.44
per short ton in:
($ 1977)
5 Years 20 Years
36.97 39.96
38.03 48.45
na
847.46
3239
245.1
917.84
1747.62
214 34
69.7
2499.96
261.48
2600.38
7.72
18.43
12.38
28.78
29.65
24.10
7.71
22.67
23.33
24.20
7.78
18.69
12.54
30.07
30.85
25.25
7.71
23.21
24.19
24.94
7.79
19.45
13.24
34.46
37.46
27.89
7.72
27.39
30.04
25.91
Notes: 1. Includes state tax revisions.
2. na = not applicable.
Source: Zimmerman, M.B. Coal Supply Model, unpublished documentation.
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Appalachia, prices should increase from 335.93 to 539.96 per short ton.
The estimated percent increases in cost over 50 years at current rates of
output is 98 percent in southern Appalachia, yielding a real price of
$72.15.
Relative to the effects of depletion in other regions of the
country, Zimmerman postulates that low-sulfur Appalachian coal,
particularly southern Appalachian coal, will soon be priced out of other
than domestic and export metallurgical markets.
For medium-sulfur coal (.85 percent to 1.84 percent), the West is
again largely unaffected by depletion. The Midwest region is less
elastic; prices would increase by 16 percent with 20 years of current
output. Again, both Appalachian regions are most heavily affected. In
southern Appalachia prices would increase by 26 percent, versus
20 percent in northern Appalachia.
For high-sulfur coal, the supply curve in the Midwest is highly
elastic. A price rise of 7 percent would suffice to bring forth 20 years
of production at current output rates. The effect of depletion in the
Appalachian regions for high-sulfur coal is approximately equal to the
medium-sulfur case.
To conclude, depletion is a relatively unimportant economic variable
in the United States for the West, and for Midwest high-sulfur and
medium-sulfur coal. For the Appalachian regions, however, depletion may
have a significant effect on coal prices, especially low-sulphur coal
prices. The ultimate importance of these possible changes in price will
be analyzed below.
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Phil Ellis has attempted to apply Zimmerman's methodology to South
African coal.55 The method was modified to accommodate data
available for South Africa, but the general approach is similar. As in
the western United States, depletion is of minor importance. Based on an
annual production scenario, which starts at 32.76 MT in 1975 and
increases to 85.80 MT in 2000, depletion costs for high-grade coal in
$1975 per metric ton increase from 30 cents in 1980 to 69 cents in 1985
(57.40 MT) to $1.15 in 1990 (60.90 MT) to $1.69 in 1995 (72.30 MT) to
12.38 per metric ton in 2000 (85.80 MT). In Zimmerman's terms this means
that production could continue at current rates for at least 50 years and
costs in $1975 would only increase by 32.38 per ton or 10 cents per
million Btu.
Time and data constraints did not allow for a similar analysis of
the effects of depletion in Canada and Australia. Most importantly, seam
thickness and overburden ratio data are not adequate to duplicate these
calculations. Fran the large reserve estimates, we can tentatively
conclude that depletion is equally unimportant in these countries, but
further research is certainly warranted.
Capital and Labor Price Increases
The second factor that may significantly affect coal prices in the
future is factor price increases. It is not the purpose of this study to
project real increases in capital and labor costs over time. However,
some general comments, and one particularly important shift, should be
noted.
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Specifically, capital and labor costs have been increasing rapidly
in coal production. The most important factor in the United States has
been increasing wages and decreasing productivity as a function of
changes in the United Mine Workers contracts. The 1978 contract calls
for wage increases of 23.5 percent in 1978, 4.8 percent in 1979 and
4.6 percent in 1980. Assuming inflation at 5.5 percent per year, this
implies an average annual real increase of 5.6 percent. 56
Real capital costs have also been increasing. Zimmerman shows that
from 1971 to 1978, the annual rate of increase in the mining machinery
index is 11.9 percent, versus 6.8 percent for the GNP deflator.57
In absolute terms, however, these increases are not likely to affect
critically coal markets. What is more important are relative shifts in
capital and labor costs, and the corresponding shifts in market
patterns. Both Australia and Canada have suffered through labor and
capital cost increases similar to those in the United States, so for this
set of suppliers, the shifts are not likely to be critical in the long
run. South Africa, on the other hand, is far more unstable in this
respect. Given their position on apartheid and the world response to it,
significant changes beyond those experienced in the other supplying
countries may well take place.
Ellis has thoroughly analyzed these potential changes. While he
concludes that the costs associated with depletion will not seriously
threaten the competitive advantage of South African coal in this century,
labor and capital costs changes may well threaten this advantage.
The main basis for this conclusion is black wages. In 1977, the
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white South African miner earned $12,305 on average, versus $1,490 for
his black counterpart. As dramatic as this difference appears, black
wages have increased since 1970 by much higher rates than white wages.
In 1974 whites earned $8,273 (nominal ) and blacks earned $596.00. The
rates have been higher, but the difference is still enormous. Since
90 percent of coal miners are black, aggregate wage levels have increased
by approximately 12 percent real per year.58 The implications of
this shift for the campetitiveness of South African coal in the future
are cons iderable .
South African producers will attempt to mitigate the effect of
increased labor costs by using more capital intensive mining methods,
particularly in the form of increased surface-mining. However, this will
not fully offset the effect of increased labor costs. Ellis has shown
that increased capital-intensity is in fact not keeping pace with
increased labor costs. Also, he notes that a shift to strip-mining will
magnify the effect of depletion costs in South Africa. Capital costs are
also likely to increase rapidly. International hostility towards South
African policies has been reflected in a decline in the availability of
foreign capital. Consequently, shifts to capital-intensity may be
limited.
Ellis calculates the effect of these possible factor price changes on
South African coal prices. In his "most likely scenario," where capital
costs are assumed to increase 5 percent per year (real), and labor costs
15 percent per year, the advantage of South African coal over U.S. East
Coast coal deteriorates by 1990. The South African FOB pier price would
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increase from $22.00 per ton in 1978 to $63.32 in 1990 (in 1978$).
Assuming constant real shipping costs, this means that U.S. coal could
increase by 4.9 percent per year to $67.00 FOB pier (from $38.00) and be
competitive. Based on [RI's real cost increase forecasts, the 1990 U.S.
price would be aproximately $68.36, or very closely competitive with
South African coal 59
Competitive Structure
The third issue to consider is the possibility of changes in the
couipetitive structure of international steam coal markets. Very little
can be said given the fact that markets are currently underdeveloped.
Nonetheless, some general comments can be made.
First, based on the existing market structures in the four
countries, the extent of competition is unclear. In the United States,
domestic markets are reasonably competitive, and there is no reason to
believe that exporters will not be similarly competitive. The existing
market structures in Canada and Australia similarly suggest a reasonably
competitive environment.
In South Africa, the extent of competition is less clear. Certainly
the structure for realizing rents exists in the export associations.
Whether rents themselves are available, and if they are, whether they
will continue to be available will be discussed in Chapter II.
Independent of the competitive structure within each country, inter-
country competition among these four nations for Western European and
Japanese markets should curtail economic rents. The actual extent of
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international canpetition relative to certain markets will be discussed
below. However, one possibility that is frequently mentioned is
collusion between exporting nations in the form of a coal cartel similar
to OPEC. It is unlikely that the coal companies themselves would collude
to control output and prices. There are simply too many canpanies, and
in the United States antitrust policies would hinder this practice.
However, as in the case of OPEC, there is a possibility that the various
national governments would collude. The Australian and South African
governments already have significant control over prices and export
quantities. They could easily appropriate monopoly rents. The United
States government could implement a tariff policy to curtail output and
increase prices. It is unlikely that they would do so given their
commitment to Western Europe and Japan, but the possibility of an
international coal cartel should not be overlooked.
Government Policies
The fourth factor that may significantly affect coal prices in the
future is government policy. There are several government policies that
may affect the supply side of international steam coal markets. All of
60
these issues have been given treatment elsewhere. Nonetheless, a
few brief qualitative comments should be made. A more detailed
quantitative analysis of these issues would be a useful future subject
for research.
First, a variety of environmental policies affect the recovery
factor for coal mines in all the countries considered. Strip-mining
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regulations, surface subsistence regulations, acid mine drainage
regulations, federal leasing limitations, and waste disposal requirements
are major examples of such policies. All of the countries cited are
regulated in these areas. The costs of compliance and the specifics of
the written regulations vary both across countries and within countries.
With some exceptions, such as strip-mining of hilly slopes in Appalachia,
costs of compliance are a small factor in total production costs. 6 1
It is possible, however, that regulations could tighten worldwide as
production levels expand and that the economic implications of this
tightening would be far greater.
Other policies may affect the supply side economics in different
ways. In Australia, the western United States, Alberta, and British
Columbia, state governments have in the past implemented state taxes on
production. This situation is most dramatic in the western United States
where, in an effort to obtain rents, Montana and Wyoming have enacted
taxes of 35 percent and 18 percent per short ton FOB mine, respectively.
Whether or not this practice would carry over to export shipments is
unclear.62 In Australia, state royalties on exports have in the past
existed, but are currently applicable only to metallurgical coal. In
Canada, most properties are owned by the states, and a complicated system
of land rental fees, leasing charges, and royalty rates exist. The
ability of state governments to realize rents in future international
coal markets through these schemes must not be overlooked.
Other possible government actions of this type are price controls or
monitoring, or export quotas. In Alberta, the state government enacted a
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coal policy in 1975 that is alleged by industry officials to seriously
hamper the competitive position of Canadian coal. 63 This is not
surprising in that Albertas's oil and gas industries, from which far
greater royalties are realized, are effectively sealed from coal
conpetition. A combination of limits on exploration and development,
hesitancy to approve new projects, and the authority to redetermine
export prices every two years is perceived as a real constraint on
Alberta's exports. A shift to British Columbia, where policies are more
responsive to coal mining interests, is foreseen.
In Australia, the Federal government also has the authority to set
prices, but has to date not done so. The only significant step that the
Australian government has taken to date is to enforce 50 percent domestic
ownership in all energy projects. Exceptions have, however, been qranted.
Only South Africa currently controls export quantities. The export
quota is planned to increase to 44 MT by 1985.64 Beyond that time it
is difficult to project South Africa's actions. Currently there is a
heated internal debate about the optimal use of South Africa's reserves.
Specifically, there is a real concern about ensuring domestic needs as
the socio-economic pressures from external energy suppliers increase.
The Petrick Commission report magnified this concern by placing a limit,
albeit high, on South African coal reserves. It is not inconceivable
that South Africa will eventually abandon exports, and use coal to
support its isolation. This is possible since a large share of their
lignite fuel requirements could in fact be met by the "Sasol" coal
conversion process.
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It is unlikely that other countries will similarly constrain
exports. Nonetheless, a more real concern is that in a period of
short--term energy supply disruptions, exports to foreign countries would
be curtailed. With respect to short-run OPEC oil-supply disruptions, it
is unlikely that the United States would curtail coal exports since
short-run substitution possibilities of coal for oil are limited. With
respect to coal supply disruptions, it is conceivable that domestic
supply shortages could be met by curtailing planned export tonnages.
This is a concern that has been raised by potential importers. The role
of the government in mitigating this concern will be considered below.
To conclude, there are several conceivable ways in which government
policy could affect the supply-side development of international steam
coal markets. Most important, stricter environmental policies would
increase production costs, and the states and/or national governments
could restrict canpetition by enacting taxes or export quotas. Little
can be said about these possibilities, however, other than that they are
possible. The advisability of government manipulation of coal markets in
either direction will be further considered below.
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APPENDIX A
RESERVES; PRODUCTION: COUNTRY SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
This appendix presents a more detailed evaluation of coal production
and reserves in each country. Also included are descriptions of coal
characteristics, mine locations, proximity to ports, and market
structure. Our purposes are both to check and contribute to the
integration and price analysis, and to provide the reader with a more
detailed understanding of the respective national coal industries.
AJSTRAL IA
Australia is divided into six states (Queensland, New South Wales,
Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia), arid one
territory (Northern Territory). Each of the six states has coal
reserves, but approximately 92 percent of the black coal reserves are
located in Queensland and New South Wales. 1
New South Wales
New South Wales raw coal production was 50.5 million metric tons
(MT) in the 1978-79 fiscal year, up 24.5 percent from the 1975-76 fiscal
year. In 1977-78, total production amounted to 49.25 MT, 37.88 of which
was underground production, and 11.38 of which was open-cut (strip mined).
Saleable black coal in 1977-78 equaled 41.67 MT, approximately
56 percent of which was consumed domestically, and 44 percent
3
exported. . The domestic consumption was comprised primarily of iron
and steel (60 percent), and electric power generation (34 percent). Of
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the exports, 76 percent were used for metallurgical purposes, and
22 percent for electricity generation.
Total exports increased from 17.74 MT in 1977-78 to 19.44 MT in 1978-79.
The New South Wales state is divided into six mining districts:
South Maitland, Singleton-Northwest, Newcastle, West, Burragorang Valley,
and South Coast. Their recent production and reserves are summarized in
Tables A-1 and A-2. Also included are underground and open-cut mining
subdivisions. 4
Our concern is with the areas in New South Wales that currently play
or will play in the future an important role in steam coal export
markets. Coal characteristics, mining conditions, and proximity to port
facilities for each district should therefore be briefly considered.
Coal quality data are not complete. One source des cribes the
typical raw coal as having a heating value of 21 to 24 million Btu per
short ton, 12 percent to 20 percent ash content, 25 percent to 28 percent
volatile matter, and .4 percent to .7 percent sulfur content. 5
However, there are considerable variations in coal characteristics across
New South Wales, and these variations are not adequately specified in the
literature. Descriptions according to sean provide more detailed, though
still incomplete, information.
The largest steam coal producing district is Singleton-Northwest.
Its two major seams are Liddell and Bayswater. In Liddell, coal is
classified as highy volatile (more than 33 percent), low in ash (less
than 16 percent), and low in sulfur (less than .5 percent) coking coal.
In Bayswater (and Ravensworth) the coal is highly volatile, medium to
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Table A-1
NEW SOUTH WALES' RAW COAL PRODUCTION
(000's rretric tonnes)
District: 1975-76
South Maitland 1189
Singleton-N.W. 10713
Newcastle 11358
West 3523
Burragorany Valley 5202
South Coast 8605
TOTAL 40590
Underground 32214
Open-cut 8376
1977-78
1676
14023
13324
4128
5004
11099
49254
37875
11379
1978-79
1502
15406
12914
4322
5039
11334
50517
38205
12312
Change since
1975-76
126.4
143.8
113.7
122.7
-3.1
131.7
124.5
118.6
147.0
Source: Joint Coal Board, 32nd Annual Report, 1973-79, p. 4.
Table A-2
BLACK OAL RESERVES AND RESOURCES OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 1979(MILLION METRIC TONNES)
Region: Measured Plus Indicated Reserves Inferred Resources
In Situ Recoverable Marketable In Site Recoverable
Singleton- 13137 6876 4439 389996 184705
Northwest
South 345 238 192 429 172
Maitland
New Castle 4120 1740 1318 7728 3146
TOTAL 17602 8854 5949 398153 188023
Western 1390 941 727 35811 21247
South- 3251 1877 1423 6822 3882
Southwestern
Oaklands 500 450 450 10000 2000
Sydney - - - 39250 15700
TOTAL 22743 12122 8549 490036 230852
Board, 32nd Annual Report, 1978-79, p. 21.Source: Joint Coal
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high ash (more than 20 percent) steaming coal. In 1977-78, production
from Liddell equaled 3.68 MT versus 5.14 MT from Bayswater. The district
total was 12.33 MT. Saleable coal output was 11.31 MT; 5.74 MT were
consumed in domestic markets, and 5.57 MT were exported. Of the domestic
consumption, 5.6 MT were used in power generation. 6
Second in importance as a stean coal producing district is
Newcastle. This district covers several coking and steaming coal seams.
The Great Northern and Wallarah seams hold highly volatile, medium to
high ash, and very low-sulfur steaming coal. Production from the Great
Northern seam was 5.2 MT in 1977-78, versus 1.44 MT from the Wallarah
seam. Total district production was 12.06 MT in 1977-78, 11 .58 of which
was saleable output. Of this amount, 8.74 MT were consumed domestically,
and 2.0 MT were exported. The domestic production included 6.25 MT for
power generation.
The Western district's mjor seam is Lithgow. Coal in the seam is
classified as highy volatile, medium to high ash, and medium sulfur steam
coal. Production in 1977-78 from this seam was 3.33 MT of the district
total (4.13 MT). Saleable prouction was 3.69 MT, 2.0 MT of which was
exported, and 1.66 of which was consumed domestically. Of the domestic
consumption, 1.07 MT were for power generation.
The three other mining districts in New South Wales currently play a
minor role in both domestic and export stean coal markets.
South Maitland lies on the Greta seam, which holds very highly
volatile, low ash coal used in coking blends and in producing town gas in
Japan. Production in 1977-78 was 1.68 MT. Burragoramg Valley lies on the
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Bulli Seam, which primarily yields low volatile, medium ash, very low
sulfur coking coal. Production in 1977-78 was 5.0 MT. Saleable
production was 3.53 MT, 3.41 MT of which were exported. The distribution
between end-uses is not available. However, some coal in this district,
for example Wollondilly coal, though best suited to coking, may be used
for steam coal exports as coking coal export demand stabilizes or
declines.
The South Coast district's main seams are the Bulli Seam and the
Wangawilli Seam. Both have primarily yielded coking coal to date. In
1977-78, the district produced 8.82 MT of saleable coal; 5.7 MT for
domestic uses, and 3.1 MT for export. Of the 5.7 MT of domestic
consumption, only .39 MT were used for electric power generation.
Mining conditions also vary within and between mining districts.
Singleton-Northwest is the only major open-cut producer (10.2 MT
open-cut, 3.8 MT underground). Newcastle open-cut mining production was
1.1 MT (13.32 MT total) in 1977-78. Open-cut mining in the other
districts combined was only 60,000 tons.
Another important variable in Australia is the captivity of
production, that is, which mines are tied exclusively to particular
consumers, usually the iron and steel industry or public utilities. 7
In Singleton-Northwest, 5.6 MT of the 17.0 MT were captive to public
utilities. In Newcastle, 2.16 MT were captive to the steel industry,
4.83 MT to public utilities, and 6.34 MT were non-captive. In the
Western district .55 MT were captive to public utilities, .37 MT to the
iron and steel industry, and 3.21 MT were non-captive.
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Finally, we are concerned with the ports that serve the different
mining districts, and the corresponding distances. 8  Singleton-
Northwest uses the port of Newcastle almost exclusively (5.55 of
5.57 MT). Mileages to port vary depending on the originating mine, but
average approximately 100 kilometers (km). As examples of the larger
mines, Buchanan-Lemington is approximately 15 road km from MT. Thorley,
which is &5 rail kin from Newcastle. Ravensworth is approximately 108
rail km from port. Most coal, except that consumed on site, utilizes
rail service for at least part of the trip to port.
The Newcastle district also relies primarily on the port of
Newcastle (2.28 of 2.63 MT). Distances to port are very short, typically
less than 25 km. For example, the Bloomfield mine is approximately 10 km
from a rail siding, and 22 km from Newcastle. Wallsend is approximately
25 km from port. An outlier is Wayee, which is about 60 km from
Newcastle. Rail and road haulage currently share this market equally.
The Western district exports coal through both Port Kembla (1.13
MT), and Sydney (.9 MT). The distance from a representative point,
Lithgow Valley, is 158 km to Sydney, and 237 km to Port Kembla. Both
rail and road transport are used. The South coast district uses Port
Kembla (2.94 MT of 3.1 MT). To the north, Coalcliffe is 61 km from
Sydney, and 28 km from Port Kembla. All other coal fields are within 70
km of Port Kembla. Here also both train and rail are utilized.
Burragorang Val ley al so uses Port Kembla ( 2.03 MT) and Sydney (1. 3
MT). Distances to port vary according to transport modes. Wollondilly
to Port Kembla is 101 km by road. Glenlee, a central washery and rail
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station in the area, is 63 km fron Sydney, and 142 km from Port Kembla.
Currently rail and truck are equally utilized.
Lastly, let us consider future developments in New South Wales.
Table A-2 presents reserves in each district. Clearly, the most
important district in this respect is Singleton-Northwest. Newcastle
also have very large reserves, while the other districts have far lower
quantities. This is reflected in recent plans for mine development in
New South Wales. Major new underground mines are planned for the
Singleton-Northwest, Newcastle, and Western districts, while major new
strip-mines are being developed in Singleton-Northwest. 9
Queensland
Queensland's raw coal production was 37.25 MT in 1978-79, up
15 percent since the 1975-76 Fiscal year. In contrast to New South
Wales, 88 percent (32.83 MT) of the 1978-79 raw coal production was from
open-cut mines, and 12 percent (4.43 MT) from underground mines.10
Saleable black coal was 26.94 MT in 1978-79 and 24.95 MT in
1977-78. Of the 1978-79 total, 18.84 MT were exported to overseas
countries. Of the exports, 99 percent were coking coal. The 6.1 MT
consumed in the state were allocated mainly to electricity generation
(4.5 MT) and an alumina refinery (1.1 MT). Total exports in 1978-79
decreased by 1.28 MT from the previous fiscal year as coking coal markets
in Japan slackened.
Queensland is divided into 9 mining districts: West Moreton,
Darling Downs, Maryborough, Kianga-Moura, Callide, Blackwater, Blair
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Athol, Mackay, and Bowen. Recent production is summarized in Table A-3.
Also included are underground and open-cut mining subdivisions.
Again, we are interested in the districts that may play an important
role in steam coal export markets. Coal characteristics, mining
conditions, and proximity to port facilities should be described for each
district.
Coal quality data are more complete for Queensland than for New
South Wales, if still not perfect. A district by district evaluation of
developed mines is possible. 11
In Northern Queensland, the Bowen district includes four mines at
Collinsville, 86 rail km southwest of the port of Bowen. The two
underground mines produced .4 MT of raw coal; the two open-cut mines
produced .4 MT also. Two seams, Bowen and Blake, are included in the
area. The Blake seam coal is high ash (19.4 percent), low sulfur
(.45 percent) steaming coal with a heating value of 23.2 million Btu per
short ton. The Bowen seam coal is a medium volatile coking coal with
sulfur content from 1 percent to 3 percent in underground mines, and from
.5 to 1.0 percent in open-cut mines. Exports in 1978-79 were only 10,202
tons, all of which were used for power generation.
In Central Queensland, the Blair Athol district includes on large
open-cut mine. The mine is approximately 490 rail km from the port of
Gladstone. The seam averages 26 meters, with an overburden ratio of
1.3:1. Production in 1978-79 was 113,331 metric ton. The coal is a
medium-volatile steam coal with sulfur content of .3 percent, ash content
of 8.2 percent, and heating value of approximately 23 million Btu per
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Table A-3
QUEENSLAND SALEABLE COAL PRODUCTION1
(Metric Tons)
District Underground Open-cut Total Total
Mines Mines 1978-1979 1977-1978
West Moreton 1442692 779044 221736 2641514
Darling Downs 7494 -- 7494 7659
Maryborough 42870 -- 42870 40944
Kianga-Moura 403877 2081767 2485644 2269793
Callide -- 1906620 1906620 1530097
Blackwater 580739 5400858 5981597 4744123
Blair Athol -- 113331 113331 147148
Mackay 201766 13147942 13349708 12657973
Bowen 414575 415739 830314 913643
TOTAL 3094013 23845301 26939314 24952894
Notes: 1. Saleable coal production has been defined as the tonnage of coal
dispatched to market plus or minus the change in coal stocks over
the period, actual stocks being adjusted to a saleable basis.
Raw coal production is the amount extracted from coal seams, the
measurement being made prior to treatment in a coal washery.
Queensland total raw coal producton in 1978-79 was 37.7 MT.
Source: Queensland Coal Board, 28th Annual Report, June 30, 1979. pg. 12.
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short ton. Steixn coal exports in 1978-79 were only 5,736 tons.
Also in central Queensland is the Kianga-Moura District, which
includes three underground and two open-cut mines. Production in 1978-79
equaled .53 MT from the underground mines, and 3.1 MT from the open-cut
mines. Moura is approximately 177 km southwest of Gladstone. Kianga is
16 km south of Moura. Kianga coal is high volatile, weak to medium
coking coal with low ash and sulfur content. A higher ash non-coking
coal is also produced. Specific heating values are not available. The
Bowen Basin range is 23 to 27 million Btu per short ton. Exports in
1978-79 were 2.25 MT, including 100,000 metric tons of steaming coal.
The Callide District is also in Central Queensland, approximately
163 km by rail from Gladstone. All the production (1.9 MT) was from
open-cut mines, and exports were negligible. The coal is a subbituminous
steaming coal with 15 percent ash, .2 percent sulfur, and 19.4 million
Btu per short ton. Local consumers are power stations and an alumina
refinery.
The Blackwater district includes five mines; two open-cut and three
underground. Underground production was 68 MT versus 6.45 MT of open-cut
production. Exports were 4.5 MT in 1978-79, 32,000 metric tons of which
were used for power generation. The largest mine is the Blackwater
open-cut mine, which is 330 rail km from Gladstone. Most coal is medium
volatile, bituminous coking coal. A typical washed analysis is
8.3 percent ash, 0.5 percent sulfur, and 27.6 million Btu per short ton.
Also in the district are the South Blackwater mines, one open-cut
and one underground. The rail distance to Gladstone is 343 km. Both
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non-coking and coking coal is produced. Non-coking coal has 23.7 percent
volatile matter, 10.9 percent ash, 0.8 percent sulfur, and 25.8 million
Btu per short ton. Lastly, Leichardt and Cook Collieries, also in the
district, are relatively small producers of coking coal.
The largest producing district in Queensland is Mackay, which
includes one underground mine (263,634 metric tons production) and three
large open-cut coal mines: Goonyella, Peak Downs, and Saraji. Total
production in 1978-79 was 20 MT, 12 MT of which were exported. The mines
are between 192 and 216 km from Hay Point port facilities. Production is
primarily coking coal with volatile matter of 19.5 percent to
26.0 percent, ash content of 7.5 percent to 9.5 percent, sulfur content
of 0.5 percent, and 27 million Btu per short ton.
The Darling Downs district includes one small mine in the Clarence-
Moreton Basin (8000 metric tons production). West Moreton includes 12
open-cut, and 12 underground mines, all with production less than
0.6 MT. Total raw coal production in West Moreton was 1.77 MT in
1978-79. Only 16,000 tons were exported, all through Brisbane. Coal is
typically steaming coal (20-23 million Btu per short ton, 17 percent to
28 percent ash, 0.4 to 0.7 percent sulfur).
The future production pattern in Queensland is not as clear as in
New South Wales, given the small level of steam coal exports. It is
possible that districts currently producing coal for metallurgical
purposes could move to steam coal markets. However, the most likely
areas for stean coal exports are Blackwater, Blair Athol, and the
Kianga-Moura districts. Southern fields around Brisbane are possible,
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Table A-4
QUEENSLAND RESERVES OF BLACK COAL 1979
(Figures are progress totals in millions of tonnes for raw coal in situ; losses will occur in mining and washing.)
MESOZOIC BASINS
NON-COKING COAL
AREA AUTHORITY TO MEASURED INDICATED TOTAL IN-
PROSPECT OR MINING FIRST CLASS M + 1 FERRED
O-C U-G TOTAL O-C U-G TOTAL
IPSWICH BASIN
IPS.WICH
Mining leases - 390 390 - 100 100 *490 -
TARONG BASIN
TARONG
AP 197C18 175 25 200 25 35 60 *260 Large
CALLIDE BASIN
CALLIDE
AP 188C'', mining leases 105 20 125 10 95 105 230 Large
MULGILDIE BASIN
MULGILDIE - - - - 15 15 t15
SURAT/MORETON BASIN
TAROOM-WANDOAN
AP189C 105 3 108 25 10 35 143 -
AP 152C'9  - - - 10 - 10 10 Very small
AP 157C 175 - 175 140 - 140 315 Large
AP 182C'9  85 - 85 20 - 20 105 Small
AP 138C 9  - - 25 - 25 25 Small
WANDOAN-DALBY
AP 15602 0  - - - - 60 60 60 Small
AP 102C'9 30 - 30 45 - 45 *75 Large
AP 150C'9  25 - 25 5 - 5 *30 Small
AP 77C21  120 - 120 - - - *120 Large
DALBY-MILLMERRAN
AP 205C20 - - - 270 80 350 *350 Large
AP 1292 2  145 - 145 50 - 50 *195 Large
Acland mining leases - 10 10 - - 10 -
Rosewood mining leases - 5 5 - - 5 -
AP 203023 175 - 175 400 - 400 *575 Large
TOTAL -
SURATIMORETON BASIN
STYX BASIN
STYX
860 18 878 990 150 1140 2018 Large
,- 4 4 - - - 4 -
TOTAL-MESOZOIC BASINS 1 140 457 1 597 1025 395 1 420 3017 Large
* Washing may be required to produce a marketable coal. t Less than 60 m in depth.
RECOVERABLE RESERVES - MESOZOIC BASINS
On the assumption that 90 per cerit of open-cut coal and 50 per cent of underground coal are extracted by min-
Ing and using existing experimental data or otherwise an arbitrary figure of 65 per cent, where washing is
required to produce a marketable coal, recoverable reserves are NON-COKING COAL - 1 770 million tonnes.
Table A-4 (continued)
PERIIAN BASINS
AREA COKING COAL NON-COKING COALAUTHORITY TO PROSPECT
OR MINING LEASE MEASURED INDICATED TOTAL INFERRED MEASURED INDICATED TOTAL IN
First Class M + I First Class M + 1
0-C U-G TOTAL O-C U-G TOTAL O-C U-G TOTAL O-C U-G TOTAL
BOWEN BASIN
Theodore
AP 202C' - - - 125 500 625 20 590 610 1235 Large U-G
Moura/Kianga
(a) Moura Franchise Area 2  110 750 860 - - - 860 Large U-G 20 10 30 - - - 30 Large(b) AP 53C - - - - 365 365 365 - - - - - - - - -
Baralaba
Mining leases4  - - - - - - - - - 15 15 - - - 15 -
Bluff
(a) Mining leases 
--- - - - - - - - - 10 10 10 -(b) AP 1906  
- - - - - - - 7 2 9 9 Very Small
Yarrabee
(a) ML 1966  - - - - - - - - 25 - 25 - - - 25 Very Small(b) AP 123C - - - - - - - - 15 - 15 - 15 15 30 Small
Hall Ck/Lake Elphinstone
AP 62C, ML 312 4  160 - 160 15 635 650 810 - - - - - - -
Collinsville
Mining leases 30 140 170 5 - 5 175 - 4 40 44 7 - -7 51 -
Newlands
ML 365' - - - - - - - - 70 85 155 - 10 10 165 Small
Eastern Creek
AP 73C 9  - - - - - - - - 12 15 27 - - - 27 -
Nebo Project 2
(a) Bee Creek, ML 368 - - - - - - - - 20 25 45 - 35 35 80(b) South Walker Ck. 85 - 85 - 190 190 275(c) Walker Ck. ML 367 - - - - - - - - 40 40 80 - 40 40 120 LargeU-G(d) Kemmis Ck 1 15 - 15 - - - 15(e) Lancewood, ML 370 - - - - 75 75 75 - - 4 4 - 4 -(f) Wards Well, ML 260 - 340 340 - - - 340 - 85 85 - - - 85 -(g) Riverside, ML 152 95 - 95 - - - 95 - - - - --
(h) Poitrel, ML 366 80 35 115 - - - 115 - - - - - - - -
(i) Winchester, ML 261 4 - 4 - - - 4 - - - -(j) AP 213C 1 - 1 - - - 1 - 5 - - - - 5
Moranbah - - - - 2050 2050 2 050 Large U-G - - - - - - - -
C.Q.C.A. Areas"
(a) Goonyella, ML 127 135 30 165 65 1 110. 1 175 1 340 Large U-G - - - - - - - -
(b) Peak Downs, ML 210 165 15 180 370 1230 1 600 1 780 Large U-G - - - - - - - -
(c) Daunia, ML 244 55 50 105 20 35 55 160 Large U-G - - - -- - - - Small(d) Norwich Park, ML 245 125 30 155 150 460 610 765 - - - - - -
Table A-4 (con'tinued)
Burton Downs
Winchester South
Blair Athol
ML 315"
German Creek
AP 206C. 219C"
Roper Creek
Oaky Creek
AP 208C, 218C'
Gregory
AP 890, ML 259's
Emerald
(a) AP 209C"
(b) Departmental area
Capella
AP 52C"
Blackwater
(a) Departmental areas
(i) Jellinbah/Caledonia
(ii) Minyango
(iii) Togara
(b) Company arps
(i) AP 217C
(ii) M L 110's(Iii) IL 121's
(iv) MLs 194.195,242,296"'(v) AP 25C, ML 197 10
(vi) AP 10C, MLs 193,1987
199,284,662
Rolleston
AP 57C'
TOTAL - BOWEN BASIN 1445 2430 3875 727 9 550 10 277 14 152 Very Large 1087 934 2021 269 5287 5 556 7 577 Very Large
GALILEE BASIN - - - - -- - J - - - - - - - Very Large
* Crucible swelling no. 3.
t Includes 555 million tonnes which yields washed proauct of ash 11-14%.
# May be coking in part.
/ To 50 m in depth.
tt Includes 30 million tonnes in seams -41.5 m thick.
** Includes 45 million tonnes in seams 41.5 m thick.
= Departmental estimate.
Source: Queensland Coal Board, 28th
Annual Report, June 30, 1979.
RECOVERABLE RESERVES - PERMIAN BASINS
On the assumption that 90 per cent of open-cut coal and 50 per cent of underground coal are extracted by mining, and
using existing experimental data, or otherwise an arbitrary figure of 65 per cent, for the recovery of coking coal after
washing, recoverable reserves are COKING COAL - 5 510 million tonnes, NON-COKING COAL - 4 250 million tonnes.
45 70
280
195
55
170
555
265
100
525
380
635
360
tt 3't t90
-o
*90
45
30
90
70
35
35
220
270
15
310
360
60
30
90
70
35
105
130
335
105
130
300
115
283
= 195
65
170
555
9
265
130
5251
380
635
360
5
10
9
30
5
115
593
555
125
170
555
39
265
220
595
415
740
490
340
275
-
275
30
145
35
2
4
275
50
Large U-G
Large U-G
Large U-G
Large
Large U-G
Large U-G
Large U-G
Large U-G
4030
120
35
2
4
185
80
25
1 40
75
585
730
90
15
1 270
1 240
205
65
120
155
25
625
730
40
90
15
1 270
1 290
205
65
120
155
275
25
625
730
70
# 90
15
1 270
1 435
240
67
4
395
25
90
Large U-G
Large
Large U-G
Small
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but less likely, steam coal exporters in the future.
This conclusion is reinforced by the non-coking coal reserve
estimates in Table A-4. Blackwater is the major coal region. Major
planned steam coal mine developments are Theodore, near Moura, Blair
Athol, Baralaba (near Moura), and the Nebo project mines (South Walker,
Newland) in the north near Hay Point.
SOUTH AFRICA
Saleable coal production in South Africa equaled 90.36 MT in 1978,
15.4 MT of which were exported. In 1979 estimated coal exports were 22.5
MT. Unlike the other countries analyzed in the study, most of the
exports were stean coal. Current figures are not available, but in 1976
87 percent of the total South African saleable coal output was consumed
by power stations. 1 2
There are five states in South Africa: Natal, Transvaal, Orange Free
State (O.F.S.), Cape of Good Hope, and Transkei. The first four all have
coal reserves, though the Cape of Good Hope has no developed coal mines.
Transvaal is by far the largest producer, accounting for 71 percent of
the 1978 coal sales (62.1 MT). Orange Free State's 1978 coal sales were
13.5 MT, and Natal 's, 11.6 MT.
South African fields are pictured in Figure A-1. Fields 1 through 5
represent isolated basins and troughs in the northern and central
Transvaal. Field 19 lies in the central part of the main Karoo Basin on
the Cape of Good Hope. Orange Free State fields include O.F.S.
Vierfontein (9), Old Springfield (10), Vereeniging-Sasolburg (1), and
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Figure A-1
Source: Petrick Report.
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South Rand (12). Natal coalfields are numbered 15-18, and Southeastern
Transvaal coalfields are numbered 7, 13, 14. Natal and southeastern
Transvaal fields lie in the main part of the Karoo Basin.
With the exception of some Transvaal fields, almost all of South
African mining is underground. In 1976, Transvaal underground production
was 46.3 MT versus 10.7 MT of open-cut production. In Natal and Orange
Free State the corresponding figures are: Natal 1.3 MT open-cut, 11.4
underground; 0.F.S. , 0.0 MT open cut, 13.8 MT underground.
Currently Transvaal is the largest steam coal exporter. Orange Free
State coal is used exclusively by domestic power stations and Sasol
plants. There are no exports from this state. Natal coal is both
anthracite and bituminous, and there are negligible steam coal exports.
Typical coal characteristics in 0.F.S. are: sulfur, 0.2 percent to
1.1 percent; ash, .25 percent to 36 percent; and heating value, 14.4 to
17 million Btu per short ton. In Natal, Bituminous steam coal ranges
from 11 percent to 24 percent ash, 0.4 percent to 2.2 percent sulfur, and
22 to 26 million Btu per short ton. 13
Transvaal coal is also variable in quality. In the Ermelo area, the
ash content is 12 percent to 16 percent, the sulfur content is
0.8 percent to 1.2 percent, and the heating value is 22 to 24 million Btu
per short ton. In the Witbank area, exported steam coal was 13 percent
to 18 percent ash, 0.5 percent to 0.9 percent sulfur, and 23 to 27
million Btu per short ton.
Distances from Southeastern Transvaal coal fields to Richards Bay
Port facilities average 540 km. They range from Ermelo (445 km) to
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Blackhill (633 km). Distances from Natal coal fields to Richards Bay
average 280 km. All movements to Richards Bay are by rail.14
The reserve estimates in Table A-5 suggest the continued importance
of Transvaal coal. Proved and indicated reserves of bituminous coal
equal 58 billion tons. Recent mining developments have occurred in both
the Witbank and Ermelo areas. It is unlikely that export production in
the next twenty years will originate elsewhere.
CAN AD A
Canadian coal production in 1978 equaled 30.4 MT. Exports amounted
to 13.6 MT, more than 90 percent of which were for metallurgical
15purposes.
Coal reserves exist in the eastern provinces of Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick, and in the western provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, and
Saskatchewan. Of the measured and indicated reserves, 97 percent are in
the Western provinces. Production by province is listed in Table A-6.
For export purposes, Alberta and British Columbia are of primary
concern. Nova Scotia is a potential exporter, but Nova Scotia's coal is
very expensive and high in sulfur content ( >3 percent). Saskatchewan's
coal is exclusively lignite, and further removed from West Coast
facilities.
British Columbia coal production in 1978 was 9 MT. The major mines
are located in the southeast, approximately 700 to 750 miles from
Vancouver. All production is from surface mines. With the exception of
a negligible amount of stean coal, all exports are used for metallurgical
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Table A-5
SOUTH AFRICAN COAL RESERVES
Proven plus indicated
(million short tons)
Bituminous An thra ci te
Province
Transv aal
Natal
Orange Free State
Cape of Good Hope
TOTAL
(Metallurgical)
916
301
1217
To tal
(Ste am)
203
356
58152
1324
4547
64023
59271
1981
4547
559 65799
Source: Commission of Inquiry into the Coal Resources of the Republic of
South Africa, "Report to the State President of the Republic
of South Africa," Pretoria, April 3, 1977, Tables 3--2 to 3-18.
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Table A-6
CANADIN COAL PRODUCTION
(million metric tons)
1969 1977 1978
Province:
Nova Scotia 2.3 2.0 2.0
New Brunswick .6 .4 .3
Saskatchewan (lignite) 1.8 5.5 5.0
Alberta (Bit. and subbit.) 4.0 12.0 13.5
British Columbia .8 8.5 9.0
Bituminous 15.1 17.1
Subbituminous 7.8 8.3
Lignite 5.5 5.0
TOTAL: 9.5 28.4 30.4
Source: Canadian Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, Canadian
Coal 1979, Ottawa, 1980, p. 9.
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purposes. Undeveloped coal reserves also exist in the northeastern
region of British Columbia.
Alberta has both subbituminous and bituminous coal, all of which is
surface-mined. The bituminous mines are located in the southwest and the
subbituminous mines in the northern plains. Virtually all of the
southern production is exported for metallurgical uses, while the plains
production is used primarily for Canadian power generation. Southern
mines are from 700 to 750 miles from port, and northern mines 700 to 800
miles from port.
Coal quality data by mines is not available. In the southeastern
sections of British Columbia and in Alberta's Southwestern section (the
lower-inner-foot belt district), typical coal is 0.6 percent sulfur, 26
million Btu per short ton, and 10 percent ash coking coal. Byron Creek
is the only steam coal mine in the area. Coal there is approximately
12 percent ash and 0.5 percent sulfur. In the Alberta plains (i.e.
Luscar, Forrestburg), subbituminous coal has 10 percent ash, 0.5 percent
sulfur, and 18 million Btu per short ton. In northeastern British
Columbia, coal is 5 percent ash, 0.5 percent sulfur, and 29 million Btu
per short ton coking coal. 16
Reserves by area are presented in Chapter I, Table 6. Major steam
coal mine developments are planned by Kaiser Resources, Fording and Byron
Creek in southeastern British Columbia, Luscar and Manalta in upper
Alberta, and Crowsnest and Elco in the southeast. 17
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UNITED STATES
United States production of bituminous and lignite coal was 665
million short tons in 1978. Exports were 40 million short tons,
virtually all of which were for metallurgical purposes.18
We have discussed producing areas in the transportation analysis
above (Chapter IV, Part A). Eight originating points were selected, each
associated with a subset of the U.S. Bureau of mines districts. Let us
reconsider each briefly. 19
First, Rock Springs represents Wyoming's Hanna Basin and parts of
northern Colorado. All production is strip-mined. Typical saleable coal
characteristics are 21 to 23 million Btu per short ton, 0.5 percent to
0.6 percent sulfur, and 8.5 percent to 9.0 percent ash. The U.S.B.M.
districts included are the southern part of 19, and 16.
Billings, Montana is used to represent the Powder River Basin in
Montana and Northern Wyoming. The enormous coal reserves are all
strippable. The subbituminous coal has 16.2 to 18.6 million Btu per short
ton, 0.4 percent to 0.5 percent sulfur, and 6 percent to 8 percent ash.
U.S.B.M. districts 19 (Northern Part) and 22 correspond to this area.
Price, Utah, which represents Utah and northern New Mexico mines,
includes U.S.B.M. districts 20 and 17. All of the Utah mining is
underground. Typical saleable quality is 23 million Btu per short ton,
0.5 percent to 0.6 percent sulfur, and 10 percent to 13 percent ash.
Gallup, New Mexico represents coal fields in Arizona and southern
New Mexico. All production is strip-mined. Typical coal has 18 to 20
million Btu per short ton, 0.4 percent to 0.7 percent sulfur, and
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10.50 percent to 15.0 percent ash. District 18 corresponds to this area.
Harrisburg, Illinois represents coal fields in Indiana, Illinois,
and West Kentucky (Districts 9, 10, 11). Production is almost equally
divided between strip-mines and underground mines. In Illinois, saleable
coal is typically 21 to 23 million Btu per short ton, 2.5 percent to
3.5 percent sulfur, and 8.5 percent to 13.0 percent ash. In Western
Kentucky coal varies from 22 to 26 million Btu per short ton, 0.9 percent
to 3.0 percent sulfur and 11 percent to 17 percent ash.
Lynch, Kentucky represents central Appalachian coal fields in West
Virginia, Virginia, and Eastern Kentucky (districts 7 and 8). The
majority of the production is underground, but strip-mine production is
substantial. Typical coal has 22 to 26 million Btu -per short ton,
1.0 percent to 3.4 percent sulfur, and 9 percent to 15 percent ash.
Wheeling, West Virginia represents coal fields in northern
Appalachia in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and North, West Virginia (Districts
1-4). Production is from both underground and strip-mines. Typical coal
has 22 to 26 million Btu per short ton, 1.0 percent to 3.4 percent
sulfur, and 9 percent to 15 percent ash.
Lastly, Birmingham, Alabama represents coal fields in southern
Appalachia. Typical saleable coal has 24 to 25 million Btu per short
ton, 0.75 percent to 1.6 percent sulfur, and 10 to 13 percent ash.
Approximately 60 percent of the production in this area (District 13) is
strip-mined.
Production by state is summarized in Table A-7.
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Table A-7
U.S. Production of Bituminous Coal
and Lignite in 1978
Production
(Thousand short tons)
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
Colorado
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
East
West
Total
Maryland
Missouri
Montana
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
W. Virginia
Wyoming
TOTAL 1/
(Underground)
6,169
3
4,511
24,841
522
108
41,624
17,860
59,484
382
576
11,897
2
32,925
4,150
9,141.
21,511
65,216
708
242,177
(Surface)
14,383
731
9,054
516
9,303
113
23,760
23,630
342
1,226
65,608
21,596
76,204
2,616
5,665
26-,600
12,056
14,028
29,340
6,068
48,551
51,882
20,020
10,435
4,708
20,099
57,620
422,950
(Total )1/
20,533
731
9,054
519
13,814
113
48,600
24,182
450
1,226
96,233
39,456
135,689
2,998
5,665
26,600
12,632
14,028
41,237
6,070
81 ,477
10,032
20,020
9,141
31,946
4,708
85,314
58,328
665,127
Notes: 1. Data may not add to totals shown due to independent rounding.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Data Reports, "Production of
Coal, Bituminous and Lignite, 1980." Weekly Coal Report No. 126.
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MARKET STRUCTURE
In this section the details on which the discussion of market
structure was based are presented.
CANADA
In Alberta there are four metallurgical coal producers for the
export market: Coleman Collieries, Canmore Mines, Cardinal River Mines,
and McIntyre Mines. Production in 1978 was respectively, 0.95 MT, 0.1
MT, 1.9 MT, and 1.6 MT.21
Subbituminous production in the plains region is all consumed
domestically. The Manalta mines produced 6.97 MT of the 8.3 MT total.
However, some of their properties are owned by Calgary Power. Fcrestburg
and Luscar produced 0.9 MT and 0.58 MT respectively. Part of their
production was also tied to the electric utilities.
In British Columbia, three canpanies exist: Kaiser, Fording and
Byron Creek. Total production equaled 9 MT (5.0 Kaiser, 2.8 Fording, and
0.52 Byron Creek). Kaiser and Fording production was almost entirely for
coking coal exports. Byron Creek produces steam coal both for export and
Ontario Hydro.
Several companies are planning steam coal expansions. Existing
canpanies planning new mines are Kaiser, Luscar, Bryon Creek, Fording,
and Manalta. New companies with mines in the planning stage are Union
Oil, Denison, Pacific Petroleum, Crows Nest, and Elco Mining. 22
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SOUTH AFRICA
In South Africa, 39 of the 56 mines are controlled by six
conpanies. Anglo-American Corp's company "Amcoal" produced 34 percent
(28.75 MT) of the total production.23 General mining and finance's
canpany Trans Natal Coal produced 25.86 MT, or 30 percent. Rand mines
(Barlow Rand's Wilbank and Welgedecht Colliery Ltd. and T.C. Lands)
produced 9.1 MT or 11 percent of the total output. Smaller producers are
J.C.I. (4.3 MT), Lonhro S.A. Ltd. (2.6 MT) and Gold fields of South
Africa (2.35 MT).
Other important producers are Shell Oil in the Rietspruit Colliery
with Rand, British Petroleum with General Mining and Total Oil at Ermelo,
the South African Iron and Steel Corp. (1.4 MT) and the South African
Oil, Coal, and Gas Canpany (5.77 MT). Six other companies produced 4.6
MT in the 15 remaining mines .
Equally important to competition in South Africa is the marketing
structure. Major producer associations are assigned export quantities by
the government, and in turn allocate these quantities amongst their
producers. Recently, some large mines have made arrangements to sell
their own coal directly on the export markets.24 Government
allocations for 1979 to 1985 are listed in Table A-8.
QU EENS LAND
Given the small amount of steam coal exports, Queensland's market
structure is especially hard to interpret. A district-by-district
analysis is, however, helpful. 25
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Table A-8
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORT ALLOCATIONS
(million metric tons)
1979-85
Transvaal Coal Owners Association
Natal Associated Collieries
Ermelo Mines*
Amcoal
Anthracite Producers Association
General Mining
British Peroleum
Shell Oil
Total Oil
T.C. Lands (Barlow Rand)
TO TAL
9.6
1.2
3.0
2.0
1.2
3.0
20.0
*Ermelo Mines includes General
For 1985 these allocations are
Mining, British Petroleum
shifted to the individual
and Total Oil.
companies.
Source: Coal in South Africa, 197
Minerals Bureau, Internal
9, South African Dept. of Mines,
1985
10.0
2.0
6.0
4.0
6.0
5.5
5.5
2.5
2.5
44.0
No. 48, pg. 41.Report,
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In West Moreton, eight companies produced 4 MT in 1978-79. The
largest company, Rhonda Colliers, produced 1 MT. In Darling Downs, one
small canpany produces 8000 tons.
In Kianga-Moura, a conglomerate, Thei ss-Dampier-Mitsui produced 3.64
MT in five mines. Theiss Holdings controls 22 percent, Damipler Mining
58 percent, and Mitsui and Co. 20 percent of the conglomerate.
In Callide, Theiss Brothers, a subsidiary of Theiss Holdings,
produced 1.9 MT. In Blair Athol, Conzinc Rio Tinto (62 percent) and
ARCO Coal (38 percent), jointly control the properties.
In Blackwater, Utah development produced 5.5 MT. Theiss Brothers
produced 1.15 MT (South Blackwater). Queensland Coal Mining, a
subsidiary of Broken Hill Proprietory Company, produced 0.45 MT, and
Dampier Mining Campany is developing properties.
In Bowen, one company, a subsidiary of MIM Holdings Ltd., produced
0.83 MT. In Mackay, a consortium, the Central Queenland Coal
Associates, produced 19.46 MT. The joint venture is managed by Utah
Development. They own 76.25 percent of the company. Other participants
are Mitsubishi Developments Pty. Ltd. (12.0 percent), Utah Mining
Australia Ltd. (4.0 percent), and Australia Mutual Provident Society
(7.75 percent). Companies developing mines include Dampier, Theiss
Holdings, Central Queenland Coal Associates, Houston Oil and Minerals,
AAR Ltd., ESSO Exploration and Production Australia, U.K. National Coal
Board, Ruhrkohle and Shell.
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NEW SOUTH WALES
New South Wales coal production by company is presented in
Table A-9. In most cases it is impossible to separate stean coal from
coking coal output.
Major producers are the steel industry and the state. In the steel
industry, two producers, Broken Hill Proprietory, and Australian Iron
and Steel Pty. Ltd. (a Broken Hill subsidiary) control production. For
the State, electricity commission subsidiaries' production tied to
electricity plants equals approximately 12 MT.
Of the remaining producers, Clutha Development Pty. Ltd. is the
leading producer, with 7.87 MT of the remaining 29.78 MT. Coal and
Allied Industries production was 4.25 MT. Seven other companies produce
between 1 and 3 MT annually. The major producers in Singleton-Northwest
are R.W. Miller and Coal and Allied Industries.
UNITED STATES
Martin Zimmerman, among others, has evaluated the coal market
structure in the United States and the following conclusions can be
drawn.26 In the East, competition is strong. Taking the reciprocal
of the Herfindahl index for the top 15 producers suggests that the
industry behaves as 13.2 equal firms. In the Midwest, markets are far
more concentrated. In Districts 9, 10, and 11, the reciprocal of the
Herfindahl Index is 5.73. In the West, there is less competition also.
At the time of Zimmerman's analysis, western coal markets were
undeveloped and the market structure could not be meaningfully
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Table A-9
NEW SOUTH WALES COAL PRODUCERS
1977-78 Production
(Million metric tonnes)
Steel Industry: OperatiigDis tricts
Broken Hill Proprietory Co. 2.16 S.C.
Australia Iron and Steel Pty. Ltd. 4.23 S.C.
(subsidiary of Broken Hill)
State Ownership:
Subsidiaries of the Electricity 7.48 N,W,S.C
Commission
(Elcon, NewCom, Huntley Collieries)
Contractors to the Electricity 5.59 SN
Commis ion
(Swanp Creek and
Ravensworth No. 2)
Other:
Clutha Development Pty. Ltd. 7.87 SN,W,BW
Coal and Allied Industries 4.26 SM,SN,N
Kerbla Coal and Coke Ltd. 2.92 SC
Buchanan Borehole Collieries 2.32 SN, N
Austen and Butta Ltd. 2.29 WSC
R.W. Miller 1.77 SN,N
The Bellambi Coal Co. 1.52 SC
Peko-Wallsend Co. 1.49 SM,N
Coaltex Pty.. 1.49 W
Blocnfield Collieries .94 N
Bayswater Colliers .68 SN
Wambo Mining Corp. .52 SN
Others: 1.71
TOTAL: 49.25
Note: SC = South Coast, SN=Singleton Northwest, BU=Buragorang
Valley, SM=South Maitland, N = Newcastle.
Source: Joint Coal Board, Black Coal in Australia, 1977-78.
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evaluated. Since then, a clearer picture has developed.
In most western regions, the market is heavily concentrated relative
to eastern coal markets.27 In Montana, six companies produced 26
million short tons in 1978. The two largest producers, Decker Coal Co.,
and Western Energy Co., accounted for more than 20 million short tons
alone. In Wyoming 1978 production was 49 million short tons. Of this,
18 million short tons were produced by Anax Coal Company. Six other
ccmpanies produced between 2.0 and 8.4 million short tons.
In Arizona all of the 11.7 million short tons output was produced by
Peabody Coal. In New Mexico, Utah International produced 8 million short
tons of the 13.0 million short tons. total. Two other companies
accounted for the remaining 7 million short tons.
Colorado and Utah are the only western states where production is not
highly concentrated. The largest producer in Colorado was Energy Fuels
Co., with 2.9 million short tons of the 13.35 million short tons total.
In Utah, total production was 10.2 million short tons. American Coal
Company produced 2.5 million short tons, and 13 other companies produced
the remaining tonnage.
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER I--APPENDIX A
IThere are also approximately 40 billion tons of demonstrated
economic brown coal resources, 98 percent of which are in Victoria. The
Victorian coal is all lignite. Given the low heating content, Victorian
coal is not expected to be exported. Furthermore, Victoria consumes very
little Queensland and New South Wales coal, so an expansion of Victorian
production will not be indirectly important to the export market either.
See Australia's Energy Resources, op. cit., Chapter 7.
2doint Coal Board, Thirty-second Annual Report, 1978-79, p. 4.
3joint Coal Board, Black Coal in Australia, 1978-79, p. 7, Table 8,
p. 67.
4 Ibid., p. 10.
SSee ICF, Inc., Coal Reserves and Production in Eight Major
Non-U.S. Coal ProducingCountries,7T9/8
6See Joint Coal Board, 1978-79, op. cit., "District Reviews--New
South Wales. "
7Ibid., p. 12.
8Ibid., p. 185.
9 Joint Coal Board, 1977-78, op. cit., pp. 174-175.
10All Queensland data is from Queensland Coal Board, op. cit.
Ibid., p. 58-73.
12South African data are from "Coal in South Africa, 1979," op. cit.
13 Petrick Commision Report, op. cit.
14Unpublished data provided by the South African Board of Railways
and Harbours. See Chapter VI, Part A.
15Canadian Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, Canadian
Coal, 1979, Ottawa, 1980.
16Canada Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, "1976
Assessment of Canada's Coal Resources and Reserves," Report CP-77-5,
1977, p. 14.
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18U . S.
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Department of Energy, Energy Data Reports, "Bituminous
Distribution, Calendar YearT97B11 ri 1979.
19 Statistics based on "Current Contract and Spot Market Steam Coal
Prices," in Coal Week, various issues, and Keystone Industry Coal Market,
1979, "Description of Seams."
2 1Canadian Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, op.
1978, p. 76.
c it.,
22Canadian Department of
1980, pp. 16-19.
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23South African Department of Mines, Minerals Bureau,
in the Republic of South Africa," op. cit.
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24
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CHAPTER II
PN PNALYSIS OF CURRENT DELIVERED STEM COAL PRICES,
AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SHIFTS IN THE COMPETITIVE STR UCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL STEM COAL MARKETS
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we integrate the transportation and supply analyses
to calculate the delivered prices of steam coal to coastal-fired power
stations in Western Europe and Japan. We will analyze the existing
ccmpetitive structure, and consider the importance of possible future
shifts in supply and transportation variables to the development of steam
coal trade.
CURRENT DELIVERED PRICES
Tables 1 through 4, and Table 5 in the ocean section (Part A,
Chapter VII) provide all the pertinent information used to calculate cost
minimizing delivered prices to Europe and Japan based on existing
conditions and constraints. To summarize briefly, United States coal
prices, FOB mine, are taken from Coal Week's "current steam coal spot and
term marker prices." The lowest sulphur level for which prices are
reported is used for eastern and midwestern coal. Transportation rates
and costs are taken from Part A, Chapters IV and VI. In the base
calculation of cost minimizing transportation choices, railroad rates are
set according to the existing U.S. domestic unit-train rate structure.
Connecting costs, transhipments from rail or truck to barges, and port
dumping charges are calculated as discussed in Chapter IV, Part A.
For Australia, two FOB pier prices are accounted for: the first is
consistent with contracts signed in 1978-79; the second consistent with
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spot prices in 1978-79. As discussed earlier, the evidence suggests that
the higher spot prices reflect short-term supply constraints, not
long-run conditions. However, the evidence is inconclusive. Australian
transportation tariffs are drawn from actual tariff sanples.
For Canada, two main supply regions are considered: the Alberta
plains; and the mountainous terrain in southern British Columbia and
Alberta. Prices per million Btu (Petu), FOB mine, are equated to those
in Montana for the plains in Alberta, and those in Utah for the southern
region of British Columbia and Alberta. Transportation tariffs are drawn
from actual tariff sanples.
For South Africa, the FOB pier price is, as discussed earlier, set
by the government. Transportation tariffs are again taken from the South
African railways tariff sheets. Exchange rates for conversion to U.S.
dollars are based on 1979 average exchange rates reported by the
International Monetary Fund.
Ocean transportation costs are based on the results presented in
Part A, Chapter VII. The base calculations assume conventional bulk
vessels, existing port size constraints and no return cargoes. All
delivered prices represent the cost to the overseas docksides; they do
not include the costs of unloading the ocean vessels. Finally, prices
are adjusted to January 1979 price levels.
Table 4 presents the cost-minimizing delivered prices to three
destinations: Yokohama, Japan; Taranto, Italy; and Rotterdam, the
Netherlands. Also included are estimates of the ocean and inland
transportation charges that are included in the delivered prices. Let us
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consider the results for each destination.
First, consider Japan. The cheapest supplier to Yokohama (and all
other Japanese ports) is Australia. Queensland coal exports through
Gladstone can be delivered for $1.19/MBtu on the low end, or $28.56 for a
normalized 24 million Btu ton. New South Wales coal delivered to Japan
costs $1.28/MBtu or $30.72/24 MBtu. The next closest competitor is South
Africa. In spite of the larger inland and ocean distances, the cheaper
rail costs per ton-mile and lower priced coal (FOB mine) yields a
delivered price of $1.40/MBtu, or $33.60/24 MBtu. Approximately equal to
this price level is Canadian coal at $1.43/MBtu. The cost minimizing
Canadian supply region is southeastern British Columbia and Alberta. The
higher coal price per ton, and per million Btu, is offset by cheaper
transportation costs per million Btu due to the very high Btu content of
British Columbian bituminous coal.
United States producers are currently in a weak competitive position
for the Japanese market. Delivered prices from Los Angeles to Yokohama
are $1.71/MBtu or $41.00/24 MBtu. This is approximately $3 greater than
even the highest Australian price range of $1.47/MBtu. Note that the
cost-minimizing-coal-supply region to Los Angeles is Price, Utah.
Lastly, medium-sulfur coal shipped to the East Coast or Gulf Coast is
priced still higher. Northern Appalachian coal via Hampton Roads to
Japan cost 52.21/MBtu. Southern Appalachian coal via Mobile to Japan
cost $2.08/MBtu. Based on high-sulfur prices, $5.00 to $6.00 less per
ton, the delivered price frcm these origins would still exceed the price
of Los Angeles exports delivered to Japan by at least $3.00/24 MBtu.
448
A different picture emerges for European markets. Consider
Rotterdam as a reference point for Northern European markets. Despite a
long ocean shipment relative to the U.S. origins, South African coal is
cheapest at $1.38/MBtu. The closest competitor, Australia, can deliver
coal for $1.61/MBtu or $5.52/24MBtu more. However, besides South Africa,
all other originating points are relatively competitive with one
another. Shipments from Gladstone cost $1.61/MBtu. Coal from Hampton
Roads and Mobile or New Orleans can be delivered to Europe for $1.70 to
$1.76/MBtu. It is interesting to note that Australia's ocean freight
cost is 42 cents/MBtu, or approximately $10.00/24 MBtu higher than the
ocean freight cost on shipments from Hampton Roads to Rotterdam.
However, based on January 1979 cost levels, the lower price of coal FOB
mine dominates this disadvantage.
If we ignore South Africa, the other originating points are also
reasonably campetitive in Northern Europe. Coal from Gallup could be
delivered via Houston for $1.93/MBtu or 46.32/24 million Btu. Lastly,
due to the significant economies of scale in ship sizes, coal from
Vancouver is priced at $1.82/MBtu in Rotterdam. The delivered price from
Los Angeles is $1.96/MBtu.
In Taranto, Italy, which represents Southern Europe and the
Mediterranean, the competitive structure is similar. Again, South Africa
is by far the cheapest supplier. The only significant difference is that
Australia's conpetitive advantage relative to the U.S. East Coast is
slightly increased due to the locational shift.
It is also interesting to note the relative importance of
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transportation and supply variables to the campetitive pattern that
obtains in Japanese and European markets. In the case of Japan, there
are four closely competitive originating points: Vancouver, Richards
Bay, Gladstone, and Port Kembla. The proportion of transportation costs
to delivered cost ranges from 43 percent to 46 percent. On the basis of
ocean transportation costs, Vancouver and Gladstone are the cheapest
supply points. On the basis of inland transportation costs, Port Kembla
and Richards Bay are the cheapest. Coal prices FOB mine range from
67 cents to 78 cents per million Btu (assuming the low cost Australian
scenario). Australia has both low ocean freight and inland
transportation costs, and so is the cheapest supplier by a significant
margin. Vancouver and Richards Bay have high inland costs and ocean
costs respectively. Los Angeles, the next closest canpetitor, has both
high ocean and inland costs which effectively prices West Coast coal out
of the Japanese market.
While transportation is the critical variable for coal shipments to
Japan, it is less important on shipments to European markets. In fact,
coal supply prices FOB mine are the dominant factor. U.S. East and Gulf
Coast origins are the cheapest to Europe based on transportation costs.
However, the high coal prices in these areas dominate this advantage, and
allow both Australian and South African suppliers to canpete. From the
United States, transportation costs are 28 percent to 32 percent of
delivered prices, versus 45 percent to 59 percent from Richards Bay and
Gladstone, respectively. The United States is doubly cursed in this
sense. On shipments to Japan, they are handicapped with high
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Table 1
U.S. Railroad and Barge Coal Rates and Costs
January 1,
(dollars per
1979
short tons)
Port-
land
2 3 4 5
Hous- N.0.
S. F. L._A. ton
Billings 12.20 18.56 19.05 23.27 25.63
9.61 14.18 14.52 17.55 19.24
20.46
16.00
6
Mo-
bile
7 8..
Balt. Hamp
ton
26.10 27.87 29.69
19.58 20.85 22.15
12.75 12.75
10.00 10.00
12.75 19.79 23.16
10.00 15.05 17.47
20.83
17.20
24.86 27.87 29.69
18.69 20.85 22.15
18.74 22.62
14.36 17.08
23.68
18.00
24.57 29.05 30.81
18.48 21.70 22.95
4 Gallup 24.79 13.24
18.64 10.38
5 Harris-
burg
6 Lynch
9.13 14.09 18.03 21.18 30.21 30.50
7.40 10.96 13.79 15.20 22.52 22.73
10.94 8.71
9.88 7.40
7.18B
12. OOE
10.12
8.76
10.45B
13.51
12.15
11.67
7 Wheeling
8 Birming-
ham
7.98
6.63
8.28B
10. OE
8.90
7.55
11 .758
12.46
11.18
12.808
4.75
3.41
4.82B
6.99E
12.51 13.50
7.71 8.47
8.20
6.52
11. OE
7.29
10.50
8.10
6.68
11 . OOE
8.89
6.76E10.50
(continued)
2 Rock-
Springs
3 Price 13.08
10.24
12.08
9.52
9.82
7.90
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TABLE 1 (continued)
NOTES: 1. For origins 1-4,
First number equals rail rate
Second number equals rail cost
Third number equals rail rate/barge cost
Fourth number equals rail cost/barge cost
For origins 5-8,
First number equals rail rate
Second number equals rail cost
B = barge rate
E = export rail rate
2. All rail rates are through ex parte 357, January, 1979
3. Barge, rail transshipments cost = $1.00
4. Transportation to riverwa.y from:
Wheeling = $2.00
Lynch = $2.00
Harrisburg = $2.00
Birmingham = $1.00
5. Billings to St. Louis = 1100 rail miles
Rock Springs = 1221
Price = 1425
Gallup = 1379
6. Western rail rate equation:
-5.75 + .0127v + .0596*u + .668 DUMEQ + .929 IMAT
+ .00124 DM +2.134 + DUMT
U=14
MAT=l ,000,000
DUMEQ, DM=1 i.e., rail-owned equipment
DUMT= new rate level
West costs = 10 mills per ton mile - see Chapters II, IV, Part A.
7. Eastern, Mideastern rates as estimated in Chapter I, Part A:
-. 07 + .0105*M + .00237*U + .369*IMAT + 1.21*DUMR + .0016*DMl
+ 1.005*DUMEQ
DUMR = 1 East, 0 Midwest
DUMEQ = 1 railroad, 0 shipper
8. Eastern, Midwestern costs:
a. If i = 5 - 7, j = 5 - 6, TA = [.133136 + (8.691*IMAT)
+ (.009543*L) + 54(MDUM) + (.004595-M) + (.0188*PGO)
+ (.0358*PDUM)12.29
rent = (.0188 * PGD) 2.29
b. If i = 7, j = 7 - 8, same but BDUM = 1, PGD is positive
c. IF i = 8, j= 5-6, PGD = 0, use a
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d. If i = 8, j = 7 - 8, PCFOB = 8.09, PG = 40, Btu = 26,
BWM = 1, use a
e. PG, PCFOB from MBZ conputer printout
(all as B.P. x (1.09)
See Chapter II, Part A.
9. a. For destinations 5 and 6, and origins 6-8, Zimmerman estimates
rents at zero. Rate levels are based on this author's
regressions. (See note 7.)
b. For destinations 5 and 6, and origin 5, Zimmerman estimates
rents at 12 cents per ton. Rate levels are based on this
author's estimation.
c. For destinations 7 and 8, and origin 5 Zimmerman's rate
estimates are $13.17 and $13.92. Table on includes this
author's rate estimates.
d. For destinations 7 and 8, and origin 6, Zimmerman's rate
estimates ae $8.34 and $8.40 versus this author's estmates
of 38.20 and $8.10.
e. For destinations 7 and 8, and origin 7, Zimmerman's rate
estimates are 36.45 and $7.98, versus $7.29 and $8.89
estimated by this author. Zimerman's cost estimates are
34.53 and $6.06. Cost estimates in Table one are equal
to this author's rate estimate adjusted by the proportionate
difference between Zimrnerman's rates and costs.
10. Barge rates -- See Part A, Chapter IV, Appendix A.
Source: Author's calculations.
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Table la
Distances Between U.S. Coal Fields and Ports (Statute Miles)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
S.F. L.A. Houston N.0. Mobile Balt. Hampton
1. Billings
2. Rock Springs
3. Price
4. Gallup
5. Harrisburg
961
1000
1024
1864
1418 1452
1000 1000
952
1038
790
740
1755 1924
2149B
1505 1747
2270B
1430
1096
6. Lyn ch
7. Wheeling
8. Birmingham
1708
2474B
1379
2427B
642
1001B
776
15 42B
1100
1760B
335
1958 2085 2215
1869 2215
1848 2170 2295
1520 2252 2273
573
660
1000
266
396B
889
594
392
799
955
584
545
800
Notes: 1. For origins 1-4, B represents joint rail-barge distance. Rail
to St. Louis, barge from St. Louis to New Orleans (1049 miles)
2. For origins 5-8,
connecting haul
B represents barge distance plus short
(less than 100 miles in all cases).
Source: 1. Railroad mileages, United States Railroad Atlas,
2. Water mileages, American Waterways Operators, Bi
Rand-McNally
g Load Afloat.
1
Port.
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Table 2
U.S. FOB Mine Prices -- January, 1979
(short tons)
.4% sulfur, Montana
52 cents/MBtu
$9.75/ton
.7% sulfur, Montana
49 cents/MBtu
$8.50/ton -
.5% sulfur, Wyoming
42 cents/MBtu
$6.75/ton
Rock Springs
Price
Gallup
Harr is burg
.6% sulfur
79 cents/MBtu
$16 .50/ton
.6% sulfur
86 cents/MBtu
$19.75/ton
.5% sulfur
80 cents/MBtu
$19.75/ton
3.55% sulfur
100 cents/MBtu
$21.50/ton
.9% sulfur
118/MBtu
$28.25/ton
.7% sulfur
127 to 128 cents/
MBtu
$30.50 to $33.25/ton
1% sulfur
116 cents/MBtu
$29. 00/ton
1.5 to 1.6% sulfur
107 to 108 cents/
MBtu
$26.25 to 26.75/ton
2.5 to 3.5% sulfur
92 to 105 cents/MBtu
$23.00 to $27.00/ton
Birmingham .75% sulfur
118 cents/MBtu
$29.50/ ton
1.6% sulfur
108 cents/MBtu
$26.00/ ton
Billings
Lynch
Wheelin g
Source: Coal Week, "Current Contract and Spot Marker Steam Coal Prices,"
March 26, 1979.
455
Table 3
U.S. FOB Pier Prices -- January,
($ per million Btu)
MMBTU/ton
1 Bill.
2 R.S.
3 Price
4 Gallup
5 Harr.
6 Lyn ch
7 Wh.
8 Birm.
1
Port.
1 .22
2
S.F.
1.59
1.39 1.39
1.43 1.38
2.04
3
L.A.
1.62
1.39
1.29
4
Houston
1.87
5
N.0.
6
Mobile
1.70 2.04 2.14
1.73 1.60 1.97 2.11
1.67 1.64 1.93 2.12
1.46 1.26 1.50 1.70 1.86 2.31
1.63 1.48 1.51
1.70 1.60
1 .66
1.37
Note: 1. All prices assume unit-train rate levels.
2. None of the prices include loading from rail
ton estimate in the United States.
3. For East and Midwest origin
based on the lowest sulfur
in the respective regions.
4. Estimated heating
1 through 8 are:
3, 23 MBtu/ton;
6, 24 MBtu/ton;
s (5-8), delivered prices are
levels reported by Coal Week
values per short ton for supply points
1, 17 Mtu/ton; 2, 21 Mtu/ton; 3,
4, 24 MBtu/ton; 5, 24 MBtu/ton;
7, 25 MBtu/ton/ 8, 25 MBtu/ton.
Source: Author's calculations.
1979
7
Bal t.
8
Hampton
2.25
2.20
2.20
2.33
1.52
1 .68
1.48
to ship. $1 per
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Delivered Steam
Table 4
Coal Prices in Western Europe($/MBtu)
Yok oh ama Rotterdam
New Orleans
Hampton
Mob i le
Los Angeles
Vancouver
Richards Bay
Gladstone
Port Kembla
2.21 Wheeling,
1% ulfur
.69 ocean
.32 inland
2.08 Birm.,
~~73 sulfur
.67 ocean
.14 inland
1.71 Price
. 38 ocean
.43 inland
1.43 B.C.
.23 ocean
.42 inland
1.40
. 4o ce an
.24 inland
1.19-1.38
.24 ocean
.28 inland
1.28-1. 47
.33 ocean
.21 inland
2.03 Billings,
~$~7 sulfur
1.81 Wheeling,
T19su lfur
.29 ocean
.32 inland
1.75 Birm.
.75% sulfur
.34 ocean
.14 inland
2.02 Price
.69 ocean
.43 inland
1.90 B.C.
.67 ocean
.42 inland
1. 40
.40 ocean
.24 inland
1.52-1.71
.57 ocean
.28 inland
1.68-1.87
.73 ocean
.21 inland
2.18 Billings,
.5% sulfur
1.76 Wheeling,
1% sulfur
.24 ocean
.32 inland
1.70 Birm.
.75% sulfur
.29 ocean
.14 inland
1.96 Price
.63 ocean
.43 inland
1.82 B.C.
.59 ocean
.42 inland
1 .38
.38 ocean
.24 inland
1.61-1.80
.66 ocean
.28 inland
1.81-2.00
.86 ocean
.21 inland
Notes: 1. Total price delivered to dockside, originating point, sulfur
level, ocean transportation cost, and inland transportation cost.
2. January, 1979 price levels.
3. U.S., Canada include $1.00 per ton dumping fee.
4. Australia:
a. 24 million Btu/short ton.
b. $.95 to $1.14 per-million Btu, FOB pier.
c. Inland Transportation based on 108 km frcm N.S.W. = $5.00 A,
$5.65 U.S. From Queensland , inland transportation cost based
on South Blackwater = $6.58 A, $7.43 U.S. per metric ton.
d. Average 1979 exchange rate, 1 Australian dollar
equals 1.13 U.S. dollars.
and Japan
.Taran to
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TABLE 4 (continued)
5. South Africa.
a. 23 million Btu/short ton
b. $1.00/MBtu FOB pier price, or 21.08 Rand per metric ton
c. 36.00 per metric ton, inland transportation costs.
d. 1979 exchange rate, 1 Rand = 1.2 U.S. dollars.
6. Canada:
a. Based on British Columbia origins
b. 26 MBtu/short ton
c. FOB mine price assumed at $20.00 U.S. per short ton.
d. Inland transportation costs estimated at $11.00 U.S.
per short ton.
Source: Author's calculations.
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transportation costs, and on shipments to Europe they are handicapped
with high coal prices. In the next section we will consider possible
future shifts in this competitive structure.
POSSIBLE FUTURE SHIFTS IN THE COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL STEAM COAL MARKETS
Having analyzed the existing economic structure of international
stean coal markets, we can begin to consider the importance of possible
future shifts in supply and transportation variables to the development
of stean coal markets.
We will focus on potential shifts relative to their effects on U.S.
participation in stean coal export markets. In essence, we ask: What
changes are likely to shift the economic structure of international steam
coal markets in the United States' favor?
First, consider inland transportation tariffs. In the United
States, shifts in both directions are possible. In the calculations
above, the railroad tariff used for shipments to the East Coast ports is
based on existing domestic unit-train rate levels. In fact, the existing
export rate structure is significantly higher than this level. From
Northern Appalachia to Hamptcn Roads, the January 1979 rate ranged from
$10.00 to $11.00 per short ton. This will add 10 cents per million Btu
to prices from this area, or 32.40/24 MBtu. From Birmingham to Mobile,
the rail rate would increase from $14.80 per ton to $16.80 per short ton,
or 9 cents/MBtu. Given no existing export rate structure based on
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western U.S. origins, the higher export rate levels are less likely for
western originating shipments.
Another possible shift in U.S. railroad rates is a change in
unit-train rate levels in either direction. As discussed in the inland
transportation chapters, railroad rates are significantly higher than
long-run marginal costs. Based on the estimates of costs in Table 1,
significant price reductions could obtain. For example, the estimated
cost to Los Angeles from Price, Utah is $7.90 per short ton, versus the
existing tariff of $9.82 per short ton. The savings in delivered prices
to Japan would amount to 8 cents per MBtu. To East Coast and Gulf Coast
ports, savings realized by rate reduction to marginal cost levels are
approximately the same.
Note, however, that with the current deregulatory bills in the U.S.
Congress, it is equally likely that domestic unit train rates will
continue to increase rapidly. Though drastic increases on export
shipments would seemingly eliminate the United States as a competitor
abroad, the risk of jeopardizing the lucrative domestic market with
export rate reductions to normally profitable levels must be a concern.
On the other hand, it is possible that the ICC will ignore the
differences between export and domestic rate structures, as they have in
the past, and allow rate discrimination to exist. Note also that other
exporting countries could similarly cut railroad rates to counteract this
s tr ate gy .
Another possible development is port expansion and/or new port
development. A number of options exist. First, assume that Los Angeles
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is expanded to handle 120,000 DWT vessels. The ocean freight would be
approximately $6.78 per short ton versus $8.69 per short toi, a savings
of 8 cents per million Btu.
A second possibility is to develop coal handling facilities and
expand ports elsewhere on the West Coast. Portland is 4323 miles from
Yokohama, or approximtely 516 less than Los Angeles. For a 60,000 ton
vessel, the saving would be 79 cents per short ton, or 3 cents per 24
M3tu. The cost minimizing origin via Portland to Japan is Billings,
Montana. The delivered price is 1.62/MBtu, versus $1.71 for Los Angeles
with a facility that can handle 60,000 DWT vessels. Rock Springs,
Wyoming and Price, Utah coal could be delivered to Japan through
Portland for $1.72 MBtu.
A similar facility in San Francisco would receive coal from Price,
Utah and deliver it to Japan for $1.67/MBtu.
With respect to the Japanese market, the minimum delivered price in
Japan would involve Billings coal via Portland. With railroad rates at
marginal cost levels, and a 120,000 DWT port facility in Portland, the
price would be $1.47/MBtu. Even with this optimistic scenario,
Australian, Canadian, and South African coals are cheaper in Japan, but
western United States coal would be closely competitive. (Note also that
this assumes no increase in port charges with port expansion. In fact,
there is virtually no correspondence between port charges and port-
expansion costs. However, in real economic terms, these additional costs
would have to be justified (see Part A, Chapter VII.)
With respect to the European market, port expansion should also be
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considered. First, consider shipments from Hampton Roads. Expansion to
allow for 120,000 DWT vessels would reduce ocean freight costs by only 3
cents/MBtu to Rotterdan. This expansion plus a reduction in rail rates
would not make much difference in the existing competitive structure.
South African coal would still be far cheaper, and U.S. coal is currently
competitive with other potential suppliers.
Another possibility is expanding the Gulf port(s). If New Orleans
was expanded to allow for 120,00 DWT vessels, the delivered price of
Billings coal in Rotterdam would be 32.06/MBtu. Low-sulfur coal to
Houston from Gallup would be priced at $1.88/MBtu in Rotterdam. Medium-
sulfur coal from Western Kentucky would be priced at $1.79/MBtu if a
120,000 DWT facility was developed in the New Orleans region. Also, if
rail rates dropped to the level of marginal costs, delivered prices in
Rotterdam would drop further to $1.65/MBtu.
To summarize, expanded facilities on the Gulf or East coasts would
not significantly affect the existing competitive structure of U.S. coal
in Europe.
Two other inland transportation shifts should be briefly recalled.
First, coal-slurry pipelines. As discussed earlier, the economics of
coal-slurry pipelines are uncertain. It is, however, possible that costs
could be equal to or below rail marginal costs, and well below existing
railroad rates. A savings of up to 10 cents/MBtu could be realized by
this development.
Secondly, waterway user charges may be increased for barge movements
on the inland waterway systen. This would affect shipments to the Gulf
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coast, but would have a negligible effect on delivered prices in Japan or
Europe.
Finally, recall again that all of these potential changes could be
counteracted by the supplying countries.
Next, let us briefly consider changes in the ocean transportation
base case assunptions. One development that might affect the United
States relative to other exporters is the availability of return
cargoes. As described in Part A, Chapter VII, South Africa and the
western United States both have return cargo possibilities on shipments
to Japan. Shipments via Los Angeles can save 4 cents/MBtu by returning
oil from Alaska. South Africa can reduce delivered prices to Japan by 2
cents/MBtu by returning oil fron Bahrain. In and of itself, this does
not mitigate Australia's competitive advantage in Japan. However, in the
ideal case cited above, the savings would further narrow the competitive
advantage of Australia's coals (1.43 Portland versus 1.28 Port Kembla).
Another important shift is in fuel prices. As noted in Part A, the
proportional effect of fuel price -increases on ocean rates does not vary
substantially over distance. The absolute effect, however, will be far
greater on longer shipments. The major implications of large fuel price
increases will be that Australia's competitive position in Europe will be
damaged, as will South Africa's competitive position in Japan.
Specifically, a 60 percent increase in fuel prices will increase the
price of Australian coal delivered to Rotterdam by approximately 10 cents
per million Btu. The corresponding increase in U.S. coal prices
delivered to Rotterdam is 3.25 cents per million Btu. If the long run
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coal prices in Australia are at the low end of estimated range, then
Australian coal would still be competitive with U.S. coal in Europe.
However, if prices are in the higher end of th range, U.S. coal will be
significantly cheaper in Europe. Overall, the increase in fuel prices
will icrease the importance of transportation, and limit the number of
competitors in each demand region.
Now, consider the possibility that high-sulfur coal could be used.
This would significantly affect only the U.S. East coast and Gulf coast
exports. To New Orleans, the delivered price of 3.5 percent sulfur coal
in Rotterdam would be $1.64/MBtu. This is still well above South African
price levels, but further below other countries' delivered prices. To
Hampton Roads, high.-sulfur coal could be delivered to Rotterdam for
11.52/MBtu, a price that is very competitive with South African prices
($1.40/MBtu). The premium on low-sulfur coal in Western Europe will be
evaluated below to see if this is a reasonable projection.
Finally, let us consider potentially important supply-side shifts.
The most important, given the existing economic structure of steam coal
markets, is the likelihood of South African coal prices increasing at a
faster rate than prices in other exporting countries.
As discussed above, Ellis' most likely case assumes that South
African prices, delivered to Europe, will equate U.S. prices by 1990.
Adjusting his calculations to reflect the existing vessel economies of
scale realized in Richards Bay, the delivered price of South African coal
in 1990 would be 13.13/MBtu. Given the existing delivered price of coal
through Hampton Roads, $1.76/MBtu, this means that the price of coal
464
delivered to Europe could increase by 5 percent real per year and be
equal to South African prices. 1
Zimnerman has estimated that medium-sulfur and low-sulfur coal
prices in the eastern United States will also escalate rapidly. 2 For
the FOB mine price of northern Appalachian medium-sulfur coal
(.84 percent to 1 .85 percent), he estimates an increase of 33 percent
(real) from 1978 to 1990, yielding $1.54/MBtu. The rail rate is
currently 32 cents/MBtu, and the ocean freight 24 cents/MBtu. Allowing
for a 7 percent real increase per year in railroad rates, the delivered
price in 1990 would be $2.50/MBtu, well below South African prices. Note
however that prices in Australia may increase at slower rates over this
period, so that the competitiveness of eastern coal is not certain.
It is also useful to consider the conpetitiveness of low-sulfur
western U.S. coal in Europe given these rapid increases in South African
prices. For example, consider coal from Gallup, New Mexico, delivered to
Europe via a port facility in Houston. The current price of coal FOB
mine is 80 cents/MBtu. Zinmerman projects an increase to 92 cents/MBtu
in 1990.3 The current inland transportation cost is 70 cents/MBtu.
Ocean frei ght in an 80,000 DWT vessel to Rotterdam is 43 cents/MBtu. The
current delivered price in Europe is $1.93/MBtu. The 1990 rate,
increasing railroad rates by 7 percent per year, is 32.93/MBtu, again
below the South African price.
To conclude, South African labor and capital cost increases in the
next decade may well eliminate the ccnpetitive advantage that they now
have in European markets. If so, U.S. East Coast medium-sulfur and
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western low-sulfur coal may ccmpete in Europe with South African coal.
However, the ability of U.S. coal to compete in Europe with Australian
coal is not clear. Large fuel price increases will favor the United
States in European markets. The effects of depletion on low-sulfur and
medium-sulfur United States coal in the East and Midwest will favor
Australia. Significantly divergent real rates of cost increases in other
mining and transportation variables may also affect the existing
competitive balance. Further research is necessary to specify the future
carnpetitive structure with greater certainty.
In the next chapters we will analyze the demand for steam coal at
these delivered prices.
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FOOTNOTES-CHAPTER II
ISee Ellis, P.,
Industry with a Focus
Thesis, MIT, 1979.
"An Economic Analysis of the South African coal
on Exports," Sloan School of Management, Master's
2Zimmerman, M.B., Coal Supply Manual, unpublished documentation;
and Zimmerman, M.B., The U.S. Coa Industry: The Economics of Policy
Choi ce . M. I. T., Cambridge, Massachusetts,, 1980.
3I bid.
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CHAPTER III
THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF STEAM COAL DEMAND
IN WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN
468
INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapters on supply and transportation we have
estimated the delivered price of steam coal to markets in Western Europe
and Japan and have analyzed some of the important economic and
institutional variables affecting international stea-n coal markets. The
next three chapters analyze steam coal demand in Western Europe and
Japan. Our purpose is twofold. First, to explain the structure of steam
coal demand, primarily for electricity generation, in Western Europe and
Japan. By this we mean to analyze the economic and policy variables that
will affect steam coal demand, and to explain the interaction between
these variables and dgmand. Second, to estimate future stean coal
demand, and to analyze the effect of changes in supply, transportation,
and demand variables on stean coal imports.
Chapters III through V are organized as follows. Chapter III will
describe the existing structure of coal demand in Western Europe and
Japan. Chapter IV will present and criticize estimates of steam coal
demand to the year 2000. Given the deficiencies and/or uncertainties in
the forecasts, Chapter V will present a more detailed analysis of steam
coal demand for electricity generation based on the economics of power
generation, the current structure of electricity generation, and various
assumptions on power plant fuel choice, and electricity demand growth
rates from the present to the year 2000.
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THE EXISTING STRUCTURE OF COAL DEMAND
IN WESTERN EUROPE PND JAPAN
Table 1 summarizes total primary energy demand in Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The solid fuels
column includes coal, coke oven gas, blast furnace gas, peat, wood, and
black liquor. Coal, however, accounts for virtually all of the
category. The salient point to make is that coal is a large input to
energy demand, yet it is dwarfed by oil, gas, and hydro resources. In
OECD Europe, and the United States, approximately 20 percent of primary
energy demand is met by solid fuels. In Japan solid fuels account for 14
percent of primary energy demand versus 42 percent in Australia.
Note also the relative magnitudes of primary energy demand. The
United States is by far the largest OECD consumer. They required 1857
million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) in 1978. OECD Europe as a whole
consumed 1227 MTOE. The largest European consumers, France, Italy, West
Germany, and the United Kingdom, accounted for 66 percent of Europe's
energy requirements. Japan's primary energy demand was 357 MTOE in 1978,
the second highest country total in the OECD.
Tables 2 and 3 present a more detailed analysis of coal consumption,
production, imports, exports, and applications. Again, the largest
producer and consumer is the United States. They produced 58 percent of
the hard coal (anthracite and bituminas) output in the OECD, and 13
percent of the total brown coal (lignite) output. Adjusting for the
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Table 1
OECD Total Energy Requirements-1978
(million tons of oil equivalent)
Crude
Solid Oil + Petroleum Nuclear Hydro and Elec-
Fuels NGL Products Gas Power Geothermal tricity Total
N. Anerica 380 927 51 508 79 131 -0.21 2077
U.S. 362(19)1836 53 465 71 70 2 1857
Canada 18 (8) 91 -1 43 8 61 -2 219
OECD Europe2 251(20) 671 5 171 39 90 - 1227
Austria 4(16) 10 2 4 - 6 0 25
Belgium 10(22) 34 -10 9 3 - - 45
Denmark 4(20) 8 8 - - - - 20
Finland 8(33) 11 1 1 1 2 - 24
France 33(17) 119 -5 20 7 16 - 190
Germany 73(27) 108 38 41 8 4 - 273
Italy 10 (7) 113 -21 23 1 11 - 137
Netherlands 3 (5) 58 -31 33 1 - - 64
Norway 1 (5) 9 - 1 - 12 - 22
Spain 11(15) 50 -2 1 2 10 - 72
Sweden 5(10) 15 10 - 6 14 - 49
Switz. 1 (4) 4 10 1 2 8 - 24
Turkey 13(42) 13 3 - - 2 - 31
U.K. 70(33) 98 -4 38 9 1 - 212
Japan 51(14) 239 18 16 15 18 - 357
Australia 29(42) 32 -2 6 - 4 - 69
Notes: 1Numbers in parentheses represent solid fuel percentage shares.
20 ECD Europe also includes Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Portugal. Total fuels include coal, coke oven gas, blast furnace
gas, peat, wood, blacke lignite.
Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of OECD Countries,
1974/1978, Paris, 1980
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differences in heating contents between hard and brown coals, the United
States consumed 558 million metric tons in 1978, versus 398 million
metric tons in OECD Europe.1 Japan consumed approximately 71 million
tons of hard coal in 1978.
The primary uses of coal are in the energy transformation sector,
specifically coke ovens and thermal power stations. In OECD countries
23 percent of total hard coal consumption was in coke ovens for
metallurgical purposes, and 63 percent in thermal power stations.
Eighty-seven percent of brown coal consumption was in thermal power
stations. Excluding the United States, however, the relative importance
of transformation applications shifts significantly. In Europe 53
percent of hard coal is used in thermal power plants. In Japan, only 11
percent of all coal consumed is used for power generation, while 77
percent is used for metallurgical purposes.
Final consumption of coal is small in all these countries. Only 11
percent of the hard coal is used in final consumiption and 6 percent of
the brown coal. In Europe, final coal consumption is evenly split
between the residential and industrial sectors. In North America and
Japan, virtually all of the final consumption is in the industrial
sector.
Tables 2 and 3 also include coal imports in 1978. Europe imported
approximately 77 million metric tons in 1978. The largest European
importer was France with 23.4 MT. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, West
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom
imports ranged from 1.5 to 7.0 million metric tons of coal.
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Table 2
0ECD Coal Conswnption-1978
(Thousand metric tons)
Coal
Country Type
Total
Domestic
Con-
sumpt ion
OECD Hard 977720
Total Brown 247667
U.S. Hard 541842
Brown 32591
Canada Hard 18593
Brown 13157
Consumption uses
Produ cti on
930796
246368
566374
32591
17141
13336
Imports/
Exports
146970/110784
1765/38
2679/36914
14119/13988
/12
Electric
Power
611556
216535
408048
28500
10350
12625
Final
Coke Con-
Ovens sumption Other
227959 115170 14484
- 15593 1592
64495 60487 -
- 4091 -
6909 1525
389
19820 52860/ 7730 54270 3220 4360
Aust. Hard 32447
Brown 30485
OECD
Europe
Hard 312149
Brown 171267
70981
30485
255007
169768
13/37911 20482
-3 -%
77298/21959
1765/26
164355
1499088
8609 3379 89
- 1314 2843
93626 45309 8864
- 9295 1924
Notes: 1. "Other" includes energy sector transformations, patent fuel
plants, gas works, blast furnace gas, producer gas, petroleum
refineries.
2. Conversion factors: Ton of oil equivalent = 107 Kcal; ton of
coal equivalent = 7 x 106 Kcal; ton of lignite equivalent = 2 x
106 Kcal. Typical conversion factors:
U.K. hard coal = 5.4 x 106 kcal to 6.6 x 106 kcal
U.S. hard coal = 6.4 x 106 kcal
U.S. brown coal = 3.1 x 106 kcal
Canada Bituminous = 6.7 x 106 kcal
Subbit = 4.5 x 106 kcal
lignite = 3.1 x 106 kcal
Australian hard = 6,2 x 106 kcal
brown = 2.2 x 106 kcal
Europe hard coal imports 6.0 to 7 .0 x 106 kcal.
Source: International Energy Agenc(y, Energy Statistics,
1980
1974/1978.
Japan Hard 70710
Paris,
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Table 3
1978 Coal Consunption - OECD Europe
(Thousand metric tons)
Consumption Uses
Coal
Country Type
OE CD
Europe
Hard
Brown
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finlan d
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switz.
Turkey
U.K.
Total
Domestic
Con-
sumption
312149
171267
2277
3130
13800
5655
5401
44590
80022
125231
12456
1215
4689
831
13193
8161
1628
149
4440
9190
120863
Production
255007
169768
1
Imports/
Exports
772982/1959
1765/26
- 2277/
3076 245/5
6590 7007/226
- 6111/
- 4789/
19690 23441/443
2730 10/10
90104 6931/18788
23587 1460/11
- 12456/
1188 27/
- 4797/73
378 447/77
11387 3443/10
8261 6/
16 1543/31
- 141/
4440
9190
121695 2352/2253
Electric
Power
164355
149088
1
2179
3698
4923
3832
22160
2340
35118
111575
1971
1155
1225
15
6818
8086
9
8
1162
3960
83208
Cok e
Ovens
Final
Con-
sumption Other
93626 45309
~ 9295
1938 338
- 880
7220 2794
- 7-18
- 1506
129380 6019
- 270
32133 9874
- 1600
10006 454
- 60
3275 272
443 374
5161 1099
- 67
1227 393
141
1875 1323
- 5211
16763 18450
Energy Agency, Energy Statistics, 1979/1978,
8864
1924
71
128
92
3440
10
2840
12000
25
14
115
8
80
19
2056
Source: International Paris,1980.
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The split between steam coal and metallurgical coal imports is not
available for 1978. However, the electric power consumption figures
combined with production and imports give a reasonable indication of the
relative volumes. In Denmark and Finland, all imports were for thermal
power generation. In the Netherlands, approximately 26 percent of the
imports were used for thermal power generation. In Sweden, 1 percent of
the imports were used for thermal power generation. In Italy, less than
16 percent of imports were for thermal power generation. For Belgium,
France, and Spain, the data in Table 2 are insufficient to split imports
between thermal uses and other uses. For 1976, the IEA estimated the
splits as follows: Spain, 4 percent thermal; France, 49 percent thermal;
Belgium, 34 percent thermal.2 Germany's imports in 1977 are
estimated at 90 percent thermal, and the United Kingdom's are estimated
to be 50 percent thermal.3 Based on these estimates, steam coal
imports in these major countries amounted to approximately 36 MT in 1978
(see Table 4). Japan imported approximately 8 MT of thermal coal in
1978. Metallurgical and other hard coal imports equaled 41 MT in these
European countries, and approximately 45 MT in Japan.
Also note in Table 5 the current distribution patterns of hard coal
for Japanese and major European consumers. Japan's major suppliers are
Australia, Canada, and the United States. For Europe, Poland, Australia,
West Germany, South Africa, and the United States are the major
suppliers. Note in particular the large European imports from Poland.
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Table 4
Steam Coal Imports in Europe and Japan - 1978
(Million metric tons)
France 11.5
Japan 8.0
West Germany 6.3
Denmark 6.1
Finland 4.8
Belgium 2.4
Italy 1.9
The Netherlands 1.25
United Kingdom 1.2
TOTAL 43.45
Source: see text, pp. 6-7.
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Table 5
Hard Coal Distribution Patterns -- Europe and Japan,-1978
(Percent)
Aust.
Demanders
Jap. 48
Fr. 7
Germ. 12
Den. 1
Belg.
Ital. 11
U.K. 44
TOTAL
Can. W. Germ. B
21 1
29
5
Suppliers
Pol. Fr. S. Afr.
1
20
1 32
75
47
19
11
5
30
17
1
4
25
18
7
Russia U.S. U.K. Other
5
4
2
15
9
4
17
6
10
1
30
26
18
4
10
1
21
72
6
3
5
Notes: 1. 1.5 percent China
2. Including Netherlands, Czechoslovakia
3. Exarnple: Australia supplies 44 percent of Japan's imports.
Source: a. France, Spain, Italy from World Coal, "Annual Review," November,
1979.
b. Germany, United Kingdom from U.S. Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Mines, International Coal Trade, February 1979.
c. Belgium, Denmark from Eurostat, Coal Statistics, Luxembourg, 1977.
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With respect to thermal coal imports in 1976, the IEA estimated that
approximately 50 percent of EEC Europe's third-party stean coal imports
(24 MT total) are supplied by Poland, 13 percent by the United States, 3
percent by Canada, 7 percent by Australia, 14 percent by S.A., and 12
percent by the U.S.S.R. 4
Table 6 presents a more detailed look at electricity consumption.
The major consumers of electricity are the industrial, residential, and
commercial sectors. In the OECD, 39 percent of electricity was consumed
in industry in 1978, 26 percent in the residential sector, and 16
percent in the commercial sector. In Europe, 42 percent was consumed by
industry, 25 percent by residences, and 13 percent by the commercial
sector. Although a minor component of total consumption, the European
transportation sector, principally the railroads, consumed 35444 million
kilowatt hours (kWh) in 1978, or 2 percent of the total consumption. In
Japan, 3 percent of total electricity consumption was by the railroads.
In the United States, in contrast, electrification in the transportation
sector is negligible. Other minor consumers of electricity are the
agricultural and public service sectors.
As shown above, electricity generation is a major consumer of coal
in the OECD. However, coal does not dominate all other inputs to
electricity generation (see Table 7). In the OECD as a whole, 35
percent of electricity was generated by coal, 32 percent by oil and gas,
20 percent by hydro, 11 percent by nuclear, and a negligible amount by
geothermal plants. The relative importance of coal varies
geographically. In the United States, 45 percent of the electricity was
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Table 6
Electricity Consunption in Europe and Japan by Sector
(Millions of kWh)
Total
Cons.
Energy
Sector
Jap. 563990 68301
U.S. 2418708 372818
Can. 324720 43496
Aust. 85982 17513
0 ECD
Eur.
Aust.
Belg.
Den.
Fin.
France
Germ.
Italy
Neth.
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switz.
Turkey
U.K.
1638796 244688
35307
48061
24462
37088
230980
356515
177167
62013
78252
98003
91845
37810
22215
287613
4815
6715
3653
4638
32923
51446
28241
5999
8883
17908
10796
5464
4372
50942
Transp.
Sector
14961
3497
700
35444
2012
907
125
155
6681
9500
5294
720
600
1613
2112
2034
206
2971
Industry
Sector
313767
814294
119190
40581
685893
13246
23500
5330
19400
91833
143999
91269
29050
38789
50645
39559
11004
11315
93370
Residential
Sector
112841
664412
77410
27188
415911
8154
10462
7430
7760
53891
110420
334404
14150
23000
15984
21618
8552
2748
85802
Commercial
Sector
49122
458240
78230
211228
4065
5659
5660
4785
41255
32000
13384
10826
3480
8792
14260
9712
3107
48264
International Energy Agency, Energy Statistics, 1974/1978,
Other
4998
105417
5420
45367
3015
818
2264
350
4397
9150
4575
1068
3500
3061
3500
769
467
6264
Source:
1980.
Paris,
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Table 7
Electricity Production by Fuel Type-1978
(Gigawatt Hours)
Production
Hydro and
Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Geothermal
Aust.
Japan
Canada
U.S.
OECD Eur.
Austri a
Bel gium
Denmark
Fin] and
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switz.
Turkey
U.K.
85982 62976 2692
563990 36175 330042
5248
63413
345100 50624 13000 12870
2400208 1077790 401579
1636646 519418 316912
38069
50838
20782
35810
226692
353429
175041
61597
81642
99853
92853
43204
21594
286506
2475
13544
11167
11745
63072
196542
9477
7059
4666
17410
9595
6399
56413
33846
98732
10586
-142 -*
-50388-**
11355-**
1974
5540 6532
188178 52874
336993
141621
5411
6622
1870
6638
66603
10936
38870
4191
Notes: *142 = oil and gas
**50388 = coal, oil, and gas
***11355 = coal, oil, and gas
Source: Internati
1974/1978, Paris,
onal Energy Agency
1980.
Energy Balances of OECD Countries,
14537
59314
31500
292987
167874
12513
3320
30485
35942
4428
4060
7649
23858
8395
37224
75046
236370
289968
417780
24891
503
20
9840
69580
18496
49907
81500
41497
57640
32835
9358
4039
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generated by coal versus 32 percent in Europe, and 6 percent in Japan.
The role of nuclear power is close to constant across regions,
contributing 10 percent in Europe, 12 percent in the United States, and
11 percent in Japan in 1978. Hydro generation amounted to 13 percent in
Japan, 12 percent in the United States, and 26 percent in Europe. Oil
contributed 59 percent in Japan, 19 percent in Europe, and 17 percent in
the United States. Gas power contributed 11 percent in Japan, 14 percent
in the United States, and 9 percent in Europe. Most striking is Japan's
dependence on oil relative to Europe and the United States.
To summarize, several salient points in reference to Europe and
Japan should be restated. First, coal is a large contributor to primary
energy demand, but is a minor contributor relative to oil and gas in
Europe and Japan. Second, major uses for coal are in thermal power plants
and coking ovens. In Europe, more than half of coal consumption is in
thermal power plants. In Japan, only 11 percent of coal consumption was
in thermal power plants in 1978, while 77 percent of coal consumption was
for metallurgical purposes. Third, though an important source of electric
power, coal is dominated by other fuel inputs in Japan, particularly oil,
and contributes only 32 percent of the power requirements in Europe.
Fourth, thermal coal imports to Japan and Europe are currently exceeded
by metallurgical coal imports: 36 million metric tons versus 41 million
metric tons in Europe, and 8 MT versus 45 MT in Japan. Fifth, the
largest OECD steam coal importer is France (11.5 MT in 1978). Following
France are: Japan (8 MT); Germany (6.3 MT); Denmark (6.1 MT); Finland
(4.8 MT); Belgium (2.4 MT); Italy (1.9 MT); U.K. (1.2 MT), and
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the Netherlands (1.25 MT). No other European country imported more than
500,000 tons in 1978.
In the next chapter we will review some recent forecasts of how this
structure of coal demand might evolve through the remainder of the
twentieth century.
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER III
'For this comparison, brown coal heating content was assumed at
50 percent of hard coal heating content. In fact, actual relationships
vary from as low as 30 percent in Germany to as high as 60 percent. OECD
conversions are presented in International Energy Agency, Energy Balances
of OECD Countries: 1974/1978, Paris, 1980, pp. viii-xiii . Note that we
use the "brown coal", "hFardcoal" classification only because the OECD
does. "Hard coal" refers to Anthracite and Bitumous coal, and "Brown
coal" refers to Lignite. The treatment of subbituminous coal is
inconsistent. In Canada, it is included in the brown coal category. In
the United States, it is considered "hard coal." With this exception,
hard coal is "coal, generally of gross califoric value of more than 5700
kcal/kg", or approximately 22.6 Btu per metric ton.
2 International Energy Agency, Steam Coal Prospects to 2000,
Organization for Economic Cooperation andDeve lopmjent, Paris, 1978, pp.
139, 140.
3World Coal Study, Coal: Bridge to the Future, Ballinger
Publishing Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980, pp. 232, 247. 1980.
4 International Energy Agency, op. cit., p. 155.
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CWAPTER IV
A REVIEW OF STEM COAL DEMAIO FORECASTS
FOR WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN
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IN TRODUCT ION
This chapter reviews several forecasts of international coal demand.
It will show that with few exceptions existing estimates of coal demand
are not very useful. Three fundamental reasons underly this conclusion.
First, most of the international energy demand models do not approach the
level of analytical sophistication seen in current U.S. energy demand
models. Judgmental scenario building normally takes the place of
developing consistent economic relationships. Second, energy demand
models for individual countries outside the United States are equally
unsophisticated. Though there are exceptions, the documentation for
these exceptions is generally poor. Third, the energy demand models that
are more reliable generally do not focus on steam coal markets, but
rather on oil markets and aggregate primary energy deamnd.
Nonetheless, a brief review of several forecasts with steam coal
demand outputs is important. Some of these forecasts are
widely-publicized and a critique of their results is useful. Also, given
the scope of international modeling efforts for coal, we must expect a
lower level of sophistication than with domestic modelling efforts. On Ily
by reviewing these forecasts can we determine the value of further demand
research. Finally, if further research is justified, the existing
studies provide a useful contrast to other results.
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ENERGY DEM AND MODELING
Prior to this review, a brief discussion of energy demand modeling is
useful as a foundation for the criticisms that follow.
Many methodologies have been used in recent years to estimate energy
demand. Given our primary concern with steam coal demand for electricity
generation, electricity models, or overall energy demand models which
focus on interfuel substitution and incorporate electricity demand, are
most useful. Electricity demand models vary in several respects:
the level of geographical and sectoral disaggregation, the behavioral
model and assumptions, statistical and econometric techniques and data,
and the incorporation of technological and policy variables. The more
sophisticated theoretical models, though often less refined empirically,
deal with the ccpetition from other fuels and from new technologies.
The essence of these demand models is to capture the consumption
decision. Typically the models separate the consumption decision into two
or more discrete steps. For example, the residential or commercial
consumer first decides how much income to spend on energy, and then which
fuels to use, subject to some objective function, normally cost
minimization. The determinants of this choice process might include
income, population, prices, and climate. The models are constructed so
that the effects of shifts in these variables on electricity demand can
be determined.
These models estimate the demand for electricity. The other problem
is to estimate the supply of electricity. In this case very different
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techniques have been applied. Mcst supply models incorporate four major
elements: 1) investment in generating capacity; 2) investment in
transmission and distribution networks; 3) production; and 4) pricing.
The investment-in-capacity decision is typically represented by a capacity
expansion model. Briefly, the utility estimates demand in a future
period, and based on existing capacity, decommissioning and derating, and
the anticipated shape of the load curve, determines the capacity needs
for future generations, subject to some objective function (normally cost
minimization). The transmission, distribution investment models develop
the geographical distribution of generating capacity by trading off
transmision and distribution costs with plant size and fuel acquisition
cost factors. The production models determine how to generate electricity
at the variable cost-minimizing level, given the existing plant mix and
transmission-distribution system. The pricing models are developed to
calculate the regulated price of electricity at given production levels.
These supply and demand models can then be integrated so that the
effects of changes in prices, incomes, and policies can be factored into
changes in fuel demand.
None of the current electricity models are ideal. Various
compromises are made depending on the application of the model and data
and financial constraints. None presents a complete general equilibrium
system where a change in any variable is coordinated over time with
changes in all interrelated variables. It is an impossible task to model
every important factor simultaneously, dynamically, and endogneously.
This can result in some inconsitencies between exogenous and endogenous
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variables. Nonetheless, electricity demand models are a useful tool for
developing a consitent and well-defined framework within wiich economic
and policy changes can be analyzed. Let us proceed in reviewing some
recent efforts at estimating steam coal demand worldwide. We will see
that in most cases these studies are far inferior to the conceptual
paradigni outlined above.
A REVIEW
FOR
The four major studies
Energy Conference (WEC); 2)
World Coal Study (WOCO); 3)
United States Department of
2000, by the International
OF STEAM
WESTERN
COAL D
EUROPE
EMAND FORECASTS
AND JAPAN
are: 1) World Energy Demand, by the World
Coal-Bridge to the Future, Report of the
Demand for World Coal Through 1995, by the
Energy (DOE); and 4) Steam Coal-Prospects to
Energy Agency (IEA).
WORLD ENERGY ONFERENCE
The 1978 report, World Energy Demand, represents the coordinated
efforts of university, government, and industry representatives
worldwide. FOr the years 1985, 2000, and 2020, energy demand by sector
and fuel are estimated for seven groups of countries: 1) North America;
2) Wetern Europe; 3) Japan, Australia, and New Zealand; 4) the U.S.S.R..
and Eastern Europe; 5) China and Centrally Planned Asia; 6) OPEC
developing nations; and 7) non-OPEC developing nations.
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The approach is essentially scenario building. Assumptions are made
about energy demand and supply growth rates, and, based on one of several
scenarios, future demand is extrapolated from current demand. For each
scenarios, the demand forecast includes three stages.
First, total primary energy demand is estimated with a constant
elasticity demand function linking energy demand to income and energy
prices. Income eleasticities are set at 0.95 in the OECD, and at 1.1
elsewhere. Price elasticities are set equal to -0.3, and the assumed
world income growth rate ranges from 3.0 percent to 4.2 percent
annually. 2
Second, if this estimate of primary energy demand exceeds exogenously
determined supply levels (based on WEC reports), adjustments are made on
the growth of oil demand in developing an "oil-constrained" forecast.
Third, given further inconsistencies, additional adjustments to
fossil fuel demand are made in obtaining fossil fuel constrained
forecasts. "Inconsistencies" refer in general to results inconsistent
with accepted ad hoc projections.
Within this simple model, three energy price scenarios are
constructed: 1) energy prices are constant in real terms; 2) real oil
prices rise fourfold and average energy prices rise 80 percent between
1977 and 2020; 3) oil prices rise eightfold, while average enrgy prices
increase by 120 percent. In both the second and third cases, estimated
demand exceeds projected supply levels so that the second stage oil
constrained forecast is used. In the oil-constrained forecast, demand
projections are disagregated by sector and fuel, using constant
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elasticity sectoral demand functions and assuming constant fuel shares
within the sectors. Oil demand is then reduced according to various ad
hoc assumptions. In the transport sector, car demand saturation and
increased fuel efficiency are assumed. Feedstock demand is adjusted
according to revised income elasticity assumptions. Fuel oil demand in
the remaining sectors is lastly adjusted to meet supply constraints.
This stage equates supply and demand of fuel, but creates an
inconsistency in other fuel shares as they have moved upward. In
particular, as coal was substituted for fuel oil, coal demand levels
exceeded WEC coal supply forecasts.
To adjust for this the fuel substitution model is used. The ode l
specifies a preference for use of indigenous supplies and a preference
order for fuels based on cost and convenience. It also restricts the
rate at which one fuel may be substituted for another, as a reflection of
inertia in market peneration. This third-stage adjustment yields
consistent estimates of demand by fuel and sector.
WORLD OAL STUDY
The World Coal Study (WOCO) and its predecessor, the Workshop on
Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES) forecasts are similar in many ways
to the WEC forecast. They are the product of collaborative efforts
between national groups, coordinated by Professor Carroll Wilson and
staff. In brief, demand and supply are predicted for each country, given
a number of assumptions.3 The results are checked for consistency,
and "gaps" are closed by a judgmental fuel adjustment model similar to
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that used by the WEC. What makes the WOCO estimates more troublesome are
the demand and supply forecasts themselves. Each is provided by a
national team, and a wide range of methodologies are used, from
econometric forecasts to energy balance projections. Although a specific
set of assumptions is given to each country for the independent modeling
efforts, the consistency among these diverse results must be questioned,
but cannot be evaluated in detail due to inadequate documentation.
Given these national reports, demand and supply projections are
integrated in various stages. The unconstrained integration simply
compares supply and demand in each country and calculates the required
exports and imports for each fuel. THese are then aggregated to check
that required exports equal required imports. Imbalances are adjusted
for the constrained integration with a fuel substitution model. In WAES,
a linear programming model allocates fuel to various demand categories to
minimize total fuel costs. In that fuel preferences are ignored, a big
switch from oil to coal and nuclear obtains.
Comments on WOCO and WEC
The WOCO/WAES and WEC forecasts are not without merit. They offer a
forum for analysts and policy makers in governments and energy industries
to discuss the prospects for energy markets. In addition, they have
provided some useful information for policy makers. In specific, they
show that if prices do not rise dramatically, world fossil-fuel supplies
might not meet future demand based on current prices.
Given their intentions, it might also be argued that criticisms on
the basis of methodological sophistication are unwarranted. Nor does
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criticism of specific details serve much purpose. If the studies are
interpreted correctly as simply judgmental scenario building based on
disequilibrium prices and quantities, their value should not be
questioned.
In fact, however, these studies have been interpreted as forecasts of
equilibrium prices and quantities. Accordingly, the basic deficiency in
the fundamental economic logic underlying these studies must be noted.
In essence, though the studies occasionally point out the infeasibility
of certain scenarios, they typically repress the actual market mechanisms
that would coordinate intertenporal shifts in prices and quantities. In
the WEC study, for example, supply levels are riot allowed to respond to
increased prices so that an illusory "gap" develops, which is then
narrowed by a series of ad hoc adjustments. Pctually, this gap would not
develop. Price responses would coordinate demand and supply levels over
time. Though the authors of these studies seem basically to grasp this
concept, the adjustments made to equate supply and demand may not reflect
actual market responses.
Drawing simple inferences from disequilibrium prices about future
equilibrian prices and quantities can be misleading if the reasons for
the initial disequilibrium are not analyzed in detail. Policy makers
should be particularly aware of this deficiency. The inference of
"gapology" is that prices will rise sharply in response to gaps, when in
fact markets could adapt over time and dampen price rises. Plans for
developing alternative technologies, for example, formulated on the basis
of sharp price increases, would clearly be endangered given different
price paths.
492
To conclude, though these studies may provide some reasonable
judgemental best-guesses about future energy needs, interpreting them as
economic analyses that integrate supply and demand in a consistent and
logical manner promises to be misleading.
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
The OECD and their affiliate, the IEA, have published several energy
demand forecasts.4 Though their analyses differ in assumptions and
perspective, all their analyses are based on "energy balance
calculations."5 This methodology includes several steps. First,
total energy and electricity demands are drawn from government forecasts
and modified according to OECD/IEA assumptions, or calculated from simple
projections of GNP and energy consunption based on constant energy/GNP
elasticities. Second, estimates of indigeneous supply and net imports of
solid fuels and gas are constructed, based on judgments and independent
estimates. With the exception of oil, production plus imports is set
equal to total energy supply. Third, subtracting non-fossil fuel
electricity generation from total electricity demand yields the amount of
electricity to be generated from fossil fuels. Typically, coal and gas
estimates are based on government forecasts, and oil is ocnsidered a
residual fuel. This yields the total energy supply for electricity. By
subtracting total energy supply of all fuels other than oil from total
energy demand, oil requirements are calculated. Finally, by subtracting
oil production from total energy demand for oil, net imports are
calculated.
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In the IEA steam coal analysis, a different perspective was taken
from other OECD reports.6 In this case, oil is not used as a
residual to close the gap. Rather, it is assumed that oil exporting
countries will not make available the supplies of crude oil required to
satisfy demand. Based on this non-price assumption, a "potential net
world excess demand" is calculated. Coal, nuclear, and conservation
efforts are considered as the most likely ways to close this gap. Two
scenarios, "the reference case," assuming constant market and policy
trends, and "the enlarged coal case," assuming policy actions in favor of
coal, are projected.
The deficiences in this approach should also be clear. Though it
provides a consistent and well-defined framework for analyzing energy
supply and demand, the components of this framework are generally based
on judgments, and the equilibrium is not price-responsive. As with WEC
and WOCO, the exercise is more helpful to tell us what cannot happen.
For example, the IEA scenario has demand growing on the basis of
historical growth rates and supply expanding on the basis of constant
prices. Clearly a "gap" will develop under this scenario. The IEA then
considers how to fill this gap. Though the IEA at least notes that
markets do not work this way, the concept of "gapology" is implicitly
accepted in their analysis.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
A more sophisticated analysis of world coal markets was recently
released by the DOE, Energy Information Administration. For the years
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1985, 1990, and 1995, metallurgical and stean coal demands are calculated
for OECD country groups: United States, Canada, OECD Europe, Japan,
Australia and New Zealand.
The DOE analysis of coal markets draws from several models covering
different aspects of international energy markets. 7  Though the exact
interaction of these different models is unclear, the coal report notes
that "the most significant contribution is from the International Energy
Evaluation System." This is not one model, but a set of sub-models
dealing with different facets of demand. As a group, the system
forecasts energy prices and quantities for 33 international regions. The
methodology is similar to the mid-range energy forecasting system
developed in 1974 for the United States. 8
More specifically, a demand curve is derived for each region and fuel
with econometric fuel demand equations. Supply curves are based on a
loosely defined process that relies primarily on technical analyses,
judgements, and government estimates. Also included are a transportation
and conversion submodel, a refinery model, and an electric utility supply
model. Oil prices are determined exogenously in the oil market
simulation model. These conponents are integrated in a linear program
that minimizes the cost of supply. An equilibrium solution obtains
through the price mechanism, which equalizes consumption to the sum of
domestic production plus imports.
This analysis is clearly better formulated than any of the previous
efforts. Though not as refined as some current U.S. demand models, it at
least approaches the ideal model formulation described earlier. There
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are particular problems, for example, GNP is exogenous and may be
inconsistent with prices. But, in general, the forecast should be more
reliable. However, the documentation of the conponent models and the
integration of these models is either poor or nonexistent. kcordingly,
it is impossible to evaluate them fully. It should also be noted that
though the overall framework is consistent, some of the studies used as
inputs to the model, in particular on transportation and supply, are
seriously flawed.
ASSUMPTIONS AND RESULTS
All of the studies forecast demand under a variety of scenarios, each
constructed under a wide-range of different assUMptions. In some cases,
the assumptions are poorly defined, for example, conservation and policy
assunptions are typically specified only in general terms. In other
cases, for example, income and price elasticities, assumptions are not
documented. Consequently, care should be taken in interpreting the
results summarized below. In all cases, the range of forecasts
represents the extreme scenarios for a given study.
Some assumptions that are clearly defined and that are critical to
demand forecasts are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Average GNP, energy,
and electricity demand growth rates are provided for the 1977 to 2000
interval. In all cases the growth rates decrease over time, so that the
projected rate for 1977 to 1985 will be much higher than from 1990 to
2000. For example, IEA projects GNP growth rates at 3.9% from 1976 to
1985, 3.5% from 1985 to 1990, and 3.0% from 1990 to 2000. Some important
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contrasts are the low oil prices assumed in the IEA analysis and the
higher electricity growth rates calculated by the IEA relative to
WOCO.9 Note however that the WOCO estimates are based on energy
inputs, while IEA's are based on electricity production. Consequently,
if thermal efficiency rises, the difference would be reduced by a small
amount.
The WOCO "high coal case" represents high growth rates, high oil
prices, and lower rates of nuclear penetration. The IEA reference case
considers normal market trends with one variation. "Low nuclear"
corresponds to currently planned rates of nuclear power development,
while "high nuclear" corresponds to faster rates. The TEA also develops
an "enlarged coal case," which assumes greater policy incentives to coal
development. The DOE high case assumes high growth rates, high energy
supplies, and minimu-n conservation. The WEC high case assumes high
growth rates and high oil prices. It should again be stressed that
camparisons between the studies should be made carefully. The set of
assumptions in one study's high (low) case may differ significantly from
another study's high (low) case. It would be useful to compare forecasts
with some consistency in this respect, but this proved to be impossible
given the limited documentation.
Given these qualifications, the results of these studies are shown in
Tables 3 through 10. The first four tables show coal's role in
electricity generation for each of the four studies. Table 7 puts the
different estimates on a comparable basis.
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Table 1
Economic, Energy, Electricity Growth Rates ( Annual Percent)
GNP Growth
W OCo IEA DOE
Energy Growth
W OCO
Electricity Growth
W OCO IEA
Japan 4.1-4.6 4.9
Japan,
Aust.,
New Z.,
Aust./
New Z
5.2-6.1 3.5-2.9 4.0-4.5 4.2
4.2
3.6-2.7
Denmark 2.8-3.4 3.3
Finland 3.0-3.0 2.9
France 3.0-4.0 4.1
Germany 3.0-3.3 3.4
Italy 2.8-3.3 3.6
Nether-
lands 2.2-3.0 2.9
Sweden 2.6-2.6 2.7
U.K. 2.0-3.0 2.3
OECD
Europe 2.7-3.2 3.6
1.6-2.4
2.0-2.0
3.1-2.3
1.8-2.1
2.3-2.5
2.0-2.7
1.5-1 .6
0.7-1.7
5.0-4.4 2.4
3.3-3.3 4.3
3.9-4.8 5.9
3.7-3.5 4.1
3.2-3.6 4.9
2.0-2.9 3.5
2.7-1.7 3.0
1.6-2.5 2.1
3.0-3.9
1. DE based on 1976-1995 annual growth rates.
2. IEA based on 1976-2000
3. WOCO based on 1977-2000
4. "Electricity growth" represents the growth of energy inputs
to electricity production for WOCO, and represents the growth
of electricity production for the IEA.
5. "Energy growth" represents primary energy demand growth.
Notes:
498
Table 1, Cont.
Sources:
a) World Coal
Publishing
Study, Coal: Bridge
Co., Cambridge, MA,
to the Future,
T980~.
b) International
Paris, 1978.
Energy Agency, Steam Coal: Prospects to 2000,
c) U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, Demand for World Coal Through 1995,
Washington, D.C., May, 1979.
Bal linger
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Table 2
Oil Price Assumptions
WOC0 2
$15. 00-$17.00
316 .00-3 21.00
19 .50-3 25 .50
325.00-535.00 125.00-3 35.00
1. $1973, delivered price to U.S. East Coast.
2. Average oil pr
United States.
ice-all OECD countries. Delivered price to the
3. 1977 dollars--Arabia, API 340 crude oil.
year increase, 1985 to 2000.
2 1/2 percent per
Sources:
IEA (See Table 1)
DOE
1985
1990
1995
2000
IEA3
$12.70
118.40
Notes:
DO E, WO0CO,
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For Japan, each study forecasts large increases in coal use for
electricity generation, both in absolute and relative terms. The WOCO
"high coal case" estimates demand at 72 million tons of coal equivalent
(MTCE) in 2000, versus 57 MTCE in the "low coal case." The IEA estimated
range is approximately equal at 45 MTCE for the low nuclear reference
case, and 75 MTCE for the high nuclear reference case.
In both studies the relative contribution of coal to power generation
increases substantially from 1985 to 2000. For the IEA study, the
increase is from 5 percent in 1985 to from 12 percent to 17 percent in
2000. For the WOCO study, the increase is from 6 percent in 1985 to from
15 percent to 17 percent in 2000. The DOE's estimates are slightly lower
than WOCO's or the IEA's. In 1990, the DOE estimates 25 to 33 MTCE, in
contrast to the IEA and WOCO estimates of 32 MTCE and 30 to 37 MTCE
respectively. The main reason for this difference is the lower rate of
coal penetration in the electric sector forecast by DOE. For 1990, WOCO
forecasts coal penetration in the electric sector from 11 percent to
13 percent, versus 8.6 percent to 11 percent for DOE. It should be noted
that the DOE estimates are in tons of coal. THe IEA and WOCO estimates
are in tons of coal equivalent. Conversions are necessary for
comparisons. For Japan, OECD adjustment figures are used. 0 For
Europe, the adjustment is more canplex, as we will see below.
The WEC only presents an estimate for total coal use for Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand as a group. For the year 2000, they estimate
coal use at 157 to 257 MTCE. The IEA estimate on this basis is 289 MTCE.
Forecasts for Europe differ to a greater extent. First, the WOCO and
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IEA estimates are again approximately equal. For the eight countries
that WOCO analyzed, they ,estimated consumption in 2000 at 222 to 327
MTCE, versus 237 to 322 MTCE by the IEA. Note, however, that the
estimates for particular countries differ substantially, especially in
Scandanavian countries. WOCO's estimate for Finland ranges from 4.2 MTCE
to 8.9 MTCE in 2000, versus the IEA's estimated range of 2.4 to 3.4
MTCE. In Sweden, WOCO estimated a range of 7 to 15 MTCE, versus 0 to 1.6
by the IEA. In Denmark, WOCO's range is 8.6 to 18.9 versus 3.9 to 11.4
by the IEA. Table 8 provides a breakdown of fuel inputs into electricity
generation as estimated by these two studies. Generally, the explanation
for these differences is a higher rate of nuclear penetraticn assumed by
the IEA for Scandanavian countries.
The DOE estimate for EEC Europe is especially difficult to convert
frcn tons of coal to tons of coal equivalent. In partiuclar, the split
between lignite and hard coal is not specified, and so the average
conversion factors cannot be determined with certainty. In Table 5 one
reasonable adjustment is made which assumes that lignite consumption in
the EEC does not increase between 1976 and 1995. Virtually all lignite
consumption is of coal produced in the EEC, and in fact it may well
decrease in the future. On this basis, DOE estimates for EEC Europe are
far below WOCO and IEA, as shown in Table 7.11
A safer ccnparison is the relative role of coal in power generation.
From 1985, DOE estimates a large relative loss of coal generation in
Europe. In 1985, 37.7 percent to 40 percent of the primary energy inputs
into electricity generation are estimated to be coal, versus 25.2 percent
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to 30.7 percent in 1995. In the IEA study, in contrast, coal maintains a
30 percent to 35 percent share to the year 2000. Note finally that the
DOE shift is attributable to a greater role for nuclear power. Coal
actually contributes a greater percentage of fossil fuel inputs in 1995
(55.3 percent to 60 percent) than in 1976 (49.7 percent).
With respect to imports, several points should be noted. First, in
Japan's case, the differences in steam coal imports exactly parallel
differences in steam coal use, since production approaches zero and
exports are zero. In Europe, however, some differences should be noted.
For France, WOCO estimates steam coal imports of 26 to 100 MTCE, versus
56 MTCE in the IEA low nuclear case. Table 9 provides some clarification
of this. For electricity generation, the WOCO estimates are similar to
the IEA's. However, WOCO projects a much greater demand for steam coal
in industry (10 to 40 MTCE). The IEA's estimated demand for all uses
other than electrical and metallurgical is only 10 to 25 MTCE, versus
WOCO's estimate of 21 to 60 MTCE.
In Germany, the IEA projects 72 MTCE of steam coal imports, versus an
estimated range of 20 to 40 MTCE by WOCO. In this case (see Table 9),
higher coal use in electricity generation and in the metallurgical sector
is assumed by the IEA. This is partially offset by WOCO's projections of
greater industrial, residential, and synthetic fuels demand for coal.
In Italy, WOCO projects stean coal inputs in 2000 at 17 to 45 MTCE,
versus 22 MTCE for the IEA low nuclear case. The difference is
attributable to a high projected use of coal in the electric sector in
WOCO's high coal case. As seen in Table 8, WOCO projects 32 percent coal
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penetration in the year 2000, versus a high of 13 percent in IEA low
nuclear case.
S UMMAR Y
For Japan, all of the studies project a large increase in coal use
for power generation, but the DOE analysis estimates a significantly
lower absolute level of consumption, and relative share for coal in power
generation. The IEA and WOCO foresee coal use in 2000 at levels six to
ten times higher than in 1977.
For Europe, WOCO and IEA estimate smaller increases in coal use for
power generation, ranging from a 37 percent to a 100 percent increase by
2000, and no relative increase in coal inputs. Again, the DOE estimate
is more conservative. They estimate a small increase in coal
consumption, in absolute terms, from 1985 to 1990 and a decrease in
relative terms; mainly due to the projected nuclear power increases in
the EEC. Hawever, they forecast an increase in EEC steam coal imports
from 23 million tons in 1976 to 65-92.4 MT in 1995.
Note also steam coal export estimates in Table 8. Several points are
important. First, Poland's role in steam coal export markets is not
expected to grow substantially by WOCO and is actually expected to
decrease by the DOE. Second, there is considerable uncertainty about the
role of the United States in steam coal export markets. WOCO projects
U.S. steam coal exports of 85 to 130 MTCE by 2000. The IEA low nuclear
case estimates only 60 MTCE, and DOE estimates 24 to 50 MT in 1995.
Third, there is also considerable uncertainty about Australia's role.
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The IEA projects Australian exports in the year 2000 at 120 MTCE, versus
75 MTCE estimated by WOCO. The DOE, in contrast, estimates only 19 MTCE
by 1995.12 Fourth, the DOE study is more optimistic about Canadian
exports than WOCO, and both studies project a large rate for South
African exports.
Metallurgical coal markets are expected to expand less rapidly. For
Japan and Western Europe as a whole, the projected increase in
metallurgical use is approximately 23 percent between 1976 and 2000.
Only WOCO analyzes other uses in detail. They estimate substantial
increases in coal demand for synfuels (from a negligible amount to 20 to
110 MTCE in 2000) and industry ( 23 MTCE to 68-124 MTCE in 2000).
In general, factors favorable to coal consumption are high growth,
high oil prices, low conservation, and slow nuclear power development.
Note again, however, that different subsets of assumptions are used in
each study. Consequently, cauparisons between studies are risky, and
given poor documentation, there is no precise way to specify the
differences. Given the general flaws in the analyses, the rough
specification of assumptions and methodologies, and the significant
variations both within and between studies, the results of the WEC, WOCO,
and IEA analyses give use little more than a reasonable speculation about
coal demand in the future. The DOE analysis is certainly better
formulated but also poorly documented. Any accurate assessment of the
DOE results is impossible. Although the range of demand may be capture
by these studies, certainly there is room for additional research to
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obtain both better forecasts of demand, and, more important, a better
understanding of the structure of demand in elecricity generation in
Western Eurpoe and Japan. Chapter V will analyze further steam coal
demand in two important countries, Japan and France.
506
Table 3
International Energy Agency Forecasts
Japan 1985
1990
2000
Denmark 1985
1990
2000
Finland 1985
1990
2000
France 1985
1990
2000
Germany 1985.
1990
2000
Italy 1985
1990
2000
Coal Used in
Electricity
(MTCE)
13.9
32.1
45.3-75.7
6.0
4.3-9.1
3.7-11.4
2.7
2.7
2.4-3.4
15.9
17.3
23.7-42.6
76.0
91 .5
94.2-138.7
8.3
12.9
16.4-21.4
Primary
Energy Input
(percent)
5
12-17
70
31-97
20
9-12
14
9-17
60-68
32-47
1
10-13
Steam Coal
Imports
13.7
33.1
76.5
7.6
10.8
13.4
3.2
3.7
5.6
17.9
24.9
55.8
7.0
22.3
72.1
8.3
12.7
21.6
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Table 3, continued
1985
1990
Coal Used in
Electricity
(MTCE)
4.7
Primary
Energy Input
(pe rcen t)
20
12.5
2000 23.4-30.8
1985 .0
1990 .0
2000 0-1.6
1985 71.4
1990 72.4
2000 74.7
1985 227.7
1990 274.8
2000 313.0-424.7
50-66
0
0-3
65
Steam Coal
Imports
(MTCE)
4.8
14.2
33.7
2.4
2.6
4.4
1.4
.0
.050
23 63.0
111.0
254.023-31
1. Column 1- Reference case low nuclear, high
nuclear. Where one number is given, the estimate
is the same for both cases.
2. Column 3- Numbers for imports correspond to low
nuclear case, i.e. high coal case.
3. OECD Europe includes EEC countries plus Greece,
Iceland, Austria, Finland, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Source: International Energy Agency, Steam Coal: Prospects to
2000, OECD, Paris, 1978. Table 1-1, pp. 139.140.
TibTe 1-2, pp. 141-143.
Nether-
lands
Sweden
U.K.
0 ECD
Europe
Notes:
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Table 4
World Coal Study Forecasts
Coal Used in Primary Steam Coal
Electricity Energy Input Imports
MTC7) (per cen t) (MTCE)
Japan 1985 13-14 6 6-7
1990 30-37 11-13 24-33
2000 57-72 15-17 53-73
Denmark 1985 10 85 11
1990 13 90 14
2000 9-19 31-92 9-21
Finland 1985 2 10 3
1990 4 24 7
2000 4-9 20-43 8- 12
Fr an ce 1985 12-25 11-21 11-34
1990 10-30 8-20 14-51
2000 10-45 6-21 26-100
Getrmany 1985 76-79 47-50 9-11
1990 84-89 45-49 18-26
2000 99-106 38-44 20-40
Italy 1985 10 13 10-13
1990 9-19 11-20 11-20
2000 17-38 16-32 17-46
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Table 4, continued
Coal Used in
Electricity
TTCE) Y
Primary
Energy Input
(percent)
Steam Coal
Imports
(MTCE)
Nether- 1985
lands
1990
2000
Sweden
U.K.
1985
1990
2000
1985
1990
2000
1. Ranges reflect
and "low coal"
difference between the "high coal"
cases.
2. Numbers rounded to million tons of coal equivalent.
Source: Report of the World Coal Study,
Carroll Wilson, Director, May,
Coal-Bridge to the Future
1980. Appendix 1, pp. 222-245.
4 18
6-9
14-26
0-1
1-6
7-15
68-72
69-73
70-77
26-33
51-78
1-2
2-20
14-39
61-62
57-58
45-51
7
10-13
20-34
3
5-12
14-23
0
0
0-15
Notes:
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Table 5
United States Department of Energy Forecast--Coal Demandl
(million metric tons)
Coal Used in
Electricity
~  
ft ) _
U.S. 1985
1990
1995
Canada 1985
1990
Japan 1985
1990
1995
Aust/NZ 1985
1990
1995
EEC2 1985
1990
1995
Other 1985
OECD 1990
1995
640.5-692.3
860.3-1017.3
1114.3-1340.7
6.8-17.6
7.2-7.2
14.6-19.5
27.3-37.5
40.9-56.9
45.0-48.3
39.9-42.0
36.1-39.0
272. 3-301.6
223.0-279.1
216.0-292.0
47.0-59.1
26.0-51.3
22.2-37.3
Fossil Fuel
(percent)
69.3-69.4
82.7-83.2
88.2-96.9
81.7-89.2
73.8-74.0
7.7-8.7
13.9-17.1
17.5-20.6
89.4-89.6
88.2-85.5
81.5-77.4
61.4-63.1
56.9-61.0
55.0-60.0
75.4-74.7
64.4-63.6
70.6-54.0
Total Inputs
~percentT~
48.4-48.5
53.9-56.0
54.7-62.6
3.3-8.9
3.0-8.6
5.1-6.6
8.6-11.0
10.2-12.7
59.9-62.2
58.0-58.3
49.1-52.8
37.7-40.0
30.0-34.7
25.0-31.0
8.1-11.3
4.5-10.7
3.3-7.5
Net Imports(T),
Exports (-)
~~TCTF
-20.1 ,-34.5
-22.0, -41.7
-24.2, -48.6
-10.6,-13.6
-9.0,-21.9
20.5, 25.5
29.5, 42.7
44.7, 63.9
-10.7, -11 .9
-14.6,-14.6
-19.2,-19.2
49.7, 64.9
53.0, 72.5
65.0, 92.0
12.9, 19.2
12.9, 19.2
6.0, 20.9
Includes Lignite and
Belgium, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, and the
hard coal.
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy
United Kingdom comprise the EEC.
3. High numbers refer to high growth, high non-OPEC energy
resources, minimun conservation.
Low numbers refer to low growth, low non-OPEC energy
resources, high conservation.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Demand
for World Coal Through 1995, Washington D.C., May 1979.
Notes: 1.
2.
511
Table 6
World Energy Conference Coal
Electricity
(TWH)
Total Coal Demand
(MTCE)
North American
1985 2683-2926
4390-58542000
OECD Europe
1985
2000
1707-1829
2805-3659
Japan, Australia,,
1985
2000
New Zealand
Notes:
1. Low numbers represent scenario L4--Low growth, moderate
conservation, high price response, oil constraint.
2. High numbers represent H4--High growth, moderate
high supply prices, oil constraint.
World Energy Conference, World Energy Demand,
Technology Press, N.Y., 1978, Appendix A.
cons erv ati on,
IPC Science and
Demand
643- 787
1044-1459
286- 329
644- 844
610- 732
1341-1829
100- 100
157- 257
Source:
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Table 7
Coal Used in Electricity Generation
(MTCE)
DO E
12-17
24-33
36-50
W OCO
13-14
30-37
57-72
181-201
222-327
174- 200
131-180
1 24- 191
IEA
14
32
45-76
183
237-322
208-224
247-342
Notes: 1. The conversion to
for DOE extimates
tons of coal equivalent from tons of coal
is as follows:
a. Japan: MTC x .88 = MTCE.
b. EEC: Lignite consumption is held equal to 1976 levels
for each future period, at 127 million tons. Hard coal
consumption is calculated by subtracting this from
totals in Table 3. For Hard coal, MTC x .88 = MTCE; for
lignite, MTC x .36 = MTCE. See IEA, Energy Balances of
OECD Countries, 1974/1978, Paris, 198. pp. vii-xii for
conversion data. Hard coal and lignite consumption data
are from IEA, Energy Statistics, 1974/1978, Paris, 1980.
Source: WOCO, IEA,
Japan 1985
1990
1995
2000
Europe 8 1985
2000
EE C 1985
1990
1995
2000
190
DOE, (See Tables 1-3).
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Fuel Choice
Table 8
in Electricity
IEA, WOCO
Generati on
Country Source Coal
(percent)
Nuclear
(percent)
Oil and Gas
~pnercent)~~
Hydro and Other
(pcent)
1976 2000 1976 2000 1976 2000 1976
Japan WOCO 4
IEA 4
Denmark WOC0 50
IEA 50
Finland WOC0 22
IEA 22
France WOC0 29
IEA 33
Germany WOCX0 56
IEA 60
Italy WOCO 4
IEA 6
Nether- WOCO 8
lands IEA 8
Sweden WOCO 0
IEA 0
U.K. WOC 66
ILEA 65
15-17
12-17
31-92
22-63
20-43
9-12
6-21
9-17
38-44
32-47
16-32
10-13
51-78
50-66
14-39
0-3
45-51
50
7
8
0
0
9
0
8
7
11
8
2
2
8
7
23
20
14
13
47-49 73
32-41 68
0-65 50
0-56 50
24-46 18
50-64 28
65-76 28
65-66 35
44-49 23
35-57 25
21-34 60
36-51 60
4-30 84
3-32 85
0-38 15
41-52 13
39-47 19
33-40 20
26-28 16
37-39 20
3 0
7-8 0
6 51
3-5 34
3-5 34
4 24
4-5 10
5-12 8
29-31 34
26-39 32
13-15 0
17-30 0
2-3 61
4-11 67
8-10 0
10-16 2
IEA low numbers refer to "high nuclear" case, high numbers
nuclear" case. WOCO's range
cases.
to "low
corresponds to high coal, low coal
Sources: WOCO, IEA. (See Table 1)
2000
18-21
12
0
0
27
16
16
14
6
18-19
12
0
46-58
45
0
1
Notes:
Table 9
Coal Use In Japan and Western Europe - 1976 to 2000
(Million Tons of Coal Equivalent)
Country Source
Japan WOCo
IEA
Denmark WOCO
IEA
Finland WOCO
I EA
France
LO
WOCo
IEA
Total
Use Electricity Mat.
(76) (2000) (76) (2000) (76) (2000)
79
83
5
4
4
4
45
45
Germany WOCO 102
IEA 112
Italy
Neth.
Sweden
U.K.
WOCO
IEA
WOCO
I EA
WOCO
IEA
14
14
5
4
2
2
WOCO 109
IEA 102
150-224
200
9-21
13
9-13
7
6
7
4
4
2
3
48-125 22
82 19
150-175 61
190 67
32-61
38
23-38
38
17-26
7
2
2
1
1
0
0
133-179 65
120 63
57-72
76
9-19
11
3-8
3
10-45
43
69
69
89-92
114
0 0
0 0
1
14
16
99-106 23
139 35
17-38
20
14-26
30
7-15
2
70-77
74
11
10
3
3
2
3
18
20
1
1
17-20
15
22-25
38
12
14
3-4
5
3
3
16-21
24
Synfuels
(2000)
0-48
0
0
3-10
10-25
0-8
1-3
1
4-13
Industrial
(76) (2000)
4 7-12
1 1-2
1 1
3 14-40
5 8-12
0 3
0 3-4
0 3
9 28-47
res./comm.
(76) (2000)
0 0
0 0-1
1 3-4
6 4-10
13 8-10
1 0
0 1
0 3-4
17 15-21
Notes: 1. IEA estimates represent the low nuclear reference case.
2. "IEA other" column includes all non-electric, non-metallurgical uses.
3. IEA current estimates are from 1976.
4. WOCo current estimates are from 1977.
Source: WOCO, IEA
IEA other
(2000)
7-10
1-2
1-2
10-25
10-13
2-5
1-4
1-3
118-23
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Table 10
Coal Exports
(MT CE)
1976-1977
(Met) {5team)
U.S. WO CO
IEA
[DE
Aust. WOCO
IEA
DOE
Canada WOCO
DOE
South WO CO
Africa DOE
Poland WOCn
DOE
USSR
37
43
43
34
28
32
10
11
1
11
WO (D
11
10
10
3
3
3
1
1
7
(Total )
48
53
53
37
31
35
11
12
1995-2000
(Met) (Steam)
60-70
70
53-73
85
75
94-131
23
27-36
12
8 25-27
39
28 39 5
65-130
60
24-49
75
120
19
4-24
14-41
(Total )
125-200
130
81-122
160
195
113-150
27-47
41-77
55-75
46 71-73
23
25
3China WOCO
50
28
50
30
WOCO 17
India/ WOCO
Indo-
nes ia
Other WoC0
0 15-20
IEA and DE initial estimates are for 1976.
WOCO initial estimates are for 1977.
DOE final estimates are for 1995; others are for 2000.
WOE South African estimate includes India exports.
Sources: WOCO, 00E,
Wes t
Germany
5 22 15-20
7
5
Notes:
25-50
IEA
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APPENDIX A
OTHER STEAM COAL DEMAND ESTIMATES
There are a number of other forecast of coal demand for countries
outside the United States. However, in most cases documentation is even
less extensive than for the studies listed above. Consequently, a review
of the results is not particularly useful.
Two studies do provide some useful comparisons, however. First, the
Institute of Energy Economics (IEE) in Japan has developed an energy
system model, with energy supply and demand and macroeconomic
components. Communications with IEE analysts provided only narrow
insight into the actual methodology. For example, the demand model is
based on econometric demand equations, and the fuel share mode is based
on a linear programming model. The exact specification is unclear.
The IEE's most recent estimates appeared in March 1979, based on
December 1978 data. Oil prices are assumed constant in real terms at
1978 levels. GNP is assumed to grow at 5.5 percent per year from 1978 to
1985, and 5.0 percent per year from 1985 to 1990. Energy growth is
projected at 4.0 percent per year from 1978 to 1985, and 3.4 percent from
1985 to 1990. Electricity consumption grows by 4.6 percent from 1976 to
1985, and 4.9 percent from 1985 to 1990. Forecasts of electricity
generation, fuel demand, and stean coal imports for 1985 and 1990 are
presented in Tables A-1 and A-2.
Steam coal demand projections for 1990 are 20.23 MTCE, versus 30 to
37 MTCE for WOCO, and 24 to 33 for DOE. Note that the difference is
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largely explained by the role of coal penetration for 1990. Nuclear
power is assumed to take on a large role in the IEE study than in other
studies, and coal is expected to take a smaller portion of fossil fuel
inputs (11 percent as estimated by IEE, 14 percent to 17 percent as
estimated by DWE).
Another set of demand estimates has been provided by the United
?
Nations European Commission for Europe.~ All the estimates are based
on government reports submitted by each country to the United Nations.
The results are summarized in Table A-3. In most cases, the results are
close to previous studies. Two notable exceptions are the low coal
forecast for France (5.4 MTCE in 1990, versus 10 to 30 MTCE for WOCO),
and the increase in consumption predicted for the United Kingdx. In
these estimates, nuclear and hydro power are estimated to account for
92 percent of France's power needs in 1990, versus 47 percent in 1975.
These results suggest that special attention be paid to Japan and France
in additional research.
Lastly, a Scandanavian utility group, Nordel, provides some insight
into the differences between the IEA and WOCO coal penetration rates for
these countries.3 For Denmark, in 1990 Nordel projects that
88 percent of electricity wil be coal-fired, for Sweden, 4 percent, and
for Finland, 12 percent. For both Sweden and Finland, the IEA estimates
are equivalent to Nordels, while WOCO assumes considerably greater rate
for steam coal. As we will see later, WOCO's may be closer in line with
more recent nuclear power projections in Scandanavian countries.
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Table A-1
Japanese Electricity Generation--Public Utilities
(Million KWh)
Hydr o
Thermal
Nu c lea r
Geothermal
Total
Total
(including
private
sources)
1975 percent
78.5 19.0
309.6 74.9
25.1 6.1
1985 percent
72.9
462.0
140. 3
1.8
413.2
475.2
100.0
115.0
667.1
760.8
10.8
68.2
20.7
0. 3
100.0
112
1990 percent
76.9
558.9
220.8
3. 4
859.9
966.1
8.9
65.0
25.7
0. 4
100.0
112.0
Table A-2
Japan--Fuel Demand in Thermal Power Plants--Public Utilities
(MTCE)
1975 percent 1985 percent 1990 percent
Coal 6.0 5.8 12.9 8.6 20.2 11.2
LNG 6.3 6.1 37.1 24.7 51.3 28.3
Oil 87.0 83.6 94.1 62.8 102.3 56.5
Other 4.7 4.5 5.8 3.9 7.2 4.0
Total 104.0 100.0 149.8 100.0 181.1 100.0
Steam coal imports are projected to be 7 MTCE in 1985, 14 MTCE in 1990.
Source: "Middle, Long-Term Energy Supply-Demand Projection-Forecast for
1985-1990," Energy In Japan, The Institute of Energy Economics,
March, 1979. p. 49.
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Table A-2
United Nations--Government Estimates
Electricity
(t Wh)
Coal Use in
Electricity
(MT CE)7
Capacity
from Coal
(percent)
Thermal
Capacity
(me gawa tts)
Ste am
Coal Inports
(MTC'E)
U. K. 1975
1980
1985
1990
Belgium 1975
1980
1985
France 1975
1980
1985
1990
Finland 1975
1980
1985
1990
Germany 1975
1980
1985
Neth. 1975
1980
1985
1990
60
68
71
83
64
69
63
63
2
3-4
4-5
16
19-21
21-22
254
279
322
373
39
48-52
59-71
179
255
340
420
25
39
46
56
302
399
524
54
66
82
90
71472
76300
82400
95600
7682
8685
8900
to 9500
26123
29000
30000
26300
5013
8690
9460
11760
65344
82900
96900
14562
18400
17900
12
20
10
5
2
3
3
4
55
64
69
0
3
4
8
18
21
8
4
20
16
13
14
53
47
39
1
17
13
27
Source: United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission
for Europe, Coal Committee, "The Use of Steam Coal in Power
Stations," Eighteenth Session, Geneva, June 1978.
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CHAPTER V
A STEP TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDiNG
OF FUTURE STEAM COAL DEMAND IN WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN
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INTRODUCTION
Ideally we would like to estimate an integrated electricity supply/
demand model for Western Europe and Japan, similar to the description
above. However, this is beyond the reaches of this thesis. Data
limitations and uncertainties encountered by this author prohibited a
rigorous electricity demand model. Instead, this chapter attempts to
further our understanding of future steam coal demand in Western Europe
and Japan, and to serve as a cross-check on other estimates by analyzing
the economics of power generation, and the possible patterns of
electricity generation capacity expansion in two major countries, Japan
and France. We make no effort to model steam coal demand rigorously.
However, with the available data we can isolate and thereby clarify major
uncertainties in the development of steam coal trade.
There are several fundamental uncertainties underlying thermal coal
demand. First, at what rate will electricity demand grow. Second, given
the levels of electricity demand, what will the demand for steam coal be
in the future. Clearly these are interdependent issues, and consistency
between the two must be considered. However, in this rough analysis we
will basically segment the two issues by taking electricity demand as
exogenous, and then analyzing in detail electricity supply choices for
given demand levels.
There are several reasons for this approach. First, data and
financial constraints do not allow for the estimation of an integrated
electricity model. Second, electricity demand in Western Europe and
525
Japan has been estimated by others. In contrast, electricity supply has
not been analyzed at the level of detail that we can now provide.
The key is to recognize possible inconsistencies between the
exogenously determined electricity demand levels and the endogenously
determined electricity supply decisions. Electricity demand growth
depends to some extent on electricity prices so that to use very high
price levels with a given very high demand level would be misleading.
However, this is more a problem of interpretation than of inherent
inconsistency. Our goal is not to generate a point estimate of coal
demand. Rather, it is to analyze electricity supply choices at various
electricity demand levels. In essence, we acknowledge the range of
possible electricity demand growth rates and leave the explanation for
this range as a function of electricity prices, economic growth, etc.,
unresolved, while concerning ourselves instead with the specifics of
electricity supply choices.
The simplified approach, modified for data constraints and uncer-
tainties, is as follows. First, the economics of power generation will
be analyzed for France and Japan. Second, based on the range of projected
electricity demand growth rates, peak load demand will be calculated for
the year 2000. Third, peak load demand will be translated into installed
capacity requirements based on historical peak-load reserve margins.
Fourth, existing capacity will be subtracted from required capacity in
2000. Fifth, derating and decommissioning of existing capacity will be
estimated and added to required capacity for 2000. This will yield
capacity expansion needs for 2000. ' Sixth, based on an assessment of the
526
power generation cost estimates, the annual load duration curves, the
existing plant mix, and the plants on order, the characteristics of new
capacity will be approximated according to various assumptions.
Recognize fully the deficiencies of this approach. Even the most
refined capacity expansion models are flawed in some respects. This
simplified approach suffers from more severe data limitations. The
estimated costs of power generation are very imprecise. Consequently, an
electricity supply model that allocates capacity to various fuels on the
basis of exact power generation economics is likely to be misleading, and
we are forced to use a less rigorous methodology. Certain factors, such
as load curve shape and thermal efficiency, are assumed to be constant
over time. Other variables, such as decommissioning and derating of
power plants, and hydro plant capacity factors can only be roughly
approximated. In addition, by ignoring production decisions, the
estimates of coal consumption could be misleading. The demand for coal
generation could shift enormously with changes in production and
operating conditions. Nevertheless, the exercise provides a foundation
for analyzing certain critical variables and at least a better
understanding of steam coal demand.
COSTS OF POWER GENERATION
This subsection provides a rough-cut estimation of power generation
costs. In general, the data are inadequate for precise calculations, and
significant uncertainties exist. Nevertheless, some reasonable
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conclusions can be formed from the available materials.
First, consider power generation costs in the United States. Three
main conclusions dominate the literature: 1) oil- and gas-fired thermal
power is more expensive than coal-fired power, even at 1977-78 oil price
levels. Recent oil price increases have only amplified the difference in
power generation costs; 2) nuclear power has had'a narrow cost advantage
over coal-fired power at current coal prices for baseload plants.
However, the cost differential is small, and has eroded as constraints on
nuclear power plants development have increased; 3) gas turbines are
still the cost-minimizing choice for peaking plants (utilization rates
are generally less than 10 percent).
Joskow, among others, has substantiated these conclusions.2
Table 1 presents his estimates of capital, operating and maintenance, and
fuel costs for each plant type in future years. The most significant
variables are fuel cost and capital costs.
Nuclear capital costs are 26 percent greater than coal capital costs
in 1980, and 46 percent greater than oil capital costs. However, given
utilization rates above 60 percent, the lower nuclear fuel costs offset
this disadvantage. Note the low capital costs for gas turbines. Given
very low utilization rates this difference dominates any conceivable
disadvantage of higher fuel and maintenance costs for gas turbines. Note
also that coal capital costs include scrubbing costs of approximately
$120/kW in 1985 dollars, and that nuclear capital costs are based on
normal engineering and financial lead times as opposed to allowing for
political and legal constraints.
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Table 2 calculates the costs per kWh based on these estimates.
First, coal and nuclear economics are compared in 1985, based on 17
percent annual capital charges, and 70 percent utilization rates. 3
In regions where coal is expensive, for example, the Middle Atlantic
region, nuclear power has a significant advantage. However, in other
regions where coal is cheaper, this advantage is'reduced. In the
cheapest coal region, the mountain states, coal generation is actually
cheaper than nuclear power. Another factor mitigating the nuclear cost
advantage is the fact that nuclear utilization rates rarely exceed
60 percent. As the realized utilization rate decreases, the economic
advantage of nuclear plants will similarly decrease.
Also in the table is a comparison of oil and coal plants in 1985
(1985 $). A utilization rate of 30 percent is assumed. The oil price
assumed is $26 per barrel in 1985, far below the likely price level given
recent develdopments in the Middle East. In this comparison we assume
the high Middle Atlantic delivered coal price. Nonetheless, even given
these assumptions, coal-fired power plants are considerably cheaper than
oil-fired plants.
Other estimates of power generation costs differ in some variables.
In specific, the capital costs of power generation, both for coal and
nuclear, are generally higher. Nonetheless, the conclusions are
similar. Coal and nuclear are closely competitive, even with scrubbers
on coal-fired plants, and both are considerably cheaper than oil-fired
plants. 4
Data on foreign power generation costs are sparse, but similar
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Table 1
U.S. Costs of Power Generation
a. Power Plant Capital Costs--New England
($ per kW, nominal- dollars)
Coal Oil Natural Gas Nuclear Gas Turbines
1980 591 511 395 746 179
1985 772 714 516 997 251
Source: Baughman, M., et al., Electric Power in the United States:
Models and Policy Analysis, MIT Pres, Cambridge, Mass., 1980,
p. 242.
b. Operating and Maintenance Costs
(Mills/kWh, nominal dollars)
Coal Oil Natural Gas Nuclear(LWR) Gas Turbines
1980 3.40 3.01 2.61 1.72 3.92
1985 4.44 3.93 3.42 2.22 5.12
Notes: Inflation is assumed at 5.5 percent annually.
Source: Baughman, et al., op. cit., p. 244.
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Table 1 (continued)
c. Fuel Costs-Mid-Atlantic
(nominal dollars)
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Costs Oil Coal Gas
7Mills/kWh) ($/larrel) ($/short ton)(cents/mcf)
1975 3.2 9.92 (1.65) 25.57 (1.07) 176.5 (1.72)
1985 9.58 26.18 (4.36) 47.64 (1.99) 361.0 (3.52)
Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses equal S/MBtu. The conversions are
based on the following heating values:
2. a. 6 MBtu/Barrel of oil
3. b. 24 MBtu/short ton coal
4. c. 1025 Btu/cubic foot gas
Source: Baughman et al., op. cit., p. 240 and pp. 248-250.
d. Current Delivered Fuel Costs-1977
($/MBtu)
Oil Gas Coal
New Jersey 2.30 1.80 1.40
Ohio 2.60 1.40-1.70 1.00
Pennsylvania 2.90 1.00
California 2.40 1.70-2.30
Source: Edison Electric Institute, Steam Electric Plant Factors,
1978 Edition.
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Table 2
A Comparison of U.S. Power Generation Costs in 1985
a. Coal versus Nuclear--Baseload Plant, Mid Atlantic
($1985, Cents/kWh)
Coal Nuclear
0 + M .44 .22
Fuel 1.40-1.99 .96
Capital 2.26 2.93
Total 4.10-4.69 cents/kWh 4.11 cents/kWh
Assumptions: 70 percent utilization
17 percent annual capital costs
Heat rates: coal-10,000; oil, 10,000; nuclear 10,500; gas
turbine 11,000
b. Oil versus Coal-Cycling
($1985, Cents/kWh)
P1 ants
Oil
0 + M .39
Fuel 3.90
Capital 4.60
Total 8.89 cents/kWh
Assumptions: 30 percent utilization
Coal
.44
1.99
5.00
7.43 cents/kWh
Source: Authors calculations are based on data provided in Baughman
et al., op. cit., 1980.
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conclusions are typical. In Great Britain, the British Department of
Energy studied the economics of power generation in 1977. Capital
costs of power plants in the 1977 pound were estimated as:
Coal: 290 pounds/kW
Steam-generating heavy water reactor: 525 pounds/kW
Advanced gas-cooled reactor: 470 pounds/lW
Pressurized water reactor: 407 pounds/kW
Coal capital costs thus range from 56- to 71 percent of nuclear
costs. The difference between these costs in Great Britain and the
United States is probably attributable to the exclusion of scrubbing
capital costs. At the existing coal prices (.33 pence/kWh in 1977),
coal-fired power generation had a cost advantage on all types of nuclear
power generation. This price per kWh is approximately equal to 82
cents/MBtu coal. As the coal price increased to .52 penrce/kWh
(1.30/MBtu), nuclear power is cheaper for base-load power generation.
In West Germany, a 1978 study by the Energy Economic Research
Institute of Cologne University also compared the economics of coal with
nuclear power generation.6 Where load factors exceed 46 percent,
nuclear power is cheaper than coal fired power in 1985 by significant
margins. However, the assumed coal price was 155 DM/ton, or
approximately $88/ton, which is the domestic coal price. At imported
coal prices, coal would be very competitive with nuclear power at higher
load factors. Note however that this study does not specify the
treatment of scrubbing equipment. If scrubbing costs are included, then
nuclear power would maintain an advantage even at imported coal prices.
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In Japan, similar conclusions obtain but certain estimates differ in
significant ways. Specifically, the relative capital costs are
different. In the United States, as noted, coal capital costs (with
scrubbers) are 80 to 87 percent of nuclear capital costs. In Japan, the
estimated percentage (also with scrubbers) is 64 to 70 percent. An IEE
study notes this difference, but offers no explanation. It is
possible that the limited experience in Japan with coal-fired plant
construction accounts for this uncertainty, and in fact the difference
between coal and nuclear capital costs will be similar to the difference
in the United States.
In Table 3 we compare the cost of nuclear power with coal-fired
power in 1979. The nuclear power data were provided by Chuba Electric
and are based on 1979 costs. The coal plant capital costs are based on
the high end of the ratio of coal plant to nuclear plant capital costs
estimated by the IEE, 70 percent. The price for coal is equivalent to
approximately $40 per metric ton. A utilization rate of 60 percent is
assumed. Based on these assumptions, coal-fired power is closely
competitive with nuclear power. If, however, the ratio of coal-fired
plant capital costs to nuclear plant capital costs is higher, nuclear
power would gain an advantage.
Another difference in the Japanese estimates is the ratio of oil
capital costs to coal capital costs. Coal capital costs are estimated to
be 1.4 to 1.5 times oil plant costs. This narrows the advantage of coal
versus oil that was demonstrated in the U.S. case. In Table 3
calculations on oil versus coal are' shown. For new plants, in $1978, at
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a 50 percent utilization, oil is slightly less expensive than coal.
However, this is based on the low oil prices in 1978. Also in the table
are calculations for oil priced at $25/barrel. In this case, even at 30
percent utilization, coal is considerably-cheaper than coal.
Finally, let us consider the economics of power generation in the
light of delivered coal prices calculated in Chapter III. In Japan, all
coal except that from the U.S. East and Gulf Coasts would be cheaper than
oil. Coal from Australia, South Africa, and Canada would be closely
competitive with nuclear power if coal plant capital costs are really as
inexpensive relative to nuclear plant capital costs as the Japanese data
indicate. The calculation in Table 3 imputes a coal price equivalent to
the coal prices from these countries, including $3.00 per ton for local
handling. If, on the other hand, coal capital costs are as much as 80
percent of nuclear capital costs, not even the cheapest Australian coal
would compete with nuclear power. Additional data is necessary to
clarify this uncertainty.
In Western Europe, the range of coal prices C.I.F. piers is $1.38 to
$1.90/MBtu. The power generation cost data are inadequate for drawing
firm conclusions. However, a reasonable inference is as follows. First,
any coal-fired power will be cheaper than oil-fired power. Second, the
cheapest coal will be competitive with nuclear power at coastal power
stations, even with scrubbers. Third, as coal prices increase over the
range noted above, nuclear power will be cheaper than coal-fired power
even at coastal sites. Given the high price of European inland
transportation (see Chapter VI, Part A), the likelihood of even the
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Table 3
A Comparison of Japanese Power Generation Costs
a. Coal versus Nuclear, 1978 New Plants
(cents/kWh)
Coal Nuclear
Fuel 1.50 .36
Capital 2.3-2.8 3.3-4.0
Total 3.8-4.30 3.66-4.36
Assumptions: 60 percent utilization, 19 percent annual capital costs.
b. Oil Versus Coal--1978 New Plants
(cents/kWh)
Oil Coal
Fuel 2.20 1.35
Capital 2.26 3.16
Total 4.46 4.54
Assumptions: 50 percent utilization, $14 per barrel oil price
Source: Author's calculations.
c. Oil Versus Coal--1978 New Plants
(cents/kWh)
Oil Coal
Fuel 3.75 1.35
Capital 3.76 5.26
Total 7.51 6.61
Assumptions: 30 percent utilization, $25 per barrel oil price
Source: Author's calculations.
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cheapest imported coals competing with nuclear power at inland sites is
small.
Given these general conclusions, the next section will consider
capacity expansion in France and Japan.
CAPACITY EXPANSION IN JAPAN AND FRANCE
As noted above, the uncertainties in power generation costs suggest
that rigorous demand models that allocate capacity on the basis of exact
power generation cost economics are likely to be misleading. However,
with the available data on the existing structure of electricity demand.
we can isolate and thereby clarify major uncertainties in the development
of steam coal demand. As discussed above, two issues will be highlighted
in the analysis: 1) the rate of electricity demand growth; and 2) the
allocation of capacity expansions over different plant types. More
specifically, three dimensions are taken as variable: 1) growth rates in
electricity demand; 2) nuclear penetration in the electric sector; and 3)
the allocation of non-nuclear plants between coal and oil or gas.
JAPAN
For Japan, electricity demand growth rates of 4 percent and 6
percent are taken as extremes for the 1977-2000 period. The high rate is
based on actual growth rates from 1970 to 1976 (see Tables 4 and 5).
Note that this compares to a growth rate in electricity production of 12
percent between 1960 and 1970. However, most analysts predict that even
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Table 4
Electricity Production Growth Rates
(Actual Percent)
1960-1970
U.S.A.
Japan
West Germany
U.K.
France
Italy
6.90
12.00
7.40
6.16
6.95
7.65
Sourde: Overseas Electric Industry Survey Institute, Inc., "Electric
Power Industry in Japan," 1978, p. 7, Table 1.
1970-1976
3.50
6.00
5.44
1.80
5.46
5.79
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Table 5
Japan-Electricity Growth Rates
(Percent)
1960-1970 1970-1976 1977-1978
Peak load 11.23 8.30 6.20
Peak capability 11.60 10.30 6.16
Production 12.00 6.00 5.60
Notes: 1977-78 growth rates
January 1, 1979.
projected based on decided plants, as of
Source: a. Japan Electric Power Survey Committee, "54th Semni-AnIual
Power Survey," Tokyo, Japan, April, 1979.
b. Overseas Electric Industry Survey Institute, Inc.,
"Electric Power Industry in Japan," Tokyo, Japan, 1978,
p. 7.
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the 1970's rate of 6 percent will not be matched in the last part of the
20th century. The 4 percent rate allows for a gradual decline in the
growth rate of electricity demand from 1977 to 2000, reaching as low as
3.0 percent in the last 5 years of the century.
Three nuclear penetration assumptions are made. The first assumes
20 percent of the capacity in 2000 will be nuclear. This is equivalent
to the percentage of capacity that is planned for nuclear plants in
1988.8 The middle assumption is 30 percent by 2000. The high
assumption is 40 percent. Which level actually obtains is more a
function of politics than economics. As noted above, the costs of
nuclear power are very close to the costs of coal-fired poer. Given
this, and given the public resistance to nuclear power in Japan, it is
unlikely that more than 30 percent of the total capacity in 2000 wil be
nuclear power. However, if nuclear power continues to penetrate the
electric sector in the 1990's at the rate planned for the 1980's, a
contribution of as high as 40 percent is possible. Note that based on
the 1976 load duration curves, approximately 50 percent of the installed
capacity is used more than 57 percent of the year.9 Consequently, 40
percent penetration means that the vast majority of baseload power will
be generated by nuclear plants.
Peaking plants, used less than 1000 hours per year, are assumed not
to be coal or nuclear. The existing percentage of total capacity which
is used for peak service is 16 percent. Hydro capacity currently
accounts for 22 percent of existing capacity. Projections for 1988 show
a decrease to 20.8 percent. We ass'ume 20 percent hydro capacity in
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2000. Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine the percentage of
hydro capacity used to serve peak demand. Based on a detailed listinc of
non-hydro plant load factors, non-hydro plants contributed 31 percent of
peaking (<:1000 hours) capacity, indicating 67 percent of peaking capacity
was provided by hydro plants. Thus, approximately 50 percent of
the hydro capacity is assumed to be peaking plants. (In other words, 11
percent of total capacity is hydro-peaking capacity.) The residual
non-peaking conventional thermal capacity additions are assumed to be met
by all coal, or 50 percent coal and 50 percent oil and gas.
Derating and decommissioning of power plants is more difficult to
specify. Projections to 1988 suggest that virtually none of the existing
cpacity will be decommissioned by this time. 1 A reasonable figure
for the entire period is a loss of one percent per year.
Table 6 presents these rough calculations. The broadest conceivable
range of steam coal demand increases for electricity generation is
18 MTCE to 219 MTCE. The most likely scenario would be 30 percent
nuclear penetration, 5 percent electricity demand growth rates, and 50
percent of new conventional thermal plants being coal fired. Based on
these assumptions, coal consumption increases to the year 2000 would
amount to 59 MTCE. Total consumption would be approximately 65 MTCE.
Note that this is consistent with the WOCO range of 57 to 72 MTCE in
2000.14
FRANCE
This section presents similar calculations for France. In this case,
an electricity demand growth rate range of 4.0 tO 5.5 percent is assumed.
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Table 6
Increments to Steam Coal Demand in Japan--1977 to 2000
High Growth Rate
Coa 50% Coal
(MTCE) (MW) (MTCE)
Low Growth Rate
l00%Coa 1 50%
(MW) (MTCE) (MW)
Low Nuclear
Medium Nuclear
High Nuclear
138552 (219)
102524 (162)
66496 (104)
69276 (110)
51262 (81)
33248 (52)
69537 (109)
46289 (73)
23041 (38)
34769 (55)
23145 (37)
11520 (18)
Note: .l High growth rate = 6.0 percent annual.
Low growth rate 4.0 percent annual.
2. Low nuclear = 20 percent total capacity
Medium nuclear = 30 percent
High nuclear = 40 percent
in 2000
3. 100 percent (50 percent) coal case means that 100 percent
(50 percent) of non-peaking conventional thermal plant
additions will be coal-fired.
4. 50 percent utilization is assumed.
5. Current coal demand is 8 MTCE.
6. Hydro capacity is 20 percent of total capacity in 2000. We
assume that 50 percent of the hydro capacity is used to
serve the peak load. -
7. Heat rating = 10,000.
8. Peaking capacity ( <1000 hrs. utilization) is assumed to
equal 16 percent of total capacity.
9. Example: If electricity demand grows at 6 percent per year
in 2000, and if coal plants amount to 50 percent of
non-peaking conventional thermal plant additions, then coal
demand in 2000 will be .81 MTCE per year.
Source: Author's calculations. See text.
100%
(MW)
Coal(MTCE)
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Table 7
Existing Coal Plants in Japan,
Company Plant (units)
Hokkaido Takigawa
Sunagawa
Ebetsu
Naie
Tohoku Hachinoe
Sendai
Chogoku Sanban
Shimonos
Kyushu Karita
EPDC
(3)
(3)
(3)
(2)
(4)
(3)
(4)
eki
(5)
Fuel Date Capacity
TiTO3kW)
(2)
Minato (2)
Isogo (2)
Takasago (2)
Takehara (2)
Wakamatsu(2)
c/o
c/o
c/o
c/o
c/o
c/o
c/o
c/o
c/o
c/o
c
c
c/o
c
1960-62
55,58,77
63,65
68,70
58
59,61
36,39
67,77
56,59
67,72
60,60
67,69
68,69
67,64
63
225
195
375
350
650
525
76
575
982
312
530
500
600
150
6045
Net Gen-
eration
(109kWh)
1.39
.96
2.49
2.58
3.22
1.60
4.00
4.10
2.02
1.06
3.54
3.37
3.72
.12
Utilization
(percent)
70.3
56.1
75.8
84.1
56.5
35.1
0.6
81.3
23.5
38.8
76.2
77.0
70.7
9.1
34.18
Source: Unpublished data provided by Tokyo Electric Power Company, 1979.
1979
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The high figure is based on actual growth rates from 1970 to 1977. The
low figure allows for a gradual decline in electricity growth rates in
the 1990s.
Again, three nuclear penetration assumptions are made. The first
assumes that 12 percent of total capacity in the year 2000 will be
nuclear power plants. This is equal to the 1978 percentage. The second
and third cases assume 25 and 50 percent nuclear capacity. The latter
figure is closest to planned nuclear penetration by EDF.15 Whether
or not it obtains is uncertain. Public resistance to nuclear power is
strong in France, but EDF has not recently cut back their nuclear
projections for the future.
Peaking plants used less than 100 hours per year are assumed not be
to coal or nuclear. Thirteen percent of total capacity is currently used
for peaking plants (less than 1000 hours). Hydro capacity currently
accounts for 34 percent of total capacity. We assume a decrease to 20
percent by 2000. As for Japan, it is difficult to determine the
percentage of hydro capacity used for serving the peak. Based on
capacity factors for different types of peaking plants, it is assumed
that 50 percent of the peak load is served by hydro plants. 16
Nonpeaking conventional thermal plant additions are allocated both evenly
between coal and oil or gas, and exclusively to coal. Derating and
decommissioning could not be specified with any accuracy. As for Japan,
a 1 percent per year loss was assumed.
The estimates for steam coal demand in France in 2000 are summarized
in Table 8. For the 50 percent nuclear assumption, the range is 6.5 to
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Table 8
Increments to Steam Coal Demand in France--1977 to 2000
Low Growth Rate
100% coal 50% coal
(MW) (MTCE) (MW) (MTCE)
Low Nuclear
Medium Nuclear
High Nuclear
57170 (90)
40530 (64)
8530 (13)
28585 (45)
20265 (32)
4265 (6.5)
High Growth Rate
100% coal 50% coal
(MW) (MTCE) (MW) (MTCE)
88640 (140) 44230 (70)
65348 (103) 32674 (52)
20555 (33) 10277 (17)
Notes: 1. High annual growth rate in electricity demand = 5.5 percent
Low annual growth rate = 4.0 percent
2. Low nuclear = 12 percent of total capacity in 2000
Medium nuclear = 25 percent
High nuclear = 50 percent
3. 100 percent (50 percent) case means that 100 percent
(50 percent) of non-peaking conventional thermal plant
additions will be coal-fired.
4. 50 percent utilization is assumed.
5. Heat rating = 10,000.
6. Peaking capacity ( <1000 hrs. utilization) is assumed to
equal 13 percent.
7. Hydro capacity equals 20 percent of total capacity in
2000. 50 percent of the peak load is served by hydro
capacity.
Source: Author's calculations.
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33 MTCE. There is not sufficient data to estimate the consumption of
existing coal-fired plants in the year 2000. A rough approximation is 8
MTCE. The total coal demand range would thus be 14.5 to 41.0 MTCE.
WOCO's range for France in 2000 is 10 to 45 MTCE.
To conclude, this rough analysis does not significantly contradict
the range of steam coal demand estimates in Chapter IV. The analysis
does, however, serve to clarify this range by relating capacity expansion
to different assumptions on electricity demand growth rates, nuclear
penetration, and the allocation of non-nuclear plants between coal and
oil or gas. In further research, this methodology could be refined. In
conjunction with a better understanding of power plant economics, and a
clearer picture of the pol itical-economic environment surrounding nuclear
power development, a more rigorous projection of steam coal demana could
be developed.
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APPENDIX A
SULFUR EMISSION REGULATIONS
Sulfur dioxide regulations should be. considered for two reasons.
First, the additional costs of sulfur control might handicap coal versus
nuclear or oil power generation economics. Second, sulfur controls, or
the lack of controls, may be important in determining coal supply
patterns. In particular, if sulfur regulations exist, the competitive
position of Eastern and Midwestern high and medium sulfur coal is damaged.
On the demand end, sulfur regulations could be an important factor
in power generation economics. There is a considerable range of cost
estimates for controls. At the high end, the International Energy Agency
calculated the total cost of 90 percent scrubbing with Fluidized Gas
Desulphurization at 4-5 mills per kWh, or approximately 44 cents/MBtu
heat input. This difference is important to the competitive position of
coal versus nuclear power. The calculations in Chapter V generally
include costs at this level, and coal is closely competitive with nuclear
power. If regulations did not exist, the advantage might swing to coal
fired power in more cases.
At the supply end, sulfur regulations are also significant. In
certain countries restrictions are rigid, and medium- to high-sulfur coal
would not be an economic choice. In other countries, sulfur controls are
presently nonexistent. In these cases Eastern and Midwestern coals would
be preferred.
Data on sulfur regulations are' inconsistent. Table 1 reports some
fuel standards for European countries (EIS), based on 7000 kcal/kg. With
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the exception of the United Kingdom, all countries prohibit the use of
high-sulfur (1 3.0) coal, but generally allow sulfur content in the 1-2
percent range. However, in some cases emissions standards are more
restrictive. In West Germany, emissions standards are 1.80 lbs
SO/million Btu heat input. This corresponds to a 1 percent weight
sulfur restriction on coal input. In Japan, sulfur emissions standards
can be met with 1.0 percent sulfur coal in non-urban areas, but .2
percent sulfur in cities, meaning that scrubbers are required.
In Italian urban areas, the restriction is 1.20 lbs S02/MBtu heat
input, which could be met by .76 percent sulfur coal. In Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, no emission standards exist. In all
the cases where regulations do exist, emission standards can almost
certainly be met more cheaply with low-sulfur coal without scrubbers than
with high-sulfur East or Midwest coal.
Note finally that sulfur regulations will no doubt tighten in
countries where they are currently loose. For future economic assessments
it is safer to assume that low-sulfur coal will be supplied, and scrubbers
will be required, as is currently the case in the United States and Japan.
Sulfur Restrictions
(Percent Based on 7000 kcal/kg)
Denmark 1.68 .66 (Copenhagen
West Germany 1.88 1.22 (in polluted areas)
France 2.75 1.38 (in Paris)
Italy 2.75 2.01 (in major cities)
Netherlands 1.68
Sweden 1.68 .68 (in major cities)
U.K. None
Source: "Steam Coal and Energy Needs in Europe to 1985," Economic
Intelligence Unit, London, 1979
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FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER V
ISee:
a. Energy Modeling Forum, "Electric Load Forecasting, Probing the
Issues with Models," EMF Report 3, Vol. 1, Stanford University, 1979.
b. "Independent Assessment of Energy Policy Models: Two Case
Studies by the MIT Model Assessment Group," MIT Energy Laboratory Report
No. MIT-EL 78-011, May 1978.
c. Turvey, R., Optimal Pricing and Investment in Electricity
Supply, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968.
Some particular problems with the traditional capacity expansion
model are: 1) the detailed time relevance of the loading pattern is lost
with the annual load curve. In practice, the model will bias the results
towards baseload plants; 2) it simplifies complicated tradeoffs between
economic costs, environmental problems, risks, and siting difficulties,
etc.; 3) by aggregating regions, the outcome predicted may differ from
the outcome predicted by a number of small systems, each reaching for its
own optimum.
2Baughman, M., Joskow, P., and Kamat, D., Electric Power in the
United States: Models and Policy Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
T9a0~.
3Ibid., p. 126.
4a. Toth, G. et al., "The Economics of Electricity Generation in
Principal OECD Countries," Prepared for U.S. Department of Energy by
N.U.S. Corp., March, 1978.
b. Institute of Energy Economics, "Power Generation Costs of
Nuclear and Thermal Stations, Supplement to Energy in Japan," No. 42,
September 1978.
c. Electric Power Research Institute, "Coal and Nuclear Generating
Costs," Palo Alto, California, April 1977.
5U.K. Department of Energy, "Comparative Study of Generation Costs
between Coal and Nuclear Generation," April 1978.
6 Energy Research Institute of Cologne University, "A Parametric
Study of Power Generation Cost from Coal and Nuclear Power," 1978.
71nstitute of Energy Economics, op. cit.
8Japan Electric Power Survey Committee, "54th Semi-Annual Electric
Power Survey," April 1979.
9 Load curve data provided by A. Yajima, Central Research Institute
of Electric Power Industry, Tokyo, Japan, October 1979.
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CONCLUSIONS
In the past few years, as oil prices have rapidly increased and as
nuclear power development has been stalled by public concern with health
and safety, the probability of a major transition to coal for power
generation has increased substantially. In certdin cases, for example
the United States, the transition is far along. New power plants are
almost exclusively coal-fired, and conversions of existing oil-fired
plants to coal are ubiquitous. In other cases, for example Western
Europe and Japan, the transition is in the early stages, and the extent
of the transition is less certain. Nevertheless, a large increase in
coal consumption, and consequently in international coal trade, is
generally foreseen in these cases also. The 1980 Venice economic summit
meetng declared an active commitment to doubling world coal prodiction
and use in the next decade.
We have analyzed the economics of coal transportation, supply, and
demand in order to expand our comprehension of the developing
international steam coal markets and, in turn, to contribute to more
effective government planning for the development of steam coal markets.
In these concluding remarks we will summarize the current economic
structure of international steam coal ma-kets and the potentially
important future economic and policy changes in these markets. In
addition, we will briefly discuss possible government participation in
the development of international steam coal trade.
We
Canada,
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focused on four major coal suppliers (Australia, South
and the United States) and two demand regions (Western
Africa,
Europe nd
Japan). There are and will be other producing and consuming countries,
but the majority of international steam coal trade should be accountable
to this subset. Within this subset, South Africa is the cost-minimizing
supplier of coal to Western Europe. The delivered price of low-sulfur
bituminous steam coal to Rotterdam as of January 1, 1979 was
approximately $1.38 per million Btu, or $33.12 per 24 million Btu. South
Africa's closest competitors in Europe, Australia and the United States
are closely competitive with each other, but coal from these countries
costs at least $5.50 per 24 million Btu more than South African coal
delivered to Rotterdam. South Africa's very low coal prices (FOB mine)
are more than enough to offset the longer transportation distance
required for South African shipments.
Australia is the cost-minimizing supplier to Japan. Low-sulfur
steam coal can be delivered to Yokohama for $1.19 per million Btu, or
$28.56 per 24 million Btu. However, this assumes that the current high
spot prices in Australia are due to short-run supply constraints, and
that the prices in late 1978 and early 1979 are a more accurate
indication of long-run costs. If this is not correct, then Canada, South
Africa, and Australia are very closely competitive in Japanese markets.
Prices would then equal approximately $35 per 24 million Btu. On all
these shipments to Japan, transportation costs account for approximately
45 percent of delivered prices.
The most striking result of these calculations is the relatively
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poor competitive position of United States coal. United States coal
cannot be delivered to Japan for less than $41 per ton, or at least $5
per ton more than Australian, Canadian, and South African coal. The
disadvantage is largely due to both high ocean transportation and inland
transportation costs, while for the other originating points at least one
cost component is relatively low. For example, South Africa has very
high ocean transportation costs, but low inland transportation costs,
while Canada has low ocean transportation costs, but high inland costs.
United States coal is currently no better off in European markets. The
delivered price to Rotterdam is at least $6.48 per 24 million Btu higher
than that for South African coal. In this case the disadvantage is not
directly due to transportation. In fact, coal transportation to Europe
is approximately $4.00 per 24 million Btu less from the United States
than from South Africa. Rather, it is due to the very high coal prices
FOB mine in Appalachia and midwestern U.S. coal fields.
As we have shown, this competitive structure could change in the
future as supply and transportation variables change. Focusing on the
United States, a reduction in rail tariffs to equal long-run marginal
cost levels, and the expansion of West Coast port facilities to handle
larger vessels would make U.S. coal more competitive with other suppliers
in Japanese markets. In the ideal case, if a new port facility were
constructed in Portland that could handle 120,000 DWT vessels, and if
railroad rates decreased to estimated marginal costs, coal could be
delivered to Japan for $1.47 per million Btu. This delivered price would
still be significantly higher than 'the delivered price of Australian coal
553
under the most optimistic Austral idn price scenario. However, the lowest
U.S. price is very close to South African and Canadian delivered coal
prices in Japan, and if Australian prices stay at the high 1979 levels,
U.S. coal would be very competitive with Australian coal.
With respect to European markets, expansion of port facilities to
handle larger ships arid a reduction in rail rates would make less of a
difference to U.S. exports. South African coal would still be
substantially less expensive, and the U.S. coal is already competitive
with other potential suppliers. A more important transportation factor
is the increase in ocean-freight fuel prices. As noted earlier, a 60
percent increase in fuel prices will increase the ocean-freight rate from
Australia to Rotterdam by approximately 10 cents per million Btu. A 60
percent increase in fuel prices will increase the ocean-freight rate from
Hampton Roads to Rotterdam by only 3.25 cents per million Btu.
Consequently, if Australian long-run coal supply prices are cons istent
with contract data observed in late 1978 and early 1979, Australian coal
delivered to Europe will cost about the same amount as U.S. coal
delivered to Europe. If, however, Australlian long-run coal supply
prices are consistent with the recent spot price levels, then U.S. coal
will be cheaper in Europe than Australian coal. Nonetheless, both
Australian and U.S. coal will be more expensive in Europe than South
African coal. Note also that increased fuel prices would narrow the set
of effective competitors in Japan, as South African coal shipments to
Japan are far longer than other shipments. The increased cost would
seriously handicap South Africa's competitive position in Japan.
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Certain developments could instead further handicap U.S. coal
exports. For example, the railroad rates imputed for the base
calculation were based on the existing domestic unit-train rate
structure. If the existing single-carload export rate structure instead
were maintained, delivered prices would increase by as much as $3.00 per
ton. Railroad deregulation could endanqer U.S. domestic coal markets as
rates become even higher, but it should not significantly affect export
markets.
There are other potentially important changes in transportation
variables. Commercialization of coal-slurry pipelines might lead to less
expensive transportation in certain cases, and might push down railroad
rates. Second, waterway user charges would increase costs, but waterway
shipments are of secondary importance to U.S. exports, and the cost
increase would be insignificant in proportion to delivered prices.
Third, the availability of return cargoes would also increase the
competitiveness of U.S. coal in the Japanese market.
To conclude, there are possible transportation developments that
would increase the competitiveness of U.S. coal in foreign markets. Most
important would be a reduction in railroad rates to equal marginal cost
levels and an expansion of port facilities. Note, finally, however, that
other suppliers might counteract these moves and regain at least some of
the their competitive advantage.
There are also potentially important supply-side changes. In the
base-case calculations, we assumed that low-sulfur coal is used. In
Japan and most of Western Europe this will probably be true. However, in
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some instances, Denmark for example, there is no market premium on
low-silfur coal. High- sulfur eastern coal could be del ivered to
Rotterdam for $1 .52/MBtu, or only 7 cents/MBtu more than South African
coal.
The future change in South African prices is potentially more
important. If, as anticipated, labor and capital costs increase faster
in South Africa due to political-economic pressures, the economic
advantage of South African coal could be eliminated over the next ten
years. However, we can expect a simultaneous, though slower, increase in
the cost of U.S. eastern and midwestern low-sulfur and medium-sulfur
coal. Although the United States may become competitive with South
Africa, Australian coal might be less expensive than both, depending
mainly on future bunker price increases.
The competitiveness of steam coal markets is also important to
future patterns of steam coal trade. As discussed earlier, current
markets appear to be competitive, but it is too early to formulate any
conclusions. Particular concerns are the possibility of South Africa
realizing monopoly rents in Europe and the possibility of an
international coal cartel similar to OPEC. In the first case, South
African has a marketing structure conducive to monopoly pricing. It is
certainly possible that it will appropriate monopoly rents in the next
decade. As to the possibility of a cartel, it would require the
participation of the U.S. coal companies, participation that is per se
illegal under antitrust laws. This does not mean that it is impossible,
as evidenced by international uranium markets, but it is unlikely.
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Another possibility is that the United States government supports a
worldw ide cartel with tariff policies, or similar mechanisms to reduce
output and elevate prices. This is, however, less likely given the
United States ties to Japan and Western Europe.
Note also that our assessment of the compet.itive structure in
international steam coal markets does not mean that only the least-cost
supplier will actually supply coal. There are additional important
economic and political factors on both the demand and supply sides.
First,, importing countries will probably seek to diversify coal suppliers
in order to minimize risks. Recent purchases by European and Far Eastern
consumciers of U.S. coal manifest this. Second, South African exports have
been limited by the South African government to 44 million mtric tons in
1985. Export quotas after 1985 may be below free-marKet levels.
Consequently, after this quota is sold, the United States and Australia
will be competitive in Europe. Third, there is considerable public
opposition to any involvement with South Africa and this opposition might
dominate the pure economic advantage of South African coal in Western
European markets. Fourth, in most cases supply curves seem to be very
elastic, so prices will not shift substantially as output cumulates.
However, prices will increase to some extent, and as they do, incremental
suppliers will become involved. At competitive equilibrium, FOB prices
will actually be equal after adjusting for transportation differentials.
The demand for steam coal in Western Europe and Japan is less
certain. Coal-fired power is clearly cheaper than oil- or gas-fired
power for baseload or cycling plant's, and it is reasonably competitive
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with nuclear-fired power at coastal power stations. Just as important as
the economics, however, are the policies of the importing nations. If
nuclear power is constrained due to health and safety concerns, the
increase in coal-fired power will obviously be much greater. Both Japan
and Western Europe governments have generally expressed a commitment to
nuclear power. In France and Great Britain, especially, nuclear power
has been planned for most future baseload generation. In all cases,
however., the government projections of nuclear power, formulated in the
late 1970s, have been significantly cut back due to public opposition.
The Three-Mile Island accident has brought resistance to a peak.
Governments still project a substantial role for nuclear power, but in
many cases their hands are currently tied by public opposition.
Possibly as important to the increase in coal-fired power is the
development of environmental regulations, both on the supply and demand
sides. We have shown that even with rigid sulfur-emissions standards,
coal-fired power is still cheaper than oil or gas, and competitive with
nuclear power. However, large increases in coal-fired power may bring
about more stringent standards on sulfur and particulate emissions. On
the supply side, more stringent surface mining controls are the most
critical factor inhibiting development of coal markets.
As we have shown repeatedly, the role of government in the
development of international steam coal markets is especially important.
A few final normative remarks on this are in order. First, where market
inefficiencies can be identified and where efficient solutions to these
problems can be formulated and successfully implemented, the governments
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should of course pursue them. For example, a way to reduce the
inefficiencies in railroad rates should be pursued in the United States.
Second, where friction exists in coal markets and where this friction is
attributable to cumbersome government restrictions, the governments
should seek to el iminate them. In part icular, environmental regulations
are essential to the socially-efficient development of coal markets, but
the regulations have often been poorly formulaled and exceedingly
complex. In many cases they could be streamlined without decreasing
their ultimate effectiveness.
Related to this
coordinat
markets.
for world
developed
coal mark
steam coa
governmen
warranted
future se
is the question of governments serving as
ing mechanisms that would expedite the development of coal
The multinational oil companies act as economic coordinators
oil markets, and possibly some private institution can be
for coordinating the various components of international steam
ets. However, in many cases the uncertainties in developing
1 markets are directly related to government policy, so some
t organization to expedite market transactions is also
. For example, importers are generally concerned about the
curity of U.S. coal supplies. Past monitoring of metallurgical
coal exports and the current embargo on grain shipments to the U.S.S.R.
have created these fears. Given this uncertainty, foreigners have been
unwilling to sign long-term contracts with U.S. coal producers.
Furthermore, without long-term contracts, U.S. companies have been
largely unwilling to invest in the infrastructure expansions necessary
for expanding exports. Only the government can assure the importers that
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arbitrary constraints on exports will not be imposed in the future. One
possibil ity for the Un ited States is to assign this responsibility to the
newly formed Energy Mobilization Board.
Beyond this, however, government involvement must be carefully
planned. There have been recent suggestions by governmental and inter-
governmental agencies that they should take an active financial role in
the development of steam coal markets. In particular, direct financial
incentives for developing coal export and import facilities have been
proposed. In advocating these measures it is important to separate the
social benefits or costs from the private benefits or costs. For
importing countries, the social benefits may be substantial. Increased
utilization of coal is an integral component of energy policies designed
to reduce dependence on OPEC oil. However, government incentives create
the possibility of government funds being substituted for what would have
been private funds. That is, it is possible that conversion from coal to
oil will be just as rapid without government incentives.
On the supply side, subsidization of coal exports is more difficult
to justify. Certainly, an increase in coal exports benefits the U.S.
balance of trade. There are gains in terms of good will in contributing
to the energy objectives of Japan and Europe. Also, there are possible
economic justifications for developing port facilities that are not
directly related to the benefits of expanding coal trade. However, great
care should be taken to avoid government involvement purely for the sake
of government involvement when private market responses may be equally or
more efficient.
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Suggestions for Additional Research
This dissertation only begins to develop understanding of
international steam coal markets. There are many instances where
additional research is warranted. Most important are: 1) the expansion
and formalization of a coal demand model for Western Europe and Japan; 2)
an analysis of energy policies in Western Europe and Japan; 3) an
analysis of coal prospects in other potential coal-supplying countries;
4) an anlysis of industrial markets for coal in Western Europe and Japan;
5) an analysis of coal gasification and liquefaction markets and
prospects in Western Europe and Japan; and 6) the development of an
integrated supply/demand, transportation world coal model. It is clear
that coal markets will gain importance in the future, and research on
these issues will contribute to intelligent planning practices.
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